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  The	  aim	  of	   this	  dissertation	   is	   to	   analyze	  and	  discuss	   the	   individual	   experience	  of	  cultural	   legacy	   and	   inheritance,	   intended	   as	   the	   transmission	   of	   an	   immaterial	  product,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  continental	  philosophy,	  and	  especially	  through	  the	  lens	   of	   phenomenology.	   In	   particular,	   I	   discuss	   why	   the	   conventional	   way	   of	  approaching	   the	  matter	   in	   terms	   of	   tradition	   is	   unsatisfying	  when	   faced	  with	   the	  deeply	  personal	  nature	  of	  the	  Inheritance/Legacy	  phenomenon.	  I	   analyze	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘content’	   as	   the	   intellectual	   object	   to	   be	   transmitted	   and	  received	  in	  the	  process,	  and	  define	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  fragmentability	  and	  inclusiveness:	  what	   is	   the	   minimal	   notion	   that	   we	   can	   still	   inherit?	   What	   is	   the	   largest	  conglomerate	  of	  ideas	  that	  we	  can	  approach	  as	  one	  content?	  I	  introduce	  the	  fundamental	  notion	  of	  cultural	  density,	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  culture	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  individual	  approach	  to	  contents.	  In	  particular,	  I	  define	  cultural	  density	  as	   the	  sum	  of	  all	  possible	  contents	  potentially	  available	   to	  an	   individual	  at	  any	  given	  time.	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Then,	  I	  move	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  actualization	  of	  the	  contents,	  which	  are	  available	  in	  one’s	  cultural	  density	  and,	  through	  attention,	  move	   into	   the	   interpretative	   space	   of	   inheritance.	   I	   also	   distinguish	   between	  attention	  and	  attentiveness.	  The	  core	  of	  my	  dissertation	  focuses	  in	  turn	  on	  Inheritance	  (the	  process	  of	  receiving	  a	  content	   from	   a	   previous	   author	   and	   making	   it	   ours)	   and	   Legacy	   (the	   creation	   of	  cultural	   contents	   in	   the	  perspective	  of	   a	   future	   receiver).	   I	   analyze	   their	   temporal	  relation	  and	  their	  complex	  interaction	  with	  our	  perception	  of	  time.	  I	  show	  how	  they	  are	   interconnected	   and	   how	   they	   both	   rely	   on	   narration	   (and	   specifically	   on	   self	  narration	  as	  a	  form	  of	  re-­‐presentation)	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  actuality.	  Finally,	   I	  deal	  with	   their	  co-­‐dependence	  and	  show	  how	  the	  reliance	  of	   Inheritance	  and	  Legacy	  on	  each	  other	  (with	  each	  needing	  the	  other	  to	  come	  first)	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  apparent	  paradox.	   I	   suggest	   the	  notion	  of	  a	  saturated	  phenomenon	  (elaborated	  by	  Marion)	   to	   solve	   it,	   with	   an	   invitation	   to	   conceive	   the	   inconceivable	   (following	  Derrida	  and	  Levinas).	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Foreword.	  
Soon	  I’ll	  find	  the	  right	  words.	  	  They	  will	  be	  very	  simple.	  	  –	  Jack	  Kerouac,	  Some	  of	  the	  Dharma	  	  My	   interest	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	   cultural	   transmission	  began	  almost	   ten	  years	  ago	  when	  I	  was	  writing	  an	  undergraduate	  thesis	  in	  History	  of	  Ancient	  Christianity.	  The	  topic	  of	  this	  work	  was	  the	  recovery,	  narration	  and	  (it	  turned	  out)	  defense	  of	  a	  second-­‐century	   gnostic	   Christian	   heretic	   –	  Marcion	   -­‐	   by	   one	   of	   the	   fathers	   of	   the	  ‘historical	   method’	   Adolf	   von	   Harnack.	   In	   one	   chapter	   of	   my	   scarcely	   significant	  work	   –	   mainly	   a	   translation	   and	   summary	   of	   Harnack’s	   book	   –	   I	   dealt	   with	   the	  problem	   of	   Good	   Faith,	   i.e.	   discussed	   how	   Harnack	   was	   extremely	   interested	   in	  showing	   that	   Marcion	   acted	   bona	   fide	   when	   presenting	   his	   view	   of	   God	   and	   the	  world	  to	  the	  new-­‐born	  Christian	  community.1	  These	  were	  just	  marginalia,	  since	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  work	  focused	  on	  philological	  and	  historical	  matters.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  will	  not	  go	  into	  details	  about	  either	  Marcion	  or	  von	  Harnack,	  here,	  since	  the	  substance	  of	  their	  theological	  views	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  my	  topic.	  Harnack’s	  book	  –	  to	  which	  I	  refer	  here	  –	  is	  published	  in	  English	  as	  Adolf	  von	  Harnack.	  Marcion:	  The	  Gospel	  of	  the	  Alien	  God.	  Eugene,	  OR:	  Wipf	  &	  Stock,	  2007.	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It	  was	  not	  until	  a	  couple	  of	  years	   later,	  when	  writing	  my	  master’s	   thesis	  on	  the	   recovery	   of	   Origen	   of	   Alexandria	   by	   nouveaux	   théologiens2,	   that	   I	   came	   to	   be	  involved	   in	   reflections	   akin	   to	   those	   raised	   by	   previous	   research.	   Here,	   the	  rehabilitation	   of	   a	   past	   author	   (formally	   declared	   an	   heretic,	   but	   still	   present	   in	  ecclesiastical	   historical	   and	   theological	   discourse)	   was	   direct	   and	   far	   more	  structural	  than	  simply	  showing	  his	  good	  faith.	  I	  found	  myself	  debating	  the	  rationale	  of	   these	   theologian’s	   re-­‐appropriation	   of	   Origen	   ,	   which	   when	   devoid	   of	   specific	  contingent	   notions	   could	   be	   reduced	   to	   questioning	   the	   reason	   behind	   modern	  authors’	  recovery	  and	  re-­‐discovery	  of	  ancient	  ones.	  My	   doctoral	   project	   was	   born	   from	   these	   questions,	   and	   it	   was	   originally	  intended	  to	  explore	  the	  historical	  implications	  of	  acts	  of	  “recovery”,	  especially	  in	  the	  dialogue	  internal	  to	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  However,	  after	  my	  move	  to	  the	  US,	  I	  began	  questioning	   the	   ‘structures’	   that	   I	   had	   taken	   as	   granted	   and	   discovering	   what	   I	  considered	   a	   problem	   for	   my	   intended	   project:	   the	   discussion	   of	   how	   “negative”	  cultural	  inheritance	  could	  be	  overturned	  and	  become	  fertile	  in	  a	  modern	  discourse	  needed	  to	  be	  preceded	  by	  a	  more	  general	  theory	  of	  cultural	  transmission,	  that	  could	  account	  for	  personal	  initiative	  and	  situations,	  since	  both	  cases	  that	  had	  initiated	  my	  exploration	  could	  not	  be	  described	  simply	  by	  utilizing	  the	  terminology	  of	  tradition;	  this	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  secondary	  phenomenon	  and	  its	  experience	  to	  be	  “derivative”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Once	   again,	   I	  will	   not	   discuss	   this	   in	   detail,	   although	   I	  will	   address	   the	   topic	   in	   chapter	  three,	  when	  discussing	  the	  effort	   to	   ‘rehabilitate’	  a	  previous	  author.	  There	   is	  no	  published	  work	   -­‐	   that	   I	   am	   aware	   of	   -­‐	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   Origen	   as	   a	   transversal	   concern	   for	  Ressourcement	  Theologians	  –	  as	  they	  are	  known	  in	  English.	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of	   someone	   else’s	   way	   of	   receiving	   a	   content	   (i.e.	   relying	   on	   someone	   else’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  past	  instated	  as	  a	  source	  of	  authority).	  	  Through	   the	   discovery	   of	   French	   phenomenology,	   I	   glimpsed	   at	   a	   new	  approach	  to	  the	  topic,	  which	  offered	  a	  way	  into	  the	  problem.	  The	  intention	  was	  (and	  is)	   to	   make	   a	   clean	   slate	   of	   preconceived	   notions	   on	   the	   topic	   (which	   had	  accumulated	   in	   my	   scholarly	   voyage	   through	   history,	   religious	   studies	   and	  anthropology),	  and	  face	  these	  questions	  with	  a	  radically	  new	  approach;	  this	  would	  mean	   re-­‐building	   my	   concept	   of	   cultural	   transmission	   from	   the	   ground	   up,	  discarding	  as	  secondary	  anything	  that	  could	  not	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  essential	  phenomena	  of	  Inheritance	  and	  –	  conversely	  –	  Legacy.	  Even	  Recovery,	  a	  word	  and	  a	  concept	  crucial	  to	  my	  master’s	  thesis,	  was	  gradually	  renounced,	  when	  I	  found	  that	  it	  was	  nothing	  else	  that	  a	  form	  –	  no	  matter	  how	  problematic	  –	  of	  what	  I	  have	  here	  and	  elsewhere	  defined	  as	  cultural	  Inheritance.	  What	  remained	  to	  be	  done,	  therefore,	  was	  to	  make	  this	  exploration	  (based	  on	  a	  constructive	  project	  of	  philosophy,	  and	  not	  on	  a	  historical	  discussion	  of	  previous	  theories	  –	  although	  I	  do	  address	  some	  of	  those)	  intelligible	  to	  others,	  and	  to	  describe	  step	   by	   step	   the	   thought-­‐process	   that	   had	   led	   me	   to	   certain	   conclusions.	   In	   the	  process	   of	   explaining	   all	   of	   this,	   I	   was	   forced	   to	   deal	   with	   topics	   that	   I	   had	   not	  foreseen	   as	   part	   of	   my	   exploration	   (namely	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   content	   and	   the	  problem	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention).	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  reader	  will	  be	  able	  to	  follow	  me	  in	  my	  discussion	  of	  these	  topics,	  and	  that	  any	  confusion	  that	  will	  arise	  from	  my	  failure	  to	  achieve	  clarity	  could	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end	  up	  being	  dissipated	  by	  reading	  further;	  I	  hope,	  thus,	  that	  perceived	  obscurities	  (due	   to	   my	   shortcomings	   in	   making	   some	   passages	   understandable	   and	   evident)	  will	  be	  illuminated	  by	  further	  explanation,	  given	  that	  in	  all	  of	  my	  work	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  stay	  away	  from	  over	  imposed	  pre-­‐conceptions	  and	  conclusions	  that	  did	  not	  arise	  consequentially	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  phenomena.	  
	   5	  
Introduction.	  	  What	   is	   an	   intellectual	   or	   cultural	   Inheritance?	   What	   will	   our	   immaterial	  Legacy	   be?	   How	   do	   the	   two	   come	   to	   be	   formed?	   What	   is	   our	   role	   in	   such	   a	  construction	  and	  how	  much,	  instead,	  is	  determined	  by	  factors	  that	  surpass	  and	  are	  independent	   from	  our	  willing	  action?	   	   Inheritance	  and	  Legacy,	  Heritage,	  Tradition,	  Culture:	   all	   of	   these	   terms	   are	   interchangeably	   used	   in	   our	   everyday	   language,	   to	  describe	  the	  reality	  in	  which	  we	  are	  part	  of	  a	  society	  and	  educated	  individuals	  with	  access	   to	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   texts	   and	   ‘cultural’	   items	   in	   general	   (from	   pictures	   to	  performances,	   from	  movies	  to	  books,	  etc.).	  Nonetheless,	   if	  we	  take	  a	  closer	   look	  at	  the	   events	   that	   these	   words	   indicate,	   we	   start	   distinguishing	   between	   them	   and	  between	   the	   phenomena	   that	   emerge	   in	   our	   inevitable	   approach	   to	   society	   and	  communication.	  We	  are	  historical	  beings.	  From	  the	  moment	  we	  are	  born,	  we	  are	  surrounded	  by	  a	  history	  that	  happened	  before	  us,	  but	  that	  is	  made	  present	  to	  us:	  not	  only	  are	  we	  
told	  such	  a	  history,	  we	  are	  immersed	  in	  a	  cultural	  construct	  that	  thrives	  in	  tradition	  and	   is	   shaped	   by	   it.	   Multiple	   traditions	   can	   converge	   into	   our	   experience	   of	   the	  world,	  but	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  cultural	  norms	  and	  objects	  that	  we	  encounter	  can	  be	  traced	  back	   to	   an	  origin	   in	   the	  past,	  which	   is	   brought	   into	   the	  present	   for	  us	  (not	  necessarily	  by	  us)	  by	  the	  actions	  and	  words	  of	  others.	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As	   individuals,	   we	   are	   constantly	   presented	   with	   cultural	   objects	   (texts,	  pictures,	  works	   of	   art)	   and	   structures	   (traditions,	   norms)	   that	   are	   ‘already	   there’,	  and	   constitute	   for	   us	   an	   inheritance	   with	   which	   we	   must	   deal,	   willingly	   or	   not.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   way	   we	   receive	   (or	   refuse	   to	   receive)	   such	   inheritances	   shapes	  what	  our	  Inheritance	  (capitalized)	  will	  be.	  Inheritance,	  as	  an	  individual	  approach	  to	  the	  Past	  as	  it	  is	  offered	  and	  presented	  to	  us	  by	  the	  world	  we	  live	  in,	  has	  been	  vastly	  underrepresented	  in	  the	  modern	  philosophical	  approach	  to	  history	  (and	  history	  of	  culture	   in	  particular),	   torn	  between	  the	  effort	  of	  considering	  humanity	  at	   large	  (in	  terms	  of	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Hegelian	  descent)	  and	  the	  focus	  on	  single	  instances	  of	  such	  a	  reception.	  Inheritance	  is	  thus	  a	  process	  in	  which	  we	  receive	  a	  content,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  overall	  ever-­‐evolving	  complex	  of	  all	  the	  cultural	  contents	  we	  have	  received	  and	  incorporated	  into	  our	  system	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  in	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  culture	  that	  presented	  us	  such	  contents	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Similarly,	  everything	  we	  say	  or	  write	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  potential	  network	  of	  information	  susceptible	  of	  being	  received	   (and	   inherited)	   in	   the	   future	   (no	  matter	  how	  close)	  by	  an	  Other	  who	  is	  not	  predetermined	  and	  who	  might	  very	  well	  not	  be	  who	  we	  intended.	  This	  process	  is	  the	  constitution	  of	  our	  legacy,	  another	  term	  vastly	  used	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  history	  of	  culture	  (with	  the	  Legacy	  of	  an	  author	  or	  a	  school	  being	   addressed	   as	   a	  well-­‐understood	   concept),	   but	   rarely	  discussed	   in	   itself.	   The	  construction	  of	  one’s	  Legacy	  is	  only	  partially	  dependent	  on	  will,	  since	  we	  have	  little	  or	  no	  control	  over	  our	  words	  and	  ideas	  after	  they	  have	  left	  us	  to	  be	  consigned	  to	  the	  vastness	  of	  human	  communication.	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At	  this	  point	  a	  terminological	  note	  is	  necessary:	  through	  my	  work,	  I	  tried	  to	  use	   a	   language	   as	   close	   as	   possible	   to	   that	   of	   the	   authors	   and	   theories	   to	  which	   I	  refer,	  with	  two	  pairs	  of	  notable	  exception.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  Inheritance/inheritor	  duo,	  with	   inheritor	  being	   the	  one	  who	   inherits,	  quite	  simply.	  As	  we	  shall	   see,	  he/she	   is	  not	   simply	   the	   interpreter	   of	   a	   text,	   but	   an	   interpreter	   who	   receives	   the	  text/document	   in	  a	  certain	  way.	  More	   problematic,	   from	   a	   terminological	   point	   of	  view,	  is	  the	  corresponding	  person	  who	  created	  the	  text/document	  that	  is	  inherited	  (and	   that	   can	   be	   part	   of	   a	   Legacy).	   I	   have	   resorted	   to	   the	   term	   inheritee,	  which	  amounts,	   I	   am	   aware,	   to	   a	   neologism,	   modeled	   after	   the	   givee	   of	   recent	  phenomenological	   discussions.	   Nonetheless,	   any	   alternative	   was	   “taken”	   -­‐	   so	   to	  speak	  -­‐	  and	  I	  was	  particularly	  wary	  of	  using	   ‘author’,	  which	  has	  been	  charged	  of	  a	  manifold	   pre-­‐constructed	   meaning	   by	   modern	   theories	   of	   interpretation.	   Also,	   in	  more	   than	   one	   place	   of	  my	   dissertation	   there	  will	   be	   the	   necessity	   to	   distinguish	  between	  the	  author	  (as	  the	  one	  who	  wrote)	  and	  the	  inheritee,	  and	  therefore	  I	  could	  not	  have	  collapsed	  the	  two	  terms	  into	  one.	  The	  reader	  should	  keep	  this	  in	  mind,	  and	  forgive	  the	  necessity	  for	  this	  neologism.	  The	   relation	   between	   Legacy	   and	   Inheritance	   is	   at	   first	   strikingly	   self-­‐evident:	   in	   terms	   of	   texts	   and	   ideas,	   we	   inherit	   something	   that	   has	   been	   said	   or	  written	   by	   someone	   else.	   Contents	   of	   our	   Inheritance	   (our	   inheritances,	   non	  capitalized	   and	   plural)	   previously	   belong(ed)	   to	   someone	   else’s	   Legacy,	   and	   vice	  versa:	   our	   Legacy	   is	   only	   realized	   as	   such	  when	   someone	   inherits	   our	  words	   and	  concepts,	  which	  would	  otherwise	  be	   lost	   in	   the	  crowd,	  so	   to	  speak.	  One	  cannot	  be	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conceived	  without	  the	  other,	  especially	  when	  we	  move	  from	  the	  generality	  of	  their	  possibility/potentiality	   to	   the	   more	   concrete	   level	   of	   a	   single	   instance	   of	  transmission	   of	   texts	   and	   ideas:	   any	   text	   has	   an	   author	   (albeit	   not	   necessarily	   a	  known	   one)	   to	   whose	   Legacy	   it	   potentially	   belongs,	   and	   an	   indefinite	   number	   of	  potential	  inheritors,	  the	  readers	  and	  interpreters	  of	  the	  text.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  problematic	  dimension	  of	  their	  correspondence	  emerges	  upon	   reflection:	   if	   the	   text	   is	   already	   inserted	   into	   an	   Inheritance	   and	   a	   Legacy,	  which	  one	  is	  the	  primary	  phenomenon	  (if	  it	  is	  possible	  at	  all	  to	  find	  one)	  and	  which	  a	  merely	  derivative	  event?	  On	  closer	  examination	   (carried	  out	   through	   this	  work)	  we	  will	   have	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   two	   instances	   (Legacy	   and	   Inheritance)	   are	   co-­‐dependent,	   and	   despite	   their	   perceived	   chronological	   distance	   (the	   moment	   of	  reading	   and	   that	   of	  writing	   are	   not	   coincident	   and	   diachronic	   elements	   intervene	  even	   in	   a	   uttering/listening	   exchange)	   they	   are	   generated	   in	   the	   same	   moment,	  which	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  Moment	  of	  Passing1,	  with	  the	  content	  that	  is	  passed	  on	  by	  the	  inheritee	  onto	  the	  inheritor,	  with	  each	  term	  presupposing	  the	  other.	  	  This	  moment,	   in	  which	   a	   cultural	   content	   passes	   from	   the	   general	   cultural	  milieu	  of	  an	  author	  into	  her	  own	  system	  of	  philosophy,	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  le	  point	  
de	  départ	  and	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  transmission	  of	  such	  contents	  and	  traditio	  needs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  chapter	  1,	  note	  1,	  for	  a	  first	  reflection	  on	  the	  word,	  or	  chapter	  5	  for	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  the	  Moment	  of	  Passing.	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to	  be	  phenomenologically	  thematized	  as	  it	  develops	  in	  this	  moment	  of	  encounter.2	  It	  is	  a	  moment	  that	  appears	  ungraspable	  (since	  it	  requires	  a	  suspension	  of	  our	  notion	  of	   causality	   as	   chronologically	   ordered)	   but	   that	   is	   nonetheless	   continuously	  repeated	  in	  our	  appropriation	  of	  our	  cultural	  past,	  and	  that	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	   an	   academic	   approach	   to	   canonical	   authors	   or	   (on	   the	   other	   hand	   of	   the	  spectrum)	  when	  new	  authors	  are	  read	  and	  proposed	  as	  relevant.	  This	  dissertation	   is	   the	  natural	   continuation	  of	  my	  aforementioned	   studies.	  After	   having	   dedicated	   many	   of	   my	   papers	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   recovery	   and	  inheritance	   in	   particular	   cases	   (among	   others,	   Harnack	   and	   Barth’s	   use	   of	   Luther	  and	  the	  rediscovery	  of	  Bonaventure	  in	  modern	  philosophy	  of	  mind),	  I	  realised	  that	  a	  step	   back	   was	   needed,	   to	   discuss	   what	   these	   ‘recoveries’,	   ‘re-­‐reading’,	   ‘re-­‐appropriation’	   meant,	   what	   they	   had	   in	   common;	   from	   there,	   the	   reflection	   on	  Inheritance	   as	   a	   fundamentally	   independent	   phenomenon	   was	   born,	   and	   my	  research	   efforts	   have	  been	   focused	  on	  using	  what	  modern	   continental	   philosophy	  had	  said	  on	  the	  matter	  to	  describe	  a	  coherent	  theory	  of	  cultural	  transmission	  from	  the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   individual	   (in	   contrast	  with	   the	  more	   group-­‐focused	   and	  authority	  dependent	  nature	  of	  tradition).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Hermeneutics	   (and	   reception	   theory	   in	   particular)	   have	   dealt	   extensively	  with	   the	   dual	  issue	  of	   traditio	   and	   traditum;	   the	   focus,	   however,	  was	  on	   the	   content	   (traditum)	   and	   the	  
traditio	  was	  approached	  mainly	  as	   the	  origin	  of	   it,	   thus	  analyzing	   the	  process	  of	   contents’	  accumulation	   and	   modification	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   final	   product	   and	   not	   as	   a	  phenomenon	  to	  which	  the	  contents	  can	  and	  shall	  remain	  a	  contingency,	  to	  be	  bracketed	  out	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  phenomenological	  definition.	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It	   has	   been	   a	   demanding	   journey,	   with	  much	   self-­‐contradiction	   involved.	   I	  had	  to	  limit,	  redefine	  or	  even	  renounce	  themes	  and	  categories	  that	  had	  appeared	  to	  be	   suitable	   to	   my	   discussion	   and	   crucial	   to	   my	   exploration	   in	   light	   of	   my	   case	  studies,	  but	  that	  proved	  not	  to	  be	  central	  when	  a	  more	  systematic	  reflection	  started.	  In	   particular,	   the	   main	   focus	   shifted	   from	   the	   concept	   of	   Recovery	   to	   the	   more	  fundamental	  ones	  of	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy.	  With	   the	   term	   Recovery,	   I	   indicate	   the	   reclamation	   by	   modern	   thinkers	   of	  previously	   forgotten	   or	   disgraced	   authors,	   either	   by	   a	   translation/edition	   of	   their	  texts	   or	   by	   a	   critical	   reflection	   able	   to	   reverse	   or	   shake	   the	   common	   (negative)	  judgment	  crystallized	  in	  the	  cultural	  milieu.	  While	  the	  attention	  to	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  past	  is	  not	  at	  all	  an	  exclusive	  feature	  of	  modernity,	  the	  increased	  availability	  of	  texts	  (via	   print),	   the	   improvement	   in	   communication	   networks,	   the	   development	   of	  scholarly	   publications	   and	   the	   need	   to	   justify	   the	   proposal	   (or	   re-­‐proposal)	   of	   a	  philosophical	   system	   to	   an	   academic	   and	   demanding	   educated	   public	   have	  significantly	  reshaped	  the	  nature	  of	  Recovery.	  The	  main	  reason	  Inheritance	  had	  to	  take	   the	   front	   stage	   and	   push	   Recovery	   back	   into	   an	   ancillary	   role	   was	   my	  realization	  of	  the	  overbearing	  presence	  of	  the	  inheritee	  in	  the	  Moment	  of	  Passing,	  a	  presence	  that	  Recovery	  alone	  could	  not	  fully	  account	  for.	  Recovery	  orbits	  around	  the	  Inheritance-­‐Legacy	  duet	  (since	  this	  something	  to	  be	  recovered	  constitutes	  someone’s	  Legacy	  and	   it	   is	  going	  to	  be	  part	  of	  someone’s	  Inheritance),	   and	  adds	   the	  problem	  of	   intentionality,	  which	   is	  present	   in	  nucem	   in	  Inheritance	   as	   well,	   but	   without	   a	   similarly	   preeminent	   role.	   Inheritance	   and	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Recovery	  are	  not	  just	  instances	  of	  memory	  (or	  anamnesis);	  it	  constructs	  its	  content	  not	  directly	  from	  what	  is	  accessible	  in	  an	  author’s	  culture:	  it	  requires	  two	  additional	  steps,	  namely	  evaluation	  of	  the	  clues	  (that	  something	  valuable	  is	  out	  there)	  and	  the	  overcoming	  of	  the	  vulnus	  which	  prevents	  the	  content	  from	  being	  proper	  part	  of	  the	  cultural	  milieu	  (be	  this	  vulnus	  a	  low	  accessibility	  of	  the	  text	  or	  a	  moral/intellectual	  stigma).	  Recovery	  was	  a	  precious	  intellectual	  tool	  when	  I	  was	  exploring	  some	  of	  the	  most	  intricate	  facets	  of	  the	  Moment	  of	  Passing,	  relating	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  inheritor,	  the	   “value”	   of	   the	   inheritee	   and	   the	   bona	   fide	  of	   both.	   However,	   my	   analysis	   will	  show	  how	  Recovery	   is	   to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  subset	  of	   Inheritance,	  a	  specific	  case	  that	   I	   will	   address	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   ‘good	   faith’	   and	   the	   ‘good	  character’	  of	  the	  inheritee.	  The	   need	   for	   a	   characterization	   of	   the	   problem	   at	   stake	   stems	   from	   the	  heavily	   charged	   status	   of	   the	   terms	   previously	   and	   commonly	   used	   when	  mentioning	   these	   processes,	   namely	   transmission	   (cf.	   Gadamer,	   Dilthey,	   etc.)	   and	  tradition	  (spanning	  from	  Christianity	  historians	  to	  anthropologists,	  theologians	  etc).	  Tradition3	  involves	   a	   concept	   of	   ‘value’	   which	   is	   not	   necessarily	   present	   when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Notably,	   tradition	   has	   been	   a	   main	   concern	   even	   outside	   philosophy	   and	   more	   so	   in	  anthropological	  studies.	  The	  reason	  for	  excluding	  such	  an	  academic	  ‘tradition	  on	  tradition’	  is	   twofold:	   first,	   the	   analytic	   and	   often	   structuralist	   approach	   of	   anthropologists	   like	  Hobsbawn	   –	   cf.	   The	   Invention	   of	   Tradition	   –	   and	   Handler	   –	   cf.	   in	   particular	   the	   article	  coauthored	  with	  Linnekin	  Tradition,	  Genuine	  or	  Spurious	  –	  or	  sociologists	  like	  Edward	  Shill	  operates	  with	  a	  different	  methodology,	  strictly	  related	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  a	  case	  study,	  going	  from	  the	  particular	  to	  the	  general	  and	  without	  the	  effort	  of	  discovering	  universals	  that	  can	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discussing	  the	  Inheritance-­‐Legacy	  binomial,	  and	  often	  refers	  to	  an	  authority	  (either	  personal	   –	   viz.	   the	   Church	   -­‐	   or	   impersonal	   –	  mores):	   it	   indicates	   a	   subset	   of	   the	  problem,	   important	   but	   not	   as	   immediately	   personal	   as	   the	   categories	   which	   are	  proposed	   here.	   Theorists	   of	   ‘transmission’,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   focus	   on	   the	  aftermath	  of	  what	  I	  call	  the	  ‘moment	  of	  passing’,	  in	  which	  a	  legacy	  is	  instituted	  and	  an	   inheritance	   generated,	   and	   discuss	   how	   the	   content	   is	   to	   be	   received	   (thus	  interpreting	   the	   potential	   inheritance	   as	   a	   given	   and	   only	   analysing	   the	   way	   in	  which	  it	  is	  actualised).	  As	   Bernard	   de	   Chartres	   (via	   John	   of	   Salisbury)	   used	   to	   say,	   we	   are	   ‘like	  dwarves	   seated	   on	   the	   shoulders	   of	   giants.’4	  Regardless	   of	   our	   estimation	   of	   such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  be	  considered	  aprioristic	  to	  the	  contingency.	  Secondly,	  the	  anthropological	  and	  sociological	  approach	   is	   concerned	   with	   groups	   and	   societies,	   to	   which	   the	   individual	   must	   relate:	  tradition	  in	  the	  anthropological	  sense	  cannot	  be	  singlehandedly	  undertaken	  or	  maintained;	  the	  ‘set	  of	  practices,	  normally	  governed	  by	  overtly	  or	  tacitly	  accepted	  rules’	  (Eric	  Hobsbawn.	  
The	  Invention	  of	  Tradition,	  Cambridge:	  University	  Press,	  1983,	  p.	  1)	  needs	  to	  be	  shared	  and	  repeated	  by	  a	  group	  (more	  often	  than	  not	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  and/or	  the	  ruling	  class)	  in	  order	  to	  be	  relevant.	  The	  transmission	  which	  is	  to	  be	  analyzed	  here,	  instead,	  is	  an	  individual	   fact,	   independent	   from	   a	   collective	   will	   or	   adherence:	   while	   the	   availability	   of	  potential	   inheritances	   is	   inextricably	   connected	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   cultural	   density	   (which	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   one),	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   individual’s	   agency	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	  analysis	   of	   the	   Legacy/Inheritance	   phenomenon.	   For	   these	   reasons,	   the	   anthropological	  analysis	   (which	   would	   have	   heterogeneous	   goals	   and	   would	   require	   a	   different	   set	   of	  competencies)	   is	   expunged	   from	   this	   work,	   and	   this	   choice	   strengthens	   the	   need	   for	   a	  different	  terminology,	  which	  I	  have	  already	  advocated.	  4	  As	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  the	  first	  recognized	  appearance	  of	  this	  famous	  sentence	  is	  indeed	  in	  John	  of	   Salisbury’s	   Metalogicon,	   3.4	   («Dicebat	   Bernardus	   Carnotensis	   nos	   esse	   quasi	   nanos	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giants	  (since	  there	  is	  nothing	  epistemologically	  necessary	  in	  considering	  traditions	  and	  the	  ideas	  of	  our	  predecessors	  worthy),	  there	  is	  no	  arguing	  that	  we	  deal	  with	  our	  cultural	  past	  on	  an	  everyday	  basis.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  in	  environments	  were	  the	  transmission	   of	   culture	   is	   regulated	   by	   institutions	   charged	  with	   authority	   (as	   in	  churches	  and	  academic	  environments).	  Whether	  tradition	   is	  an	  explicit	  part	  of	   the	  claim	   to	   such	   authority	   (as	   it	   is	   often	   the	   case	   with	   historically	   established	  Churches)	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  commonly	  accepted	  matter	  of	  affairs	  (as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  humanities),	   there	   is	  no	  escaping	  a	  confrontation	  with	  what	  was	  written,	  said	  and	  thought	  in	  the	  past.	  	  In	   my	   dissertation,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   while	   tradition	   (a	   common	   frame	   of	  reference	   in	   our	   experience	   of	   Inheritance)	   has	   received	   due	   attention	   by	  philosophers	   and	   most	   importantly	   by	   sociologists,	   Inheritance	   has	   not	   been	   the	  focus	   of	   a	   self-­‐standing,	   autonomous	   philosophical	   analysis.	   Inheriting	   a	   text	   has	  been	  considered	  as	  nothing	  more	  of	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  without	  proper	  consideration	  of	  the	  complex	  dynamics	  involved	  in	  the	  reading	  of	  a	  text	  that,	  by	  definition,	  belongs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
gigantium	  humeris	   insidentes,	   ut	   possimus	   plura	   eis	   et	   remotiora	   videre,	   non	   utique	   proprii	  
visus	   acumine,	   aut	   eminentia	   corporis,	   sed	   quia	   in	   altum	   subvehimur	   et	   extollimur	  
magnitudine	  gigantean»)	  which	  becomes,	  in	  Henry	  Osborn	  Taylor	  «Bernard	  of	  Chartres	  used	  
to	  say	  that	  we	  were	  like	  dwarfs	  seated	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  giants.	  If	  we	  see	  more	  and	  further	  
than	  they,	  it	  is	  not	  due	  to	  our	  own	  clear	  eyes	  or	  tall	  bodies,	  but	  because	  we	  are	  raised	  on	  high	  
and	   upborne	   by	   their	   gigantic	   bigness.»	   (The	   Mediaeval	   Mind,	   Harvard:	   University	   Press,	  1966,	  vol.	  2,	  p.	  159.)	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to	  the	  past,	  and	  whose	  worth	  in	  the	  present	  is	  constituted	  exactly	  by	  the	  process	  of	  inheriting	  generated	  by	  our	  reading	  of	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  account	  for	  what	  the	  status	  of	  the	  discussion	  is	  on	  this	  matter,	  I	  will	   begin	  with	   an	   historical	   perspective;	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   I	  mention	   the	  main	  authors	   I	   believe	   to	   have	   fruitfully	   contributed	   to	   the	   discussion	   of	   these	  phenomena.	  While	   highlighting	   the	   elements	   that	   I	   believe	   to	   be	   precious	   to	   this	  project	   (and	   that	   will	   be	   fully	   discussed	   in	   the	   following	   chapters),	   I	   will	   try	   to	  briefly	  explain	  why	  their	  chosen	  perspective	  leads	  them	  astray	  from	  a	  full	  theory	  of	  Inheritance,	  Legacy	  and	  Passing.	  Despite	  not	  being	  interested	  in	  confuting	  theories	  that	   are	   not	   “wrong”	   per	   se	   (but	   that	   simply	   focus	   on	   different	   aspects	   of	   the	  problem),	  I	  will	  show	  how	  and	  why	  authors	  that	  have	  dealt	  with	  notions	  of	  cultural	  transmission	   in	   the	   past	   have	   not	   fully	   tackled	   the	   problems	   of	   Inheritance	   and	  Legacy	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  individuals	  involved	  in	  this	  process.	  	  The	  unsatisfying	  nature	  of	  an	  approach	  can	  reside	  in	  an	  excess	  of	  generality,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  with	  both	  the	  sociological	  approach	  to	  tradition,	  addressing	  issues	  of	  
communal	  reception5,	  and	  the	  Hegelian	  one	   focusing	  on	  Humanity	  at	   large.	  Both	  of	  these	  perspectives	  fail	  to	  properly	  address	  the	  personal	  experience	  of	  the	  Inheritor	  (and	  conversely	  of	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  Legacy,	  which	  I	  name	  the	  inheritee).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  an	  individual	  cannot	  relate	  to	  a	  tradition	  and	  be	  inspired	  by	  his	  being	  part	   of	  what	   is	   perceived	   as	   a	   communal	   reception,	   nor	   to	   imply	   that	   generalized	  discourses	   on	   Humanity	   and	   Culture	   are	   incompatible	   with	   the	   dimension	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  The	  Invention	  of	  Tradition,	  op.	  cit.,	  especially	  the	  introduction	  by	  Hobsbawm.	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individual	  actor	  in	  culture;	  nevertheless,	  there	  is	  a	   level	  of	  personal	  relation	  to	  the	  content	   in	   time	   which	   cannot	   be	   resolved	   inside	   those	   models	   and	   needs	   to	   be	  explored	  in	  its	  own	  merit.	  On	   the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum,	   Reception	   Theorists	   have	   analysed	   the	  reading	  and	  interpretation	  of	  a	  text,	  but	  without	  considering	  it	  against	  the	  frame	  of	  our	  general	  process	  of	  Inheritance,	  which	  is	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  single	  instance	   of	   interpreting	   a	   text,	   since	   it	   is	   part	   of	   a	   series	   of	   analogous	   moments	  (inheritances)	  which	   contribute	   to	   the	   shaping	   of	   our	   general	   Inheritance,	   i.e.	   the	  historical	   component	   and	  dimension	   of	   our	   cultural	   and	  philosophical	   standpoint.	  Reception	  Theory	   is	   not	   a	   compact,	   unified	   ‘school’,	   and	   there	   is	   a	   certain	   leeway	  between	   theories	   of	   interpretation	   relying	   on	   authorial	   intent6	  and	   approaches	  favouring	  the	  text	  per	  se7.	  	  After	  this	  historical	  excursus,	  I	  will	  move	  toward	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  “playing	  field”	  in	  which	  these	  instances	  of	  cultural	  transmission	  are	  experienced:	  we	  inherit,	  
receive,	   interpret,	   read	   and	   so	   forth	   and	   so	   on,	   but	   the	   object	   of	   such	   actions	   is	  usually	   understood	   as	   a	   given.	   Definitions	   of	   a	   text	   (and	   in	   general	   of	   a	   cultural	  object	  that	  can	  be	  the	  object	  of	  our	  intellectual	  activity)	  presuppose	  an	  access	  to	  it,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Cf.	   in	   particular	   Hans	   Robert	   Jauss.	   Toward	   an	   Aesthetic	   of	   Reception	   and	   Question	   and	  
Answer.	  Gadamer’s	  approach	  to	  the	  question	  is	  more	  complicated,	  as	  discussed,	  for	  example,	  in	  David	  Weberman.	  "Gadamer's	  Hermeneutics	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  Authorial	  Intention."	  in	  Irwin,	   William,	  The	   Death	   and	   Resurrection	   of	   the	   Author?	   Westport,	   Conn:	   Greenwood	  Press,	  2002.	  7	  Most	  preeminently	  Roland	  Barthes	  in	  his	  Death	  of	  the	  Author.	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which	  is	  always	  taken	  for	  granted.	  In	  my	  first	  chapter,	  then,	  I	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  the	   ‘location’	   (both	   chronological	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   accessibility)	   of	   these	   cultural	  objects	  (these	  ‘contents’)	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  possibility	  of	  accessing	  them.	  I	  therefore	  introduce	   the	   notion	   of	   cultural	   density,	   and	   explain	   why,	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	  individual’s	   experience	   of	   historicized	   cultural	   transmission,	   this	   is	   more	  appropriate,	   precise	   and	   useful	   than	   the	   overcharged	   notion	   of	   Culture	   (which	  necessarily	  involves	  a	  super-­‐personal	  dimension).	  	  Indeed,	   before	   delving	   into	   the	   fascinating	   albeit	   problematic	   notion	   of	  Inheritance,	   we	   have	   to	   distinguish	   its	   frame	   of	   operation.	   Our	   experience	   of	   the	  world	   never	   happens	   in	   a	   void,	   thus	   the	   Inheritance	   of	   one	   text,	   idea	   or	   cultural	  content	   in	   general	   already	   implies	   a	   restriction	   of	   the	   field	   from	   multiplicity	   to	  individuality	  (the	  text	  I	  am	  reading,	  the	  discourse	  I	  am	  listening	  to,	  compared	  to	  all	  of	   the	   ones	   I	   could	   have	   inherited	   instead).	   This	   will	   bring	   forward	   preliminary	  questions	  dealing	  with	  the	  ‘space’	  in	  which	  this	  selection	  happens	  and	  disclosing	  the	  notion	   of	   ‘attention’,	   main	   force	   in	   the	   process	   of	   extraction	   of	   one’s	   inheritance	  from	  the	  muddy	  waters	  of	  Culture	  and	  tradition.	  	  Such	  a	   space	   is	  what	   I	  define	  as	  cultural	  density,	   i.e.	   the	   sum	  of	  all	  possible	  inheritances	  that	  are	  available	  to	  me	  and	  lie	  in	  my	  range	  of	  accessibility	  as	  potential	  before	  interpretation,	  and	  even	  before	  the	  attention	  that	  makes	  interpretation	  and	  reading	  possible.	  Cultural	  Density	  is	  thus	  meant	  to	  identify	  the	  complex	  of	  accessible	  inheritances	   surrounding	  a	  potential	   inheritor,	  possibly	   coinciding	  with	  his	  or	  her	  cultural	   milieu	   as	   enriched	   by	   his	   or	   her	   own	   experiences,	   characterized	   by	   a	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constant	   state	   of	   expansion	   and	  modification	   largely	   independent	   from	   the	  will	  of	  such	  an	  inheritor.	  	  I	   analyze	   the	   status	   of	   these	   cultural	   contents	   and	   objects	   of	   our	  interpretation	  before	  such	  an	   interpretation	   is	   taken	   for	  granted.	  We	  discuss	   texts	  and	  cultural	  contents	  (pictures,	  music,	  topoi,	  etc.)	  always	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  interpreter,	  without	  asking	  how	  this	  interpretation	  is	  even	  possible,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  process	   (a	   theme	  which	  has	  been	  properly	  addressed	  by	  Ricoeur8	  among	  others)	  but	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   it	   having	   an	   object.	   This	   leads	   us	   to	   the	  discussion	   of	   the	   complicated	   matter	   of	   pre-­‐interpreted	   contents,	   an	   unfamiliar	  concept	  to	  which	  I	  dedicate	  a	  large	  part	  of	  my	  first	  chapter.	  My	   breaking	   away	   from	   the	   overcharged	   notion	   of	   Culture	   (heavy	   with	  ethical	  and	  historical	  implications	  and	  involving	  a	  nebulous	  definition	  at	  best)	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  and	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  just	  a	  terminological	  clarification;	  it	  is	  a	  shift	  of	  perspective	  on	  the	  sum	  of	  cultural	  objects	  presented	  to	  the	  individual.	  The	  reclamation	  of	  the	  individual	  standpoint	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  contents	  are	   presented	   to	   and	   appropriated	   by	   the	  attention	   exerted	   by	   the	   protagonist	   of	  this	  exploration,	  the	  cultural	  inheritor.	  	  
Attention	   is	   indeed	   another	   unrepresented	   matter	   in	   philosophical	  elaborations	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  interpretation	  and	  cultural	  inheritance:	  we	  assume	  our	  possibility	  of	  reading	  and	  analyze	  the	  reasons	  of	  our	  choice	  of	  one	  text	  over	  another	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 	  See	   in	   particular:	   Paul	   Ricoeur.	   Interpretation	   Theory:	   Discourse	   and	   the	   Surplus	   of	  
Meaning.	  Fort	  Worth:	  Texas	  Christian	  University	  Press,	  1976.	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often	  without	  inquiring	  into	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  explored	  to	  give	  account	  of	  such	  a	  choice.	  Once	  again,	   it	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  correlation	  between	  potentiality	   and	   actualization	   of	   our	   inheritance,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   a	  chronological	   problem:	   attention	   is	   easy	   to	   grasp	   as	   ‘having	   been	   exerted’	   or,	  negatively,	   as	   absent.	   It	   is	   much	   harder,	   though,	   to	   account	   for	   attention	   as	   a	  momentary	  beginning;	  nonetheless,	  this	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  (or	  at	  least	  attempted)	  if	  we	  want	  our	  exploration	  of	  personal	  reception	  of	  cultural	  objects	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  the	   individual,	  personal	  experience	  of	  a	  cultural	  content,	  which	  we	  have	  discussed	  as	  the	  crucial	  feature	  of	  inheritance.	  	  The	   instantaneous	   nature	   of	   attention	   has	   been	   explored	   more	   by	   fiction	  (and	  poetry	   in	  particular)	  than	  by	  systematic	  works	  of	  philosophy.	  The	   ‘first	  sight’	  (or	   the	  much	   less	   thought-­‐of	   ‘first	  hearing’)	   are	  much	  more	  present	   in	  verses	  and	  fictional	  descriptions	  than	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  reception.	  Prejudice9	  and	  pre-­‐judgment	  are	  much	  more	  crucial	  to	  the	  accepted	  problematic	  of	  interpretation	  than	  the	   instantaneous	   moment	   of	   attention10.	   My	   second	   chapter,	   The	   Moment	   of	  
Attention,	   focuses	   on	   the	  moment	   of	   individual	   acknowledgement	   of	   a	   content	   as	  antecedent	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  interpretation	  and	  shows	  how,	  before	  judgment,	  there	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  On	   the	  matter	   of	   prejudice	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   Reception	   Theory,	   see	   in	   particular	   Richard	  Kearney,	   Between	   Tradition	   and	   Utopia,	   in	   Wood,	   David.	  On	   Paul	   Ricoeur:	   Narrative	   and	  
Interpretation.	  London	  ;	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1991.	  10	  Germs	   of	   a	   theory	   of	   the	  moment	   of	   attention	   are	   arguably	   present	   in	   Bachelard’s	  The	  
Intuition	  of	  the	  Instant,	  but	   the	  author	   is	  much	  more	  concerned	  about	   rebutting	  Bergson’s	  theories	  on	  time	  than	  about	  exploring	  such	  a	  concept.	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is	   recognition	  of	   the	  content	  as	   that	  which	   is	   to	  be	  accessed;	   such	  a	   recognition	   is	  made	  possible	  by	  attention.	  	  Once	   again,	   therefore,	   before	   dealing	   with	   Inheritance	   as	   a	   phenomenon	  (manifested	  in	  our	  choice	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  contents	  and	  their	  integration	  in	  a	  system)	  we	  must	  discuss	  how	  these	  contents	  we	  have	  individuated	  and	  located	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  can	  become	  full	  objects	  of	  interpretation.	  Thus,	  the	  second	  chapter	  is	   completely	  dedicated	   to	   attention;	  on	  one	   side,	   this	   is	  understood	   in	   terms	  of	   a	  general	   faculty	   allowing	   us	   to	   extract	   a	   particular	   text	   from	   the	  mass	   of	   possible	  input	  (both	  sensorial	  and	  epistemological)	  that	  are	  presented	  to	  us	  everyday.	  On	  the	  other	   side,	   attention	   as	   the	  moment	   in	  which	   such	   an	   extraction	   is	   carried	   out	   is	  discussed	  and	  evaluated	  as	  the	  source	  of	  our	  capability	  for	  interpretation.	  After	  having	  described	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  Inheritance	  can	  be	  thought	  and	  take	  place	  (i.e.	  a	  ‘space’	  of	  potential	  inheritances	  are	  described	  as	  pre-­‐accessed)	  and	  having	   analyzed	   the	   moment	   in	   which	   such	   potentiality	   is	   actualized	   through	  attention,	   I	  will	   be	   able	   to	   turn	   the	   focus	   to	   Inheritance	   per	   se.	   Chapter	   3	  will	   be	  dedicated	  to	  the	  core	  of	  my	  dissertation,	  i.e.	  Inheritance	  considered	  on	  its	  own.	  	  First	  of	  all,	   the	  phenomenon	  will	  need	   to	  be	  defined,	  clarifying	  certain	  paralogisms	   that	  are	   inevitable	   but	   risk	   confusing	   us.	   In	   particular,	   we	   need	   to	   distinguish	   the	  threefold	   signification	   of	   ‘Inheritance’,	   relating	   to	   a)	   the	   act	   of	   inheriting,	   b)	   the	  
single	   content/text	   inherited,	   and	   c)	   the	   overall	   experience	   of	   cultural	   reception	  which	   shapes	   our	   view	   of	   the	   world	   and	   is	   integral	   to	   our	   intellectual	   and	  philosophical	  activity.	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The	   nature	   of	   Inheritance	   is	   strictly	   related	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   inheritor	   in	  shaping	   its	  own	  history,	  not	   in	  a	   ‘factual’	  sense,	  but	  on	  an	  epistemological	   level.	   In	  particular,	   historical	   awareness	   as	   intended	   by	   Gadamer 11 	  is	   a	   fundamental	  
discrimen	   in	   our	   identification	   of	   an	   inheritance	   as	   such,	   since	   both	   require	   a	  historical	  perspective	  that	  goes	  beyond	  our	  comprehension	  of	  our	  present.	  In	  order	  for	   us	   to	   understand	   a	   text	   historically,	   and	   thus	   grasp	   its	   complete	   meaning	  (according	   to	   Gadamer)	   and	   understand	   it	   as	   an	   inheritance	   (in	   the	   scope	   of	   our	  exploration)	  we	  need	  to	  be	  fully	  conscious	  of	  the	  relative	  alienation	  of	  our	  presence	  in	  time	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  cultural	  content	  originating	  in	  a	  chronological	  elsewhere.	  	  German	   Philosophy	   (from	   Fichte	   to	   Schelling,	   from	   Herder	   to	   Voegelin)	   dealt	  extensively	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  Ages	  (or	  Epochs,	  etc.)	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  a	   discussion	   of	   these	   ‘sectors’	   of	   history	   (usually	   conceived	   as	   relatively	  homogenous)	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  show	  how	  the	  individuality	  of	  inheritance	  implies	  a	  necessary	   independence	   of	   the	   relation	   inheritee-­‐inheritor	   from	   the	   traps	   and	  snares	  of	  such	  rigid	  categorizations.	  	  The	   transformative	   role	   of	   inheritance	   (both	   for	   the	   content	   and	   for	   the	  inheritor)	  is	  discussed:	  according	  to	  Gadamer’s	  notion	  of	  interpretation	  we	  recover	  the	   text	  as	  «la	  manifestation	  d’un	  moment	   créateur»12,	  but	   this	   contrasts	  with	   the	  independence	   of	   our	   reading,	   which	   is	   always	   absolutely	   tied	   to	   our	   unfettered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 	  Cf.	   Hans	   Georg	   Gadamer,	   Problèmes	   Épistemologiques	   de	   Sciences	   Humaines	   in Le	  
Problème	  De	  La	  Conscience	  Historique.	  Paris:	  Seuil,	  1996.	  	  12 	  “The	   manifestation	   of	   a	   creative	   moment”,	   from:	   Gadamer,	   Fondation	   pour	  
l’Hermeneutique,	  in	  Le	  Problème…	  p.	  75.	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historical	   presence.	   Therefore,	   the	   intuitions	   about	   interpretation	   that	   we	   can	  gather	   from	   our	   reading	   of	   Gadamer	   (and	   through	   him	   of	   Heidegger)	   need	   to	   be	  mediated	   with	   Ricoeur’s	   exploration	   of	   narrative	   as	   a	   meditational	   tool	   in	   our	  approach	  to	  time:	  since	  the	  very	  first	  chapters	  of	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	  he	  engages	  in	  a	  post-­‐Augustinian	   discourse	   about	   aporias	   in	   our	   experience	   of	   time13,	   which	   he	  claims	  to	  be	  only	  solvable	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  memory.	  	  This	   will	   lead	   us	   to	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   memory	   (both	  collective	   and	   individual)	   and	   Inheritance	   (proper	   to	   the	   individuality	   of	   the	  inheritor),	   and	   the	   role	   of	   what	   Ricoeur	   defines	   as	   the	   Threefold	   Present	   of	   the	  mind.	  Here	  the	   individual	   is	  conceived	  as	  both	   inheritor	  and	   inheritee	  at	   the	  same	  time;	   this	  entangled	  situation	  needs	   to	  be	   fractioned	  and	  analyzed,	  and	   then	   to	  be	  reconstructed	  (two	  chapters	  later)	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  Passing	  (a	  term	  that	  originates	  in	  these	  very	  passages	  by	  Ricoeur,	  but	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  not	  explored	  there).	  	  Memory	   is	   part	   of	   historical	   awareness,	   but	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   part	   of	   a	  specific	  inheritance	  (while	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  one’s	  Inheritance	  as	  a	  system	  of	  received	  contents).	  A	  primary	  example	  of	   the	  compartmentalization	  of	  memory	   is	   the	   case	   of	   unwilling	   or	   unconscious	   inheritances:	   not	   only	   when	  receiving	  a	  text	  we	  may	  do	  so	  without	  a	  historical	  “memory”	  (or	  awareness)	  of	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ricoeur.	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1984,	  Ch.	  1,	  “Aporias	  of	  
the	  experience	  of	  time”.	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author14,	  but	  even	  more	  when	  refusing	   to	  acknowledge	   the	  source	  of	  an	   inherited	  content.	   Problematic	   inheritances,	   secret	   ones	   or	   mis-­‐constructed	   ones	   all	  contribute	  to	  the	  complicated	  relation	  between	  knowledge/memory	  on	  one	  side	  and	  attribution/recognition	   on	   the	   other,	   which	   is	   inevitable	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	  realization	  of	  one’s	  Inheritance.	  	  The	   reaction	   of	   the	   inheritor	   to	   any	   part	   of	   his	   Inheritance	   is	   necessarily	  influenced	   by	   one’s	   own	   Weltanschauung,	   but	   the	   very	   process	   of	   Inheritance	  shapes	  such	  a	  world-­‐view.	  This	  is	  only	  partially	  addressed	  by	  the	  discussion	  about	  tradition:	   Tradition	  has	   been	   established	   and	   described	   always	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
traditum,	   and	   thus	   incorporated	   in	   theories	   of	   interpretation	   (which	   constantly	  refer	  to	  what	  is	  read,	  to	  the	  content):	  a	  shift	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  process	  in	  which	  this	  transmission/tradition	  is	  generated	  and	  (at	  the	  same	  time)	  received	  is	  what	  is	  now	  required	   to	   give	   a	   philosophical	   description	   of	   the	   matter.	   It	   is	   not	   surprising,	  indeed,	  that	  the	  philosophical	  study	  of	  this	  problem	  is	  still	  heavily	  relying	  on	  literary	  theory	   and	   hermeneutics	   that,	   while	   certainly	   important	   and	   somehow	   akin	   to	  philosophy,	  have	  a	  more	  practical	  approach	  and	  are	  more	   interested	   in	  explaining	  (or	  discussing	   the	  possibility	  of)	  the	  right	  way	   to	  receive,	   than	   in	   inquiring	   in	  how	  this	  receiving	  is	  even	  possible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  There	  can	  be	  a	  superficial	  ignorance	  –	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  anonymous	  text	  transmitted	  by	  a	   tradition	   or	   school	   –,	   a	  mistaken	   knowledge	   –	   as	  with	   a	  wrongly	   attributed	   text	   –	   or	   a	  more	   profound	   disinterest	   –	   when	   interpreting	   a	   text	   without	   any	   care	   for	   the	   time	   or	  situation	  in	  which	  it	  was	  originated.	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But	   could	   tradition	  be	   constructed	   as	   a	   shared	   inheritance?	  The	  discussion	  over	   shared	   inheritances	   is	   problematic,	   since	   no	   real	   sharing	   is	   possible:	   even	  hypothesizing	   the	   time	   and	   situation	   in	   which	   two	   different	   actors	   accessed	   the	  content	   conveyed	   by	   tradition	   as	   identical,	   their	   Inheritance	   as	   constructed	   until	  that	  moment	  would	  be	  irremediably	  different;	  thus	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance	  (if	  not	  the	   experience	   per	   se)	   would	   not	   be	   that	   of	   a	   shared	   reception,	   but	   only	   of	   a	  simultaneous	  (and	  parallel)	  one,	  albeit	  possibly	  similar.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  asymptotic	  notion	   of	   identical,	   shared	   inheritance	   is	   worth	   exploring	   to	   understand	   how	   the	  personal	   situation	   of	   the	   inheritor	   is	   brought	   into	   the	   fray	   and	   what	   of	   its	  components	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  process.	  There	   is	   no	   exclusivity	   of	   contemporaneity,	   when	  we	   come	   to	   inheritance:	  our	  examples,	  inspirations	  or	  masters	  can	  be	  authors	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  epoch,	  who	   wrote	   in	   an	   overlapping	   time;	   or	   we	   can	   inherit	   contents	   from	   thinkers	  belonging	  to	  a	   line	  of	  thought	  (often	  a	  tradition	  in	  the	  usual	  sense).	  The	  difference	  between	  horizontal	  (the	  former)	  and	  vertical	  (the	  latter)	  axis	  of	  inheritances	  proves	  to	  be	  strictly	   intertwined	  with	   the	  notions	  of	  shared	  contents,	   shared	   inheritances	  and	  traditions:	  the	  grouping	  of	  inheritances	  in	  individual	  experience	  happens	  inside	  the	  construction	  of	  one’s	  Inheritance	  (strictly	  capitalized),	  or	  philosophical	  system.	  This	   creates	   a	   contrast	   with	   both	   different	   instances	   of	   verticality	   (people	   who	  inherit	   from	   the	   same	   sources,	   but	   with	   different	   results)	   and	   with	   examples	   of	  tradition	  (which	  may	  claim	  to	  own	  such	  sources).	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Inheritance	   is	   connected	   to	   our	   idea	   of	   history,	   to	   our	   process	   of	   re-­‐composition15	  of	  a	  past,	  which	  relies	  on	  the	  attribution	  of	  intent	  and	  importance	  to	  people	  (authors)	  who	  can	  be	  long	  dead.	  Our	  Inheritance	  relies	  on	  our	   judgment	  on	  them,	  and	  on	  their	  personality	  and	  historical	  role	  beyond	  that	  of	  author	  of	  the	  text	  or	   source	   of	   the	   idea	   we	   are	   considering.	   Most	   importantly,	   other	   people’s	  judgments,	   a	   communal	   or	   traditional	   opinion	   on	   an	   author,	   may	   shape	   such	   an	  inheritance,	   at	   least	   on	   a	   descriptive	   level:	   the	   refusal	   of	   an	   inheritee,	   indeed,	   can	  happen	   on	   a	   superficial	   level	   (receiving	   and	   inheriting	   his	   or	   her	   ideas	   while	  rejecting	  any	  connection	  to	  him	  or	  her)	  or	  more	  deeply,	  with	  a	  rejection	  of	  certain	  ideas	  qua	  coming	  from	  an	  unreliable,	  unworthy	  source	  (or	  one	  that	  we	  consider	  as	  such).	  Secret	  inheritances	  and	  negative	  inheritances,	  nonetheless,	  do	  not	  stray	  from	  the	   model	   with	   which	   we	   inherit:	   i.e.	   they	   are	   still	   modes	   of	   appropriation	   of	   a	  cultural	  content	  from	  the	  past	  influencing	  our	  present	  philosophical	  system.	  If	  Inheritance	  is	  a	  transformative	  process,	  contributing	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  our	   philosophical	   and	   intellectual	   system,	   we	   must	   finally	   ask	   whether	   this	  transformation	  is	  limited	  to	  ourselves	  or	  whether	  it	  can	  induce	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  “age”	  in	  which	  we	  live.	  A	  possible	  answer	  would	  be	  that,	  if	  there	  is	  transformation,	  it	  emerges	   from	   our	   legacy,	   which	   is	   transmitted	   to	   the	   world	   ‘out	   there’	   with	   its	  potentiality	   for	   reception.	  However,	   since	   the	   appropriation	  of	   an	   inheritance,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  “Recomposing	   in	   retrospective”	   is	   one	   of	   the	   definitions	   of	   history	   used	   by	   Ricoeur,	  rewording	   from	   Bloch’s	   Apologie	   pour	   l’histoire	   on	   page	   30	   of	   Histoire	   et	   Vérité,	   Paris:	  edition	  du	  Seuil,	  1955.	  We	  will	  discuss	  this	  work	  extensively	  in	  chapter	  3.	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transformative	  process	  per	  se,	  always	  happens	  in	  the	  present	  (in	  the	  ‘now’	  which	  is	  ‘not	   before’	   and	   ‘not	   yet’),	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   status	   of	   the	   present	   is	  necessarily	   modified	   as	   soon	   as	   our	   transformation	   is	   brought	   into	   being	   by	   our	  approach	   to	   the	   inherited	   content.	   Ultimately,	   the	   answer	   depends	   on	   the	  perspective	   we	   assume	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	   issue:	   a	   factual	   transformation	   is	  certainly	  happening,	  but	  the	  question	  must	  then	  become	  one	  of	  cultural	  or	  epochal	  transformation.	  And	  to	  this	  matter	  I	  will	  dedicate	  the	  last	  reflections	  of	  the	  chapter,	  distinguishing	  between	   the	   legacy/inheritance	   axis	   (which	   is	   strictly	   connected	   to	  our	  historicization	  of	  reality)	  and	  our	  action	  as	  member	  of	  a	  cultural	  milieu	   in	   the	  present.	  While	   focusing	   on	   the	   matter	   of	   inheritance,	   we	   will	   be	   referring	   to	   the	  cultural	   contents	   of	   our	   Inheritance	   not	   only	   as	   present	   in	   our	   availability,	   but	  specifically	   as	   part	   of	   the	   intellectual	   output	   of	   other	   authors,	   both	   known	   and	  unknown	  to	  us.	  Once	  our	  exploration	  of	  Inheritance	  will	  be	  satisfactorily	  developed,	  we	  will	   find	   ourselves	   bound	   to	   analyze	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   Legacy,	   i.e.	   precisely	  this	   production	   of	   contents	   by	   an	   author,	   at	   a	   given	   time	   (arguably	   one	   that	   is	  different	  from	  the	  time	  of	  inheritance).	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  will	  address	  the	  terminological	  issue	  of	  the	  ‘inheritee’	  (a	  term	  forged	  having	  in	  mind	  the	  perspective	  of	  Inheritance)	  as	  a	  working	  tool	  even	  when	  discussing	  Legacy,	  and	  define	  what,	   linguistically	  and	  philosophically,	  we	  must	  understand	  when	  we	  say	  Legacy	  (especially	  clarifying	  that	  it	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  aggregate	  of	  contents,	  a	  personal	  process	  and	  the	  status	  of	  a	  content	  in	  such	  a	  process).	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Analogously	   to	   Inheritance,	   I	  will	   discuss	   the	   temporality	  of	   Legacy,	  not	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   the	   particularity	   of	   a	   case	   study	   (e.g.	   “Nietzsche	   wrote	   in	   the	   18th	  century”),	  but	   trying	   to	  establish	   the	  time-­‐frame	   in	  which	  a	  Legacy	   is	  created	  with	  reference	   to	   the	   sense	   of	   time	   of	   its	   author,	   and	   clarify	   how	   permanence	   is	   the	  dimension	   of	   time	   most	   properly	   true	   to	   the	   process	   of	   legacy:	   while	   the	   single	  moments	  of	  creation	  of	  contents	  appear	  in	  the	   ‘present’	  of	  the	  inheritee	  and	  in	  the	  ‘past’	   of	   the	   inheritor,	  without	   a	   perception	   of	   an	   overarching	   permanence	   of	   the	  content	  the	  legacy	  would	  not	  be	  uttered.	  I	  will	  explore	  this	  intimate	  connection	  on	  the	   Bergson-­‐Bachelard	   axis	   of	   duration/instant	   and	   show	   how	   both	   are	  encompassed	   in	   this	  notion	  of	  permanence.	   Some	  cases	   (nominally	   the	   talk	  of	   the	  madmen	  and	  the	  words	  of	  the	  mystic),	  -­‐which	  could	  appear	  to	  prove	  problematic	  for	  this	   approach	   to	   the	   mode	   of	   time	   of	   legacy	   –	   will	   be	   explored	   with	   some	  more	  detail,	   dialoguing	   with	   De	   Certau	   in	   addition	   to	   Gadamer	   and	   Ricoeur	   (who	   will	  continue	   to	   constitute	   the	   backbone	   of	   our	   analysis).	   The	   renovated	   focus	   on	   the	  state	   of	  mind	   of	   the	   inheritee	   that	   derives	   from	   such	   analysis	   of	   permanence	  will	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  projection	  of	  meaning,	  a	  notion	  introduced	  in	  chapter	  3	  (when	  with	  Gadamer	  we	  will	  discuss	  the	  inherent	  expectation	  of	  meaning	  present	  in	  every	  instance	  of	  interpretation)	  which	  will	  need	  to	  be	  readdressed	  and	  reversed	  to	  give	   account	   of	   the	   state	   of	   hopefulness	   that	   characterize	   the	   production	   of	   any	  cultural	  contents	  (in	  terms	  of	  hope	  for	  ‘witness’).	  We	  must	  try,	  however,	  to	  go	  past	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  creation	  to	  try	   and	   access	   the	   inheritee	   as	   such,	   thus	   looking	   at	   his	   work	   in	   general	   and	   its	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relation	   with	   its	   (potential)	   inheritors.	   This	   relation	   is	   often	   confused	   with	  Tradition,	  and	  once	  again	  we	  will	  be	  called	  to	  distinguish	  the	  absolutely	  individual	  axis	   of	   Legacy/Inheritance	   from	   the	   authority-­‐related	   dimension	   of	   Tradition.	   In	  particular,	  we	  will	  show	  how	  speaking	  of	  tradition	  already	  involves	  an	  evaluation	  of	  legacy	   and	  a	   renunciation	  of	   the	   singularity	   of	   it.	   In	   relation	   to	   this	  point,	  we	  will	  also	  distinguish	  Legacy	  from	  the	  Inheritance	  of	  the	  inheritee:	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  former,	  the	  two	  are	  functionally	  and	  factually	  distinct.	  	  In	   this	   perspective,	   narration	   (and	   re-­‐narration)	   will	   emerge	   as	   crucial,	   since	  Tradition	  –	  from	  an	  individual	  standpoint	  –	  involves	  narrating	  oneself	  (and	  another)	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  Tradition	  itself.	  	  The	   Narration	   of	   time,	   in	   particular,	   is	   important	   in	   relation	   to	   ‘historical	  awareness’,	   that	   is	   fundamental	   to	   historiography	   and	   philosophy	   in	   Reception	  Theory	  and	  post-­‐modernism	  alike.	  DeCertau	  will	  prove	  useful	  on	  this	  matter,	  with	  his	  analysis	  of	  ‘structured	  time’	  in	  historiography.	  We	  shall	  discuss	  what	  this	  means	  for	  the	  self-­‐understanding	  (and	  self-­‐narration)	  of	  the	  inheritee	  as	  the	  author	  of	  their	  own	  Legacy.	  I	  will	  also	  provide	  some	  examples	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  author’s	  perception	   of	   time	   and	   the	   production	   of	   their	   legacy	   in	   time,	   also	   analyzing	   the	  extreme	   case	   of	   On	   Kawara,	   whose	   works	   of	   art	   try	   to	   encapsulate	   their	   time	   of	  creation	  and	  nothing	  else.	  While	  Kawara	  is	  an	  artist	  and	  not	  a	  philosopher,	  some	  of	  the	   insights	   highlighted	   by	   his	   work	   and	   by	   his	   critics	   will	   provide	   interesting	  stimuli	   for	   our	   discussion	   of	   self-­‐narrative	   and	   bring	   us	   into	   the	   definition	   of	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authorship	   in	   the	   perspective	   of	   permanence	   and	   recognition;	   Gadamer	   and	  Foucault	  will	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  frame	  in	  which	  to	  develop	  our	  analysis.	  	  I	   will	   thus	   discuss	   recognition	   and	   recognizability	   as	   fundamental	  components	  of	  the	  ideological	  construction	  of	  legacy	  as	  aggregation	  of	  contents,	  and	  highlight	  how	  the	  theme	  of	  recognition	  is	  crucial	  to	  Western	  history	  of	  thought,	  and	  not	   only	   to	   recent	   philosophy	   of	   interpretation.	   This	   will	   lead	   us	   to	   discuss	   the	  connection	   (and	   difference)	   between	   recognition	   and	   identity	   and	   see	   how	   the	  inheritee	  has	  limited	  control	  over	  both.	  Consequently,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  legacy	  and	  the	  problem	  of	   ‘claim’	  (claim	  to	  a	  legacy/claim	  to	  an	  inheritance)	  that	  was	  touched	  upon	  by	  Gadamer	  but	  never	  fully	  explored.	  	  The	  reliance	  on	  the	  inheritor,	   the	  hope	  to	  “make	  sense”	  and	  the	  claim	  to	  an	  identity	  as	  author	  of	  a	  legacy	  will	  prove	  to	  be	  crucial	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  Legacy	  itself.	  The	   co-­‐dependence	   of	   Inheritance	   and	   Legacy	   (each	   relying	   on	   the	   other	   to	   be	  actualized)	  will	  be	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  my	  last	  chapter.	  First,	  I	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  dialogue	  has	  been	  the	  model	  upon	  which	  Reception	  Theory	  has	  developed	  its	   theory	   of	   Interpretation.	   From	   there,	   I	   will	   show	   how	   the	   moment	   in	   which	  inheritance	  and	  legacy	  are	  generated	  by	  each	  other	  could	  initially	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  possible	  dialogue.	  After	  doing	  so,	  however,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  the	  necessary	  dialogue	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  impossible	  one,	   in	  terms	  of	  both	  content	  and	  identity	  of	  the	  speakers.	   We	   will	   also	   see	   how	   this	   impossibility	   to	   conceive	   such	   a	   dialogue	  prevents	  us	  from	  thinking	  of	  a	  Legacy	  or	  an	  Inheritance	  as	  distinct,	  and	  constantly	  leads	   us	   to	   think	   of	   them	   only	   after	   they	   are	   brought	   to	   light	   in	   the	   moment	   of	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Passing.	   I	  will	   explain	   how	   I	   came	   to	   define	   this	  moment	   as	   one	   “of	   Passing”	   and	  elucidate	  what	   is	  meant	  by	   this	  expression	  and	  what	  characteristics	   I	   recognize	   to	  the	  moment	  itself.	  This	   ‘inconceivability’	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  Passing,	  however,	  shall	  not	  become	  the	   end-­‐point	   of	   our	   exploration,	   and	   I	   will	   show	   how	   a	   triplet	   of	   philosophers	  (Levinas,	  Derrida	  and	  Marion	  respectively)	  have	  discussed	  the	  philosophical	  notion	  of	  thinking	  the	  impossible.	  We	  will	  move	  from	  the	  ‘interior	  impossibility’	  of	  Levinas	  to	  ‘undecideability’	  and	  ‘thinking	  the	  unthinkable’	  in	  Derrida.	  Finally,	  we	  will	  find	  in	  Marion’s	  ‘saturated	  phenomenon’	  the	  solution	  to	  this	  conundrum	  and	  show	  how	  he	  extended	   this	   intuition	   beyond	   the	   theological	   discourse	   to	   which	   it	   is	   usually	  relegated.	  After	   showing	   how	   we	   should	   approach	   the	   Moment	   of	   Passing	   as	  unthinkable	   saturated	   phenomenon,	   though,	  we	   shall	   consider	   the	   presence	   of	   its	  results	   in	   our	   everyday	   cultural	   life,	   and	   explore	   how	   we	   are	   able	   to	   discuss	  inheritance	  and	  legacy	  if	  we	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  really	  conceiving	  them.	  The	  solution	  will	  bring	  us	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  our	  discussion	  of	  inheritance,	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	   notion	   of	   Narrative,	   which	   once	   again	   will	   resolve	   –	   following	   Ricoeur	   –	   a	  temporal	  aporia,	  although	  it	  will	  be	  an	  external	  one	  and	  not	  –	  as	  in	  Augustine’s	  case	  –	  one	  of	  internal	  experience.	  In	  conclusion,	  I	  will	  show	  how	  Ricoeur’s	  intuition	  of	  the	  stabilizing	  power	  of	  Narrative	   is	   in	   agreement	  with	   (and	   helps	  make	   explicit)	   the	   enigmatic	   notion	   of	  Play	   that	  appears	   in	  Gadamer’s	  work	  and	  that	  has	  been	  explored	  even	  outside	  the	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field	  of	  philosophy	  proper.	  We	  will	   therefore	  acknowledge	  the	   inevitability	  of	  play	  and	   narration	   to	   give	   account	   of	   our	   role	   as	   actors	   in	   the	   interplay	   of	   cultural	  discourse,	   yet	  without	   falling	  back	   into	   the	  paradigms	  of	  Tradition	  and	  Culture	   as	  the	  main	  elements	  of	  our	  individual	  cultural	  action.	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  mapped	  a	  route	   for	  myself	  and	   for	   the	  reader,	  and	  onto	   this	  journey	   we	   shall	   now	   embark,	   to	   try	   to	   reach	   our	   destination	   without	   losing	  ourselves	  along	  the	  way.	  
	   31	  
Chapter	  1:	  Preliminary	  concerns:	  the	  history	  of	  individual	  transmission	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  Cultural	  Density.	  	   	  	  The	  problem	  of	  cultural	  transmission	  has	  always	  been	  a	  relevant	  one	  in	  the	  study	   of	   Religion	   and	   Philosophy	   alike,	   but	   tradition	   has	   obscured	   the	   individual	  nature	   of	   this	   phenomenon.	   The	   stress	   on	   tradition	   (and	   traditum	  and	   tradire)	   as	  epistemological	   and	   philosophical	   problems	   has	   resulted	   into	   an	   analysis	   exerted	  over	   a	   dimension	   of	   experience	   that	   does	   not	   properly	   belong	   to	   the	   individual:	  
tradition	  implies	  either	  a	  society,	  or	  a	  group	  in	  that	  society	  or	  (more	  customarily	  in	  the	  discussion	  about	  Religion,	  religious	  tradition	  and	  history	  of	  philosophy)	  a	  school	  of	   thought.	   So	   when	   speaking	   of	   tradition	   we	   are	   referring	   to	   a	   process	   that	   is	  primarily	   and	   absolutely	   connected	   to	   a	  multitude	   of	   individuals.	   The	   problem	   of	  inheritance	   as	   a	   personal	   phenomenon,	   enclosed	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   the	   individual	  subject’s	   cultural	   experience,	   and	   with	   a	   prominent	   role	   of	   the	   person	   who	   is	  inheriting	  a	  cultural	  content,	  has	  been	  obfuscated	  by	  this	  focus	  on	  the	  group.	  	  What	   I	  propose	   to	  do	  with	  my	  dissertation	  and	  research	  project	   is	   twofold:	  first	   and	   foremost,	   an	   historical	   perspective	   is	   needed,	   in	   order	   to	   establish	  what	  prominent	   figures	   have	   conceived	   the	   problem	   of	   reception	   and	   how	   they	  approached	   the	   topic	   of	   personal	   cultural	   inheritance	   and	   the	   reciprocal	  phenomenon	   of	   Legacy.	   I	   plan	   to	   show	   how	   these	   formulations	   have	   never	  completely	  satisfied	  the	  need	  for	  a	  phenomenological	  description	  of	  inheritance	  and	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legacy,	  lacking	  the	  conception	  of	  inheritance	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  intertwined	  with	  but	  independent	  from	  tradition,	  and	  shaped	  by	  personal	   initiative	  (both	  conscious	  and	  unconscious)	  in	  a	  way	  that	  tradition	  is	  not	  and	  is	  not	  supposed	  to	  be.	  
	  Beside	   this	   historiographical	   and	   descriptive	   step	   of	   my	   research,	   a	  constructive	  step	  will	  become	  necessary:	  to	  categorize	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy	  in	  a	  phenomenological	  sense,	  bracketing	  out	  all	  contingencies	  that	  we	  normally	  attach	  to	  such	   phenomena	   and	   removing	   the	   preconceptions	   that	   words	   related	   to	   the	  linguistic	   family	  of	   tradition	   suggest.	  The	  questions	   to	  be	  answered	  are	   important	  ones	  if	  we	  want	  to	  discuss	  the	  personal	  dimension	  of	  culture:	  what	  is	  inheritance	  in	  its	   phenomenological	   core?	   What	   is	   legacy?	   How	   are	   they	   related	   or,	   most	  importantly,	  even	  possible?	  First	  of	  all,	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy,	  which	  are	  almost	  synonyms	  in	  everyday	  language,	   are	   not	   truly	   synonymous.	   They	   are	   used	   interchangeably,	   but	   their	  proper	  meaning	  would	   be	   quite	   distinct,	   according	   to	   their	   etymology	   and	   to	   the	  dictionary:	   Inheritance	   is	   described	   as	   “a	   thing	   that	   is	   inherited”	   (obviously),	   and	  inheriting	  as	  “receiving	  something”	  (New	  Oxford	  American	  Dictionary).	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  receiver,	  and	  on	  the	  (only	  apparently	  passive)	  act	  of	  appropriating	  something	  coming	  from	  elsewhere.	  This	  sets	  Inheritance	  apart	  from	  Legacy,	  which	  is	  strictly	  “a	  thing	   handed	   down	   by	   a	   predecessor”;	   there	   is	   therefore	   a	   correspondence,	   but	  absolutely	   no	   coincidence,	   despite	   the	   confusion	   caused	   by	   expressions	   like	  ‘grandpa’s	  inheritance’,	  which	  should	  be	  constructed	  as	  ‘grandpa’s	  legacy’	  if	  we	  want	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  the	  progenitor	  has	  left	  behind	  him.	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The	   two	   phenomena	   are	   strictly	   related,	   reciprocally	   dependent,	   and	  specular:	   they	  mirror	  each	  other	  and	   they	  share	  a	  particular	  moment	   in	  which,	  as	  we	   will	   see,	   both	   are	   generated,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   and	   which	   constitutes	   a	  paradoxical	   problem,	   given	   that	   Inheritance	   and	   Legacy	   depend	   on	   each	   other	   as	  reciprocal	  primary	  causes.	  This	  moment,	  in	  which	  a	  cultural	  content	  passes	  from	  the	  general	   cultural	  milieu	   of	   an	   author	   into	   our	   own	   system	   of	   philosophy	   is	   at	   the	  same	   time	   le	  point	  de	  départ	   and	   the	   final	   destination	  of	   the	   transmission	  of	   such	  content;	   it	   is	   in	   this	   moment	   of	   encounter	   that	   traditio	   needs	   to	   be	  phenomenologically	   thematised	  as	   Inheritance	  and	  Legacy,	   since	   traditio	   itself	  has	  failed,	   as	   a	   concept,	   to	   account	   for	   this	   moment,	   as	   we	   shall	   see	   in	   particular	   in	  chapter	  3	  and	  4.	  	  Legacy	  is	  meant	  as	  the	  cultural	  product	  (composed	  of	  one	  or	  many	  –	  or	  one	  
and	   many	   –	   cultural	   contents)	   of	   an	   author	   (the	   inheritee,	   in	   contrast	   with	   the	  receiving	   inheritor),	   which	   is	   consigned	   to	   the	   public	   and	   taken	   away	   from	   the	  control	   of	   the	   author	   himself.	   This	   system	   of	   contents	   potentially	   survives	   the	  physical	   author	  and,	  most	   importantly,	   is	  projected	  out-­‐there	  (in	   the	  Heideggerian	  sense),	   ready	   to	   be	   received	   and	   interpreted.	   Anything	   an	   author	   writes	   is	  susceptible	   of	   becoming	   his	   Legacy,	   often	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   his	   own	  intentionality.	   It	   must	   be	   noted,	   however,	   that	   one’s	   Legacy	   is	   perceived	   as	   the	  totality	  of	  contents	  transmitted	  by	  him	  AND	  received	  by	  someone	  else.	  This	  creates	  a	  dual	  and	  ambiguous	  relationship	  between	   legacy	  and	   inheritance,	  with	   the	   former	  being	   a	   requisite	   for	   the	   latter,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   depending	   on	   it	   for	   its	   own	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realization.	  This	  paradoxical	  tension	  constitutes	  the	  peculiar	  nature	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  Passing1	  and	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  features	  of	  such	  a	  phenomenon.	  Inheritance	  indicates	  the	  correlated	  act	  of	  receiving	  a	  content	  making	  it	  part	  of	  one’s	  own	  cultural	  and	  philosophical	  system.	  Inheritance	   is	  not	   just	  memory,	  or	  anamnesis,	   but	   is	   a	   constructive	   process,	   which	   stems	   directly	   from	   what	   is	  accessible	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   inheritor’s	   cultural	   milieu;	   it	   includes,	   but	   it	   is	   not	  completed	  by,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  content	  (be	  it	  a	  text,	  a	  picture,	  a	  performance,	  or	   any	   other	   form	   of	   cultural	   expression),	   to	  which	   follows	   a	   reflection	   based	   on	  historical	   awareness	   (an	   awareness	   of	   the	   reciprocal	   position	   in	   history	   of	   the	  inheritor	  and	  of	  the	  inheritee	  –	  the	  individual	  whose	  work	  is	  inherited).	  It	  is,	  as	  we	  shall	   see,	   first	   and	   foremost	   an	   act	   of	   reconstruction	   through	   narrative,	   which	  transforms	  the	  inheritor,	  the	  content,	  and	  their	  dependence	  on	  the	  inheritee.	  	  Kantian	   philosophy,	   with	   its	   founding	   ambition	   of	   being	   a	   Copernican	  revolution,	  was	  supremely	  interested	  in	  how	  we	  receive	  data	  via	  our	  intuitions	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Passing	  is,	  on	  itself,	  a	  word	  with	  a	  focused	  history,	  which	  stems	  from	  Ricoeur:	  in	  Time	  and	  
Narrative	   (Chicago:	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Press,	   1984,	   vl.	   1,	   p.8	   and	   ff.)	   he	   shows	   how	  Passing	   is	   the	   core	   of	   our	   experience	   of	   time.	   If	   time	   is	   ‘what	   passes’,	   it	   is	   only	   our	  conceptualization	   which	   allows	   us	   to	   substitute	   the	   Passing	   with	   the	   Present	   and	   thus	  understand	   time	   as	   a	   structured	   three	   fold	   present	   (Past-­‐Present,	   Present-­‐Present	   and	  Future-­‐Present)	  which	  constitutes	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  temporality,	  and	  thus	  enables	   us	   to	   advance	   towards	   our	   idea	   of	   history.	   Passing	   is	   the	   absolute	   immediacy	   of	  temporal	   phenomenon,	  which	   becomes	   something	  else	  (the	   threefold	   present	   in	  Ricoeur’s	  Narrative,	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy	  in	  our	  exploration)	  only	  when	  reflected	  upon.	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how	  we	  synthetize	  them	  through	  concepts,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  our	  comprehension	  of	   reality.	   Such	   an	   epistemology	  was	   focused	   on	   the	   subject,	   and,	  while	   giving	   an	  innovative	  account	  of	   time	  and	  space	  as	  pure	   intuitions,	   it	  was	   less	  suitable	   for	  an	  analysis	   of	  historical	   time	  as	   independent	   from	   individual	   consciousness	   and	   thus	  for	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   transmission	   of	   concepts	   through	   a	  chronological	  gap.	  	  Nonetheless,	  we	   cannot	   underestimate	   the	   influence	   of	   Kantian	   philosophy	  on	  the	  topic:	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  our	  topic	  will	  be	  the	  reflection	  on	  the	  matter	  carried	  out	  by	  Fichte	  who,	  in	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Present	  Age,	  	  was	  the	  first	  Kantian	  philosopher	   to	   give	   a	   solid	   description	   of	   the	   problems	   of	   transmission	   of	   ideas	  through	  time.	  In	  particular,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  he	  addressed	  the	  contrast	  between	   the	   sphere	   of	   individual	   thinking	   and	   common	   thought,	   prefiguring	  Bergson’s	   notion	   of	   common	   sense;	   he	   described	   in	   detail	   his	   notion	   of	   Ages	   and	  Epochs	   not	   as	   arbitrary	   divisions	   of	   history,	   but	   as	   stages	   in	   human	   social	   and	  individual	   development	   in	   which	   the	   individual	   could	   be	   ahead	   or	   behind	   the	  cultural	  moment	  of	  his	  peers.	  	  Similar	  intuitions	  had	  been	  present	  in	  the	  works	  on	  the	  matter	  by	  Herder,	  a	  few	   decades	   earlier,	   but	   Fichte	   was	  more	   successful	   in	   integrating	   the	   individual	  dimension	  of	  the	  thinker	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  Bildung	  that	  had	  been	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  18th	  century	  discourse	  on	  history.	  Benefiting	  from	  a	  unified	  perspective	  (dedicating	  an	  entire	  cycle	  of	  lectures	  –	  the	  above	  mentioned	  Characteristics),	  and	  thanks	  to	  his	  notion	  of	  certain	  enlightened	  individual	  capable	  of	  “advancing”	  their	  Age,	  he	  is	  able	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to	  provide	  a	  	  useful	  description	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  Authors	  and	  the	  “culture”	  of	  their	  upbringing	  (Bildung)	  and	  of	  their	  ‘circles’.	  Schelling	  as	  well,	  while	  not	  dealing	  directly	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  transmitting	  ideas	   through	   time,	   gives	   a	   wonderful	   description	   of	   what	   he	   addresses	   as	  
Mitwissenschaft.	   Such	   a	   co-­‐knowledge	   of	   creation	   is	   forged	   by	   the	   passing	   of	   the	  present	  into	  past	  and	  grounds	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  future.	  The	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  it,	  though,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  participated	  by	  individual	  subjects	  conceived	  as	  a	  series	  of	  individuals	   and	   not	   (as	   in	   some	   critical	   parts	   of	   Fichte’s	   analysis)	   as	   a	   mass-­‐phenomenon.	  Given	  the	  less	  focused	  nature	  of	  his	  work	  and	  the	  less	  direct	  interest	  in	  the	  transmission	  of	  ideas	  through	  time,	  he	  will	  be	  less	  relevant	  to	  our	  exploration.	  The	  most	   important	   theorists	   for	  my	   research,	   however,	   belong	   to	   the	  20th	  Century.	  Hermeneutics	  and	  reception	  theory	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  Phenomenology	  on	   the	  other	  will	  provide	   the	  philosophical	   frame	  and	   the	  methodology	  needed	   to	  lead	  us	  to	  any	  significant	  result.	  Ricoeur	  and	  Gadamer,	   in	  particular,	  with	  their	   interest	   in	  how	  we	  receive	  a	  text,	  engaged	  issues	  very	  close	  to	  those	  on	  which	  my	  research	  is	  focusing.	  They	  both	  gave	  fascinating	  accounts	  of	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  interpretation,	  with	  Ricoeur	  focusing	  on	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  text	  per	  se	  and	  Gadamer	  advocating	  cultural	  awareness	   as	   crucial	   to	   our	   interpretation	   of	   a	   text.	   Their	   modern	   theory	   of	  hermeneutics	  (referred	  to	  by	  the	  loose	  term	  of	  ‘Reception	  Theory’)	  was	  an	  evolution	  with	   respects	   to	   famous	   predecessors	   like	   Schleiermacher	   and	   Dilthey,	   although	  Gadamer	  was	  more	   thorough	   in	   recognizing	   (and	   discussing)	   this	   kind	   of	   critical	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inheritance.	   Ricoeur’s	   account	   of	   Narrative	   as	   a	  mode	   of	   understanding	   time	   and	  Gadamer’s	  notion	  of	  play	  as	  model	   for	  the	   interaction	  between	  subjects	   in	  Art	  will	  be	   present	   throughout	   my	   work,	   and	   an	   important	   part	   of	   our	   discussion	   of	  attention,	  content	  and	  interpretation	  was	  born	  in	  dialogue	  with	  their	  texts.	  
	  Nonetheless,	   they	   unfortunately	   stopped	   short	   of	   a	   proper	  phenomenological	   investigation	   of	   these	   issues	   for	   reasons	   that	   are	   different	   and	  specific	   to	   the	   two.	  Ricoeur’s	   interest	   in	   the	   text	  per	  se	   and	   in	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   text	  becoming	   autonomous	   (with	   a	   death	   of	   the	   author	   in	   a	   Barthes’s	   sense)	   did	   not	  provide	   the	   conditions	   for	   an	   account	   of	   the	   value	   of	   Legacy:	   if	   the	   text	   is	  irremediably	   detached	   from	   us	   as	   soon	   as	   it	   is	   uttered,	   how	   can	   we	   construct	   a	  concept	  of	  Legacy	   that	   is	  meaningful	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  a	  projection	  of	  our	  being	   into	  the	  Present-­‐Future?	  Gadamer,	  instead,	  could	  have	  had	  a	  philosophical	  system	  suitable	  to	  include	  a	  theory	  of	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy,	  but	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  his	  magnus	  opus	  Truth	  and	  
Method	   was	   the	   identification	   of	   aesthetical	   consciousness	   with	   historical	  consciousness	  and	  thus	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  topic	  of	  historical	  transmission	  to	  those	  of	  experiential	   and	   aesthetic	   reception	   of	   contents.	   Moreover,	   both	   Gadamer	   and	  Ricoeur	  take	  the	  possibility	  of	  receiving	  someone	  else’s	  text	  and/or	  ideas	  as	  a	  given	  and	   inquire	   the	  how	   and	   not	   the	   possibility	   per	   se	   of	   this	   phenomenon.	   They	   are	  already	   in	   a	   contingent	   frame.	   To	   move	   forward	   on	   the	   path	   they	   designed	   and	  traced,	  and	  overcome	  the	  difficulties	  that	  these	  limitations	  comport,	  I	  will	  resort	  to	  the	  methods	  of	  phenomenology.	  	  
	   38	  
Husserl,	  in	  various	  places	  of	  his	  work	  and	  most	  importantly	  in	  his	  late	  work	  
The	  Crisis	  of	  European	  Sciences,	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  historical	  dimension	  of	   individual	   experience;	   nonetheless	   he	   does	   not	   focus	   on	   the	   production	   and	  reception	  of	  contents:	  the	  history	  he	  is	  speaking	  of	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  history	  of	  experience,	  not	  a	  history	  of	  speculation,	  nor	  one	  of	  intellectual	  concepts.	  Heidegger’s	   first	   main	   work	   (Being	   and	   Time)	   is	   focused	   on	   primary	  presence,	  and	  thus	  less	  interested	  in	  history	  than	  the	  late	  Husserl,	  and	  provides	  us	  with	  fundamental	  tools	  with	  his	  depiction	  of	  the	  They	  as	  something	  that	  is	  out	  there.	  There	  are	  two	  characteristics	  of	  this	  elaboration	  preventing	  the	  They	  from	  being	  the	  completion	  and	  the	  sole	  tool	  of	  our	  categorization	  of	  inheritance	  and	  legacy.	  On	  the	  one	   hand,	   the	   They	   is	   absolutely	   and	   irremediably	   inauthentic;	   I	   believe	   that,	  especially	   in	   an	   age	   as	   rich	   as	   ours	   with	   data,	   cultural	   contents	   and	   information,	  perceiving	  the	  individual	  as	  authentically	  incapable	  of	  inheriting	  from	  the	  out	  there	  is	  a	  methodological	  error.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  They	  is	  characterized	  by	  idle	  talk	  and	  here	   is	   the	  tension	  that	  I	  want	  to	  expose	  and	  make	  central	   to	  my	  work.	  When	  the	  They	   and	   the	   out-­‐thereness	   of	   the	   potential	   intellectual	   content	   are	   inherited,	  the	   projection	   must	   become	   present	   if	   we	   want	   those	   intellectual	   contents	   to	  become	  actual	  in	  our	  cultural	  and	  philosophical	  system	  The	  most	  interesting	  successors	  of	  Husserl	  and	  Heidegger,	  for	  our	  topic,	  are	  the	   so-­‐called	   French	   Phenomenologists,	   in	   particular	   Derrida,	   Levinas,	   Henry	   and	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Marion.	  Derrida,	  while	  not	  properly	  a	  phenomenologist	  (as	  he	  states2),	  has	  been	  in	  dialogue	   with	   such	   a	   school	   and	   provides	   useful	   insights	   through	   his	   theory	   of	  deconstruction,	   which	   is	   fruitfully	   applied	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   text	   and	   in	  particular	   in	   a	   small	   book	   like	   The	   instant	   of	   my	   death3	  he	   gives	   us	   interesting	  suggestions	   in	  order	   to	   approach	   the	  problem	  of	  what	  happens	   to	  our	   experience	  when	  it	  is	  transformed	  into	  an	  intellectual	  content	  to	  be	  passed	  on.	  	  Levinas	   is	   the	   father	  of	  what	  has	  been	  called	   ‘the	  philosophy	  of	   the	  Other’4	  and,	  while	  his	  work	  will	  only	  become	  important	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  my	  dissertation,	  his	   intuitions	  on	  the	  absolute	   inconceivability	  of	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  Other	  will	  provide	   the	   starting	   model	   for	   a	   description	   of	   the	   moment	   of	   passing,	   the	  diachronic	   encounter	   between	   the	   past	   inheritee	   and	   the	   future	   inheritor	   in	   a	  present	  that	  does	  not	  properly	  belong	  to	  either	  of	  them.	  Marion,	  though,	  could	  be	  the	  most	  important	  thinker	  for	  my	  aims:	  his	  notion	  of	  ‘saturated	  phenomenon’	  could	  provide	  the	  key	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  «I	  am	  also	  for	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  horizon,	  but,	   for	  that	  very	  reason,	  by	  saying	  so,	  I	  am	  not	  a	  phenomenologist	  anymore.	  I	  am	  very	  true	  to	  phenomomenology,	  but	  when	  I	  agree	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  suspending	   the	  horizon	   then	   I	  am	  no	   longer	  a	  phenomenologist.»	  Derrida	  and	   Marion,	   “On	   the	   Gift:	   A	   Discussion	   between	   Jacques	   Derrida	   and	   Jean-­‐Luc	   Marion.	  Moderated	  by	  Richard	  Kearney”,	  in	  John	  D.	  Caputo,	  Michael	  J.	  Scanlon,	  God,	  the	  Gift	  and	  Post-­‐
Modernism,	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.	  66.	  3	  Maurice	   Blanchot,	   Elizabeth	   Rottenberg,	   and	   Jacques	   Derrida.	  The	   Instant	   of	   My	   Death.	  Stanford,	  Calif:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  4	  Cf.	  in	  particular	  Adriaan	  T.	  Peperzak,	  and	  Emmanuel	  Lévinas.	  To	  the	  Other:	  An	  Introduction	  
to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Emmanuel	  Levinas.	  West	  Lafayette,	  Ind:	  Purdue	  University	  Press,	  1993,	  Introduction.	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passing,	   that	   particular	   and	   philosophically	   fecund	   moment	   in	   which	   Legacy	   is	  generated	  by	  the	  attentive	  presence	  of	  an	  inheritor	  and	  an	  inheritance	  is	  generated	  in	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   inheritee 5 .	   This	   codependence,	   both	   ontological	   and	  chronological,	   creates	   a	   paradoxical	   tension	   that,	   if	   not	   considered	   as	   something	  transcending	  our	  capacity	  for	  categorization,	  cannot	  be	  grasped,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  main	  reason	   for	  which	  western	   philosophy	   has	   failed	   to	   give	   an	   account	   of	   Inheritance	  and	  Legacy	  as	  individual,	  absolute	  and	  primary	  phenomena.	  	  Other	   important	   figures	   for	   my	   work	   will	   be	   modern	   philosophers	  (Frenchmen,	   for	   the	   greatest	   part)	  who	   belong	  more	   or	   less	   properly	   to	   the	   vast	  array	  of	  thinkers	  labeled	  as	  “post-­‐structuralists”	  or	  “post-­‐modernists.”	  Among	  them,	  the	  most	   relevant	  one	  will	  prove	   to	  be	  Foucault,	  Deleuze,	  De	  Certeau	  and	  Barthes	  (beside	  the	  already	  mentioned	  Derrida).	  We	  will	  go	  into	  the	  details	  of	  their	  relevant	  work	  in	  chapter	  3	  and	  4,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  author	  (and	  of	  the	  historiographer)	  as	  part	  of	  a	  narrative	  have	  been	  important	  to	  the	  development	  of	  my	  exploration.	  Obviously,	   other	   authors	   (both	   philosophers	   and	   artists)	   will	   become	  prominent	  while	  we	  go	   along,	   but	   they	  will	   be	   either	   ‘summoned’	  by	   the	   thinkers	  here	  pre-­‐presented,	  or	  will	  be	  used	  to	  clarify	  a	  concept	  emerging	  from	  their	  works,	  and	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  given	  the	  reader	  an	  idea	  of	  my	  general	  frame	  of	  reference	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  my	  analysis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  inheritee	  is	  the	  author	  of	  the	  original	  content,	  the	  protagonist	  of	  the	  process	  of	  legacy	  and	  the	  one	  to	  be	  ‘inherited’	  as	  content-­‐origin.	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  When	  we	  approach	  the	  problem	  of	   inheritance,	  we	  must	  decide	  whether	   to	  focus	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  at	  first	  and	  then	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  content	  or	  vice	  versa	  to	  take	  a	  leap	  to	  the	  content	  itself	  and	  from	  there	  to	  come	  back	  to	  the	  process	   of	   inheriting	   as	   a	   phenomenon.	   The	   first	   hypothesis	   would	   be	  methodologically	   sounder	   from	   a	   phenomenological	   perspective,	   but	   the	   idea	   of	  inheritance	   as	   something	   primeval	   and	   conceptually	   antecedent	   to	   content	   is	  unfamiliar	   to	   our	   conception	  of	   the	  world,	   to	   the	  point	   that	   in	   common	  discourse	  pointing	   out	   how	   some	   cultural	   content	   is	   received	   and	   not	   already	   owned	   can	  prove	  confusing	  and	  be	  reduced	   to	   the	  reality	  of	   the	  shared	  knowledge	  of	  a	  social	  group	  or	  of	  a	  school	  of	   thought;	  we	  may	  struggle,	   therefore,	  when	   trying	   to	   tackle	  the	  phenomenon	  directly,	  and	  this	  was	  indeed	  the	  prime	  cause	  for	  this	  investigation	  of	  mine	  on	  the	  topic.	  So	  at	  first	  we	  must	  try	  to	  define	  what	  a	  cultural	  content	  is	  because	  it	  is	  sure	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  speak	  of	  intellectual	  and	  cultural	  inheritance	  (or	  Legacy	  for	  that	  matter),	  detaching	  ourselves	  from	  the	  dimension	  of	  physical	  inheritance,	  we	  need	  to	  separate	   the	   realm	  of	   content	   constructed	   as	   an	   intellectual	   object	   from	   the	  mere	  data	  which	  are	  conveyed	  through	  the	  same	  method	  (namely,	  language	  and	  text)	  but	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  addressed	  speculatively	  but	  only	  factually:	  we	  do	  not	  inherit	  a	  grocery	  shopping	  list,	  while	  we	  do	  inherit	  significant	  works	  of	   literature	  and,	  even	  more	  specifically,	  we	  receive	  certain	  archetypes	  and	  contents	  and	  narrative	  devices	  which	  are	  condensed	  in	  one	  and	  many	  pieces	  of	  literature.	  
	   42	  
Going	   back	   to	   the	   content,	   we	   should	   define	   it	   as	   a	   complex	   idea	   in	   the	  Lockean	   sense.	   Locke	   defines	   simple	   ideas	   as	   not	   purely	   transmittable.	   He	  writes	  that	  every	  man	  is	  conscious	  that	  he	  thinks,	  and	  applies	  this	  thinking	  to	  ideas	  (Essay	  
concerning	  human	  understanding,	  II.1).	  He	  then	  goes	  on,	  since	  he	  is	  interested	  to	  in	  determining	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   ideas	   per	   se,	   a	   different	   aim	   from	   the	   one	   we	   are	  pursuing	  here.	  We	  have	  to	  step	  away	  from	  his	   inquiry	  into	  simple	  ideas	  and	  try	  to	  deal	   with	   his	   brilliant	   analysis	   of	   complex	   ideas,	   which	   he	   defines	   in	   terms	   of	  relations.	   The	   combination	   of	   irreducible	   simple	   ideas	   (self	   evident	   notions	   and	  sensual	   retentions)	   is	   the	   source	   of	   complex	   ideas.	   While	   the	   Lockean	   notion	   of	  complex	  idea	  can	  apply	  to	  something	  far	  simpler	  than	  what	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  get	  to	  in	  our	  search	  for	  content	  (ranging	  from	  the	  simple	  notion	  of	  an	  object	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  accidents),	  his	  model	  is	  still	  precious	  in	  analyzing	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  content.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  any	  complex	  idea	  is	  built	  upon	  three	  moments:	  combination,	  relation,	  and	  abstraction;	  these	  moments	  are	  crucial	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  cultural	  contents	  as	  well.	  	  Most	  of	  our	  speculative	  thinking,	  even	  more	  so	  in	  our	  cultural	  experience	  of	  Art,	  narration	  and	  more	  generally	  in	  experiences	  without	  a	  practical	  and	  functional	  teleology,	   is	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   combinations.	   Any	   story	   is	   a	   combination	   of	  subjects/characters	   and	   events,	   but	   the	   style	   of	   the	   author	   and	   the	   rhythm	  of	   the	  narration	  are,	   as	  well,	   part	  of	   the	   combination:	  we	   cannot	  have	  a	   cultural	   content	  with	  a	  monolithic	  simple	  idea,	  since	  that	  would	  only	  be	  a	  nugget	  of	  a	  fact.	  Moreover,	  anything	  monolithically	   constructed	   (the	   “idea	  of	   a	   stone”	  would	  be	  a	  particularly	  fitting	  example)	  cannot	  be	  fruitfully	  inherited,	  but	  only	  duly	  passed	  on.	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The	  second	  step	  is	  Relation:	  when	  we	  receive	  something	  from	  someone	  else	  we	   usually	   inherit	   an	   established	   relation	   and	   connection	   between	   the	   elements	  forming	  such	  a	  content:	  in	  inheriting	  the	  Founding	  Fathers’	  political	  discourse	  about	  state	  and	  citizen,	  maintaining	  the	  same	  relation	  between	  the	  two	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  truly	  inherit	  such	  a	  content;	  this	  will	  be	  immediately	  obvious	  if,	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  thought-­‐experiment,	   we	   combine	   that	   two	   elements	   (State	   and	   Citizen)	   in	   a	   new	   relation	  (with	  the	  first	  holding	  all	  the	  power	  and	  all	  the	  rights	  over	  the	  second):	  this	  would	  immediately	   create	   a	   rupture	   and,	   indeed,	   disprove	   our	   claim	   of	   having	   inherited	  such	  a	  content	  from	  the	  Founding	  Fathers.	  Relation	  between	  the	  combined	  elements	  becomes	   the	   fundamental	   definition	   allowing	   us	   to	   distinguish	   whether	   two	  contents	   are	  merely	   talking	  about	   the	   same	   thing	   or	   if	   they	   are	   indeed	   the	   same	  content	  (which,	  we	  will	  see,	  can	   itself	  be	  modified	  by	  entering	   into	  a	  relation	  with	  more	  contents).	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  only	  reproducing	  the	  content	  verbatim	  is	  a	   way	   to	   inherit:	   we	   do	   not	   conceive	   professors	   teaching	   Philosophy	   101	   as	   an	  instance	   of	   inheritance	   (despite	   the	   fact	   that	   their	   teaching	   can	   be	   constructed	   as	  reliant	  on	  a	  plethora	  of	  inheritances,	  which	  contribute	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  teach	  such	  a	  class).	   	   This	   highlights	   how	   the	   relation	   amongst	   the	   elements	   of	   a	   content	   is	   a	  topical	  point	  in	  our	  effort	  to	  identify	  a	  certain	  content	  as	  distinguished	  from	  others	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  distinguish	  amongst	  mechanical	  (or	  at	  least	  not	  innovative)	  repetition	   and	   	   a	  new	  elaboration	  of	   the	   content	  with	   the	   aim	  of	  providing	   a	  new	  approach	   to	   it:	   through	  new	  explorations	  of	   the	   relation	  new	  content	   is	  produced	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and	  whether	  this	  is	  part	  of	  a	  process	  of	  inheritance	  or	  not	  is	  a	  different	  matter	  from	  the	  problem	  at	  stake	  here,	  namely	  the	  definition	  of	  cultural	  content.	  	  The	  third	  element	  in	  Locke’s	  analysis	  of	  complex	  ideas	  is	  Abstraction:	  this	  is	  immediately	  obvious	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Philosophical	  discourse,	  but	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  fully	  understood	  in	  order	  to	  become	  a	  part	  of	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  content-­‐transmission.	  No	   observable	   object,	   much	   less	   the	   description	   of	   an	   object,	   can	   be	   factually	  transmitted.	   A	   form	   of	   abstraction	   immediately	   intervenes.	   We	   could	   argue	   that,	  since	  language	  is	  necessary	  to	  the	  mind	  to	  think6,	  our	  thinking	  a	  complex	  idea	  (and	  our	   being	   conscious	   of	   thinking	   it)	   is	   already	   an	   abstraction.	   This,	   far	   from	  constituting	   a	   problem,	   establishes	   the	   cultural	   content	   as	   (at	   least	   partially)	  independent	   from	   the	   factuality	   it	   may	   have	   originated	   from.	   Even	   contents	  referring	   to	   a	   physicality	   are	   abstracted	   in	   order	   to	   be	   retained	   and	   meaningful	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  holds	  true	  at	  least	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  modern	  continental	  philosophers,	  whose	  standpoint	   I	   will	   be	   following	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   On	   the	  matter,	   Gutting	   –	   summarizing	  Derrida	   –	   writes:	   «Derrida	   argues	   that	   even	   if,	   for	   example,	   we	   were	   contemporaries	   of	  Plato,	   speaking	   directly	   with	   him,	   there	   would	   still	   be	   unresolvable	   unclarities	   simply	  because	   of	   the	   limitations	   of	   language	   in	   general.	   […]	   I	   can	   always	   recourse	   to	   the	   “inner	  speech	  of	  thought”,	  which	  will	  present	  my	  thought	  to	  myself.	  But	  to	  this	  Derrida	  responds	  that	   the	   very	   fact	   that	   I	   am	   using	   a	   language	   to	   express	   my	   thoughts	   introduces	   the	  possibility	  of	  misunderstanding:	  the	  language	  is	  not	  my	  creation	  […]	  but	  a	  socially	  produced	  structure	  the	  meaning	  of	  which	  may	  escape	  me	  (even	  regarding	  the	  claims	  I	  am	  making	  to	  myself).»	   Gary	   Gutting.	   Thinking	   the	   Impossible.	   French	   Philosophy	   since	   1960.	   Oxford:	  University	   Press,	   2011,	   p.	   152.	   Gutting	   follows	   Derrida’s	   1967	   article	   “Différance”,	   in	  
Margins	  of	  Philosophy,	  tr.	  Alan	  Bass,	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1982,	  1-­‐27.	  This	  view	  on	  language	   appears	   to	   be	   shared	   (and	   certainly	   is	   not	   contested	   explicitly)	   by	   all	   Derrida’s	  major	  interlocutors,	  and	  by	  Reception	  Theorists	  and	  French	  Phenomenologists	  alike.	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transmitted.	  Only	  things	  that	  are	  fixed	  in	  a	  cultural	  content	  can	  become	  inheritable	  or	  prove	   themselves	   as	   suitable	  objects	  of	   legacy,	   and	   this	   is	   only	  possible	   after	   a	  certain	  degree	  of	  abstraction.	  The	  content	  can	  become	  structured	  and	  conceived	  either	  as	  a	  text	  or	  as	  the	  content	  of	  a	  text.	  A	  text	  or	  a	  corpus	  of	  work	  could	  then	  be	  a	  content	  per	  se	  or	  a	  meta-­‐content,	  and	  there	  are	  methodological	  benefits	  in	  both	  of	  these	  approaches,	  but	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  our	   investigation	  we	  should	  try	  to	  account	  for	  both.	  Even	  when	  we	  deal	  with	  a	  text	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  the	  language	  or	  on	  an	  intra-­‐textual	   interpretation	   but	   more	   on	   what	   receiving	   and	   transmitting	   such	   a	  content	  means,	  beside	  the	  internal	  (and	  conjuncture-­‐related)	  meaning	  of	  the	  text	  as	  a	  self	  standing	  object	  of	  knowledge.	  Therefore,	  any	  reflection	  on	  the	  medium	  of	  the	  text	  must	  be	  a	  function	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  transmission	  and	  remain	  marginal	  to	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  content.	  	  The	  first	  question	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  content	  that	  we	  should	  ask	  is	  whether	  the	  content	  should	  have	  limits	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  whether	  and	  how	  much	  the	  content	   can	   be	   fragmented	   before	   losing	   its	   recognizability	   as	   a	   cultural	   content.	  There	   is	  certainly	  a	   limit	  of	   fragmentability:	  a	  short	  text	  can	  still	  be	  a	  content,	  and	  likewise	  even	  a	  meaningful	  part	  of	  a	  sentence	  can	  be	  one,	  but	  words	  per	  se	  are	  not	  usually	  cultural	  contents	  but	  the	  mean,	  and	  the	  vehicle	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  such	  a	  content.	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  language	  discloses	  a	  world,	  in	  Gadamer’s	  sense,7	  we	  cannot	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Palmer	  summarizes	  this	  most	  efficiently	  when	  noting	  how	  «Gadamer	  chooses	  the	  concept	  of	  disclosure.	  Language	  discloses	  our	  world,	  not	  our	  environmental	  scientific	  world,	  but	  our	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ignore	   the	   fact	   that	   at	   the	   level	   of	   single	  words	   the	   content-­‐idea	   can	  break	  down.	  Notable	   exceptions	   exist:	   an	   innovative	   or	   meaning-­‐charged	   word	   can	   become	   a	  content	   per	   se,	   but	   it	   is	   the	   meta-­‐text,	   be	   it	   an	   explanation,	   a	   consuetude	   or	   a	  tradition,	  which	  actually	  carries	  the	  burden	  of	  meaning	  and	  the	  content	  crystallized	  in	   the	   single	   word	   is	   actually	   broader	   than	   the	   graphic	   sign	   or	   the	   sound	  representing	  that	  word	  in	  language.	  	  Defining	  how	  much	  a	  content	  can	  be	  fragmented	  would	  be	  an	  herculean	  task,	  since	  the	  possible	  cases	  are	  endless	  (quite	   literally,	  since	  they	  augment	   in	  number	  while	  we	  write	   about	   them),	   but	   the	   opposite,	   the	   upper	   limit,	   is	   undeterminable	  even	  on	  a	  philosophical	   level.	  Since,	  as	  we	  explained,	  combination	  and	  relation	  are	  the	   determining	   factors	   in	   the	   characterization	   of	   a	   cultural	   content,	   the	  permutation	   of	   the	   same	   elements	   can	   spiral	   in	   an	   infinite	   series	   of	   content	   and	  meta-­‐discourse	   about	   content,	   becoming	   in	   turn	   another	   content	   to	   be	   discussed.	  We	  can	  transmit	  a	  content	  with	  something	  as	  short	  as	  a	  sentence	  (or	  a	  meaningful	  word,	   as	   said	   above)	  but	  we	   can	   similarly	  describe	   the	   entirety	  of	   the	  work	  of	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  lifeworld.»	   [Richard	   E.	   Palmer.	   Hermeneutics;	   Interpretation	   Theory	   in	   Schleiermacher,	  
Dilthey,	   Heidegger,	   and	   Gadamer.	   Evanston,	   Ill.:	   Northwestern	   University	   Press,	   1969,	   p.	  205]	   Gadamer	   discusses	   this	   all	   though	   Part	   III	   chapter	   3	   (‘Language	   as	   horizon	   of	   a	  hermeneutic	   ontology’)	   of	  Truth	  and	  Method,	   pp.	   397-­‐448.	   Among	   others,	   this	   passage	   is	  striking:	  «Our	  own	  language	  world,	  this	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live,	  is	  not	  a	  tight	  enclosure	  that	  hinders	   the	   knowing	   of	   things	   as	   they	   are;	   rather,	   it	   encompasses	   basically	   everything	  which	  our	   insight	   is	   able	   to	  broaden	  and	   lift	  up	   […]	  The	  world	   is	   always	  human,	   and	   this	  means	  a	  linguistically	  created	  world.»	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artist	   (e.g.	   Picasso’s	   cubism	   intended	   as	   a	   consistent	   content),	   a	   philosopher	   or	   a	  theologian	  as	  something	  to	  be	  transmitted	  and	  received.	  	  Can	  something,	  which	  is	  fragmentable	  to	  a	  variable	  degree	  and	  expandable	  to	  virtually	   infinite	   magnitudes,	   be	   conceived?	   The	   answer	   is	   that	   not	   only	   it	   is	  possible,	  but	  that	  we	  do	  as	  much	  every	  day,	  since	  we	  are	  constantly	  immersed	  in	  a	  language	   in	  which	   expressions	   like	   ideas,	   cultural	   ideas,	   cultural	   tradition	   appear	  necessarily.	  Our	  experience	  as	  individuals	  in	  a	  society	  and	  in	  a	  cultural	  tradition	  is	  inseparable	   from	   our	   encounter	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   cultural	   content.	  Recognizability,	   then,	   becomes	   a	   discriminating	   factor	   in	   our	   conceptualization	   of	  contents	   in	   a	   cultural	   transmission	   paradigm:	   but	  we	   should	   not	   confuse	   content	  with	  transmission	  and	  inheritance.	  	  The	  content	  is	  something	  inert,	  which	  may	  become	  the	  constituting	  core	  of	  a	  Legacy	   and	   be	   received	   as	   an	   object	   in	   an	   inheritance,	   but	   it	   is	   static	   and	  not	   the	  subject	  (but	  only	  the	  object)	  of	  change.	  We	  must	  understand	  that	  the	  content	  comes	  into	   being	   before	   interpretation	   and	   it	   is	   thus	   different	   from	   the	   text	  hermeneutically	  understood,	  which	  comes	  into	  being	  for	  the	  reader	  in	  and	  after	  the	  interpretative	  process.	  	  Content	  may	   be	   received	   and	   become	   part	   of	   an	   Inheritance,	   but	   it	   can	   be	  rejected	  as	  well,	  possibly	  giving	  birth	  to	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  negative	  inheritance,	  and	  since	   this	  happens	  without	   the	  content	  per	  se	  being	   transformed	  (being	   fixed	   in	  a	  static	  form),	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  is	  not	  the	  content	  per	  se	  to	  constitute	  an	  inheritance,	  but	  an	  attentive	  act	   is	   required	   to	  enter	   it	   into	  one.	  While	   it	   is	   true	   that	  we	  can	  never	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read	   twice	   the	  same	  content	   in	   the	  same	  way,	  we	  can	   indeed	  read	   twice	   the	  same	  content	   in	   its	   independent	   form.	   It	   is	   the	   reader	   (and	   thus	   the	   very	   process	   of	  reading)	  who	  is	  changing,	  disclosing	  a	  possible	  re-­‐interpretation	  or	  re-­‐reception	  of	  the	  content-­‐text.	  Dilthey	  can	  help	  us	  begin	  our	   inquiry,	  with	   the	  description	  of	   the	  historical	  
milieu	  that	  he	  provides	  in	  The	  Rise	  of	  Hermeneutics:	  going	  back	  to	  Schleiermacher,	  he	  states	  that	  the	  individuality	  of	  the	  exegete	  and	  that	  of	  the	  author	  (which	  is	  removed	  from	   the	   content)	   are	   not	   opposed:	   they	   are	   both	   formed	   upon	  what	   he	   calls	   the	  	  «substratum	   of	   human	   nature»8	  (der	   Grundlage	   der	   allgemeinen	   Menschennature)	  and	   he	   says	   that	   the	   interpreter	   is	   projecting	   his	   own	   “sense	   of	   life”	   into	   another	  historical	   milieu.	   This	   is	   key	   to	   the	   process	   of	   	   “recreation”9,	   which	   according	   to	  Dilthey	   is	   the	   fundamental	   feature	   in	   any	   process	   of	   interpretation	   and	  understanding.	  This	  is	  the	  potential	  innovation	  that	  is	  however	  partially	  lost	  in	  the	  work	   of	   Dilthey,	   who	   does	   not	   explore	   this	   further.	   To	   him,	   historical	   milieu	  constitutes	  a	  clear	  self-­‐standing	  concept	  and	  he	  is	  thus	  not	  interested	  in	  dissecting	  it	  further,	  in	  going	  to	  its	  conceptual	  roots.	  	  Let	  us	  analyze	  further	  this	  fertile	  concept	  of	  historical	  milieu.	  It	  is	  historical	  in	  that	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   chronological	   position	   of	   an	   individual	   (be	   it	   the	   subject	  individual	  who	  is	  performing	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  text	  or	  the	  object-­‐individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Dilthey,	  “The	  Rise	  of	  Hermeneutics”,	  trans.	  Federic	  Jameson,	  New	  Literary	  History,	  3,	  no.	  2	  (1972):	  229-­‐244,	  p.	  243.	  9	  See	  “The	  Rise	  of	  Hermeneutics”,	  note	  above,	  for	  a	  detailed	  description.	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author	  which	  is	  no	  more	  active	  but	  reduced	  to	  the	  voice	  that	  has	  spoken	  before	  but	  is	  now	  silent10)	  in	  a	  succession	  of	  men	  and	  groups	  of	  men.	  Milieu	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  immersion	  we	  have	  being	  discussing	  for	  the	  last	  few	  pages.	  The	  milieu	  is	  around	  us	  and	  does	  not	  change	  from	  person	  to	  person.	  We	  are	  in	  a	  milieu,	  and	  we	  can	  move	  in	  that	  milieu	  without	  changing	  it.	  This	  historical	  milieu	  is	  certainly	  a	  cultural	  concern:	  Dilthey	   is	   not	   referring	   to	   technology.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   after	   McLuhan11	  we	   can	  hardly	   separate	   an	   imaginary	   “human	   pure	   culture”	   from	   the	   reality	   of	   the	  technology	   of	   the	  world	  we	   live	   in	   any	  more;	   nonetheless,	   Dilthey	   focuses	   on	   the	  cultural	   dimension	   (in	   terms	   of	   knowledge	   and	   expression	   of	   such	   knowledge)	   of	  our	  world,	  which	  is	  intertwined	  but	  not	  coincident	  with	  our	  technological	  level.	  	  How,	  then,	   is	   this	  cultural	  world	  constructed?	  This	   is	  another	  problem	  with	  Dilthey’s	  definition:	   cultural	  milieu	  always	  assumes	  a	  group	  at	   large,	   sharing	  or	  at	  least	  participating	   in	   the	  same	  culture.	   If	   the	   interpreter	  projects	  his	  own	  sense	  of	  life	   (which	   appears	   to	   be	   personal),	   he	   projects	   it	   into	   a	   cultural	   milieu,	   which	  belongs	  to	  a	  time,	  not	  to	  an	  individual	  (the	  time	  of	  the	  author	  is	  not	  personal	  to	  the	  author:	   other	   individuals	   live	   in	   that	   time	   and	   share	   the	   culture	   of	   the	   silenced	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  It	   is	   indeed	   interesting	   how	   for	   the	   text	   to	   speak,	   we	   need	   the	   author	   to	   be	   silent.	  Interpreting	   the	   text	   is	   cutting	  out	   the	  viva	  voce	   of	   the	  one	  who	  wrote	   it,	  who	  becomes	   a	  factor,	  a	  condition	  for	  the	  object-­‐text	  and	  not	  a	  subject	  in	  any	  understanding	  of	  the	  word.	  11	  Cf.	   in	   particular	   Marshall	   McLuhan.	   The	   Gutenberg	   Galaxy:	   The	   Making	   of	   Typographic	  
Man.	  Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1962.	   I	  will	  not	  delve	   into	  McLuhan’s	   theories,	  here.	  However,	  in	  this	  masterpiece	  of	  his,	  McLuhan	  highlights	  a	  relation	  between	  the	  artist’s	  culture’s	   technological	   level	   and	  his	   own	  artistic	   production,	   and	   shows	  how	   ‘intellectual’	  and	  ‘artistic’	  progress	  cannot	  be	  dissociated	  from	  advancements	  in	  techné.	  
	   50	  
author	   of	   the	   to-­‐be-­‐interpreted	   content).	   While	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   individual	   has	  access	  to	  his	  time,	  this	  milieu	  is	  not	  ‘directly’	  his,	  but	  only	  derivatively	  (since	  he	  has	  no	  primary	  access	  to	  it,	  and	  must	  discover	  it	  in	  the	  interaction	  with	  the	  ‘others’	  who	  crowd	   his	   time).	   The	   cultural	   milieu	   is	   clearly	   intended	   as	   a	   shared	   reality,	  determined	  by	  time	  and,	  at	  most,	  geography;	  the	  individuals	  moving	  into	  it	  share	  it,	  with	  it	  being	  the	  same	  to	  them	  and	  remaining	  relatively	  same	  in	  the	  time	  of	  their	  life.	  We	  must	  remember	  that,	  to	  Dilthey,	  the	  cultural	  milieu	  of	  the	  author	  is	  the	  one	  of	  his	  
time	  intended	  as	  a	  general	  moment	  in	  history,	  not	  the	  one	  of	  the	  particular	  author-­‐subject	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  writing.	  	  These	  shared	  elements,	  then,	  are	  part	  of	  what	  I	  define	  as	  cultural	  density:	  it	  is	  an	   expression	   that	   needs	   to	   substitute	   the	   notions	   of	   Culture	   and	   even	   historical	  
milieu	  when	  dealing	  with	  individual	  experiences.	  First	  of	  all,	  our	  cultural	  density	  is	  a	  constantly	   changing	   reality,	   with	   nothing	   of	   the	   monolithic	   stability	   of	   culture:	   it	  changes	  not	  with	  historical	  evolution	  but	  with	  the	  personal	  experience	  of	  time.	  My	  cultural	  density	  is	  not	  today	  what	  it	  was	  two	  years	  ago	  and	  is	  not	  yet	  the	  same	  as	  it	  will	   be	   in	   a	   few	   years.	   Every	   time	   a	   content	   is	   encountered,	   our	   cultural	   density	  mutates,	   becoming	   denser:	   it	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   total	   sum	   of	   potential	   inheritances	  
available	   to	   us	   that	   we	   could,	   with	   an	   act	   of	   attention,	   bring	   to	   life	   as	   our	   actual	  
inheritances.	  	  Cultural	   density	   is	   always	   and	   absolutely	   individual.	  We	   do	   not	   share	   any	  part	  of	  it,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  certain	  contents	  can	  and	  will	  appear	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  individual	   cultural	   densities.	   This	   is	   not	   only	   because	   of	   our	   differences	   in	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inclination	   and	  approach,	   since	   these	   come	   into	   account	  only	  when	   the	   content	   is	  actualized	  as	  an	  inheritance	  through	  interpretation:	  interpretation	  comes	  after	  our	  possibility	   to	   access	   the	   content	   and	   cannot	   thus	   shape	   our	   cultural	   density.	   The	  irreproducibility	  of	  cultural	  density	  lives	  in	  the	  impossibility	  of	  having	  access	  to	  the	  very	  same	  sum	  of	  contents.	  Interestingly	  enough,	  the	  more	  interested	  and	  open	  we	  are	   to	   otherness,	   the	   less	   likely	   it	   becomes	   that	   we	   can	   have	   a	   significant	  overlapping	   of	   our	   cultural	   density	   and	   someone	   else’s	   one:	   vice	   versa,	   having	  access	  to	  the	  least	  possible	  variety	  of	  cultural	  contents	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  small	  and	   enclosed	   community)	   brings	   forward	   a	   higher	   level	   of	   coincidence	   between	  different	  cultural	  densities	  inside	  such	  a	  reality.	  Cultural	  density	  is	  something	  that	  is	  always	  already	  there;	  it	  predates	  us	  and	  defines	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  cultural	  world.	  	  We	  must	   inquire,	   though,	   about	   how	   these	   contents	   become	   available	   and	  present	  themselves	  to	  us.	  Our	  cultural	  density	  is	  the	  subset	  of	  content	  in	  our	  culture	  at	   large	  which,	   by	   virtue	   of	   accessibility,	   constitute	   potential	   inheritances	   for	   our	  individual	   and	   subjective	   cultural	   and	   philosophical	   system	   (with	   all	   the	   possible	  declinations	   in	   terms	   of	   ethics,	   religious	   and	   political	   views)	   but	   we	   are	   left	   to	  wonder	  where	  these	  contents	  come	  from.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  they	  cannot	  come	  from	  our	  inheritor-­‐self,	   since	   for	  us	   to	  encounter	   the	  contents	  as	  otherness	  and	  to	   integrate	  them	  into	  something-­‐our	  (our	  Inheritance	  as	  the	  system	  of	  all	  received	  inheritance-­‐s)	  they	  must	  necessarily	  find	  their	  origin	  elsewhere	  than	  from	  us;	  this	  elsewhere	  is	  always	  already	  there:	  while	  we	  can	  sometimes	  track	  down	  the	  historical	  origin	  of	  a	  single	   cultural	   content,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   imagine	   a	   human	   being	   (as	   part	   of	   a	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human	   race	   and	   of	   a	   subset	   of	   human	   culture)	   devoid	   of	   any	   degree	   or	   layer	   of	  cultural	  density.	  	  No	   matter	   how	   small	   the	   network	   of	   content	   accessible	   to	   the	   individual,	  something	  is	  always	  already	  there	  to	  be	  received	  in	  a	  cultural	  sense.	  From	  the	  oral	  tradition,	  the	  ballads	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  wisdom	  in	  non-­‐urbanized	  oral	  cultures	  to	  the	   vast	   interdisciplinary	   interaction	   of	   post-­‐modern	   and	   internet-­‐connected	  modern	  western	  society,	  ‘no	  man	  is	  an	  island’	  as	  Donne	  so	  beautifully	  summarizes,	  so	   aptly	   in	   an	   age	   (the	   17th	   century)	   in	   which	   the	   world	   is	   beginning	   to	   come	  together	   in	   a	  more	  unified	  way.	   It	   is	   not	   by	   chance	   that	   in	   the	   central	   part	   of	   the	  poem	   (far	   less	   famous	   than	   the	   incipit	   or	   the	   excipit)	   he	   speaks	   of	   continent	   and	  Europe	  as	  a	  unity	  which	  is	  found	  in	  any	  of	  its	  inhabitants:	  	  Every	  man	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  the	  continent,	  A	  part	  of	  the	  main.	  If	  a	  clod	  be	  washed	  away	  by	  the	  sea,	  Europe	  is	  the	  less.	  	  We	  are	  not	  islands,	  then,	  because	  mankind	  is	  already	  there	  and	  we	  are	  faced	  with	  at	  least	  a	  part	  of	  it.	  Something	  is	  always	  already	  there	  and	  we	  cannot	  imagine	  a	  man	   without	   an	   array	   of	   previous	   contents	   to	   be	   inherited.	   Adam,	   the	   first	   man,	  could	  very	  well	  be	  an	  exception,	  but	  even	  then	  the	  word	  of	  God	  would	  be	  present	  to	  him	  to	  receive	  and	  live	  by.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  he	  receives	  such	  a	  word	  directly	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and	  personally,	  without	  any	  cultural	  system	  (and	  even	  less	  any	  cultural	  density)	  to	  speak	   of.	   But	   we	   are	   not	   Adam,	   we	   live	   and	   think	   in	   a	   world	   of	   post-­‐Babelian	  language,	   in	   which	   the	   distinctiveness	   of	   our	   cultural	   density	   is	   inescapable	   and	  undisputable.	  	  We	   are	   left	   wandering,	   then,	   what	   this	   out	   there	   in	   which	   the	   sum	   of	   our	  inheritable	  contents	  is	  to	  be	  found	  can	  be.	  We	  found	  them	  out	  there,	  predating	  our	  decision	  of	  focusing	  on	  them,	  but	  how	  are	  they	  there?	  Heidegger	   (Being	   and	   Time,	   1927)	   provides	   a	   precious	   description	   of	   the	  They	  (das	  Man)	  as	  characterized	  by	  Being-­‐there-­‐too	  (Auch-­‐da-­‐sein)	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  Others.	   He	   then	   redefines	   the	   Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   of	   the	   Dasein	   as	   a	   Being-­‐with-­‐other	  (Mit-­‐dasein)12.	  Heidegger	  points	  out	  how	  these	  Others	  are	  «encountered	  from	  out	   of	   the	   world,	   in	   which	   concernfully	   circumspective	   Dasein	   essentially	   dwell»	  (1927,	  p	  121/157).	  	  In	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  world,	  language	  is	  the	  immediate	  medium	  via	  which	  we	   understand	   such	   a	   world:	   Gadamer	   in	   Truth	   and	   Method	   clearly	   shows	   how	  language	  is	  not	  ex-­‐post	  but	  a	  primary	  phenomenon,	  which	  is	  impossible	  for	  us	  not	  to	  experience	  when	  living	  in	  this	  world.	  The	  Heideggerian	  They,	  therefore,	  proves	  itself	  unsuitable	   to	   our	   effort	   of	   localization	  of	   the	   ‘where’	   of	   our	   cultural	   density,	   even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  notion	  of	  mit-­‐dasein	  recalls	  Schelling’s	  mit-­‐wissenschaft,	  especially	  since	  both	  rely	  on	  the	  constructive	  power	  of	   imagination	  for	  the	  disclosure	  of	  a	   ‘common’	  world	  shared	  with	  others.	   On	   the	   matter,	   see	   in	   particular	   Christopher	   S.	   Yates.	   The	   Poetic	   Imagination	   in	  
Heidegger	  and	  Schelling.	  London,	  UK:	  Bloomsbury,	  2013.	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more	   so	   when	   Heidegger	   stresses	   the	   inauthenticity	   of	   Idle	   Talk,	   which	   contains	  everything	  that	  is	  uttered	  by	  the	  They.	  	  We	   are,	   therefore,	   always	   already	   immersed	   in	   a	  world	   rich	  with	   contents,	  whose	  potentiality	  as	  inheritances	  (and	  more	  generally	  as	  received	  texts,	  instead	  of	  mere	   contents)	   is	   disclosed	   trough	   language	   and	   offered	   to	   us	   simultaneously	  (while,	   as	   we	   mentioned	   and	   will	   see	   later,	   inheritance	   is	   always	   a	   process	   fully	  localized	   in	   time)	   in	   a	   plurality	   of	   presentations.	   Heidegger’s	   presentation	   as	   the	  They-­‐I	   is	   problematic	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	   culture,	   so	   it	  may	  be	   fruitful	   to	   revert	   to	  Buber	  and	  the	  I-­‐Thou	  Nature	  of	  Man.	  	  Buber	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  the	  wholeness	  of	  Being	  (or,	  we	  shall	  say,	  relational	  Being)	   is	   always	   contained	   in	   the	   I-­‐Thou	   relation	   and	   never	   in	   the	   I-­‐It,	   quite	   the	  opposite	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  authenticity	  with	  which	  the	  I-­‐to-­‐present-­‐at-­‐hand	  relation	  is	  imbued	   in	   Being	   and	   Time.	   The	   I-­‐Thou,	   is	   the	   all-­‐comprehensive	   location	   of	  experience.	  It	  encompasses,	  therefore,	  more	  than	  what	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  here.	  	  We	  must	  also	  argue	  whether	  the	   I-­‐Thou,	  so	   focused	  on	  the	  non-­‐It	  nature	  of	  the	   Thou,	   can	   be	   applicable	   to	   the	   content	   which,	   while	   expression	   of	   an	   Other	  (constructible	   as	   a	   Thou)	   is	   not,	   per	   se,	   an-­‐Other,	   but	   only	   another	   discourse;	  nonetheless,	  Buber	  describes	  the	  realm	  of	  experiences	  as	  gravitating	  around	  sphere	  of	  Relations,	   and	  one	  of	   them	   is	   that	   of	   intelligible	   forms.	  Buber	   explains	  how	  we	  never	  experience	  a	  Thou,	  but	  we	  are	  always	  in	  a	  relation	  with	  it:	  in	  this	  sphere,	  the	  content	  could	  be	  re-­‐instated	   in	  our	  realm	  of	  experience	  as	   the	  underlying	  relation	  not	  to	  a	  Thou,	  but	  to	  a	  They.	  A	  new	  and	  different	  (non-­‐Heideggerian)	  They,	  that	   is	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re-­‐disclosed	  through	  our	  openness	  to	  the	  contents,	  a	  pre-­‐openess	  which	  is	  a	  relation	  (their	   relation	   to	   us	   in	   terms	   of	   availability,	   our	   relation	   to	   them	   in	   terms	   of	  intelligibility	  –	  we	  know	  they	  are,	  and	  we	  know	  we	  can	  access).	  	  The	   true	   relation	  by	  which	   cultural	   density	   and	   the	   contents	   are	   informed,	  thus,	   becomes	   a	   I-­‐You/They	   (with	   the	   plural	   You	   substituting	   the	   singular	   Thou)	  relation,	   which	   is	   always	   potential	   and	   ready	   to	   be	   actualized	   into	   an	   I-­‐Thou	  experiential	  instant,	  in	  which	  the	  projection	  of	  the	  I	  onto	  one	  content,	  via	  a	  moment	  of	  attention,	  breaks	   the	  collective	  nature	  of	   the	  You/They	  summoning	  the	  Thou	  of	  the	  Other,	  the	  authored	  text	  which	  implies	  the	  authoring	  author	  (but	  not	  necessarily	  the	   historical	   author,	   which	   is	   often	   eclipsed,	   as	   both	   Ricoeur	   and	   Barthes	  emphasize).	  	  This	  shifts	  require,	  consequently,	  a	  re-­‐imagining	  of	  Buber’s	  supreme	  relation,	  in	  which	  presence	  (of	  the	  content	  in	  the	  cultural	  density	  of	  the	  I	  and	  of	  the	  authoring	  Other	   in	   the	   content(s))	   substitutes	   grace:	   the	   meeting	   is	   no	   more	   primary,	   but	  always	  happens	  after	  the	  presence,	  a	  potentiality	  of	  meeting	  which	  is	  always	  already	  there.	   The	   living	   is	  meeting	   formula	   is	   shifted	   into	   a	   condition	   of	  meeting	  because	  living	   in	  a	  world	  of	  discourse,	  where	   the	   lust/theory	   is	   secondary	  and	   its	   collapse	  unnecessary:	  potentiality	   for	  understanding	  comes	  before	  potentiality	   for	  wanting,	  since	  we	  cannot	  want	  without	  thinking	  the	  thing	  that	  we	  want,	  and	  in	  accessing	  our	  thinking	  we	  access	  discourse,	  which	  in	  turns	  makes	  our	  cultural	  density	  possible	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  in	  which	  we	  are	  understanding	  the	  world	  in	  which	  our	  object	  of	  desire	  is	  situated.	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This	  new	  system	  of	  relations	  can	  overcome	  the	  diachrony	  between	  the	  past-­‐
ness	   of	   the	   I-­‐It	   (whose	   objects	   «subsist	   only	   in	   the	   time-­‐that-­‐has	   been»)	   and	   the	  
presentness-­‐meeting	  postulated	  by	  Buber	  as	   the	  primary	   locus	  existentiae	  of	   the	   I-­‐Thou.	   The	   crystallization	   of	   the	   Others	   into	   contents	   and	   the	   I-­‐They/You	   relation	  disclose	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  unified	  present-­‐past,	  since	  if	  it	  true	  that	  «true	  beings	  are	  lived	  in	  the	  present,	  [while]	  the	  life	  of	  objects	  is	  in	  the	  past»,	  the	  peculiar	  nature	  of	  the	  object-­‐[cultural]content	   	  as	  a	  potential	  voice	  of	  an-­‐other	  draws	  them	  back	   into	  the	  present	  of	  being,	  at	  least	  on	  a	  potential	  level.	  	  It	  must	  be	  clear,	  though,	  that	  this	  is	  strictly	  in	  a	  pre-­‐attention	  situation,	  if	  we	  want	   to	   remain	   true	   to	   at	   least	   the	   general	   paradigm	   of	   Buber’s	   philosophy:	   any	  actualization	   of	   the	   content	   (through	   the	   moment	   of	   conscious	   attention)	   would	  break	   the	  mutual	   relation	   (of	   a	  manifold	  of	   accessible	   contents	  with	  an	   individual	  capable	  of	  accessing	  them)	  and	  transform	  that	  into	  a	  subject-­‐object	  interaction,	  thus	  reverting	  to	  the	  I-­‐It	  schema	  and	  pushing	  back	  the	  content	  into	  a	  passive	  and	  static	  element	  only	  there	  to	  be	  experienced	  as	  object	  of	  a	  “mean”.	  	  Moreover,	  only	  while	  every	  single	  content	  is	  a	  potential	  individual	  encounter	  presented	   to	   the	   individual	   already	   immersed	   into	   the	   density,	   can	   it	   escape	   its	  assimilation	  in	  the	  many-­‐It	  and	  the	  “accumulation”	  of	  the	  It-­‐world	  into	  the	  cultural	  history	  of	   humanity.	  Buber	   is	   indeed	   convinced	   that	   the	   (inauthentic?)	   It-­‐world	   is	  grounded	  on	  culture	  but	  he	  appears	  to	  be	  referring	  to	  the	  practical	  aspects	  of	  such	  a	  culture	   (in	   terms	  of	  Economics	   and	  State),	   capable	  of	   enforcing	   a	   causality	  on	   the	  subject-­‐citizen,	   and	   not	   on	   the	   content	   as	   access	   to	   another	   Being.	   This	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interpretation	   (on	   which	  my	   elaboration	   on	   Buber	   is	   based)	   is	   reinforced	   by	   the	  passages	  of	  Freedom	  (from	  the	  many-­‐It)	  which	  is	  presented	  to	  us	  “in	  the	  Face”:	  the	  content	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  face,	  although	  not	  necessarily	  an	  historical	  face	  –	  the	  I	  of	  the	  I-­‐Thou	  (and	  of	  the	  I-­‐They/You)	  is	  a	  person	  in	  communality	  with	  another	  person.	  	  This	  localization	  of	  the	  contents	  must	  reconcile	  their	  nature	  of	  being	  always-­‐already-­‐there,	   available	   for	   us	   to	   use	  and	   thus	   ready-­‐at-­‐hand	   in	   the	   Heideggerian	  sense,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  authentic	  to	  the	  Dasein	  immersed	  in	  a	  world	  that	  is	  no	  more	  conceived	  as	  only	  a	  place	  of	  physical	  tools;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  contents	  are	  such	  before	   they	   become	   inheritances	   or	   are	   interpreted	   as	   texts:	   this	   allows	   them	   to	  come	   before	   the	   subjugation	   of	   their	   implied	   author	   to	   the	   attention/aim	   of	   the	  subject	  to	  whose	  cultural	  density	  they	  belong,	  thus	  escaping	  the	  reduction	  to	  the	  It-­‐world	  of	  the	  many-­‐it	  that	  Buber	  depicts	  as	  robbing	  Man	  of	  his	  Nature.	  It	  is	  indeed	  a	  fine	   line,	   but	   one	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   traced	   if	  we	  want	   to	   understand	  what	   kind	   of	  relation	  exists	  between	  the	  soon-­‐to-­‐be	  interpreters	  and	  the	  potential	  objects	  of	  their	  interpretation.	  Going	  back	  to	  Donne,	  we	  are	  a	  part	  of	  the	  main,	  but	  the	  main	  is	  there	  for	  us	  and	  for	  us	  only.	  The	  main	  –	  intended	  as	  the	  system	  of	  relations	  which	  I	  feel	  part	  of	  I	  am	  part	  of	  and	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  the	  ideas	  and	  contents	  I	  can	  have	  access	  to	  -­‐	  is	  not	  the	  same	  main	  of	  my	  Neighbor	  or	  at	  least	  it	  is	  not	  the	  same	  main	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  read	  this	  main	  as	  the	  milieu	  once	  again,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  understand	  ‘every	  man’	  not	  as	  an	  expression	  about	  the	  individual,	  but	  once	  again	  as	  a	  commentary	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  man	  as	  part	  of	  a	  group	  of	  men.	  In	  this	  case,	  Donne	  would	  be	  telling	  us	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nothing	   (since	   it	   is	   evident	   that	  we	   live	  beside	  other	  men,	   if	   it	   is	   only	   a	  matter	  of	  proximity).	  
	  	  Our	  cultural	  density	  is	  nothing	  else	  than	  the	  human	  reality	  we	  are	  immersed	  in	   as	   a	   thinking	   mind:	   our	   embodiment	   shapes	   it	   but	   not	   fully	   determines	   it,	  especially	  in	  an	  era	  in	  which	  information	  is	  immediately	  accessible	  without	  physical	  constraint	  and	  absolutely	  pervasive,	  not	  only	  to	  the	  point	  that	  Europe	  is	  the	  less,	  but	  so	   that	   virtually	   the	   entire	   world	   is	   collapsed	   into	   accessibility	   at	   the	   reach	   of	   a	  (digital)	   fingertip.	   The	   reduction	   of	   distance,	   though,	   is	   always	   experienced	   in	  potentiality:	   there	   is	   no	   relation	   between	   this	   constantly	   increasing	   amount	   of	  information	   (and	   information	  about	   this	   information)	  and	   the	  actualization	  of	   this	  potential	   into	   the	   cultural	   input	   and	   output	   of	   an	   individual,	   in	   terms	   of	   notions,	  vocabulary,	   prima	   face	   experiences	   of	   different	   countries,	   etc.	   Thus,	   what	   is	  expanding	  is,	  once	  again,	  not	  our	  Culture	  (beside	  the	  problematic	  limitation	  of	  this	  concept	  I	  tackled	  earlier)	  but	  our	  cultural	  density.	  	  Contents	  are	  then	  present	  in	  a	  state	  of	  accessibility,	  a	  readiness-­‐to-­‐mind,	  so	  to	   speak,	  which	   is	   ungrounded	   in	   Being	   and	  Time,	   but	  which	   is	   around	   us	   in	   our	  every-­‐day	  experience.	  Cultural	  density	  is	  always	  tied	  to	  the	  present	  and	  expands	  in	  a	  fluid	  environment,	  with	  a	  model	  that	  traditional	  notions	  of	  Tradition	  and	  Culture	  fail	  to	  frame.	  We	  should	  be	  reminded,	  here,	  of	  Deleuze’s	  notion	  of	  Difference	  as	  a	  model	  for	  self-­‐modifying	  unstable	  Ideas.	  He	  writes	  in	  his	  Difference	  and	  Repetition:	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The	  Idea	  of	  Fire	  subsumes	  fire	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  single	  continuous	  mass	  capable	   of	   increase.	   The	   Idea	   of	   Silver	   subsumes	   its	   object	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	  liquid	   continuity	  of	   fine	  metal.	  However,	  while	   it	   is	   true	   that	   continuousness	  must	  be	  related	  to	  Ideas	  and	  to	  their	  problematic	  use,	  this	  is	  on	  condition	  that	  it	  be	  no	  longer	  defined	  by	  characteristics	  borrowed	  from	  sensible	  intuition	  […]	  Continuity	  truly	  belongs	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  Ideas	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  an	  ideal	  cause	  of	  continuity	  is	  determined.	  13	  	  The	  model	  of	  difference	  is	  the	  most	  fitting	  when	  addressing	  the	  problem	  (in	  the	   “problematic”	   Deleuzian	   sense,	  which	   is	   one	   of	   organizing	   and	   understanding	  the	   world,	   with	   problematization	   becoming	   not	   an	   hindrance,	   but	   a	   resource	   of	  intellect)	  of	  cultural	  density,	  which	  as	  we	  said	  cannot	  be	  subject	  of	  hard	  limits,	  both	  horizontally	   (it	   is	   slightly	   different	   for	   people	   sharing	   a	   large	   number	   of	   cultural	  contents)	  and	  vertically	  (my	  cultural	  density	  today	  is	  built	  upon	  but	  not	  coincident	  with	  my	  cultural	  density	  as	  it	  was	  yesterday).	  The	  cause	  of	  continuity,	   in	  this	  case,	  would	  be	   the	  being	   at	  my	  disposal,	   in	  differential	   opposition	   to	   all	   those	   contents	  that	   are	   not	   anymore	   or	   not	   yet	   within	   my	   metaphorical	   and	   practical	   reach.	  Deleuze	   explains	   how	   difference	   is	   not	   just	   diversity	   or	   otherness,	   since	   it	   is	  grounded	  in	  what	  is	  shared.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  culture	  as	  shared,	  that	  we	  had	  to	  renounce	  a	  few	  pages	  ago	  in	  face	  of	  the	  incompatibility	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  our	  experience,	  can	  thus	  be	  reintroduced,	  not	   anymore	   as	   something	   strongly	   coherent	   and	   cogent,	   but	   as	   a	   function	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Paul	  Patton.	  Difference	  and	  Repetition.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1994,	  p.	  171.	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product	   of	   our	   personal	  difference,	   which	   is	   established	   as	   an	   expression	   of	  what	  Deleuze	  refers	  to	  as	  “univocal	  Being”;	  we	  are	  part	  of	  many	  cultures,	  which	  become	  therefore	   nothing	   else	   than	   subsets	   of	   our	   cultural	   density	   that	   are	   shared	   with	  others,	  to	  whom	  (and	  to	  us	  as	  well)	  they	  represent	  not	  the	  overarching	  limit	  of	  the	  horizon	   of	   cultural	   accessibility	   (as	   it	   was	   the	   case	   in	   the	   old	   notion	   of	   national,	  continental	   or	   traditional	   culture)	   but	   a	   lower	   limit	   of	   aggregation	   for	   a	   social	  understanding	  and	  collocation	  of	  the	  contents.	  	  Interestingly	   enough,	   the	   German	   notion	   of	   Bildung	   (to	   which	   Gadamer	  dedicates	   much	   attention	   in	   Truth	   and	   Method14),	   often	   translated	   as	   Culture,	  includes	  a	  personal	  and	  developmental	  nature,	  which	  supports	  and	  helps	  delimiting	  the	  notion	  of	  cultural	  density:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  individual,	  since	  it	  includes	  both	  Culture	  at	  large	  (which	  is	  shared)	  and	  formatio/education,	  which	  is	  always	  singular	  and	  different	  from	  person	  to	  person.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  though,	  it	  is	  always	   conceived	   as	   developed	   through	   time,	   connected	   to	   personal	   history	   and	  fragmented	  into	  steps	  of	  an	  ever-­‐evolving	  process.	  	  Bildung	  is	  the	  self-­‐conscious	  counterpart	  to	  cultural	  density:	  when	  a	  content	  is	  accessed,	  it	  moves	  from	  it	  into	  Bildung;	  cultural	  density	  can	  then	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  outer	  limit	  of	  Bildung,	  constituting	  at	  the	  same	  time	  its	  limes	  and	  its	  potentiality	  of	   expansion.	   Hegel	   believed	   that	   «philosophy	   has	   in	   Bildung	   the	   condition	   of	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  in	  particular	  Part	  I,	  Section	  B.1	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existence» 15 ,	   since	   Bildung	   provides	   the	   promotion	   to	   universality	   crucial	   to	  philosophy.	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   whatsoever,	   then,	   that	   cultural	   density	   cannot	  provide	   the	   condition	   for	   a	   mature	   and	   developed	   philosophizing:	   no	   surprise,	  though,	  since	  we	  have	  already	  defined	  it	  as	  previous	  to	  any	  elaboration.	  Potentiality,	  and	  not	  actualization	  in	  theory,	  is	  the	  core	  of	  this	  array	  of	  contents	  available	  to	  us.	  	  Similarly	  useful	  in	  a	  negative	  definition	  of	  cultural	  density	  (i.e.	  saying	  what	  it	  is	  different	  from,	  to	  avoid	  confusions)	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  sensus	  communis,	  which	  Fichte	  and	  Hegel	  reprise	  from	  Vico	  and	  that	  has	  been	  a	  relevant	  notion	  in	  both	  Reception	  Theory	  and	  deconstruction.	  Vico’s	  sensus	  communis	  is	  indeed	  acquired	  by	  living	  and	  circumstantial,	   just	   like	   cultural	   density	   is;	   it	   is	   also	   not	   thought	   out,	   but	   felt	  immediately,	  as	  a	   series	  of	   images	  of	  probability.	  However,	   it	  differs	   from	  cultural	  density	  in	  two	  main	  ways:	  1. it	   is	  “communis”,	  meaning	  that	   it	   is	  completely	  shared.	  The	  individuality	  is	  lost;	  its	  social	  nature	  is	  well	  exemplified	  by	  Bergson	  who	  writes	  «tandis	  que	  les	  autres	  séns	  nous	  mettent	  en	  rapport	  avec	  de	  choses,	   le	  bon	  séns	  preside	  à	  nos	  relations	  avec	  des	  personnes»	  (Ecrit	  et	  Broles,	  p.	  8).	  2. it	  involves	  judgment	  (although	  based	  on	  probability	  rather	  than	  on	  truth).	  This	  means,	  going	  back	  to	  Gadamer,	  that,	  contrary	  to	  appearance	  (and	  to	  Vico’s	  explanation),	  it	  comes	  after	  interpretation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Hegel,	  Georg	  W.	  F,	  Michael	  George,	  and	  Andrew	  Vincent.	  The	  Philosophical	  Propaedeutic.	  Oxford,	  UK:	  B.	  Blackwell,	  1986,	  p.	  45.	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It	   should	   be	   noted	   how	   Shaftesbury	   equates	   Sensus	   Communis	   with	   sympathy:	  while	  this	  takes	  away	  judgment	  and	  theorization,	  it	  also	  destroys	  the	  value	  of	  sensus	  communis	   in	  Vico’s	   sense	   of	   it	   as	   a	   first	  mode	  of	   explanation	  of	   the	  world.	   If	   it	   is	  reduced	   to	   a	   sympathetic	   inclination	   to	   access	   certain	   “otherness-­‐es”,	   it	   can	   be	  reinstated	  as	  cultural	  density,	  but	  we	  must	  travel	  far	  from	  its	  original	  definition.	  	  The	  chronological	  extension	  of	  Bildung,	  to	  which	  we	  will	  have	  to	  come	  back,	  is	   absent	   in	   the	   cultural	   density	   that,	   being	   unconceived	   and	   always	   before	  thematization,	  can	  only	  be	  felt	  in	  the	  “now”.	  Temporally,	  indeed,	  my	  cultural	  density	  is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   absolutely	   present.	   While	   the	   availability	   of	   individual	  contents	  must	  have	  been	  presented	  to	  us	  “before”	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  our	  cultural	  density	   is	   displayed	   to	   our	   mind	   as	   reachable,	   it	   is	   only	   the	   present	   situation	   in	  which	   we	   are	   immersed	   that	   can	   be	   relevant	   to	   our	   experience	   of	   the	  cultural/historical	  milieu.	  What	   is	   not	   yet	   available,	   despite	   its	   possible	   existence	  
simultaneously	  to	  our	  cultural	  density,	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  it.	  	  The	   possible	   irrelevance	   of	   a	   content	   to	   our	   intellectual	   system,	   as	  well,	   is	  irrelevant,	   since	   accessibility	   is	   the	   only	   condition	   discriminating	   against	   certain	  contents	   (those	   unknown	   to	   us	   and	   potentially	   unavailable).	   Immediacy	   is	   the	  crucial	  dimension:	  what	  is	  accessible	  to	  us	  immediately	  is	  not	  to	  be	  discovered,	  but	  only	   to	   be	   explored.	  While	   it	   is	   certainly	   true	   that	  when	   actualized	   as	   intellectual	  experiences	  (and	  inheritances)	  most	  of	  the	  contents	  will	  disclose	  the	  notion	  and	  the	  accessibility	   of	   further	   ones	   (thus	   expanding	   our	   cultural	   density	   through	   this	  disclosure,	   in	  a	  self-­‐multiplying	  process	  only	  partially	  connected	  to	  our	  freedom	  of	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choice),	   this	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	   immediate	   now	   which	   shapes	   our	   realm	   of	  accessibility.	   The	   time	   of	   this	   “now”	   is	   different	   from	   the	   time	   of	   the	   reader,	   the	  interpreter	  and	  the	   inheritor:	   it	  precedes	   it	  and	  prefigures	   it,	  but	   is	  always	  before.	  My	  being	  “now”	  immersed	  in	  contents	  is	  shaped	  by	  what	  I	  am	  reading-­‐now,	  but	  it	  is	  projected	  forward:	  what	  I	  am	  reading-­‐now	  is	  constantly	  re-­‐determining	  what	  I	  am	  potentially	  going	  to	  access	  “soon”.	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  messianic	  quality	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  contents	  in	  the	  “out	  there”:	  while	  they	  are	  absolutely	  relevant	  (they	  are,	  after	  all,	  there	  to	  be	  experienced	  by	  me	  and	   conversely	   they	   limit	   the	   scope	   of	   my	   possible	   immediately	   future	   cultural	  experience)	  and	  define	  me	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  culture	  I	  am	  immersed	  in,	  they	  can	  never	  be	   completely	   present16.	   My	   cultural	   density	   is	   not	   my	   erudition	   (my	   Buildung).	  Contents	  flow	  constantly	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other,	   from	  the	  presence	  of	  memory	  and	  knowledge	   to	   the	  potential,	  de-­‐personalized	   immediacy	  of	  availability	  at	   the	  reach	  “of	   a	   fingertip”.	   We	   say	   “I	   cannot	   remember”	   to	   avoid	   admitting	   “I	   don’t	   know”,	  afraid	  of	   the	   latter	   re-­‐consigning	   the	   forgotten	   content	   to	   anonymity,	   ignoring	   the	  space	  of	  accessibility	  disclosed	  by	  cultural	  content:	  what	   is	  not	  alien	  to	  us,	  but	  not	  immediately	  present	  either.	  The	  truth	   is	   that	  most	  of	  what	  we	  claim	  to	  remember,	  we	   only	   have	   in	   our	   realm	   of	   availability,	   since	   genuine	  memorization	   is	   rare,	   at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  We	   are	   reminded	   of	   the	   Talmudic	   story,	   in	   which	   Rabbi	   Joshua	   Levi	   cannot	   ask	   the	  Messiah	  anything	  else	  than	  “When	  wilt	  thou	  come	  Master?”	  (Sanhedrin	  98a).	  Similarly,	  we	  can	  only	  wonder,	   about	  a	   content	   that	  abides	  our	  cultural	  density,	   “When	  will	   I	   access	   it?	  When	  will	  I	  conquer	  it?	  When	  will	  I	  know	  it?”	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least	   for	   intellectuals	  of	  my	  generation,	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  excess	  of	   information	  both	  contemporary	  and	  ancestral.	  	  Since	  cultural	  density	   is	   the	   locus	  of	  contents	  before	  they	  are	  accessed,	   it	   is	  outside	   the	   sphere	  of	   competence	  of	  our	  historical	   consciousness;	   it	   comes	  before	  any	  temporal	  consideration.	  In	  it,	  voices	  of	  ages	  past	  and	  the	  most	  recent	  discussion	  on	   contemporaneity	   are	   present	   in	   the	   same	   way,	   since	   the	   possibility	   of	   our	  experiencing	   it	   is	   primary	   and	   divested	   of	   any	   consideration	   of	   historicality.	   In	  contemplating	   this	   indiscernible	  present	   (since	  discerning	   is	   interpreting	  and	   that	  belongs	  to	  the	  now	  of	   the	  reader)	  we	  must,	  as	  Voegelin	  aptly	  explains,	  «beware	  of	  the	   fallacy	   of	   transforming	   the	   consciousness	   of	   an	   unfolding	   mystery	   into	   the	  gnosis	  of	  a	  progress	  in	  time»17	  (Order	  and	  History,	  v.	  2	  The	  World	  of	  The	  Polis,	  p.	  5).	  	  Cultural	   density	   does	   not	   ‘progress’,	   it	   is	   only	   different	   from	   anyone	   else’s	  and	   different	   from	   itself	   in	   the	   future	   and	   in	   the	   past,	   without	   any	   teleological	  constriction.	   Epistemologically,	   it	   comes	   before	   what	   Gadamer	   defines	   as	   the	  “historical	   ‘becoming	   aware’”18,	   the	   most	   important	   modern	   revolution	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Eric	   Voegelin,	   and	   Athanasios	   Moulakis.	   Order	   and	   History:	   Volume	   II:	   The	   World	   of	   the	   Polis.	  Columbia,	  MO:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  2000,	  p.	  5.	  18	  The	  “becoming	  aware”	  or	  “prise	  de	  conscience”	  was	  a	  reprise	   from	  Ricoeur’s	  Histoire	  et	  
Vérité,	  which	   had	   been	   published	   three	   years	   before	   the	   conferences	   in	   Louvain	   which	  constitute	   Le	   Problème	   de	   la	   Conscience	   Historique.	   In	   his	   work	   Ricoeur	   was	   interested	  mainly	   in	  what	   he	   called	   the	   “philosophical	   reception”	   of	   history	   and	   only	   addressed	   the	  “Short	  History	  of	  the	  Self”	  insofar	  as	  it	  could	  be	  rescued	  by	  the	  overarching	  “Long	  History	  of	  Consciousness”	   (Ricoeur,	   Histoire	   et	   Vérité,	   Paris:	   Éd.	   du	   Seuil,	   1955,	   p.	   39-­‐40),	   and	  subjectivity	  was	  thus	  discussed	  only	  after	  the	  conscious	  (attentive)	  moment.	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grounding	  of	  his	  hermeneutics.	  Gadamer	   intuited	   the	  existence	  of	   such	  a	   space,	   to	  which	  he	  hints	  when	  discussing	   the	  need	  of	   relativism	  to	  conceive	   the	  plurality	  of	  content	  and	  disengage	  from	  the	  Kampf	  der	  Weltanschauungen19.	  He	  says	  that	  before	  the	  development	  of	  historical	   sense,	  we	  are	   trapped	   in	   the	  basic	  naiveté	  of	   seeing	  things	   “just	   as	   they	   are”	   (“Problemes	   épistémologiques	   de	   Sciences	   Humaines”	   in	  
Probleme	  de	  la	  Conscience	  Historique).	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  account	   for	   this	  naïve	  and	   immediate	   dimension	   of	   our	   access	   to	   culture,	   since	   he	   is	   worried	   with	   the	  establishment	  of	  historical	  consciousness,	  which	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  prerequisite	  and	  a	  product	  of	  Hermeneutics.	  	  The	   contents,	   not	   yet	   accessed,	   are	   suspended	   in	   a	   non-­‐temporal	   display,	  since	  as	  we	  explained	   they	  are	  not	  yet	   thematised	   in	  any	   sort	  of	  historical	  milieu,	  which	   would	   require	   awareness	   and	   theorization	   of	   the	   contents	   themselves.	  Ricoeur	   is	  crystal	  clear	  when	  he	  explains	   that	  «time	  becomes	  human	  to	   the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  articulated	  through	  a	  narrative	  mode,	  and	  narrative	  attains	  its	  full	  meaning	  when	  it	  becomes	  a	  condition	  of	  temporal	  existence»	  (Time	  and	  Narrative,	  p.	  52):	  it	  is	  clear	   that	   no	   narrative	   can	   predate	   our	   accessing	   the	   contents	   and	   the	   individual	  meaning	  of	  them	  is	  not	  part	  of	  one’s	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  we	  arrange	  our	  access	  to	  yet-­‐to-­‐be-­‐known	  contents	  in	  a	  functional	  manner	  (distinguishing,	  e.g.,	  what	  we	  can	  access	  momentarily,	  what	  we	  need	  to	  “check”	  in	  terms	  of	  sources	  and	  what	  we	  know	  it	  exists	  but	  have	  no	  way	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Literally	  “War	  of	  Visions	  of	  the	  World”,	  but	  it	  has	  convincingly	  been	  translated	  as	  Culture	  War.	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accessing,	   since	   we	   do	   not	   know	   where	   to	   look	   for),	   but	   this	   is	   more	   of	   a	  geographical,	   spatial,	   methodological	   categorization	   then	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   time.	  Moreover,	   such	   a	   categorization	   would	   already	   be	   a	   byproduct	   of	   memory,	   a	  consequence	  of	  a	  choice,	  and	  thus	  subjected	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  “I”	  as	  reader	  and	  interpreter,	   thus	   losing	   the	   immediacy	   of	   cultural	   density,	   which	   always	   comes	  
before	  the	  moment	  of	  attention.	  To	  summarize,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  for	  a	  content	  to	  be	  inherited	  a) it	  needs	  to	  be,	  indeed,	  an	  intellectual/cultural	  content;	  we	  saw	  how	  contents	   are	   always	   defined	   ex-­‐post,	   after	   having	   accessed	   them,	  since	  we	   lack	  a	  clear,	   shared	  and	   incontestable	  definition	  of	  what	  can	  be	  constructed	  as	  a	  cultural	  content,	  despite	  having	  a	  general	  idea	  of	  it.	  b) It	   needs	   to	   be	   accessible.	   We	   have	   shown	   how	   the	   concept	   of	  Culture	   (capitalized	   and	   paired	   with	   a	   definer,	   an	   adjective	   à	   la	  “American”,	   “academic”,	   “post-­‐modern”,	   etc.)	   fails	   to	   grasp	   the	  absolute	  individuality	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  contents.	  c) It’s	  “out	  there”	  before	  being	  accessed.	  This	  has	  brought	  us	  to	  define	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  contents	  qua	  accessible,	  before	  interpretation.	  	  Consequently,	  departing	   from	  the	   inauthentic	  They	  of	  Heidegger	  and	   from	  the	   too	  narrow	  (and	  post-­‐interpretational)	  I-­‐Thou	  of	  Buber,	  we	  tried	  to	  develop	  a	  place	  for	  the	  I-­‐You/They	  dynamic	  and	  we	  have	  called	  such	  a	  space	  cultural	  density.	  We	  have	  distinguished	  this	  from	  Bildung	  and	  from	  Common	  Sense.	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Now	  that	  we	  have	  delimited	  the	  status	  of	  the	  contents	  before	  interpretation,	  we	  must	  inquire	  into	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  these	  contents,	  available	  to	  us	  but	  not	  yet	   relevant,	   are	  brought	   into	  our	   consciousness	   and	  how	   they	  become	   important	  via	  a	  prise	  de	  conscience,	  i.e.	  the	  moment	  of	  attention.	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Chapter	  2:	  The	  moment	  of	  Attention.	  	  After	  defining	  what	  we	   refer	   to	  by	   “content”	   and	  having	   explored	  what	  we	  call	  cultural	  density,	  I	  must	  now	  move	  onto	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention;	  attention	   is	   the	   necessary	   link	   (both	   conceptual	   and	   chronological)	   between	   the	  content	  as	  undistinguished	  potentiality	  in	  cultural	  density	  and	  their	  actualization	  in	  interpretation.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  collocation	  in	  time	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  and	  underline	  how	  the	  physical,	  mathematical	  “time	  of	  the	  clock”	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  our	  experience	  of	  attention.	  I	  will	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  always	  experienced	   momentarily	   and	   as	   a	   ‘now’,	   but	   also	   give	   account	   of	   the	   difference	  between	   this	   ‘now’	   as	   a	   precise	   moment	   on	   one	   side	   and	   the	   ‘now’	   of	   historical	  situation	  and	  the	  ‘now’	  of	  cultural	  density	  on	  the	  other.	  	  I	  will	  reflect	  on	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  ‘heard	  of’	  and	  show	  how	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  our	  possibility	  for	  turning	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  content.	  Expanding	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘hearing	  of’	  and	  comparing	   it	  with	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘hearing/listening’,	   I	  will	  show	  how	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  is	  exactly	  what	  divides	  the	  former	  from	  the	  latter.	  I	  will	  explain	  how	  Dilthey’s	  and	  Gadamer’s	  notion	  of	  personal	  sense	  of	  history	  as	  the	  first	  moment	  of	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  contents	  fails	  to	  give	  account	  of	  attention,	  which	  needs	  to	  pre-­‐date	  historicization	  in	  our	  cultural	  experience.	  	  I	  will	  also	  expand	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  attention	  and	  attentiveness,	  and	  show	   how	   the	   absolute	   instantaneous	   nature	   of	   the	   former	   strides	   with	   the	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prolonged	  process	  constituted	  by	  the	  latter.	  I	  will	  show	  how	  attentiveness	  relies	  on	  attention	   to	   become	   actual,	   and	   therefore	   inquire	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   attention	  proper,	  in	  relation	  with	  both	  our	  senses	  and	  our	  concepts.	  During	  this	  exploration,	  I	  will	   refer	   to	   exemplar	   cases	   from	  Art	   and	   Literature,	   in	   order	   to	   offer	   the	   reader	  some	  examples	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  themes	  even	  outside	  philosophy	  proper.	  	  Finally,	  I	  will	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  us	  to	  make	  attention	  the	  subject	  of	  our	  study,	   but	   why	   we	   must,	   nonetheless,	   give	   an	   account	   of	   its	   implications	   before	  moving	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   interpretation	   and	   Inheritance.	   I	   will	   show	   how	   the	  expectation-­‐value	  of	  attention	  is	  crucial	  to	  our	  exerting	  it	  over	  an	  object.	  This	  notion	  of	   expectation	   will	   be	   important	   even	   for	   interpretation,	   and	   it	   is	   therefore	  important	  to	  discuss	  its	  role	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  that	  always	  comes	  first.	  	  	  We	  have	  defined	  the	  space	  of	   the	  pre-­‐interpreted	  contents	  (i.e.	  our	  cultural	  density)	  as	  a	  space	  of	  contemporaneity,	  a	  ‘now’	  which	  is	  always	  ‘before’	  our	  access	  to	   the	   content,	   while	   remaining	   in	   the	   space	   of	   our	   accessibility	   and	   thus	   being	  always	   at-­‐the-­‐same-­‐time	  with	   our	   chronological	   collocation	   in	   the	   stream	   of	   time	  and	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  all	  other	  contents.	  The	  passing	  of	  time	  shapes	  and	  modifies	  cultural	  density	  in	  its	  components,	  with	  new	  potential	  interpretation	  appearing	  into	  our	  reach	  and	  other	  exiting	  the	  range	  of	  our	  possibilities	  for	  attention;	  however,	   it	  does	  not	  change	  the	  status	  of	  contemporaneity	  between	  the	  contents	  and	  between	  the	  contents	  and	  us,	  since	  we	  are	  always	  immersed	  in	  it,	  and	  it	  contains	  all	  the	  non	  interpreted	  contents	  at	  the	  same	  time.	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The	   moment	   in	   which	   such	   contents	   have	   entered	   our	   range	   of	   potential	  access,	   their	  movement	   from	  elsewhere	   into	   the	   sphere	   of	   our	   cultural	   density,	   is	  made	  irrelevant	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  is	  over.	  The	  contents	  over	  which	  we	  could	  exert	  access	  (since	   cultural	   density	   is	   always	   in	   a	   state	   of	   potentiality,	   and	   the	   content	   is	   only	  actualised	  ‘later’)	  are	  pre-­‐presented1	  to	  us	  without	  any	  regard	  for	  the	  when	  of	  their	  appearance	   into	   the	  range	  of	  our	  accessibility:	   their	  (pre-­‐)presence	   in	   the	   ‘now’	  of	  cultural	  density	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  chronological	  systematizations,	  they	  do	  not	  belong	   to	   history	   by	   themselves.	   Writing	   history	   and	   being	   written	   as	   parts	   of	  history	  would	  presuppose	  an	  interpretation;	  this	  cannot	  happen	  before	  a	  moment	  of	  representation,	  which	  can	  only	  happen	   through	  attention	  and	  can	  only	  be	  exerted	  over	   these	   pre-­‐presented	   contents.	   These	   contents	   must	   therefore	   exist	   to	   us	   a-­‐historically	   and,	   to	   the	   degree	   that	   chronological	   order	   is	   conceived	   by	  consciousness,	  a-­‐temporally.	  Insofar	  as	  we	  inhabit	  our	  cultural	  density,	  we	  are	  immersed	  in	  an	  a-­‐temporal	  world,	  and	  only	  our	  state	  of	  not-­‐interpretation	  of	  the	  contents	  tells	  us	  apart	  from	  the	  Tralfamadorians,	   the	   bizarre	   aliens	   of	   Slaughterhouse	   N.	   5,	   which	   Kurt	   Vonnegut	  depicts	   as	   seeing	   all	   that	   has	   happened	   and	   has	   been	   spoken	   in	   absolute	  contemporaneity:	  they	  do	  not	  understand	  time	  as	  a	  discernible	  variation;	  everything	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  state	  cannot	  be	  a	  presentation,	  since	  they	  are	  not	  actually	  present	  to	  us.	  They	  are	  not	  read,	  accessed	  or	  interpreted,	  but	  are	  there	  to	  be	  made	  present	  only	  by	  an	  act	  of	  attention.	  They	  are	  not	  re-­‐presented,	  since	  our	  consciousness	  is	  not	  the	  eminent	  source	  of	  them,	  not	  more	   than	   it	   is	   the	   source	   of	   our	  World	   at	   large.	   Nonetheless,	   they	   are	   in	   a	   state	   of	   pre-­‐presentation,	  since	  they	  are	  already	  in	  the	  condition	  to	  be	  represented	  and	  made	  present.	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is	  present	  to	  them	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  contemporaneity;	  yet,	  such	  a	  simultaneity	  is	  not	  one	  of	  time,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  conceive	  of	  time	  and	  things	  and	  events	  are	  only	  ‘there’2.	  We	  are	   in	   the	   same	   relation	   to	   the	   cultural	   contents	   surrounding	   us:	   they	   are	   not	  discernable	  or	  discerned,	  since	  the	  time	  of	  their	  author	  or	  of	  their	  source	  can	  only	  be	  disclosed	  at	   the	  moment	  and	   in	  virtue	  of	  our	   interpretation	  of	  what	   the	  content	   is	  and	  of	  how	  it	  is	  transmitted	  to	  us.	  	  We	   are	   as	   much	   immersed	   in	   and	   influenced	   by	   time	   as	   originators	   of	  contents	   (as	   we	   will	   see)	   as	   we	   are	   absolutely	   independent	   from	   time	   in	   our	  inhabiting	  our	  cultural	  density.	  The	  possibility	  of	  reading	  is	  only	  dependent	  on	  the	  accessibility	  -­‐	  and	  not	  on	  the	  dated-­‐ness	  or	  novelty	  -­‐	  of	  the	  content	  itself:	  the	  next,	  new-­‐to-­‐me,	  Euripide’s	   tragedy	   can	  be	   there	   for	  us,	   yet-­‐to-­‐be-­‐accessed,	   as	  much	   as	  the	  last	  winner	  of	  the	  Prix	  Goncourt.	  	  This	  personal	  now	  is	  not,	  therefore,	  developed	  and	  expressed	  into	  the	  now	  of	  the	  clock,	  nor	  in	  the	  now	  of	  cultural	  awareness,	  although	  it	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  latter	  and	  certainly	  changes,	  slightly,	  with	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  first.	  ‘Internal	  time’3,	  arguably	   the	   locus	   of	   such	   a	   now,	   appears	   to	   have	   a	   varying	   influence	   on	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  While	   the	   Tralfamadorians	   have	   a	   spatial	   and	   geographical	   ‘human’	   idea	   of	   ‘there’,	   the	  ‘there’	   of	   our	   cultural	   density	   is	   just	   a	   phenomenological	   state	   of	   being	   out	   of	   our	  consciousness	  and	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  not	  a	   ‘there’	  marred	  by	  any	  physical	  notion	  of	   ‘place’,	  which	   can	   only	   come	   to	   us	   after	   the	   contents	   are	   interpreted	   and	   connected	   to	   physical	  location	  (usually	  that	  of	  its	  author,	  or	  the	  place	  were	  it	  was	  written,	  etc.).	  3	  In	  the	  meaning	  that	  this	  assumes	  in	  Bergson,	  as	  opposed	  to	  time	  of	  the	  clock.	  Cf.	  Bergson,	  Henri,	   and	   Frank	   L.	   Pogson.	   Time	   and	   Free	   Will:	   An	   Essay	   on	   the	   Immediate	   Data	   of	  
Consciousness.	  New	  York:	  Harper,	  1960.	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contemporaneity.	   If	   accessibility	   were	   determined	   by	   physical	   considerations	  (which	  it	  is	  less	  and	  less	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  expanded	  digital	  information),	  it	  would	  be	   conceivable	   that	   geographical	   and	   spatial	   considerations	   could	   shape	   the	  temporality	  of	  this	  ‘now’	  more	  than	  chronological	  succession	  of	  events.	  	  Even	   if	   we	   assume	   absolute,	   non-­‐geographically	   determined	   accessibility	  (which	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  constitutes	  the	  perfect	  hypothesis	  for	  our	  discussion,	  since	  it	  allows	   us	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   contents	   per	   se	   more	   than	   on	   the	  circumstances	  of	   their	  being	  at	  our	  reach),	   living,	  passing	  time	   is	  not	  a	  part	  of	  our	  cultural	  density,	  although	  the	  opposite	  can	  be	  true,	  since	  the	  status	  of	  one’s	  cultural	  density	  could	  be	   theoretically	  determinable	   (if	  we	   imagined	  absolute	   information)	  at	  a	  given	  time	  T.	  However,	  only	  a	  new	  determination	  at	  a	  time	  T’	  could	  inform	  us	  on	  the	   status	   of	   the	   same	   person’s	   cultural	   density	   at	   that	   time	   T’,	   since	   the	   mere	  passing	  of	  time	  from	  T	  to	  T’	  gives	  us	  no	  means	  of	  determining	  modifications	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  contents.	  The	   moment	   of	   attention	   destroys	   this	   absolute	   now	   in	   which	   we	   are	  immersed	   and	   which	   informs	   our	   relation	   to	   the	   not	   yet	   interpreted	   contents,	  breaking	   their	   simultaneity	   and	   bringing	   a	   fraction	   of	   our	   cultural	   density	   to	   the	  forefront	  of	  our	  consciousness.	  Time	  erupts	  on	  the	  scene	  in	  a	  threefold	  scheme.	  	  First,	   cultural	   density	   is	   modified,	   thus	   moving	   to	   a	   relative	   T’,	   which	  witnesses	   a	   different	   cultural	   density,	   immediately	   reduced	   (since	   the	   content	  we	  accessed	  is	  not	  not-­‐accessed	  anymore)	  and	  likely	  expanded	  (since	  most	  access	  to	  a	  content	  discloses	  more	  potential	  accessibility,	  thus	  increasing	  our	  cultural	  density).	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This	   time	   T’	   is	   not	   per	   se	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   cultural	   density,	   since	   to	   us	   that	  remains	  always	  in	  a	  state	  of	   ‘right	  now’	  (‘right	  now	  I	  am	  not	   interested	  in’	  or	   ‘I	  do	  not	  know	  of…’	  which	   implies	  a	   ‘…right	  now’).	  However,	   this	   ‘now’	   is	   the	   ‘now’	  of	  a	  consciousness	  (with	  its	  relative	  cultural	  density)	  that	  is	  immersed	  in	  a	  time	  T’	  and,	  given	   the	   hypothetical	   absolute	   information	  we	   assumed	   above,	   could	   be	   seen	   as	  different	   from	  what	   it	   was	   before.	   Time	   acts	   on	  our	   cultural	   density,	   despite	   not	  being	  active	  in	  it	  beyond	  this	  impression	  of	  simultaneity.	  	  	  Second,	   the	   content	   is	   suddenly	   fixed	   in	   time,	   thrown	   in	   a	   timeline	   and	  redefined	  as	  written	   “before”	  and	  read	   “at	   this	  moment”:	  not	  only	   it	  differentiates	  itself	   from	  all	  the	  other	  contents	  of	  the	  subject’s	  cultural	  density,	   it	  also	  acquires	  a	  status	  of	   temporal	   collocation	  which	   is	  different	   from	  other	   instances	  of	   the	   same	  content	   as	   read/accessed	   in	  other	   times,	   by	  other	   subjects.	  The	  very	   fact	   of	   being	  actualised,	  of	  moving	   from	  the	  status	  of	  accessible	   content	   to	   that	  of	  accessed	  one,	  gives	  the	  content	  a	  place	  in	  time,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  new	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  its	  being	  accessed.	   If	   in	   the	  personal	  history	  of	   the	  accessing	  subject	   the	  content	  only	  exists	  “from	  now	  on”,	  it	  exists	  so	  with	  a	  history:	  from	  now	  on	  the	  subject	  will	  have	  already	  accessed	  the	  content	  that	  was	  accessed	  today,	  and	  this	  content	  is	  the	  one	  that	  was	  accessed	  at	  least	  also	  today.	  	  Thirdly,	   the	   time	  of	   the	   subject	   is	  marked,	  his/her	  history	   is	  pinpointed	  at	  least	   temporarily,	   and	   until	   the	   memory	   of	   the	   content	   fades	   away	   from	   his/her	  mind	   the	   subject’s	   personal	   chronology	   now	   contains	   the	  moment	   of	   attention	   in	  which	  such	  a	  content	  has	  been	  accessed.	  The	  now	  of	  the	  cultural	  density	  is	  shattered	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for	  a	  moment,	  and	  the	  now	  of	  the	  subject’s	  attention	  is	  there	  to	  be	  remembered.	  The	  content	  is	  accessed	  at	  this	  time	  and	  was	  not	  before,	  and	  it	  is	  accessed	  by	  the	  subject,	  who	  conversely	  accesses	  it	  at	  this	  moment	  in	  time	  and	  not	  before.	  	  None	   of	   these	   temporalizations,	   these	   appearances	   of	   time,	   coincides	  with	  History	  or	  with	  the	  time	  of	  the	  clock:	  History	  is	  not	  made	  of	  and	  by	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	   which	   is	   by	   its	   nature	   absolutely	   individual	   and	   impossible	   to	   narrate,	  since	   it	   discloses	   interpretation	   but	   is	   not,	   yet,	   interpretation.	   History	   needs	  historical	  awareness	  in	  order	  to	  be	  constructed,	  and	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  is	  the	  source	   of	   such	   awareness,	   but	   precedes	   it	   and	   is	   not	   susceptible	   to	   it:	  we	   cannot	  historicise	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  but	  only	  (possibly)	  the	  interpretation	  that	  came	  from	   and	   after	   it,	   since	   before	   attention	   there	   is	   nothing	   to	   be	   accounted	   for	   on	  which	  to	  exercise	  attention,	   if	  not	  potentiality	  of	  content.	  A	  history	  of	   	  moments	  of	  attention	  would	  be	  nonsensical	   if	   it	  were	   to	  be	  anything	  else	   than	  a	  history	  of	   the	  interpretations	   these	  moments	  gave	  raise	   to,	   since	   it	  would	  have	  no	  content	   to	  be	  discussed,	  no	  time	  to	  be	  named	  and	  no	  object	  in	  discourse	  (since	  attention	  is	  always	  immediate	   and	   precedes	   discourse).	   Moreover,	   History	   is	   not	   interested,	   is	   not	  attentive,	  only	  the	  subject	  is,	  since	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  is	  absolutely	  personal,	  as	  we	  shall	  see.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  while	  the	  clock	  can	  register	  the	  time	  of	  the	  moment,	  the	  clock	   itself	   is	  oblivious	  and	   irrelevant	  at	   the	   same	   time.	   ‘He	   read	  of	  Napoleon	  at	  a	  very	   young	   age	   and	   was	   inspired’	   or	   ‘After	   reading	   Tolstoy	   I	   moved	   on	   to	  Dostoevsky’	   are	   not	   statements	   about	   the	   time	   of	   the	   clock,	   but	   relative	   to	   the	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internal	   time	  of	   the	   reader,	   and	   even	   so	   only	   relevant	   in	   a	   relational	   space	   (after,	  
then,	  again,	  not	  on	  Friday	  or	  at	  noon).	  Moreover,	   the	  clock	   is	  never	  read,	   since	   the	  attention	  is	  natürlich	  devoted	  to	  the	  content;	  after	  all	  that	  is	  the	  very	  reason	  for	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  as	  we	  define	   it.	  Mathematical,	  objective	  time	  is	  pushed	  to	  the	  background,	  the	  time	  of	  attention	  is	  tautologically	  only	  the	  time	  in	  which	  we	  access	  the	  content,	  and	  it	  relies	  only	  on	  our	  psychological	  and	  living	  state	  to	  define	  itself	  in	  a	  chronology	  of	  similar	  absolutely	  individual	  moments.	  	  This	  status	  of	  conflicted	  temporality	  is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  defining	  such	   a	   moment	   is	   not	   immediate	   to	   consciousness:	   the	   moment	   of	   attention	   is	  always	   immediately	  after	  a	  defined	  status	  of	  cultural	  density	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  immediately	   before	   interpretation.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   two	   segments	   of	   times	   that	   it	  separates	  are	  not	  homogeneous;	  the	  time	  from	  which	  and	  after	  which	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  emerges	  is	  a	  static	  and	  contemporaneous	  time	  of	  a-­‐historicality,	  one	  in	  which	  all	  the	  contents	  exist	  qua	  accessible	  and	  devoid	  of	  their	  time,	  since	  such	  a	  time	  can	  only	  be	  given	  to	  them	  by	  the	  interpretation	  which	  is	  yet	  to	  happen.	  Conversely,	  the	   time	   of	   interpretation	   is	   a	   dynamic,	   processing	   time:	   interpretation	   is	   never	  static,	  it	  constantly	  moves,	  and	  its	  time,	  both	  perceived	  and	  ‘on	  the	  clock’	  is	  a	  time	  of	  progress	   and	   constant	   change.	   Interpretation	   ‘happens’	   at	   a	   specific	   time	   in	   the	  subject’s	  personal	  history,	  while	  cultural	  density	  simply	  ‘is	  there’	  and	  is	  only	  defined	  temporally	   by	   its	   simultaneity,	   internal	   and	  with	   the	   consciousness	   of	   the	   subject	  who	  lives	  it	  as	  the	  ‘now’	  in	  which	  he	  is	  immersed.	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The	  moment	  of	  attention,	  therefore,	  carries	  in	  itself	  a	  tension	  that	  prefigures	  that	   of	   the	   moment	   of	   Passing,	   to	   which	   attention	   is	   crucial	   but	   which	   is	   not	  exhausted	  in	  the	  attention	  itself	  (since	  it	  involves	  historicization	  and	  awareness,	  but	  we	  will	  get	   to	  this	   later);	   it	  needs	  to	  stem	  from	  a	  passive,	  potential,	  non	  historical,	  absolute	  individual	  ‘now’	  where	  no	  language	  is	  (yet)	  spoken	  and	  where	  all	  cows	  are	  potentially	   black.	   But	   it	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	   actualization	   of	   interpretation,	   which	   is	  grounded	  in	  language,	  discloses	  a	  world	  to	  our	  consciousness,	  grasps	  the	  content	  as	  actual,	  and	  erupts	  on	  the	  scene	  of	  history,	  both	  personal	  and,	  potentially,	  capitalized.	  Attention	   can	   only	   be	   exerted	   over	   contents	   being	   in	   our	   accessibility,	   i.e.	  belonging	  to	  our	  cultural	  density.	  An	  old	  man	  who	  has	  no	  notion	  of	  how	  a	  computer	  works	   has	   no	   access	   to	   the	   virtually	   infinite	   contents	   accessible	   through	   digital	  connection,	  no	  matter	  the	  relative	  availability	  of	  a	  computer	   in	  his	  office	  or	   in	  any	  physical	  environment	  he	   is	   immersed	   in.	  This	   is	   the	  nature	  of	  cultural	  density	  and	  attention	   can	   only	   operate	   on	   it,	   as	   far	   as	   language	   and	   culture	   are	   concerned.	  Attention	  operates	  also	  outside	  the	  sphere	  of	  cultural	  contents,	  since	  it	  is	  informed	  by	   senses	   and	   can	   be	   exerted	   over	   phenomena	   	   which	   exceed	   the	   sphere	   of	  language,	  but	  once	  we	  want	  to	  discuss	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  culture,	  we	  must	  revert	  to	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	   language,	   attention	   can	   only	   be	   turned	   to	   something	   that	   was	  there,	  in	  potency,	  in	  the	  range	  of	  the	  subject’s	  cultural	  density.	  	  We	  must	  therefore	  remember	  that	  accessibility	  to	  us,	  availability	  to	  attention,	  is	   not	   just	   existence	   in	   a	   space	   materially	   reachable	   by	   our	   sight:	   the	   Iliad	   is	  available	  to	  anyone	  with	  Internet	  connection,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  cultural	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density	  of	  whoever	  has	  never	  heard	  of	  it.	  Attention,	  therefore,	  requires	  hearing	  of,	  or	  
having	   heard	   of.	   Hearing	   of,	   before	   seeing,	   before	   watching.	   Hearing	   of	   does	   not	  equate	  hearing,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  obvious	  figurative	  value	  of	  the	  hearing	  of	  which	  is	  lacking	   in	  the	  simple	  hearing	  (we	   ‘hear	  of’	  even	  when	  reading,	  while	  we	  only	  hear	  when,	  well,	  hearing),	  but	  also	  in	  the	  passivity	  involved	  in	  the	  former:	  ‘I	  have	  heard	  of	  it’	   means	   I	   have	   not	   investigated	   it,	   I	   do	   not	   know,	   I	   have	   not	   yet	   devoted	   my	  attention	  to	  it.	  Hearing	  of	  is	  a	  self-­‐expression	  in	  negativity,	  a	  form	  of	  the	  not-­‐yet,	  and	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  cultural	  density.	  	  We	  do	  not	  ‘hear	  of’	  a	  Voice:	  we	  hear	  it.	  The	  Voice	  of	  the	  Other	  is	  heard	  in	  the	  meeting:	  the	  Other	  -­‐	  as	  firstly	  met	  -­‐	  is	  always	  unheard	  of,	  and	  only	  seen	  (or	  heard?4)	  in	  the	  meeting,	  but	  hearing	  of	  the	  Other	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  hearing	  their	  voice.	  The	  voice	  from	  which	  I	  can	  hear	  of	  an-­‐other	  is	  always	  that	  of	  a	  third,	  another-­‐other	  so	  to	  speak,	  a	  voice	  that	  is	  not	  proper	  to	  the	  Other	  I	  am	  hearing	  of.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	   discloses	   an	   interesting	   question:	   the	   gaze,	   crucial	   to	   modern	   phenomenological	  theories	   of	   the	   Other,	   especially	   in	   the	   Face	   of	   the	   Other	   as	   constructed	   by	   Levinas,	  summons	  me.	  But	  if	  I	  ‘see’	  the	  Other	  as	  other,	  what	  about	  hearing?	  While	  I	  cannot	  have	  seen	  an-­‐Other	   before	   seeing	   them,	   I	   could	   have	   heard	   of	   them	   before	   seeing	   them	   or	  meeting	  them.	   If	   the	  Other	   is	  always	  an	  absolute,	  what	  happens	  about	   the	  pre-­‐encountered	  other?	  We	  are	  faced	  (!)	  with	  two	  possible	  solutions:	  either	  we	  reduce	  the	  Other	  to	  an	  un-­‐meetable	  ‘first	   Other’,	   who	   has	   the	   face	   of	   the	   obstetric	   and	   means	   nothing	   to	   our	   not	   yet	   fully	  conscious	   self,	   or	   we	   break	   the	   illusion	   of	   this	   perfect	   Other	   as	   depicted	   by	   Levinas	   and	  realize	   that,	   since	   we	   are	   always	   already	   immersed	   in	   a	   world	   of	   communication,	   total	  Otherness	   can	  only	   be	   encountered	  when	  we	  hear	  of	   the	  unheard,	   and	  not	  when	  we	   lock	  gaze	   with	   another.	   We	   are	   left	   wondering,	   though,	   what,	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   hearing,	   can	  substitute	  the	  simultaneity	  and	  the	  inevitability	  of	  this	  “locking”	  of	  the	  gaze(s).	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  Beckett’s	  Godot	  is	  the	  antonomasia	  of	  a	  character	  that	  can	  only	  be	  heard	  of,	  one	   that	   lacks	   a	   voice.	   He	   is	   spoken	   of,	   and	   has	   been	   heard	   of	   before	   the	   plays	  begins,	   so	   that	   he	   is	   twice	   removed,	   since	   even	   the	  hearing	  of	   is	   hidden	   from	   the	  spectator.	   Vladimir	   and	  Estragon	  have	   already	  heard	  of	  Godot,	   and	  while	   it	   is	   not	  clear	  whether	  they	  know	  him	  or	  not,	  he	  is	  part	  of	  their	  discourse.	  Pozzo,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  not	  heard	  of	  Godot,	  Godot	  is	  outside	  his	  reach	  until	  brought	  into	  it	  via	  the	  other	   two	   clochards.	   Indeed,	   the	   character	   of	   Pozzo	   is	   unwilling	   to	   engage	   in	   an	  interpretation	   of	   the	   unseen	   Godot,	   and	   the	   fictional	   illusion	   allows	   him	   to	  constantly	  recreate	  a	  status	  of	  not	  having	  heard	  of,	  of	  being	  oblivious	  to	  him,	  which	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  an	  ordinary	  subject.	  The	  very	  name	  of	  Godot,	  of	  whom	  they	  have	  been	  speaking	  for	  entire	  scenes,	  is	  constantly	  vanishing	  from	  Pozzo’s	  mind	  («If	  I	  had	  an	  appointment	  with	  this	  Godin…	  Goden…»	  -­‐	  Beckett,	  Waiting	  for	  Godot,	  act	  1),	  dissolving	  itself	  back	  into	  his	  cultural	  density.	  	  Even	   characters	   bursting	   into	   scene	   (and	   thus	   acquiring	   a	   voice,	   and	   a	  relevant	  one	  to	  boot)	  can	  be	  heard	  of	  before	  properly	  being	  met.	  A	  famous	  example,	  
Pride	   and	  Prejudice’s	   “object	   of	   desire”,	   Mr.	   Darcy,	   is	   seen,	   but	   not	   yet	  met;	   he	   is	  spoken	  of,	  he	  is	  pronounced	  to	  be:	  	  Mr.	  Darcy	   soon	  drew	   the	   attention	  of	   the	   room	  by	  his	   fine,	   tall	   person,	  handsome	   features,	   noble	   mien,	   and	   the	   report	   which	   was	   in	   general	  circulation	   within	   five	   minutes	   after	   his	   entrance,	   of	   his	   having	   ten	  thousand	  a	  year.	  The	  gentlemen	  pronounced	  him	  to	  be	  a	  fine	  figure	  of	  a	  man.	  (P&P,	  Ch.3,	  Par.	  5)	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  The	   voice	   that	   has	   spoken	   of	  Darcy	   is	   not	   his,	   yet	   he	   is	   unmistakably	   the	  centre	  of	  attention.	  Darcy	  can	  (and	  will)	  speak,	  but	  his	  importance	  is	  prefigured	  by	  the	   voices	   of	   others.	   The	   act	   of	   appearing	   is	   muted,	   relying	   on	   the	   voices	   of	   the	  bystanders	  to	  give	  account	  of	  the	  apparition.	  A	  multitude	   can	   have	   a	   voice,	  while	   it	   is	   seldom	  heard	   of:	   the	   voice	   of	   the	  People	  is	  heard	  (and	  sometimes	  listened	  to)	  by	  the	  inspired	  politician,	  but	  becomes	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  people,	  when	  it	  is	  heard	  of.	  When	  the	  multitude	  is	  heard	  of	  but	  not	  listened,	  it	  loses	  any	  identity,	  it	  is	  fragmented	  into	  incoherent	  individual	  forces,	  becomes	  a	  mass	  as	  Manzoni	  exemplifies:	  	  	  What	   constitutes	   the	  mass,	   and	   the	   real	  material	   of	   a	  mob,	   is	   a	  mixed	  	  heap	  of	  men,	  who	  by	  undefined	  gradations,	  	  fall,	  more	  or	  less,	  into	  one	  of	  the	   extreme	  parties	   :	   some	   a	   little	   fanatic,	   some	   a	   little	   knavish,	   	   some	  inclined	  to	  have	  justice	  administered	  according	  to	  their	  own	  views;	  some	  looking	   	  anxiously	   to	  see	  some	  villainy	  committed,	   	   ready	   for	  any	   thing	  ferocious	  or	  merciful,	  to	  	  adore	  or	  to	  execrate,	  as	  occasions	  may	  present	  	  themselves,	  to	  experience	  fully	  the	  influence	  	  of	  either	  one	  or	  the	  other,	  feeling	  greedy	  every	  	  moment	  to	  know,	  and	  to	  believe	  any	  thing	  	  however	  extravagant,	   impatient	   to	   cry	   out,	   to	   	   applaud,	   or	   to	   condemn.	   (The	  Betrothed,	  Chapter	  XIII)	  	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  deus	  in	  a	  vox	  populi	  where	  the	  populus	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  object	  of	  conversation.	  The	  divinity	  is	  in	  the	  voice,	  the	  Voice	  of	  God	  speaks	  to	  Moses	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from	   the	  bushes	   and	  he	  hears	   it.	  The	  power	  of	  hearing	   the	  voice	   is	   lost	   in	   the	   re-­‐narration,	   in	   the	   hearing	   of.	   ‘Blessed	   are	   those	   who	   have	   not	   seen	   and	   yet	   have	  believed’	  (John	  20.29),	  and	  hearing	  of	  is	  not-­‐seeing,	  is	  relying	  on	  witnesses,	  although	  not	  eye	  witnesses	  but	  verbal	  ones	  (ear-­‐witnesses?).	  Retelling	  cannot	  carry	  the	  Voice,	  and	  only	   speaking	  again	   (and	  hearing	  prima	  facie)	   can	   reinstate	   the	  divinity	   (‘The	  word	   of	   the	   Lord’,	   as	   the	   catholic	   liturgy	   reminds	   us	   at	   the	   end	   of	   every	   reading	  during	  mass).	  	  None	   of	   these	   situations	   (the	   voices	   of	   the	   Other,	   of	   the	   People,	   of	   God)	  contemplates	  a	  value	  for	  the	  heard	  of,	  since	  hearing	  of	  implies	  not	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  subject	  matter,	  being	  (still)	  oblivious	  to	  what	  is.	  Something	  we	  have	  heard	  of	   is	  something	   to	  which	  we	   can	   turn	   our	   attention,	   specifically	   since	  we	   have	   not	   yet	  done	  as	  much,	  and	  this	  turning	   is	  what	  constitutes	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  which	  has	   always	   been	   surpassed	   when	   we	   are	   hearing	   /	   seeing	   /	   listening	   /	   reading	  something	  (as	  opposed	  to	  hearing	  of	   it).	  After	   the	  moment,	   the	   ‘heard	  of’	  becomes	  the	  ‘read’	  (or	  the	  ‘heard’,	  the	  ‘listened	  to’),	  and	  thus	  it	  must	  be	  in	  this	  moment	  that	  the	  turning	  of	  attention	  is	  originated,	  resolved	  and	  forgotten.	  	  After	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  the	  content	  is	  a	  content	  I	  know,	  a	  content	  I	  am	  reading,	  a	  content	  I	  interpret,	  and	  by	  interpreting	  I	  possess	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  was	  not	  before,	  when	  all	   I	  had	  was	   the	  potentiality	   for	  contents	  which	   I	  could	  access.	  That	  potentiality	  is	  still	  there,	  luring	  me	  to	  expand	  my	  horizon,	  to	  reach	  once	  more	  in	  to	  it,	   to	   turn	   my	   attention	   to	   the	   next	   exciting	   potential	   content.	   But	   the	   actualised	  content	  is	  not	  there,	  anymore,	  the	  turning	  of	  attention	  is	  forgotten,	  since	  it	  does	  not	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remain	   in	   the	   history	   of	  my	   knowledge.	   I	   have	   read,	   I	   have	   interpreted,	   I	   cannot	  recall	  the	  feeling	  of	  not	  having	  read,	  of	  not	  having	  known.	  	  The	  negativity	  of	  not-­‐knowing,	  of	  not-­‐having-­‐accessed-­‐yet,	  is	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	   felt,	   the	  having	  heard	  of	  but	  not	  having	  read	   is	  not	  a	   feeling	  that	  can	  be	  recalled,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  something	  that	  was	  ever	  the	  subject	  of	  our	  attention.	  If	  it	  had	  been,	  the	  status	  of	  its	  object/content	  would	  not	  have	  been	  that	  of	  the	  ‘having	  been	  heard	  of’,	  but	  something	  that	  the	  subject	  had	  an	  interest	  in,	  to	  which	  the	  subject	  had	  already	   turned	   his/her	   attention.	   Before	   reading,	   before	   interpreting,	   there	   was	  nothing:	  the	  content	  existed	  only	  in	  the	  mass	  of	  accessible	  content.	  Indeed,	  our	  only	  way	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   un-­‐accessed	   content,	   to	   the	   heard	   of,	   is	   in	   terms	   of	  what	   our	  access	  to	  it	  gave	  us.	  ‘Before	  reading	  Melville,	  I	  did	  not	  know	  who	  Ahab	  was’5	  is	  more	  a	  statement	  about	   one’s	   status	   after	   interpretation	   than	   it	   is	   one	   about	   our	   before-­‐attention	  condition.	   Ahab	   can	   exist	   to	  my	   consciousness	   only	   after	   being	   the	   subject	   of	  my	  attention	   and	   in	   the	   original	   time	  before	  my	   attention	  was	   turned	   to	  Ahab	   such	   a	  statement	  would	  have	  made	  no	  sense	  to	  me,	  or	  at	  least	  would	  have	  made	  no	  more	  sense	   than	   just	   saying	   that	   there	   are	   things	   that	   one	   does	   not	   know,	   which	  constitutes	   however	   a	   far	   more	   general,	   impersonal	   and	   far	   less	   situational	  statement.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	   could	   be	   only	   partially	   true,	   because	   one	   could	   have	   accessed	   the	   content-­‐Ahab	  without	  necessarily	  accessing	  the	  entirety	  of	   the	  content-­‐Moby	  Dick	  and	  certainly	  without	  having	  accessed	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  [the	  entirety	  of	  the	  works	  by]	  Melville.	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The	  very	  status	  of	  being	   ‘heard	  of’	   is	  stripped	  away	   from	  the	  content	  when	  the	   sentence	   ‘I	   heard	   of	   it’	   is	   uttered:	   attention	   has	   been	   turned	   to	   the	   content,	   a	  discussion	   is	  ensuing,	   the	   liminal	  condition	  of	  pre-­‐presence	  has	  been	  dragged	   into	  the	  presence	  of	  discourse.	  As	  soon	  as	  we	  hear	  another	  talking	  of	  it	  and	  we	  comment	  ‘I	  have	  heard	  of	  it’,	  we	  are	  interpreting	  it,	  trying	  to	  discern	  what	  it	  is,	  when	  I	  heard	  of	  it,	  when	   and	  how	   it	   came	   to	   be	   part	   of	  my	   cultural	   density:	   the	   content	   has	   been	  already	   extracted	   from	   the	   aurea	   mediocritas	   of	   anonymity	   granted	   to	   it	   by	   the	  contemporaneity	   of	   cultural	   density	   and	   has	   been	   fixed	   into	   a	   precise	   instant	   in	  time.	  The	  time	  at	  which	  I	  was	  asked	  about	  it,	  the	  time	  I	  recall	  first	  hearing	  about	  it	  and	  the	  time	  (yet	  to	  come	  into	  actuality)	  of	  when	  I	  am	  going	  to	  ‘read	  it’,	  to	  ‘interpret	  it’6,	  all	  of	  these	  are	  suddenly	  disclosed	  and	  brought	  into	  being,	  creating	  a	  history	  and	  a	   story	   of	   my	   relation	   to	   the	   content,	   the	   former	   already	   accumulating	   data	   (the	  when	  of	  these	  three	  instances),	  the	  latter	  shaping	  my	  memory	  of	  my	  relation	  to	  it.	  History	  is	  not	  before	  attention,	  and	  Gadamer’s	  idea	  of	  historical	  awareness	  as	  foundational	   to	   our	   approach	   to	   culture	   is	   flawed	   by	   his	   understanding	   of	   the	  possibility	   of	   reception	   of	   content	   as	   a	   given,	   without	   an	   analysis	   of	   why	   such	  contents	   can	   even	   be	   received.	   Temporal	   proximity	   means	   nothing	   in	   terms	   of	  potential	   accessibility	   to	   the	   content,	   and	   sharing	   an	   age	   or	   an	   epoch	   gives	   no	  guarantee	  about	  sharing	  cultural	  density.	  The	  time	  in	  which	  attention	  is	  exerted,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  is,	  by	  the	  way,	  an	  illusion	  of	  discourse,	  since	  mentioning	  the	  content	  as	  something-­‐I-­‐do-­‐not-­‐know	   [yet]	   is,	   indeed,	   already	   an	   interpretation,	   a	   comparison	  of	  what	   I	   ‘heard	  of’	  with	   what	   I	   know.	   The	   content	   is	   no	   more	   the	   ‘not	   accessed’	   but	   is	   interpreted	   as	  something-­‐I-­‐do-­‐not-­‐know;	  the	  process	  of	  interpretation	  is	  very	  much	  alive	  already.	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moment	   that	  disrupts	  one’s	  cultural	  density	   to	  recreate	  a	  new	  array	  of	  potentially	  accessible	  contents	  is	  independent	  from	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  content	  was	  first	  uttered.	  One’s	  historical	  awareness	  can	  only	  come	  from	  one’s	  access	  to	  the	  contents,	  and	  shape	  his/her	  systematization	  of	  them,	  but	  cannot	  be	  the	  origin	  of	  such	  access,	  since	  it	  is	  generated	  through	  the	  turning	  of	  attention	  to	  such	  contents.	  	  When	  he	  speaks	  about	  Les	  Problems	  Épistemologiques	  des	  Science	  Humaines,	  Gadamer	  is	  convinced	  that	  historical	  sense	  constitutes	  the	  overcoming	  of	  the	  basic	  naiveté	  of	  seeing	  things	  ‘just	  as	  they	  are’,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  he	  considers	  this	  historical	  sense	  to	  be	  an	  a-­‐priori	  faculty	  of	  consciousness	  (which	  would	  thus	  express	  itself	  autonomously	  as	  historical	  consciousness)	  or	  whether	  he	  believes	  that	  such	  an	  awareness	  stems	  from	  the	  contents	  accessed	  as	  they	  are	  but	  modified	  by	  entering	  in	  contact	   with	   consciousness	   itself.	   He	   states	   that	   interpretation	   is	   the	   reflexive	  behaviour	   through	   which	   historical	   consciousness	   receives	   (not	   passively)	   the	  voices	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  this	  once	  again	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  how	  consciousness	  has	  come	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   history.	   No	   matter	   the	   answer	   we	   choose	   to	   give	   to	   this	  question,	   it	   is	   necessary	   that	   the	   contents	   are	   accessed,	   before	   the	   voices	   they	  contain	  can	  be	  heard	  (and	  interpreted).	  	  Gadamer,	   reading	   Heidegger7,	   understands	   historicity	   as	   the	   place	   for	   the	  tension	   between	   attention	   and	   oblivion,	   but	   does	   not	   show	   how	   the	   two	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Gadamer,	  “Martin	  Heidegger	  et	  la	  signification	  de	  son	  ‘herméneutique	  de	  la	  facticité’	  pour	  le	   sciences	   humaines”	   in	   Gadamer,	   Hans	   Georg,	   Le	   Problème	   de	   la	   Conscience	   Historique,	  Paris:	  Seuil,	  1996.	  p.	  29.	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supposed	  to	  be	  merged	  together.	  Memory	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  oblivion,	  not	  attention,	  which	  is	  the	  condition	  for	  both:	  for	  something	  to	  be	  forgotten,	  it	  needs	  to	  have	  been	  noticed	   first.	  We	   do	   not	   abandon	   to	   oblivion	  what	  we	   have	   never	   known,	   and	   in	  order	   to	   turn	  away	  our	  attention,	  allowing	   for	   forgetfulness,	  we	  need	   to	  have	   first	  turned	   our	   attention	   to	   it.	   Can	   historicity	   be	   the	   line	   between	   remembering	   and	  forgetting?	   Maybe,	   but	   we	   must	   then	   distinguish	   historicity	   from	   the	   product	   of	  historical	  consciousness,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  preserve	  the	  latter	  as	  an	  act	  of	  interpretation:	  to	   interpretation,	   retaining	   partially	   is	   a	   performing	   act	   of	   creation,	   of	   projection,	  and	  what	  is	  not	  chosen	  (and	  thus	  consigned	  to	  oblivion)	  is	  not	  in	  tension	  with	  what	  is	  preserved.	  Gadamer’s	   notion	   of	   historicity	   relies	   upon	   Dilthey’s	   idea	   that	   historical	  awareness	  and	  historical	  perspective	  are	  the	  source	  for	  any	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  and	  are	   primary	   to	   the	   subject.	   In	   Gadamer’s	   reading,	   Dilthey	   main	   goal	   is	   to	   make	  historical	   consciousness	   not	   only	   the	   necessary	   instrument	   to	   reach	   any	   kind	   of	  historical	   knowledge,	   but	   indeed	   a	   mode	   of	   self-­‐knowledge.8 	  Gadamer	   follows	  Dilthey,	   ignoring	   Husserl’s	   intuition:	   by	   bracketing	   the	   historical	   situation	   as	  contingency,	   Husserl	   calls	   for	   something	   foundational	   going	   beyond	   historical	  experience.	  The	  Lebenswelt	   is	  not	  born	  out	  of	  our	  historical	  awareness,	  but	  comes	  before	  it,	  before	  any	  awareness	  of	  us	  in	  time.	  It	  is	  bizarre	  how	  Gadamer,	  who	  in	  the	  same	   period	   was	   using	   Heidegger	   to	   explore	   the	   value	   of	   projection	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Cf.	  Gadamer,	  “Scope	  and	  Limits	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Wilhelm	  Dilthey”	  in	  Gadamer,	  Hans	  Georg,	  
Le	  Problème	  de	  la	  Conscience	  Historique,	  Paris:	  Seuil,	  1996.	  p.	  29.	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hermeneutics,	  could	  deliberately	  ignore	  the	  breakthrough	  made	  by	  Husserl	  and	  his	  new	  insights	  into	  our	  way	  of	  interpreting	  the	  world.	  Even	  limiting	  one’s	  reading	  to	  Heidegger	   (and	   especially	   to	   Being	   and	   Time,	   the	   explicit	   frame	   of	   reference	   for	  Gadamer’s	  use	  of	  Heidegger),	   it	   is	  hard	   to	  understand	  how	  Gadamer	  could	  remain	  true	   to	   a	   philosophical	   standpoint	   that	   put	   historical	   awareness	   on	   such	   a	   high	  pedestal.	  But	  even	  accepting	  Gadamer’s	  and	  Dilthey’s	  notion	  of	  historical	  perspective	  as	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   distortion	  when	   accessing	   the	   contents,	  we	  must	   reject	   the	  primacy	   accorded	   to	   historically	   informed	   interpretation,	   since	   this	   cannot	   be	  exerted	  on	  a	  content	  which	  has	  not	  been	  accessed	  yet.	  The	  awareness	  itself	  can	  only	  come	   after	   a	   reflection	   about	   time	   and	   cultural	   evolution	   (since	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	  understanding	   one’s	   culture	   as	   a	   product	   of	   one’s	   time)	   and	   this	   cannot	   happen	  
outside	  history,	  and	  the	  testimonies	  of	  such	  a	  history	  need	  to	  be	  found,	  and	  accessed,	  in	   one’s	   cultural	   density.	   The	   primacy	   of	   historical	   perspective	   as	   orienting	   our	  thought	  must	  make	  way	   for	   the	  moment	   of	   attention,	   which	  while	   being	   exerted	  over	   a	   cultural	   density	   shaped	   by	   historical	   perspective,	   shares	   with	   the	   latter	   a	  continuous	  dialectical	  dynamic,	  with	  the	  one	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  other,	   and	   vice	   versa,	   in	   an	   ever	   expanding	   movement	   of	   projection	   and	  actualization.	  	  Historical	   awareness	   cannot	   provide	   us	   with	   anything	   that	   our	   cultural	  density	  has	  not	  already	  made	  available	  to	  us,	  since	  the	  idea	  that	  History	  determines	  the	   totality	   of	   cultural	   contents	   available	   to	   our	   consciousness	   does	   not	   take	   into	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account	   the	   exploration	   of	   cultural	   density	  we	  have	   carried	   out	   in	   Chapter	   1.	  Our	  chronological	   collocation	   is	  only	  partially	   responsible	   for	   the	  contents	  available	   to	  us,	  since	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  we	  do	  not	  have	  a	  potential	  access	  to	  all	  contents	  previous	  or	   contemporary	   to	   us	   nor	   do	  we	   share	   an	   identity	   of	   potential	   accessibility	  with	  everyone	  else	  living	  in	  the	  same	  historical	  milieu.	  Dilthey	   describes	   the	   historical	   Self	   (i.e.	   a	   Self	   acting	   with	   historical	  consciousness)	   as	   operating	   a	   mediation	   between	   History	   and	   one’s	   own	  historicality;	  this,	  however,	   is	  already	  a	  de-­‐historicization,	  since	  this	  mediation	  can	  either	  be	  immersed	  in	  history	  or	  be	  an	  absolutely	  free	  choice.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  such	  mediation	   is	  already	   irremediably	   flawed	  by	   its	  own	  necessity	  given	   the	  historical	  moment,	   and	  cannot	  be	   reduced	   to	  anything	  else	   than	  a	   self-­‐less	  historical	  milieu,	  bringing	   us	   once	   again	   to	   the	   indisputable	   difference	   between	   contemporaries’	  access	  to	  contents,	  which	  was	  exactly	  the	  question	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  answer.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  Self	  and	  Method	  (a	  crucial	  expression	  of	  Self	  in	  the	  approach	  to	  culture	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Dilthey)	  must	  express	  an	  absolute	  affirmation	  over	  the	  contingency	  of	  one’s	  historical	  essence,	  thus	  denying	  the	  very	  process	  the	  mediation	  was	  trying	  to	  convey;	  	  we	  are	  taken	  back	  to	  the	  absolute	  instant	  of	  individual	  attention,	  as	  the	  only	  
discrimen	   for	   our	   access	   to	   contents.	   Cultural	   density	   is	   then	   not	   reducible	   to	   a	  contingency,	  nor	  to	  a	  historically	  determined	  abstract	  methodological	  issue,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  very	  starting	  point	  and	  grounding	  for	  our	  intellectual	  and	  cultural	  expression,	  in	  need	  of	  a	  moment	  of	  attention,	  personal	  and	  absolutely	  instantaneous,	  to	  bring	  the	  contents	  from	  their	  state	  of	  potentiality	  to	  actualization	  in	  interpretation.	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What	   we	   can	   salvage	   of	   this	   important	   reflection	   on	   the	   role	   of	   historical	  context	  and	  personal	  historicity	  is	  this:	  to	  be	  conscious	  of	  our	  nature	  as	  conditioned	  beings.	   But	   we	   must	   renounce	   the	   illusion	   that	   we	   can	   break	   through	   this	   via	  historical	   awareness.	   «The	   real	   life,	   which	   is	   immanent	   knowledge,	   assumes	   the	  traits	   of	   a	   universal	   experience»9	  is	   to	   be	   intended	   with	   the	   ‘real	   life’	   not	   being	  determined	   by	   the	   historical	   moment	   but	   by	   our	   personality	   and	   our	   personal	  cultural	   density,	   the	   summa	  of	   our	   available	   cultural	   contents	   (or	   inheritances,	   as	  they	   will	   need	   to	   be	   considered	   when	   we	   will	   tackle	   historical	   perspective	   in	   its	  more	  proper	  post-­‐attention	  space).	  Before	  historicity,	  then,	  comes	  attention,	  which	  is	  both	  a	  state	  and	  an	  activity	  of	  the	  subject.	  The	  subject	  is	  or	  is	  not	  attentive	  to	  something	  (or	  is	  attentive	  now	  and	  was	  not	  before),	  and/or	  the	  subject	  exerts	  its	  attention	  over	  something.	  The	  two	  are	  not	  identical,	  although	  they	  can	  coincide	  in	  certain	  situations.	  First	  of	  all,	  attentive	  as	  a	  state,	  as	  prolonged	  in	  time,	  belongs	  more	  to	  the	  process	  of	   interpretation	  than	  it	  does	   to	   the	   moment	   of	   attention	   as	   instantaneous,	   self-­‐propagating	   and	   self-­‐standing.	  The	  moment	  of	  attention	  can	  indeed	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  state	  of	  awareness	  and	  attention	  in	  the	  subject,	  but	  cannot	  have	  its	  origin	   in	   it,	  otherwise	  attention	  would	  already	  be	  directed	  to	  the	  object,	  and	  we	  should	  simply	  look	  elsewhere	  (earlier)	  for	  the	  moment	  itself.	  Analogously,	  a	  state	  of	  attention	  would	  presume	  an	  object	  of	  such	  attention,	  stabilising	  this	  attention	  as	  coming	  from	  the	  subject	  and	  being	  directed	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Dilthey,	  Gesammelte	  Schriften	  v.	  5	  p.	  364,	  quoted	  by	  Gadamer	  in	  “Scope	  and	  Limits…”,	  op.	  cit.	  
	   88	  
the	  content,	  and	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  content	  itself,	  as	  pre-­‐interpreted	  and	  immersed	  in	  the	  I-­‐You/They	  of	  cultural	  density,	  is	  not	  susceptible	  of	  objectification	  (of	  an	  I-­‐It	  relation).	  If	  we	  dismiss	  attentiveness	  as	  the	  source	  of	  attention,	  we	  should	  explore	  the	  possibility	   of	   attention	   as	   grounded	   on	   an	   instantaneous	   act	   of	   the	   subject,	  wondering	   if	  attention	   is	  exerted	  by	  his	  conscious	  self,	  and	  whether	   it	  depends	  on	  other	   intellectual	   faculties	   or	   it	   is	   a	   self-­‐standing	   primary	   faculty	   of	   the	   subject	  himself.	   First	   of	   all	   we	   shall	   inquire	   whether	   attention	   is	   willing,	   unwilling	   or	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  both.	  Contents	  are	  pre-­‐presented	  to	  us,	  but	  attention	  is	  the	  force	  that	  actualizes	  them	  into	  the	  sphere	  of	  our	  consciousness.	  	  We	  have	  discussed	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  heard	  of	  and	  we	  have	  said	  that	  when	  we	   answer	   ‘I	   heard	   of	   it’	   we	   are	   already	   engaging	   ourselves	   in	   interpretation:	  answering	   the	   voice	   of	   the	   other	   can	   bring	   a	   content	   to	   the	   forefront	   of	   our	  attention.	  In	  this	  case,	  without	  will,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  discuss	  the	  content,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  to	   reject	   it	   (‘I	   am	   not	   interested	   in	   it’):	   we	   should	   not	   confuse	   the	   moment	   of	  attention	   with	   the	   pursuit	   of	   an	   interest	   (which	   as	   we	   will	   see	   is	   an	   important	  matter	   to	  discuss	  when	  approaching	   the	  problem	  of	   inheritance).	   It	  would	  appear	  that	  our	  attention	  is	  summoned	  by	  the	  activity	  of	  an-­‐other,	  and	  forced	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  object	  of	  our	  discourse.	  	  However,	  listening	  involves	  turning	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  other,	  since	  hearing	  is	   not	   listening:	   listening	   involves	  understanding	   the	   language	   and	   engaging,	   once	  again,	   a	   discourse	   and	   an	   interpretation	   of	   such	   a	   discourse.	   The	   other	   speaks	   of	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something,	  but	  our	  will	  to	  listen	  is	  what	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  enough	  to	  permit	  our	   attention	   to	   be	   turned	   to	   the	   content.	   The	   first	   content,	   in	   this	   case,	   is	   the	  content	  of	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  other,	  which	  we	  choose	  freely	  to	  access.	  Only	  through	  this	  first	   moment	   of	   attention,	   the	   other	   is	   allowed	   to	   lead	   our	   attention	   to	   a	   second	  moment,	  the	  one	  in	  which	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  content	  to	  which	  our	  turning	  of	  attention	  was	  called.	  Even	  when	  we	  encounter	  contents	  while	  accessing	  other	  contents	  and	  we	  can	  be	  (and	  usually	  are)	  caught	  in	  a	  series	  of	  moments	  of	  actualization	  of	  the	  contents	  in	  which	  our	  attention	  is	  turned	  from	  a	  content	  to	  another,	  as	  it	  is	  common	  when	  we	  are	  exploring	  or	  researching	  a	  certain	  subject	  matter,	  moving	  inside	  its	  boundaries	  but	  exploring	  different	  subsets	  of	   contents.	   If	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	  original	   turning	  of	  attention	  must	  have	  been	  voluntary,	   the	   same	  must	  be	   said	  of	   all	   the	  moments	  of	  attention	   which	   follow	   one	   another:	   a	   content	   entering	   our	   cultural	   density	   is	  something	   over	   which	   we	   have	   little	   control	   (although	   our	   choices	   influence	  positively	  the	  augmentation	  of	  our	  cultural	  density),	  not	  so	  much	  the	  contents	  that	  we	  choose	  to	  access.	  Turning	  our	  attention	  is	  always	  a	  conscious	  act,	  although	  it	  is	  influenced	   by	   cultural	   density	   (in	   terms	   of	   possible	   objects)	   and	   arguably	   by	  subconscious	   considerations	   (but	   this	   would	   entail	   a	   psychological	   analysis	  more	  apt	  to	  a	  Freudian	  discussion	  than	  it	  is	  to	  this	  exploration).	  	  Attention,	   thus,	   is	   a	   faculty	   that	   is	   only	   exerted	   in	   the	  moment	   and	  which	  discloses	   attentiveness,	   and	   interest.	   Language	   tricks	   us:	   there	   is	   no	   identity	  between	  the	  instantaneous	  attention	  and	  the	  prolonged	  attentiveness,	  and	  the	  latter	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depends	  for	  its	  coming	  into	  being	  on	  the	  first	  one	  having	  been.	  We	  can	  maintain	  our	  extended	   attention	   (=attentiveness)	   only	   in	   virtue	   of	   having	   exerted	   	   our	  instantaneous	  attention,	  by	  turning	  it	  to	  the	  object.	  	  Turning	  attention	   from	  an	  object	  to	  another,	   is	  always	  a	  momentous	  action,	  but	   it	   could	   lead	   us	   to	   assume	   that	   since	   we	   are	   moving	   it	   from	   the	   first	   to	   the	  second	  one	  it	  needed	  to	  be	  “still”	  on	  the	  second	  one.	  However,	  this	  is	  once	  again	  an	  illusion	  of	  language.	  If	  we	  understand	  attention	  as	  a	  faculty	  of	  noticing,	  of	  grasping	  something	  that	  was	  not	  there	  for	  us	  in	  a	  conscious	  way	  as	  an	  object	  to	  be	  engaged	  by	  our	  intellect,	  we	  cannot	  take	  such	  an	  attention	  to	  be	  constantly	  directed	  to	  the	  same	  object.	   Concentration	   is	   not	   attention,	   it	   is	   attentiveness,	   or	   interest.	   ‘May	   I	   have	  your	  attention’	   is	   always	  a	  beginning,	   it	   is	   about	  what	  was	  not	  before,	   it	   is	  not	  an	  invocation	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   same	   status.	   Having	   somebody’s	   attention	   is	   a	  movement,	   it	   is	   a	   turning	   of	   their	   attention	   to	   me.	   After	   getting	   their	   attention,	  which	   amounts	   to	   an	   active	   choice,	   a	   content	   or	   a	   person	   can	   only	  maintain	   it,	   a	  passive	  continuation,	  an	  expression	  of	  attentiveness.	  	  Persistence	   is	   an	   obstacle	   to	   attention	   and	   a	   stumbling	   stone	   even	   for	  attentiveness:	   what	   is	   always	   ‘there’	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   our	   everyday	   experience	   is	  either	  not	  yet	  an	  object	  of	  attention	  or	  it	  risks	  being	  not	  an	  object	  of	  our	  interest	  and	  attentiveness	   anymore.	   Contemporary	   artists	   and	   conceptual	   art	   have	   introjected	  this	  sentiment	  and	  made	  it	  crucial	  to	  their	  very	  notion	  of	  artistic	  expression;	  Warhol	  commented	   on	   his	  Death	   and	  Disasters	   (a	   series	   of	   iterated	   paintings	   of	   horrible	  mechanical	   incidents	   and	   technology	   related	   fatalities):	   «But	   when	   you	   see	   a	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gruesome	  picture	  over	  and	  over	  again,	  it	  doesn’t	  really	  have	  any	  effect»	  (Warhol,	  in	  Swenson,	  What	  is	  Pop	  Art,	  1963,	  60).	  The	  “effect”	  is	  the	  effect	  on	  our	  sensibilities,	  on	  our	   conscience	   and	   feelings.	   However,	   the	   content	   of	   the	   picture	   (the	   fatality,	   the	  loss,	   the	   horror)	   would	   still	   effect	   our	   feelings,	   if	   accessed	   freely.	   Warhol	   is	   not	  claiming	   we	   are	   desensibilised	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   pain	   and	   suffering:	   what	   he	   is	  discussing	  is	  the	  very	  possibility,	   for	  us,	  of	  noticing	  such	  a	  content.	  The	  reason	  the	  effect	  on	  our	  feeling	  is	  negated	  is	  that	  the	  interposition	  of	  banalisation10	  has	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  content.11	  This	  is	  not	  true	  only	  of	  cultural	  contents	  as	  constructed	  in	  texts	  and	  symbols,	  but	   even	   (and	  maybe	   in	   particular)	   of	   everyday	   objects	   (the	   ‘ready-­‐to-­‐hand’	   tools	  crucial	   to	   Heidegger’s	   theory	   of	   the	   World);	   Anish	   Kappo,	   London	   based	   Indian	  visual	   artist,	   describes	   his	   work	   on	   de-­‐objectified	   forms	   saying	   that	   «[he	   is]	  interested	  in	  that	  moment	  when	  a	  thing	  dematerializes,	  when	  it	  isn’t	  just	  an	  object»	  (quoted	  by	  the	  Boston	  Museum	  of	  Fine	  Arts,	  in	  their	  exposition	  of	  his	  piece	  “Untitled,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Surprisingly	  enough	  (despite	  familiarity	  with	  banal	  and	  with	  the	  “-­‐isation”	  suffix),	  English	  has	  not	  “imported”	  such	  a	  word	  from	  French.	  While	  trivialisation	  captures	  some	  aspects	  of	  it,	   the	   insistence	  of	  banal	  on	  the	   lack	  of	  originality	  makes	   it	  more	  suitable	  than	  the	  simple	  
trivial.	  11	  We	  should	  notice	  here	  how	  the	  container,	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  art	  and	  an	  object	  of	  reflection,	  is	  in	  turn	  a	  content	  accessed	  by	  our	  attention,	  both	  when	  we	  see	  Death	  and	  Disasters	  and	  when	  we	   discuss	   its	   sociological	   and	   artistic	   value.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   eliminate	   the	  exemplary	  value	  of	  the	  reflection	  on	  the	  “sub-­‐content”	  (the	  images	  of	  pain	  and	  death)	  which	  is	  subtracted	  from	  our	  attention	  by	  repetition.	  Perpetuation,	  with	  its	  constancy	  in	  time	  and	  space,	   reduces	   the	   space	   for	   the	  momentariness	  of	   the	  act	  of	   turning	  our	  attention	   to	   the	  content.	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(Shu-­‐red)”,	  2007):	  only	  by	  destroying	  familiarity	  and	  usualness	  the	  not-­‐anymore-­‐an-­‐object	   can	   become	   once	   again	   an	   object-­‐of-­‐attention.	   The	   space	   for	   attention	   is	  disclosed	  –	  in	  this	  case	  and	  in	  many	  others	  -­‐	  by	  the	  novelty	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  attention,	  which	   needs	   to	   be	   created	   through	   the	   disruption	   of	   its	   habitual	   reality.	   The	  ‘dematerialisation’	  of	   the	  object	  destroys	  our	   interpretation	  of	   the	  object	  as	  a	   tool,	  subtracting	  it	  from	  the	  clutches	  of	  our	  interpretation	  and	  recreating	  it	  in	  a	  space	  of	  pre-­‐presence	  (pre-­‐presentation)	  which	  comes	  before	  interpretation.	  	  What	  Kappo	  aims	  at	  conceptually	  –	  and	  what	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  obtain	  visually	  –	  is	   therefore	   the	   re-­‐immersion12	  of	   the	  physical	  mass	  of	  his	  work	  of	   art	   in	   the	  pre-­‐interpreted	  space	  of	  cultural	  density:	  we	  are	  left	  wondering	  whether	  this	  is	  possible	  if	   we	   are	   to	   encounter	   such	   a	   work	   in	   the	   scope	   and	   horizon	   of	   the	   prestigious	  museum	   and	   exposition	   hosting	   it.	   Our	   content	   is	   presented	   as	   already	   re-­‐interpreted	  (or	  already	  re-­‐materialised,	  to	  relate	  it	  to	  Kappo’s	  words)	  as	  an	  object	  of	  art	   and	   it	   is	  doubtful	  whether	   it	  was	  ever	  present	   to	  our	  accessibility	  without	   the	  interpretational	  charge	  the	  situation	  (historical	  and	  spatial)	  enforces	  upon	  us.	  Our	   external,	   momentous	   attention	   can	   be	   called,	   and	   demanded,	   by	   an	  Other,	   intended	   as	   a	   fellow	   subject,	   a	   Thou	   in	   an	   I-­‐Thou	   relation.	   Our	   attention,	  however,	   is	   always	   turned	   to	   a	   content,	   to	   a	   single	   aspect	   of	   the	   Thou	   who	   is	  demanding	  a	  relation.	  When	  we	  access	  a	  text	  by	  an	  author,	  our	  attention	  is	  turned	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Immersion	  in	  its	  transitive	  sense	  of	  us	  (or	  Kappo)	  immersing	  the	  content	  once	  more	  into	  cultural	   density,	   imbuing	   it	  with	   the	   non-­‐conceptualized	   status	   of	   pre-­‐interpretation;	   can	  this	   happen	   in	   virtue	   of	   our	   own	   (intransitive)	   immersion	   in	   the	  mind-­‐experiment	   of	   the	  author?	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the	   text	   as	   it	   is	   and	   appears,	   physically	   and	   intellectually,	   in	   front	   of	   us	   in	   the	  moment	  of	  attention.	  The	  author,	   the	  rest	  of	   their	  work,	   the	  other	   texts	   that	  share	  contents	   or	   contingent	   characteristics	   with	   the	   accessed	   contents:	   everything	   is	  pushed	   back	   by	   the	   absolute	   individuality	   of	   the	   moment	   of	   attention.	   Only	   a	  speculative	  moment,	   coming	   after	  attention	   and	   after	   the	   first	   interpretation,	   can	  grasp	  the	  general,	  attention	  is	  always	  focused	  on	  the	  particular	  at	  first.	  There	  is	  no	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  beginning	  to	  read	  “Cicero’s	  opera	  omnia”	  if	  not	  in	  retrospective:	  our	  attention	  is	  turned	  to	  one	  content;	  it	  is	  true,	  though,	  that	  turning	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  text	   can	   in	   turn	   extract	   other	   related	   contents	   from	   the	   anonymity	   of	   cultural	  density.	  	  Going	   back	   to	   the	   figure	   of	   the	   Other,	   of	   the	   author	   of	   a	   text	   (or	   the	   actor	  giving	  a	  performance,	  or	  the	  voice	  on	  the	  phone,	  or	  even	  the	  person	  speaking	  to	  our	  face	  standing	  in	  front	  of	  us),	  this	  is	  not	  the	  immediate	  object	  of	  our	  attention,	  if	  we	  are	   to	   access	   the	   text	   (i.e.	   if	   our	   attention	   is	   turned	   to	   the	   text);	   not	   only	  reading/seeing/listening	  to	  the	  content	  does	  not	  imply	  paying	  any	  attention	  -­‐	  on	  our	  part	   -­‐	   to	   the	   carrier	   of	   the	   content,	   but	   indeed	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	   presenter	  interferes	  with	  our	  access	  to	  the	  presented	  [content]:	  if	  we	  are	  actively	  considering	  the	   beauty	   of	   an	   actor,	   we	  may	   lose	   sight	   of	   the	   content	   of	   his/her	   performance.	  Yeats,	  a	  poet	  always	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  symbolic	  value	  of	  words,	  describes	  the	  young	  woman	  involved	  in	  politics	  going	  to	  the	  rally	  and	  states:	  	  
Her	  nights	  [were	  spent]	  in	  argument	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Until	  her	  voice	  grew	  shrill.	  
What	  voice	  more	  sweet	  than	  hers	  
When,	  young	  and	  beautiful,	  	  
She	  rode	  to	  harriers?	  	  	  	   	   	   	   (Easter	  1916	  –	  19-­‐2313)	  	  The	  arguments	  cannot	  be	  named,	  they	  are	  silenced,	  they	  disappear	  from	  the	  scene,	  despite	  the	  scene	  being	  one	  about	  them	  being	  spoken.	  The	  attention	  (of	  Yeats	  and	  of	  the	  reader)	  needs	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  speaker	  (the	  sweet	  woman),	  and	  even	  more	  so	  when	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  spoken	  is	  not	  even	  mentioned,	  as	  in	  the	  verses	  of	  a	  friend	  and	  protégé	  of	  Yeats’,	   the	  American	  poet	  Rupert	  Brooke,	  who	  describes	  his	  “goddess”	  in	  terms	  of	  voice,	  not	  of	  words:	  
	  
And	  voice	  more	  sweet	  than	  the	  fair	  plaint	  of	  viols	  is,	  
Or	  the	  soft	  moan	  of	  any	  grey-­‐eyed	  lute-­‐player.	   (Ante	  Aram,	  18-­‐1914)	  	  Making	   her	   speak	   would	   lose	   her	   divinity	   and	   shift	   our	   attention	   to	   the	  content,	   without	   allowing	   the	   loving	   care	   of	   the	   poet	   to	   manifest	   her	   delicacy	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  William	   Butler	   Yeats,	   The	   Collected	   Works	   of	   W.B.	   Yeats	   Volume	   I:	   The	   Poems:	   Revised	  
Second	  Edition,	   Ed.	   by	  Richard	   Finneran,	  New	  York,	  NY:	   Scribner,	   1997,	   p.	   180.	   On	   Yeat’s	  opinion	  of	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  delicacy	  of	  his	  young	  women	  friends	  and	  their	  political	  activity	   (and	   Easter	   1916	   in	   particular)	   see	   Elizabeth	   Butler	   Cullingford,	   “Shrill	   voices,	  accursed	   opinions”	   in	   Yeats,	   W	   B,	   and	   James	   Pethica.	  Yeats's	   Poetry,	   Drama,	   and	   Prose:	  
Authoritative	  Texts,	  Contexts,	  Criticism.	  New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton,	  2000,	  399-­‐407.	  14	  Brooke,	  Rupert.	  Collected	  Poems.	  Cambridge:	  Oleander	  Press,	  2010,	  p.	  20.	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front	   of	   our	   reading	   eyes.	   For	   the	   voice	   to	   speak,	   thus,	   it	  must	   stay	   silent,	   or	   un-­‐listened	   to.	   Hearing	   the	   voice	   is	   not	   listening	   to	   it,	   and	   viceversa.	   Attention	   is	   a	  momentous	  instance	  independent	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  its	  object	  has	  been	  made	  present	  to	  it.	  In	  a	  space	  marked	  by	  absolute	  focus	  (as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  with	  the	  moment	  of	  attention)	  any	  distraction	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  main	  obect;	  the	  first	  attention,	  the	   turning	   to,	   is	   the	   moment	   which	   precedes	   the	   possibility	   of	   attentiveness	   as	  extended	  in	  time	  and	  objects	  (and	  subject	  to	  reflection	  and	  theorization)	  and	  as	  such	  has	   no	   space	   for	   two	   objects,	   thus	   if	   the	  medium	   is	   to	   be	  made	   content	   this	  will	  happen	  only	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  content	  such	  a	  medium	  was	  supposed	  to	  carry.	  	  There	  is	  a	  mutual	  exclusivity	  between	  the	  two,	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  conceived	  as	   objects	   of	   potential	   attention.	   In	   the	   space	   of	   pre-­‐interpretation,	   they	   are	   both	  suitable	   of	   becoming	   contents	   for	   our	   attention,	   but	   as	   soon	   as	   one	   of	   them	   is	  actualized	   the	  other	   is	  pushed	  back	   into	  a	  not-­‐yet	   accessed	   status.	  We	   look	  at	   the	  stone	  with	  the	  engraved	  hieroglyphs	  in	  a	  different	  way	  if	  we	  are	  invested	  in	  Geology	  more	  than	  Egyptology,	  and	  the	  one	  mind-­‐set	  cannot	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  other	  any	  more	  than	  the	  attention	  focused	  on	  the	  text	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  attention	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  stone.	  	  In	   such	   an	   hypothetical	   situation,	   even	   when	   looking	   at	   the	   text	   –	   which	  appears	  so	  unnaturally	  written,	   from	  our	  modern,	  Western	  perspective	  –	  we	  must	  choose	   whether	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   hieroglyphics	   as	   a	   visual	   unusual	   aesthetic	   or	  whether	  to	  read	  the	  text	  (assuming,	  of	  course,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  grasp	  the	  meaning).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  text	  itself	  becomes	  an	  obstacle	  to	  attention,	  it	  goes	  from	  transparency	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to	  opacity	  and	  presents	  itself	  as	  a	  first	  content,	  an	  object	  of	  attention,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  before	  moving	  to	  the	  content	  beneath,	  the	  content	  of	  the	  text	  (with	  the	  latter	  reduced	  to	  a	  tool	  and	  made	  transparent	  once	  again).	  The	   author	   of	   a	   text	   is	   not	   immune	   to	   this	   absolute	   dichotomy:	   unless	   he	  becomes	  the	  content	  (in	  light	  of	  an	  attention	  focused	  on	  him	  and	  not	  on	  his	  work),	  he	  cannot	  be	  grasped	  at	  first,	  and	  must	  be	  “reconstructed”	  in	  interpretation	  (which	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  always	  involves	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  content	  in	  light	  of	  other	  contents	   previously	   interpreted).	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   gauge	   whether	   such	   a	   primary	  attention	  can	  be	  focused	  on	  an	  Other	  who	  is	  not	  physically	  present:	   it	  would	  seem	  that,	  while	  we	   can	  decide	   to	   revel	   in	   the	  voice	   ‘more	   sweet	   than	   the	   fair	  plaint	   of	  viols’,	   and	   we	   certainly	   can	   appreciate	   the	   precious	   aspect	   of	   an	   engraved	  incunabulum,	   admiring	   the	   ‘voice	   of	   the	   author’	   in	   the	   text	   is	   impossible	  without	  having	  first	  turned	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  text	  itself.	  If	  this	  was	  true,	  that	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  distant,	  historicized	  author	  could	  never	  become	  a	  content	  for	  our	  absolute	  attention,	  but	  only	  be	  always	  a	  secondary	  object,	  to	  be	  understood	  but	  never	  witnessed.	  We	   shall	   come	   back	   to	   this	   in	   chapter	   3,	  when	   dealing	  with	   the	  proper	  problem	  of	   inheriting	  a	   text	   (and	  an	  author)	   from	  the	  past,	  and	  be	  content	  (satisfied),	  for	  the	  present	  moment,	  with	  noting	  how	  much	  harder	  it	  is	  for	  the	  source	  of	  a	  content	  to	  become	  an	  object	  of	  our	  absolute	  attention	  than	  it	  is	  for	  the	  medium	  of	  such	  a	  content.	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  medium	  via	  which	  the	  content	  becomes	  an	  object	  of	  our	  attention	  leads	  us	  to	  inquire	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  our	  asserting	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our	  attention	  and	  experiencing	  the	  world	  via	  our	  senses.	  Is	  attention	  nothing	  more	  than	  putting	  all	  of	  our	  senses	   in	  play?	  Certainly,	  without	  senses	  we	  could	  not	   turn	  our	   attention	   to	   anything	   external	   to	   our	   consciousness,	   but	   this	   does	   not	  necessarily	   imply	   that	   any	   outward	  moment	   of	   attention	   is	   to	   be	   reduced	   to	   the	  physicality	  of	  senses.	  	  Attention,	  as	  a	  motus	  of	  our	  consciousness,	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  status	  of	  the	  world	  as	  presented	  to	  us	  via	  the	  senses	  (since	  we	  cannot	  turn	  our	  external	  attention	  to	  something	  that	  is	  not	  already	  there	  and	  perceived	  by	  us),	  and	  it	  is	  of	  consequence	  for	  the	  use	  of	  our	  senses	  (since	  when	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  we	  also	  ‘turn	  our	  eyes’	  or	   ‘lend	  an	  ear’).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  two	  spheres	  overlap	  but	  do	  not	  coincide.	  Senses	  are	  our	  way	  to	  access	  the	  object	  and	  to	  grasp	   its	  characteristics,	  while	  attention	   is	  the	  reason	  for	  our	  accessing	  the	  object	  itself,	  to	  focus	  our	  senses.	  Senses	  are	  active	  even	  when	  attention	  is	  distracted:	  we	  hear	  what	  we	  do	  not	  listen	  to,	  we	  see	  what	  we	  are	   not	  watching,	   and	  we	   perceive	   the	   background	   as	   colored	   even	  when	  we	   are	  focusing	  on	  the	  forefront.	  	  If	   attention	  were	   to	   be	   contained	  by	   or	   synonymic	  with	   senses,	   distraction	  would	  be	  impossible	  or	  at	  least	  senseless.	  To	  be	  distracted,	  we	  need	  our	  attention	  to	  turn	   away	   from	  something,	   but	   that	   something	   to	  which	   it	   is	   (unwillingly)	   turned	  must	   be	   present	   to	   us	   and	   it	   can	   be	   as	   much	   only	   via	   our	   senses.	   Senses	   and	  attention	  struggle	  with	  each	  other,	  with	  attention	  trying	  to	  exert	  its	  dominance	  over	  them,	   and	   they	   -­‐	   in	   turn	   -­‐	   disturbing	   the	   concentration	   that	   lies	   at	   the	   essence	   of	  attention	  in	  the	  first	  place.	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Attention	   itself	   is	   a	   limitation	   of	   senses,	   not	   a	   function	   of	   them,	   and	   stems	  from	  the	  self-­‐consciousness	  of	  a	  being	  (our	  being	  as	  Dasein,	  as	  being	  immersed	  in	  a	  world)	  that	  knows	  that	  its	  senses	  present	  to	  it	  a	  world	  that	  is	  ungraspable	  at	  large	  by	  its	  intellect.	  The	  simultaneity	  of	  virtually	  infinite	  sensory	  stimulations	  transcends	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  of	  a	  finite	  mind.	  Aquinas	  explains	  (Summa	  Theologica,	  Part	  I,	  Q86)	  how,	  given	  the	  abstraction	  that	   intellect	   carries	   out	   on	   intelligible	   species,	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   it	   to	   know	  singulars,	  without	   the	   intermission	  of	  senses.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  however,	   the	  very	  notion	  of	  singularity	  shapes	  the	  way	  our	  intellect	  knows	  and	  provides	  a	  schema	  for	  our	  senses	  to	  be	  exerted:	  if	   it	   is	  true	  that	  our	  intellect	  could	  not	  grasp	  the	  singular	  object	   without	   senses,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   our	   senses	   receive	   the	   world	   as	   a	   not-­‐organized	  reality,	  and	  only	  our	  intellect	  can	  discern	  the	  singularities	  in	  between	  the	  absolute	   generality	   of	   our	   sensorial	   inlay.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   for	   cultural	  contents,	  for	  texts	  and	  artifacts	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  interpretation.	  Senses	  alone	  can	  only	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  factuality	  of	  their	  “being	  there”	  as	  objects,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  that	  allows	  our	  intellect	  to	  take	  notice	  of	  them,	  providing	  interpretation	  and,	  even	  before	  that,	  the	  very	  understanding	  of	  them	  as	  objects	  for	  a	  possible	  interpretation.	  Attention,	  when	  exercised	  outwardly	  (and	  not	  as	  an	  exercise	  of	  memory	  and	  imagination	  alone),	  is	  thus	  channeled	  by	  the	  senses,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  function	  of	  them.	  Even	  when	  we	  assume	   that	   something	   is	   forcefully	  presented	   to	  our	   attention	  via	  the	  senses,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  fully	  functional	  and	  self-­‐preserving	  attention:	  if	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we	   do	   not	   notice	   something	   extremely	   notable,	   we	   will	   describe	   ourselves	   as	  extremely	  distracted,	  with	  ‘our	  head	  in	  the	  clouds’15;	  whether	  we	  choose	  not	  to	  focus	  on	   the	   events	   (despite	   their	   notability)	   or	   whether	   the	   distraction	   is	   due	   to	   our	  attentiveness	   being	   devoted	   to	   something	   so	   interesting	   that	   our	   attention	   is	   not	  ready	  to	  be	   turned,	   the	  result	   is	   the	  same:	  no	  experiential	  presentation,	  no	  matter	  how	  intense,	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  grasp	  our	  attention.	  	  Distraction	   is	   an	   affirmation	   of	   independence	   of	   attention	   from	   the	   senses,	  although	  it	  can	  be	  presented	  in	  discourse	  as	  a	  forceful	  redirection	  of	  our	  attention.	  When	  we	  are	  not	   listening	   to	   a	   source,	   and	  we	  are	  distracted,	   that	   is	  because	  our	  attention	  has	  been	  actively	  redirected,	  destroying	  the	  attentiveness	  that	  we	  had	  (or	  were	   supposed	   to	   have)	   granted	   to	   that	   source.	   The	   source	   is	   still	   there,	   emitting	  sounds	  that	  our	  senses	  can	  catch,	  and	  the	   ‘other’	  object	  of	  our	  attention,	  by	  which	  we	   are	   distracted,	   is	   not	   necessarily	   affecting	   our	   senses	   with	   a	   more	   intense	  magnitude.	   Novelty,	   more	   than	   loudness,	   is	   the	   measure	   of	   distraction;	   the	  ‘intervening’	  is	  the	  dimension	  of	  our	  losing	  attentiveness	  and	  turning	  our	  attention	  to	  something	  new.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Curiously,	  an	  idiomatic	  expression	  that	  appears	  verbatim	  in	  all	  main	  European	  languages,	  and	  that	  chooses	  to	  describe	  a	  situation	  of	  inward	  self-­‐focus	  with	  a	  figurative	  “place”	  that	  is	  not	   only	   external	   to,	   but	   also	   very	   remote	   from	   the	   subject.	   It	   is	   the	  misunderstanding	  of	  attention,	  that	  is	  often	  presented	  as	  externally	  determined,	  and	  as	  subjugated	  to	  the	  senses:	  if	  the	  man	  is	  not	  focused	  on	  what	  we	  are	  presenting,	  his	  senses	  are	  clouded.	  We	  will	  see	  in	  a	  moment	  how	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  senses	  and	  attention	  is	  naïve	  and	  unsuitable	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  our	  process	  of	  knowledge.	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To	   clear	   any	   doubt	   about	   attention’s	   independence	   from	   the	   senses,	   it	   is	  enough	  to	  consider	  the	  very	  fact	  of	  our	  internal	  attention.	  We	  can	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  something	  that	  is	  not	  present	  to	  the	  senses,	  and	  is	  not	  present-­‐ed	  by	  and	  through	  them.	  Fichte	  famously	  called	  the	  attention	  of	  his	  students	  to	  turn	  from	  an	  object	  of	  the	  senses	  (the	  wall)	  to	  their	  act	  of	  thinking	  the	  wall.16	  Inward	  attention	  is	  then	  our	  initiating	  a	  thinking	  process	  whose	  content	  ideas	  are	  not	  ‘immediate	  sensuous’	  ideas	  (to	   use	   Locke’s	   distinction)	   but	   are	   provided	   by	   memory,	   speculation	   and	  imagination.	   Thought	   (or	   reflection)	   is	   thus	   sparkled	   in	   the	  moment	   of	   attention,	  without	   any	   necessary	   input	   from	   outside	   sources	   (and	   thus	   without	   the	  collaboration	  of	  our	  senses).	  	  Attention,	   in	   this	   case,	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   first	   moment	   of	   thought.	   Is	   then	  attention	  a	  function	  of	  thinking,	  a	  sub-­‐product	  of	  reflection,	  whereby	  it	  finds	  its	  own	  foundation?	  Have	  we	   rescued	  attention	   from	   the	  domineering	   grasp	  of	   the	   senses	  just	  to	  hand	  it	  over	  to	  the	  intimate	  supremacy	  of	  thought?	  Attention	  stems	  from	  self-­‐consciousness,	   since	   only	   I	   can	   be	   turning	  my	   attention	   to	   an	   object	   that	  was	   not	  present-­‐ed	  to	  me	  before.	  Without	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  self,	  of	  my	  self,	  my	  attention	  is	  not	  turned,	  or	  at	   least	   I	   cannot	  grasp	   the	  new	  object	  as	  an	  object	  of	  my	  attention,	  but	  simply	  as	  naively	  present	  in	  the	  world	  reachable	  by	  my	  senses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  ‘Denken	   Sie	   die	   Wand’,	   the	   opening	   invocation	   by	   Fichte	   to	   his	   students,	   and	   their	  stupefied	   reaction	   after	   the	   following	   steps	   of	   required	   self-­‐reflection,	   are	   narrated	   by	  Henrik	   Steffens	   in	   his	   autobiography.	   The	   passage	   is	   referred	   in	   English	   in	   J.	   G.	   Fichte,	  
Introductions	   to	   the	   Wissenschaftslehre	   and	   Other	   Writings	   (1797-­‐1800),	   ed.	   Daniel	  Breazeale,	  Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  1994,	  p.	  111.	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Moreover,	   I	   am	  always	  attentive	   to	  my	   interior	   self:	  nothing	  goes	  on	   in	  my	  mind	  which	  is	  unrelated	  and	  unknown	  to	  my	  self-­‐consciousness.	  Even	  the	  Freudian	  notion	   of	   subconscious,	   so	   profoundly	   received	   by	   our	   Western	   culture	   and	   so	  strictly	   connected	   to	   our	   interaction	   with	   the	   world,	   is	   framed	   by	   this	   relation	  between	  attention	  and	  the	  self.	  We	  are	  not	  aware	  of	   the	  subconscious	  because	  we	  cannot	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	   its	  content,	  since	  we	  are	  not	  aware	  of	   it.	  Nonetheless,	  we	  are	  conscious	  of	  our	  thoughts	  and	  drives,	  which	  such	  a	  subconscious	  generates.	  The	  drives,	   the	  movements,	   the	  events	  of	  our	   interior	   self	  are	  not	  unknown	   to	  us,	  and	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  of	   internal	  attention	   in	  this	  case,	   is	  repeated	  even	   in	  the	  realm	  of	  subconsciously	  motivated	  thoughts.	  	  Attention,	   nonetheless,	   is	   hard	   for	   us	   to	   fully	   grasp,	   to	   understand	   at	   the	  fullest.	   Whenever	   we	   are	   thinking	   attention,	   our	   attention	   is	   distracted	   by	   our	  thinking,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  only	  think	  and	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  and	  of	  our	   turning	   of	   attention	   to	   an	   object.	   Our	   attention	   is	   always	   focused	   on	   the	   next	  thing,	  but	  our	  thought	  can	  only	  reflect	  upon	  the	  last	  thing	  we	  focused	  our	  attention	  on,	   unless	   we	   assume	   that	   we	   can	   be	   caught	   in	   a	   state	   of	   absolute	   attention	   on	  attention,	  which	  would	   nonetheless	   immediately	   decay	   to	   attentiveness,	   since	   the	  moment	  of	  the	  turning	  would	  already	  be	  lost	  and	  substituted	  by	  a	  state.	  Such	  a	  state	  of	   attentiveness	   toward	   our	   attention	  would	   therefore	   be	   unable	   to	   deal	  with	   the	  momentous	   nature	   of	   the	   turning,	   and	   reduced	   to	   attentiveness	   toward	  attentiveness,	   which	   -­‐	   while	   certainly	   worth	   of	   dedication	   -­‐	   is	   not	   what	   we	   first	  hypothesized	  as	  the	  object	  of	  our	  reflection.	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Schelling,	  with	   incomparable	  poetry,	   tells	  us	   that	   self	   consciousness	   is	   «the	  lamp	  of	  our	  system	  of	  knowledge,	  but	  casts	   its	   light	  only	   forward»17	  and	  this	  suits	  perfectly	   the	   points	   we	   addressed	   about	   attention:	   it	   can	   never	   rest,	   it	   is	   either	  moving	  or	  not	  present,	  cannot	  shed	  light	  on	  itself,	  but	  only	  on	  its	  objects,	  and	  is	  not	  fully	   reachable	   by	   self-­‐consciousness,	   on	   which	   nevertheless	   it	   depends	   for	   its	  conceptual	  elaboration.	   Just	   like	  Schelling’s	  self-­‐consciousness,	  attention	  can	  never	  illuminate	   itself,	   and	   yet	   we	   depend	   on	   it	   for	   illumination	   of	   the	   world.	   If	  consciousness	  is	  a	  lamp,	  a	  flashlight,	  attention	  is	  the	  wrist	  that	  moves	  it,	  allowing	  us	  to	   illuminate	   the	  new	  object.	  Once	   the	  movement	   is	  done	  (when	  attentiveness	  has	  begun)	  and	  the	  object	  is	  lit	  (by	  the	  senses),	  the	  wrist	  may	  rest,	  may	  even	  disappear	  from	  the	  picture,	  only	  to	  be	  needed	  again	  at	  the	  next	  moment	  of	  attention.	  Attention	  is	  therefore	  not	  ancillary	  to	  consciousness	  but	  as	  necessary	  to	  it	  as	  it	   is	   dependent	   upon	   it.	   Consciousness	   is	   the	   basis	   for	   attention,	   but	   it	   would	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Schelling,	   Principle	   of	   Transcendental	   Idealism,	   Chapter	   1	   (“On	   the	   supreme	   mediating	  principle	  of	  knowledge”).	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  how,	  in	  this	  very	  same	  text,	  Schelling	  will	  come	  to	  equate	  philosophy	  and	  thought	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  philosophizing	  self,	  able	  to	  relate	   to	   whatever	   object	   it	   wishes	   and	   unconstrained	   by	   the	   objects	   it	   encounters.	   Self-­‐consciousness	   is	   described	   as	   an	   act	   which	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   being.	   While	   deeply	  grounded	   in	  Schelling’s	   idealism,	   this	  schema	   is	  unparalleled	   in	   its	  wonderful	  depiction	  of	  consciousness	  in	  general	  (and	  not	  only	  of	  the	  Self)	  as	  something	  restless,	  which	  cannot	  be	  grasped	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   being	   something,	   but	   only	   as	   a	   momentary	   action.	   Despite	  subsequent	   philosophy	   (especially	   modern	   philosophy	   of	   mind,	   but	   also	   modern	  phenomenology	   since	   Heidegger	   –	   see	   Levinas)	   having	   done	   exactly	   what	   he	   advocated	  against	   (i.e.	   analyzing	   our	   consciousness	   as	   a	   state),	   his	   profound	   intuition	   remains	   valid	  when	  applied	  simply	  to	  attention,	  and	  not	  to	  consciousness	  in	  its	  whole.	  
	   103	  
limited	   to	   self-­‐consciousness	   (deprived	   even	   of	   embodiment)	   if	   it	   weren’t	   for	  attention.	   Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	   analysis	   of	   our	   perception	   of	   the	   ‘natural	   world’	  addresses	  this	  relation	  of	  ‘perceptual	  consciousness’	  to	  the	  world	  	  Perception	  entails	  a	  process	  of	  making	  explicit	  which	  could	  be	  pursued	  to	  infinity	   and	   which,	   moreover,	   could	   not	   gain	   in	   one	   direction	   without	  losing	  in	  another	  and	  without	  being	  exposed	  to	  the	  risks	  of	  time.	  […]	  The	  percept	  is	  and	  remains,	  despite	  all	  critical	  education,	  on	  the	  hither	  side	  of	  doubt	   and	   demonstration.	   The	   sun	   ‘rises’	   for	   the	   scientist	   in	   the	   same	  way	   as	   it	   does	   for	   the	   uneducated	   person,	   and	   our	   scientific	  representations	  of	  the	  solar	  system	  remain	  matter	  of	  hearsay,	  like	  lunar	  landscapes,	   and	   we	   never	   believe	   in	   them	   in	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   we	  believe	   in	   the	   sunrise.	   […]	   Each	   thing	   can,	   after	   the	   event,	   appear	  uncertain,	  but	  what	  is	  at	  least	  certain	  for	  us	  is	  that	  there	  are	  things,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  world.18	  	  While	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  words	   clearly	   revert	   to	   the	  discussion	  of	   the	   senses	  above,	   there	   are	   two	   instances	   of	   his	   prose	   underneath	   which	   lies	   our	   elusive	  matter,	  the	  nature	  of	  attention:	  the	  making	  explicit,	  as	  a	  process	  of	  disclosure,	  needs	  to	  be	  momentous,	  and	  this	  strikes	  us	  as	  being	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  ‘always	  active’	  nature	  of	   senses	   and	   perceptual	   consciousness.	   This	  moment,	   repeatable	   ad	   infinitum,	   is	  imbued	   with	   what	   Merleau-­‐Ponty	   defines	   as	   «the	   momentum	   which	   carries	   us	  beyond	  subjectivity,	  which	  gives	  us	  our	  place	  in	  the	  world	  prior	  to	  any	  science	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Maurice	   Merleau-­‐Ponty,	   Phenomenology	   of	   Perception,	   transl.	   Colin	   Smith,	   London	   and	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2002,	  p.	  401.	  Additional	  page	  references	  are	  given	  in	  parentheses.	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verification»	   (p.	   400):	   we	   should	   by	   now	   recognise,	   behind	   this	   ‘momentous	  moment’,	  the	  function	  of	  attention	  as	  we	  have	  described	  it	  so	  far.	  Attention	  is	  what	  gives	  us	   the	  certainty	  of	   the	  event,	  which	  can	   ‘appear	  uncertain’	  when	  attention	   is	  once	  again	  directed	   to	   another	  object,	   turned	   to	   the	  next	   event	   in	  our	  perception,	  with	  the	  first	  one	  receding,	  «disappearing	  only	  to	  give	  place	  to	  another	  perception»	  (p.	   401).	   As	  we	   said	   already,	   attention	   is	   an	   instantaneous	   act	   of	   ‘turning’,	   which	  discloses	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   perception	   in	   a	   world	   of	   perceptions	   at	   large.	  Perceptions	  operate	  in	  a	  state	  of	  attentiveness	  initiated	  by	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  which	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   perception	   and	   is	   conditioned	   by	   consciousness	   in	   a	  reciprocal	  relation.	  What	  we	  have	  said	  about	   the	  difficulty	  of	   turning	  our	  attention	   to	  our	  very	  moment	  of	   attention	   can	  be	   said	  more	   specifically	   also	  of	   our	   accessing	  a	   cultural	  content.	  The	  act	  of	  reading,	  seeing	  or	  listening	  to	  a	  content,	  just	  like	  Fichte’s	  thinking	  of	  the	  wall,	  is	  	  ‘made	  explicit’	  in	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  sense	  only	  retrospectively,	  and	  in	  a	  dimension	  of	  reflection	  which	  is	  detached	  from	  the	  act	  of	  reading,	  seeing	  or	  listening	  which	  happens	  in	  the	  world	  of	  perception.	  While	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  access	  to	  and	  appropriation	   of	   has	   always	   already	   happened,	   we	   can	   turn	   our	   attention	   to	   our	  memories	   and	   conceptions	   of	   it,	   recreating	   such	   an	   object	   for	   our	   attention	   not	  through	  a	  re-­‐enacting	  of	  the	  act	  (which	  would	  be	  a	  different,	  performative	  act,	  and	  not	  the	  act	  of	  first	  access	  which	  constitutes	  the	  desired	  object)	  but	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  reflection.	  This	  attention	  through	  memory	   is	   less	   immediate	  (since	   it	   temporalizes	  attention	   in	  a	   line	  of	   times	   that	   is	  necessarily	  post-­‐interpretation)	  but	  nonetheless	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exerted,	   in	   the	   way	   internal	   attention	   is	   exerted,	   as	   we	   mentioned	   before	   when	  discussing	  attention-­‐to-­‐self.	  This	   temporalization	   is	   not	   true	   of	   the	   more	   immediate	   act	   of	   turning	  attention	  to	  an	  object,	  and	  a	  cultural	  one	  to	  boot.	  The	  object-­‐content	  is	  present	  to	  us	  as	  pre-­‐interpreted,	  being	   there	  without	  any	  consideration	  of	   space	  and	   time,	  or	  at	  least	  of	  space	  and	  time	  of	  its	  creation.	  We	  perceive	  that	  the	  content	  is	  ‘there’	  (with	  the	  “there”	  being	  a	  function	  of	  availability,	  and	  not	  one	  of	  distance)	  to	  be	  accessed	  ‘now’.	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  related	  to	  the	  ‘when’	  of	  the	  content.	  The	  when	  to	  which	  attention	  can	  be	  turned	  is	  always	  the	  now	  of	  a	  container.	  The	  play	  is	  on	  stage	  in	  the	  ‘now’,	  and	  Hamlet	  or	  The	  Clouds	  are	  collapsed	  into	  contemporaneity,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  represented	  in	  a	  now	  of	  accessibility.19	  They	  are	  on	  stage	  now	  and	  I	  am	  turning	  my	  attention	  to	  them	  ‘today’	  when	  I	  sit	  through	  the	  play.	  The	  book	  is	  in	  my	  library	  (or	  available	  through	  my	  computer)	  and	  present	  as	  accessible,	  and	  such	  accessibility	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Theatrical	  performances,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  cultural	  content,	  are	  bearers	  of	  the	  ‘now’	  of	  the	   calendar,	   since	   their	   availability	   ‘now’	   does	   not	   even	   require	   real	   accessibility,	   but	  simply	  the	  notion	  that	  such	  availability	  is	  happening	  ‘in	  this	  period’	  or	  ‘soon’.	  The	  messianic	  value	  of	  a	  piece	   ‘being	  scheduled’,	  especially	  shines	  with	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  première:	  the	  content	   is	   “to	   come”,	   yet	   is	   not	   there	   yet,	   and	   can	   only	   be	   accessed	   as	   potentiality,	  nonetheless	  disclosing	  a	  space	  of	  interpretation	  which	  can	  be	  explored	  by	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  booklet	  or	  by	   the	  reading	  of	   the	  script	  –	  which	  amounts,	  nonetheless,	   to	  acceding	  another	  content	  which	   is	  not	   yet	   the	   foreshadowed	  one.	  No	  other	   content	   can	  equate	   this	   tension	  between	   the	   being	   scheduled	   and	   the	   happening,	   although	   highly-­‐expected	   novels	   from	  famous	  authors	  or	  academic	  pieces	  on	  debated	  topics	  can	  achieve	  a	  similar	  level	  of	  interest	  before	  they	  are	  fully	  accessible.	  Nonetheless,	  they	  are	  going	  to	  be	  crystalized	  in	  accessibility,	  while	  the	  messianic	  pièce	  is	  to	  be	  offered	  to	  our	  attention	  only	  at	  the	  one	  time.	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disregards	  any	  consideration	  of	  the	  chronology	  of	  its	  composition,	  disappearing	  into	  the	   ‘now’	   of	   “I	   am	   now	   reading”,	   which	   implies	   a	   moment	   of	   attention	   that	   has	  already	  happened.	  The	  time	  of	  attention	  is	   informed	  by	  the	  now,	  just	   like	  cultural	  density	  was,	  with	   its	   necessary	   “contemporaneity”.	   But	   there	   are	   multiple	   “nows”	   which	   are	  condensed	   in	   the	   moment	   of	   attention,	   to	   which	   cultural	   density,	   with	   its	   static	  dimension,	  was	   indifferent.	   Beside	   the	   “now”	   of	  my	   being	   in	   the	  world	   today	   and	  being	  capable	  of	  attention	  now,	  and	  the	  ‘now’	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  “now”	  there	  (the	  book	  is	  now	  in	  my	  library,	  the	  movie	  is	  now	  on,	  etc.)	  to	  be	  accessed/subject	  to	  my	  attention,	  attention	  introduces	  a	  third	  now,	  the	  now	  of	  accessing	  which	  was	  absent	  from	  cultural	  density,	  necessarily	  stuck	  in	  its	  pre-­‐accessed	  status.	  I	  am	  now	  turning	  my	  attention	  to	  this	  or	  that:	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  –	  that	  we	  have	  been	  discussing	  -­‐	   is	   a	   dynamic	  now	  of	   events,	   contemporary	   and	   yet	   extremely	  different	   from	   the	  two	  nows	  which	  attention	  as	  potential	  shares	  with	  cultural	  density.	  	  The	  now	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  one’s	  cultural	  density	  was	  a	  time	  of	  not-­‐yet	  (not	  yet	  read,	  not	  yet	  accessed,	  not	  yet	  mine)	  grounded	  in	  present	  and	  projected	  in	  the	  future	  (an	  unreachable	  future	  of	  absolute	  actualization	  of	  all	  the	  contents	  which	  was	  unreachable	  precisely	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  constant	  re-­‐creation	  of	  one’s	  cultural	  density).	  It	   was	   an	   unreflective	   now,	   since	   reflection	   is	   never	   before	   interpretation,	   and	  because	  as	  we	  have	  seen	   the	  contents	  were	  not	  understood	  chronologically	   (since	  historicization	   is	   a	   function	   of	   interpretation)	   but	   only	   in	   the	   now	   of	   their	   being	  available.	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The	   now	   of	   one’s	   own	   presence-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   was,	   as	   well,	   a	   non-­‐chronological	   now,	   function	   of	   my	   being	   there	   as	   a	   being	   disclosed	   only	   in	   the	  present:	   as	   Heidegger	   points	   out,	   temporality	   is	   disclosed	   in	   discourse	   (and	   thus	  after	   the	   pre-­‐presence	   of	   cultural	   density,	   after	   the	   moment	   of	   attention):	  «Discourse	  in	  itself	  is	  temporal,	  since	  all	  talking	  about…	  ,	  of…	  ,	  or	  to…	  ,	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  ecstatical	  unity	  of	  temporality.»	  (Being	  and	  Time,	  349/400).	  Conversely,	   attention	   is	   not	   just	   about	   ‘being	   present’,	   its	   dynamism	   is	   a	  function	  of	  Heidegerrian	   ‘making	  present’,	   it	   is	   the	   first	   instance	  of	   «letting	   things	  be»	   [ein	   “Sein”	   lassen]	   (Being	   and	   Time,	   354/405)	   which	   is	   disclosed	   by	   our	  interpretation	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  world.	  Using	  Heidegger’s	  language,	  attention	  is	   the	   bringer	   of	   contents	   (and	   cultural	   contents	   in	   particular)	   from	   the	  inauthenticity	  of	  the	  They	  into	  the	  absolute	  authenticity	  of	  concern/care.	  While	  we	  have	  already	  shown	  how	  the	  notion	  of	   inauthenticity	  prevents	  us	   from	   identifying	  the	  They	  with	  our	  cultural	  density	  and	  vice	  versa,	  Heidegger	  more	  than	  anyone	  else	  in	   the	  20th	   century	  gives	  an	  account	  of	   this	   ‘making	  present’	  which	   is	  precious	   for	  our	   understanding	   of	   the	   temporal	   collocation	   of	   attention,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	  attention	  (Aufmerksamkeit)	  is	  never	  mentioned	  in	  his	  opus	  magnum.20	  	  While	   attention	   introduces	   temporality	   and	   breaks	   the	   serenity	   of	   the	  uneventful	   ‘now’	   of	   cultural	   density	   and	   the	   pre-­‐interpretation	   state	   of	   pre-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Cf.	   in	   particular	   Being	   and	   Time,	   II.4,	   Sec.	   69	   (b):	  The	  Temporal	  Meaning	  of	   the	  Way	   in	  
which	  Circumspective	  Concern	  becomes	  Modified	  into	  the	  Theoretical	  Discovery	  of	  the	  Present-­‐
at-­‐hand	  Within	  the	  World.	  
	   108	  
presence,	   it	   is	   not	   yet	   exerted	   over	   a	   temporality	   composed	   of	   past-­‐present-­‐and-­‐future.	  Past	  is	  absent,	  since	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  possible	  temporal	  dimension	  of	  the	  contents	   is	   collapsed	   into	   their	   presence	   into	   availability,	   with	   their	   historical	  presence	  and	  their	  persistence	  in	  time	  being	  pushed	  back	  into	  interpretation,	  which	  can	  only	  happen	  after	  and	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention.	  Our	  ‘attention	  to	  the	  past’	  is	  actually	  not	  ‘attention’,	  but	  a	  reflection,	  a	  speculative	  moment,	  which	  needs	  to	   follow	   our	   ‘turning	   our	   attention’	   to	   a	   content	   (a	   monument,	   a	   relic,	   a	   text,	   a	  narrative,	  etc.)	  of	  which	  such	  a	  past	  is	  the	  object.	  Similarly,	  the	  future	  is	  only	  present	  as	  pre-­‐figured,	  and	  it’s	  limited	  to	  the	  content’s	  future-­‐as-­‐accessed	  and	  the	  subject’s	  future-­‐as-­‐having-­‐accessed	   (the	   content).	   The	   future	   of	   their	   ‘being’	   is	   bracketed;	  only	   their	   potential	   relational	   future	   is	   addressed	   by	   attention,	   in	   the	   form	   of	  expectation.	  Merleau-­‐Ponty:	  	  	  The	  interpretation	  which	  I	  now	  give	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  my	  confidence	  in	  psychoanalysis.	   Tomorrow,	   with	   more	   experience	   and	   insight,	   I	   shall	  possibly	  understand	  it	  differently,	  and	  consequently	  reconstruct	  my	  past	  in	   a	   different	   way.	   In	   any	   case,	   I	   shall	   go	   on	   to	   interpret	   my	   present	  interpretations	  in	  their	  turn,	  revealing	  their	  latent	  content	  and,	  in	  order	  finally	  to	  assess	  their	  truth-­‐value,	   I	  shall	  need	  to	  keep	  these	  discoveries	  in	   mind.	  My	   hold	   on	   the	   past	   and	   the	   future	   is	   precarious,	   and	   my	  possession	  of	  my	  own	  time	  is	  always	  postponed	  until	  a	  stage	  when	  I	  may	  fully	  understand	  it,	  yet	  this	  stage	  can	  never	  be	  reached,	  since	  it	  would	  be	  one	  more	  moment,	  bounded	  by	  the	  horizon	  of	  its	  future,	  and	  requiring	  in	  its	  turn	  further	  development	  in	  order	  to	  be	  understood.	  (Phenomenology	  of	  Perception,	  p.	  404)	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  While	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  general	  sense	  of	  what	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  calls	  ‘the	  human	  world’21	  (wherefrom	   the	   insistence	   on	   the	   impossibility	   of	   a	   ‘full’	   interpretation,	  with	   the	   escaping	   moment),	   this	   passage	   deals	   (although	   extremely	   briefly)	   with	  some	  of	   the	  notions	  which	  we	  have	  made	   crucial	   to	   our	   analysis	   of	   attention:	   the	  reconstruction	   of	   the	   past	   as	   an	   interpretation	   through	   different	   moments	   of	  reflection;	   the	   notion	   that	   only	   the	   present	   is	   fully	   in	   the	   reach	   of	   my	   attention;	  finally,	  the	  fleeting	  nature	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention.	  What	  is	  left	  to	  be	  addressed,	  then,	  is	  the	  connection	  between	  attention	  and	  the	  future,	  and	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  latter	  into	  the	  ‘now’	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  attention.	  Attention	   deals	   essentially	   with	   expectation.	   There	   is	   no	   expectation	   in	  cultural	  density,	  since	  expectation	  implies	  the	  understanding	  of	  actualisation,	  or	  –	  as	  Heidegger	   said	   –	   «to	   expect	   something	  possible	   is	   always	   to	   understand	   it	   and	   to	  ‘have’	   it	  with	   regard	   to	  whether	   and	  when	   and	   how	   it	  will	   actually	   be	   present	   at	  hand»	  (Being	  and	  time,	  p.	  262/306).	  The	  expectations	  I	  hold	  about	  contents	  about	  which	  I	  know	  something	  are	  only	  made	  explicit	  (and	  thus	  present)	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	   in	   which	   the	   content	   is	   individualised	   as	   the	   one	   being	   accessed	   and	  extracted	   from	   the	   anonymous	   indifference	   of	   cultural	   density,	   whose	   opacity	  prevents	  the	  contents	  from	  being	  already	  fully	  present.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Merleay-­‐Ponty	  recognizes	   that	  «the	  cultural	  world	   is	   [then]	  ambiguous,	  but	   it	   is	  already	  present.	  I	  have	  before	  me	  a	  society	  to	  be	  known»	  (Phenomenology	  of	  Perception,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  405).	   Nonetheless,	   his	   focus	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   role	   of	   embodiment	   in	   relation	   to	   such	   a	  cultural	  world	  and	  not	  such	  a	  world	  per	  se.	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When	   a	   content	   is	   accessed,	   two	   sets	   of	   expectations	   overlap:	   expectations	  about	  the	  content	  proving	  to	  be	  worth	  something	  and	  expectations	  about	  oneself	  as	  a	  reader/listener	  of	  the	  content,	  as	  improved	  or	  empowered	  by	  the	  act	  of	  accessing	  it.	   a) Text-­‐related	  expectations.	  	  On	  a	  most	  immediate	  level,	  the	  content	  is	  accessed,	  the	  attention	  turned	  to	  it,	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  recognised	  as	  a	  valuable	  content.	  This	  worth,	  this	  ‘cultural’	  worth	  is	  in	  turn	  twofold:	  	  	  1. We	  not	  only	  perceive	  it	  (as	  a	  conglomerate	  of	  sensory	  perceptions,	  as	   an	   object	   with	   dimension,	   colour,	   weight,	   size)	   nor	   we	   just	  consider	  it	  on	  the	  background	  of	  the	  social	  world	  we	  are	  immersed	  in	   (taking	   into	   consideration	   things	   like	   state	   of	   preservation,	  aesthetic,	  etc.).	  We	  do	  more.	  We	  access	  the	  content	  as	  a	  content.	  We	  read	  it,	   instead	  of	   letting	  the	  lines	  and	  the	  letters	  recede	  to	  simple	  aesthetic	  concerns.	  We	  listen	  to	  it,	  evaluating	  the	  meaning	  and	  not	  just	  the	  sound	  of	  what	  we	  hear.	  Such	  a	  value	  is	  the	  immediate	  value	  of	  the	  text	  qua	  text,	  but	  it	   is	   informed	  by	  a	  symbolic	  value	  that	  we	  have	   learned	   (which	   is	   language	   in	   both	   cases	  and	  writing	   in	   the	  reading	  situation).	  The	  expectation,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  ‘simply’	  that	  of	  a	  
speaking	   content.	   A	   content	   which	   can	   be	   engaged	   culturally	  indeed,	  with	  a	  message	  or	  meaning	  (no	  matter	  how	  banal,	  naïve	  or	  inconsequential	  it	  may	  prove	  to	  be).	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2. We	   also	   choose	   to	   access	   fully	   the	   text,	   reading	   it	   instead	   of	  skimming	   it,	   listening	   to	   it	   thoroughly	   instead	   of	   half-­‐heartedly,	  finishing	  it	  instead	  of	  	  ‘putting	  it	  down’	  midway,	  watching	  it	  instead	  of	  exiting	  the	  theatre	  or	  switching	  tv	  channel.	  This	  means	  that,	  past	  the	  moment	  of	   recognition	  of	   the	   content	  as	  a	   cultural	   content,	  of	  the	   con-­‐textualisation	   of	   the	   text,	  we	   operate	   a	   choice,	   preferring	  the	  content	  we	  are	  accessing	  to	  other	  (potential	  and	  actual)	  objects	  of	  our	  attention.	  A	  judgment	  of	  value	  is	  always	  happening,	  but	  it	  is	  hard	   to	   find	   a	   general	   rationale	   behind	   such	   an	   act	   of	   judgment	  intrinsic	   in	   the	   moment	   of	   attention.	   The	   reason	   for	   	   our	  considering	   that	   content	   valuable	   can	   range	   from	   being	  confrontational	   and	   outraged,	   to	   being	   looking	   for	   amusement,	   to	  the	  search	  for	  inspiration,	  to	  the	  simple	  desire	  to	  be	  “up	  to	  speed”	  with	  the	  world	  at	  large,	  etc.	  Therefore,	  the	  judgment	  (which	  is	  by	  its	  very	   nature	   ill-­‐informed	   whenever	   it	   ventures	   behind	   tautology)	  can	  only	  be	  reduced	  to	  ‘my	  interest	  lies	  with	  this’.	  But	  since	  for	  the	  object	  of	  attention	  to	  be	  a	  text	  we	  must	  have	  an	  interest	   in	  such	  a	  text,	   this	   is	   reduced	   to	   an	   even	  more	   pleonastic	   ‘my	   interest	   lies	  with	  what	  I	  am	  interested	  in’.	  22	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 	  The	   untranslated	   (and	   untranslatable)	   text,	   the	   foreign	   speech,	   assumes	   here	   an	  extremely	   problematic	   value,	   especially	   when	   dealing	   with	   expectation-­‐2:	   while	   the	  expectation-­‐1	   about	   the	   content	   per	   se	   is	   immediately	   met	   (the	   text	   is	   a	   text,	   and	   it	   is	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b) Self-­‐related	  expectations	  Conversely	  to	  the	  expectations	  related	  to	  the	  content	  itself	  and	  to	  its	  value	  as	  a	  text	  and	  as	  a	  text	  of	  interest,	  amongst	  the	  motives	  informing	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  content	   there	   is	   always	   a	   component	   of	   expectation	   about	   our-­‐Self(/ves).	   In	  approaching	   the	   text,	  we	   foresee	  ourselves	  as	   improved.	  Our	  self-­‐projection	   in	   the	  future	   as	   the-­‐one-­‐who-­‐has-­‐read	   discloses	   an	   expectation	   that	   the	   text	   will	   prove	  useful.	  However,	  such	  an	  expected	  usefulness	  does	  not	  lie	  and	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  content	  per	  se.	  The	  same	  content,	  we	  are	  aware,	  could	  prove	   instrumental	   to	  Self-­‐improvement	   for	   one	   and	   remain	   barren	   for	   another.	   The	   projection	   we	   are	  experiencing,	   when	   turning	   our	   attention	   in	   trepidation	   to	   the	   new	   text	   which	   is	  presented	   as	   to-­‐be-­‐read,	   as	   present-­‐at-­‐hand,	   is	   a	   projection	   which	   is	   absolutely	  personal,	  relies	  on	  our	  imagination	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  gaps	  of	  how	  it	  will	  modify	  our	  being.	  All	   of	   these	   expectations	   rely	   heavily	   on	   the	   moment	   of	   attention,	   which	  while	   independent	   from	   senses	   and	   in	   a	   relation	   of	   co-­‐dependence	   with	   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  recognized	   as	   such	   as	   soon	   as	   attention	   is	   turned	   to	   it),	   expectation-­‐2	   (the	   text	   being	   of	  worth	   to	  me)	   collapses	   as	   soon	  as	   I	   cannot	  deal	  with	   the	   text	   as	   such.	  The	   text	   is	  pushed	  back	   to	   an	   aesthetic	   composition	   of	   lines,	   and	   yet	   it	   claims	   to	   be	   dealt	  with	   as	   a	   cultural	  content.	  The	  expectation-­‐2	  value	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   canceled	   (the	   text	   is	  not	   going	   to	  be	  useful)	  and	  multiplied	  (since	  expectation-­‐2	  cannot	  be	  verified,	  its	  potentiality	  is	  infinite;	  the	  unread	  text	  might	  have	  all	  the	  value	  I	  could	  ever	  need,	  yet	   it	   is	  denied	  of	  me).	  Both	  drives	  (cancellation	  and	  multiplication)	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  a	  conceptual	  shift	  to	  a	  level	  of	  self-­‐related	  expectation,	  which	  will	  now	  be	  addressed:	  the	  expectation-­‐2	  is	  still	   true	  (since	  the	  text	  is	  potentially	  useful),	  yet	  its	  immediate	  form	  is	  useless	  to	  me,	  insofar	  as	  I	  cannot	  access	  it.	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consciousness,	  must	  carry	  the	  weight	  of	  this	  projection	  and	  this	  judgment	  of	  value	  in	  order	  to	  disclose	  the	  space	  of	  interpretation	  in	  which	  worthiness	  (both	  personal	  and	  of	  the	  text)	  can	  fully	  be	  evaluated.	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Chapter	  3:	  Processing	  Inheritance.	  	  In	   previous	   chapters,	   we	   have	   explored	   the	   pre-­‐interpretational	   space	   in	  which	  the	  contents	  lie	  before	  being	  accessed	  and	  inherited,	  focusing	  on	  the	  absolute	  neutrality	  of	  their	  content	  to	  us.	  Then,	  we	  have	  analysed	  the	  moment	  of	  attention,	  as	  the	  crucial	  turning	  point	  transforming	  potential	  contents	  into	  actual	  text	  and	  ideas	  susceptible	  to	  be	  inherited.	  Nonetheless,	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  delved	  into	  the	  core	  of	  our	  exploration,	   i.e.	   Inheritance	   (and	   inheritances),	   a	   concept	   of	   which	   we	   have	  discovered	  some	  layers,	  but	  that,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  illuminated	  by	  focused	  reflection.	  First	  of	  all,	  we	  need	  to	  try	  to	  define	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  the	  word	  Inheritance.	  It	  should	   be	   clear,	   by	   now,	   that	   we	   are	   not	   referring	   to	   the	   physical,	   material	   and	  monetary	  inheritance	  provided	  in	  the	  last	  will	  and	  testament	  of	  a	  dying	  man.	  That	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  very	   important	  matter	   for	  our	  experience	  of	  society,	  but	  one	  that	   is	  best	  analyzed	  by	  legal	  historians	  and	  attorneys,	  or	  by	  economists	  if	   intended	  as	  a	  large,	  social	  phenomenon.	  Our	  focus,	  it	  should	  be	  made	  clear,	  is	  on	  the	  specular	  concept	  of	  cultural	  inheritance,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  we	  shall	  make	  our	  analysis.	  We	   have	   already	   mentioned	   the	   apparent	   synonymy	   between	   Legacy	   and	  Inheritance,	   but	   we	  must	   repeat	   here	   that	   in	   their	   proper	   usage	   one	  mirrors	   the	  other,	  without	   identity	  between	   the	   two.	   I	   have	  no	   intention	  of	  making	   a	   case	   for	  their	   proper	   usage,	   since	   no	   concern	   of	   language	   is	   present	   in	   my	   exploration.	  
	   115	  
Nonetheless,	   the	  way	  the	   terms	  are	  used	  here	   is	  best	  clarified	   if	  we	  consider	   their	  original	  sense,	  that	  being	  a) Inheritance	  =	  a	  ‘thing’	  that	  we	  come	  in	  possession	  of,	  which	  belonged	  to	  someone	  else	  OR	  the	  act	  of	  	  inheriting	  such	  a	  thing.	  b) Legacy	  =	  a	  thing	  handed	  down	  by	  a	  predecessor.	  The	  standard	  definition	  of	  Legacy	  does	  not	  include	  the	  act,	  but	  we	  will	  address	  this	  in	  our	  next	  chapter.	  Therefore,	  inheritance	  has	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  reception,	  and	  not	  of	  passing	  on	  and	  handing	  down	  (beside,	  obviously,	  the	  notion	  of	  passing	  and	  handing	  down	  as	  needing	  a	  receiver,	  which	  we	  will	  address	   later).	  This	   limits	  but	  yet	  does	  not	  fully	  clarify	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  inheritance	  when	  we	  deal	  with	  notions	  of	  cultural	  transmission.	   Inheritance	   is	   used	   (and	   has	   been	   used	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	  dissertation)	   to	   indicate	   no	   less	   than	   four	   concepts,	   all	   interconnected	   but	   not	  completely	  superimposable.	  One	  axis	  of	  distinction	  is	  between	  the	  individuality	  and	  the	  collectivity	  that	  can	  be	  implied	  in	  the	  term,	  while	  the	  other	  is	  the	  process/object	  distinction	  already	  present	  in	  the	  dictionary	  definition.	  
An	   inheritance	   is	   a	   content	   which	   has	   become	   an	   interpreted	   text,	   going	  through	  my	   process	   of	   reading	   and	   interpreting	   it,	   but	   that	   has,	   as	   well,	   become	  inserted	  in	  a	  vertical	  axis	  of	  time,	  being	  received	  now	  (or	  later	  than	  then)	  and	  having	  appeared	   then.	   Interpretation	   alone	   is	   necessary	   but	   not	   sufficient	   for	   a	   text	   to	  become	  an	  inheritance,	  a	  conception	  of	  time	  and	  a	  collocation	  of	  that	  content	  in	  time	  and	  relatively	  to	  subjective	  time	  are	  also	  needed.	  The	  main	   interpreter	  of	   the	  text,	  the	  inheritor	  who	  is	  making	  the	  text	  into	  an	  inheritance	  by	  making	  it	  part	  of	  his	  or	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her	  system,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  only	  one	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  content	  as	  an	  inheritance	  and	  consequently	  for	  the	  chronologisation	  of	  the	  axis	  of	   transmission.	  His	  or	  her	  role,	  as	   inheritor,	   is	  crucial	   to	  the	  reception	  of	   the	  text,	  but	  not	  to	  its	  recognition	  as	  an	  inheritance.	  	  Nonetheless,	   the	   inheritor	   is	   a	   crucial	   element	  of	   the	  process	  of	   inheritance.	  Inheritance	  as	  a	  process	  is	  the	  very	  act	  of	  reading	  a	  text	  that	  was	  written	  before.	  It	  could	   be	   unconscious	   (in	   which	   case	   an	   external	   validation	   in	   the	   form	   of	  recognition	  would	  become	  necessary),	  but	  for	  the	  moment	  it	  suffices	  to	  clarify	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  inheritance	  comprises	  both	  the	  content	  and	  the	  process	  by	  which	  such	  content	   is	   appropriated.	   It	   is	   a	   process	   that	   happens	   in	   a	   time	   that	   is	   the	   time	   of	  reading/hearing	  (=accessing)	  the	  content	  but	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  relies	  on	  a	  time	  that	   is	  antecedent	   to	   that	  moment,	   the	   time	   in	  which	   the	  content	   is	  originated,	   i.e.	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  creation.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  a	  process	  that	  has	  both	  an	  instantaneous	  and	  an	  extended	  dimension,	  since	  the	  appropriation	  of	  a	  content	  (extended	  process)	  goes	  beyond	  the	  first	  access	  to	  it	  (instantaneous	  and	  finite).	  Stepping	  away	  from	  the	  littera	  of	  the	  dictionary,	  my	  Inheritance	  (capitalized	  and	   with	   the	   possessive	   adjective)	   is,	   once	   again,	   an	   expression	   that	   brings	   us	  deeper	  into	  the	  core	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  describe,	  while	  insisting	  on	  the	   dichotomy	   content/process	   we	   have	   found	   on	   the	   first	   level	   of	   meaning.	  My	  
Inheritance	   is	   (with	   a	   parallelism	   to	   what	   happens	   with	   concrete	   properties)	   not	  only	   the	   single	   item	   that	   I	   inherit	   from	   one	   source,	   but	   the	   ensemble	   of	   all	   the	  ‘things’	   that	   I	   have	   inherited	   from	   different	   sources	   and	   that	   now	   constitute	   an	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integral	   part	   of	   my	   position	   in	   the	   world.	   In	   other	   words,	  my	   Inheritance	   is	   the	  system	   of	   ideas	   and	   concepts	   that	   I	   have	   so	   far	   received	   in	   my	   interaction	   with	  authors	  who	  came	  before	  my	  time,	  and	  thus	  the	  system	  of	  all	  my	  inheritances.	  Analogously	   to	   what	   happens	   with	   the	   more	   stringent	   meaning,	   then,	  my	  
Inheritance	  must	  also	  refer	  to	  a	  process,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  process	  of	  appropriation	  of	  all	  these	  contents	  (inheritances),	  which	  become	  part	  of	  my	  Inheritance.	  The	  so	  far	  is	  the	   time	   in	   which	   my	   Inheritance	   as	   a	   process	   is	   experienced:	   not	   in	   a	   sense	   of	  irrelevance	   (since	   my	   Inheritance	   is	   constantly	   complete	   insofar	   as	   it	   represents	  everything	  I	  have	  deemed	  important	  to	  my	  system	  of	  thought),	  but	  as	  a	  dimension	  of	  presence	  in	  the	  present	  which	  a	  single	  instance	  of	   inheritance	  could	  not	  grasp	  and	  that	   implies	   a	   constant	   modification	   while	   the	   present	   becomes	   past	   and	   new	  contents	   are	   added	   to	  what	   thought	   itself	   to	   be	   self-­‐sufficient	   until	   such	   addition	  took	  place.	  Time,	  then,	  is	  crucial	  to	  our	  experience	  of	  inheritance.	  Inheritance,	  by	  its	  very	  nature,	  can	  only	  happen	  in	  the	  now	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  then,	  the	  past.	  Not	  a	  general,	  unidentified	  past,	  but	  the	  past	  to	  which	  the	  content	  belonged	  before	  being	  inherited.	  It	  was	  part	  of	   the	   inheritor’s	  cultural	  density,	  but	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  such	  a	  space	   is	  characterized	  by	  a	  non-­‐historical	  contemporaneity,	  which	  is	  different	  from	  the	  now	  of	  the	  inheritor	  in	  which	  the	  inheritance	  must	  take	  place.	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This	   present	   is	   grounded	   in	   a	   historical	   awareness,	   such	   that	   the	   time	  inheritance	   is	   not	   the	   ‘now’	   of	   the	   mere	   fact:	   as	   Bloch	   explains1	  the	   observation	  which	  characterizes	  our	  historical	  approach	  is	  not	  the	  mere	  contemplation	  of	  what	  he	  calls	   factus	  brutus,	  but	   finds	   its	  sense	   in	  our	  considering	  such	  a	   fact	  against	   the	  horizon	  of	  time	  as	  perceived	  by	  our	  subjectivity.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  historical	  fact	  needs	  to	  be	  understood	  and	  thematized	  in	  light	  of	  the	  time	  in	  which	  it	  happened.	  In	  the	   case	   of	   inheritance,	   this	   is	   the	   time	   of	   the	   process-­‐inheritance,	   i.e.	   the	   time	   in	  which	  our	  experience	  as	  receiving	  subjects	  is	  unravelled.	  According	   to	  Ricoeur,	   such	  a	   thematization	   cannot	  be	   completely	  objective,	  since	   the	   thinker	   (be	   he	   an	   historian	   or	   a	   philosopher)	   cannot	   avoid	   bringing	   his	  subjectivity	  into	  the	  process2.	  He	  distinguishes	  four	  traits	  of	  our	  subjectivity	  that	  can	  shape	  or	  interfere	  with	  our	  reception	  of	  the	  content	  from	  the	  past.	  The	   first	   trait	   is	   ‘historical	   choice’	   or	   the	   judgment	  of	   importance,	  which	   is	  absolutely	   fundamental	   for	   the	   process	   of	   inheritance:	   if	   something	   is	   read,	   but	  judged	  unimportant,	  the	  process	  is	  interrupted.	  The	  content	  would	  not	  be	  received,	  nor	   become	   a	   part	   of	   our	   philosophical	   system.	   This	   is	   highly	   problematic,	   since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Bloch,	  Marc	  L.	  B,	  and	  Etienne	  Bloch.	  Apologie	  Pour	  L'histoire,	  Ou,	  Métier	  D'historien.	  Paris:	  A.	   Colin,	   1997,	   esp.	   Ch.	   4	   “L’analyse	   historique”,	   section	   1	   “Juger	   et	   comprendre.”	   On	   the	  matter	   see	   also	   Ricoeur,	   Paul,	   Histoire	   et	   Verité,	   Paris:	   ed.	   De	   Seuil,	   1955,	   Chapter	  “Objectivité	  et	  Subjectivité”.	  2	  Ricoeur	  is	  here	  (Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  ch.	  2)	  referring	  to	  history,	  but	  given	  his	  understanding	  of	   history	   as	   «the	   reception	   [by	   the	   historian]	   of	   a	   series	   of	   facts	   and	   documents»,	   his	  scheme	  works	  just	  as	  well	  for	  our	  case.	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Theory	   cannot	   help	   the	   philosopher	   trying	   to	   expand	   his	   system	   as	   it	   can	   the	  historian	   looking	   for	   proof	   supporting	   his	   approach.	   Raymond	  Aron	   rightly	   states	  that	   «la	   théorie	   précède	   l’histoire»3,	   but	   the	   very	   nature	   of	   inheritance	   as	   a	  transformative	  process	  makes	  things	  more	  complicated:	  if	   it	   is	  true	  that	  we	  have	  a	  “theory”,	  a	  standpoint,	  when	  beginning	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance	  and	  interpretation	  of	  a	  text,	  we	  do	  so	  understanding	  that	  such	  a	  process	  could	  modify	  the	  standpoint	  itself.	  	   Fichte	  explains	  that	   the	  only	  true	  philosophy	   is	   the	  one	  that	  transforms	  the	  thinking	  of	  its	  performers;4	  similarly,	  no	  inheritance	  can	  be	  true	  if	  the	  end	  result	  is	  not	   a	   transformation	   (either	   by	   modification	   or	   by	   addition)	   of	   the	   system	   of	  philosophy	  of	  the	  thinker	  undergoing	  the	  inheritance.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  result,	  if	  the	  text	  remains	  dead	  letter,	  no	  inheritance	  can	  take	  place	  (and	  arguably	  no	  legacy,	  but	  this	  will	   be	   addressed	   later).	   We	   can	   understand	   Ricoeur’s	   remark	   as	   having	   two	  possible	  meanings:	  	  a) In	  a	  pre-­‐interpretational	  space,	  turning	  our	  attention	  to	  one	  work	  instead	  of	   another.	   As	   I	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   two,	   this	   is	   a	   partially	   wilful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Raymond	  Aron.	  Introduction	  à	  la	  philosophie	  de	  l'histoire.	  Essai	  sur	  les	  limites	  de	  l'objectivité	  
historique,	  Gallimard,	  1991,	  p.	  111.	  4	  «No	  one	  can	  arrive	  at	  this	  unknown	  unless	   it	  produces	   itself	   in	  him,	  but	   it	  does	  this	  only	  under	   the	   condition	   that	   this	   very	   person	   produces	   something,	   namely	   the	   conditions	   for	  insight’s	   self-­‐production.»	   Fichte,	   Johan	  Gottlieb,	  The	  Science	  of	  Knowing.	   J.G.	  Fichte’s	  1804	  
Lectures	  on	  the	  Wissenschaftslehre,	  translated	  and	  with	  an	  introduction	  by	  Walter	  E.	  Wright,	  New	  York:	  SUNY,	  2005,	  p.	  22.	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operation,	  influenced	  by	  a	  chain	  of	  moments	  of	  attention,	  which	  becomes	  completely	  wilful	  when	  we	  enter	  a	  state	  of	  attentiveness.	  But,	  most	  likely,	  we	  should	  interpret	  Ricoeur’s	  first	  step	  as	  
b) Post-­‐interpretation	  of	  the	  text,	  or	  at	  least	  after	  the	  first	  access	  to	  the	  text.	  Therefore,	   the	   choice	  must	   be	   understood	   as	   concerning	   the	  use	  of	   the	  content	   for	  historiographical	  purposes	  or,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  our	  analysis,	  an	  evaluation	  of	  worthiness	  from	  our	  part	  regarding	  the	  content;	  from	  this,	  a	  change	   of	   status	  would	   ensue	   for	   the	   content,	  which	  will	   evolve	   from	  a	  read	   and	   interpreted	   content	   into	   an	   inheritance.	   It	   is	   in	   the	   nature	   of	  appropriation,	   as	   much	   as	   it	   is	   in	   that	   of	   ‘historical	   explanation’5,	   to	  require	  a	  moment	  of	  subjective	  judgment	  of	  importance,	  which	  is	  nothing	  less	   than	   this	   first	   step	   of	   the	   acknowledgment	   of	   subjectivity	   on	  Ricoeur’s	  part.	  The	   second	   step	   involves	   a	   ‘vulgar	   conception	   of	   causality’.	   While	   this	  apparently	   does	   not	   apply	   directly	   to	   the	   process	   of	   inheritance	   as	   it	   does	   to	  theories	  of	  history,	  we	  just	  need	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  relation	  in	  the	  Lockean	  sense,	  that	  we	  provided	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  our	  notion	  of	  content.	  We	  can	  then	  understand	  how,	   in	  the	  expansion	  of	  a	  complex	   idea	  (a	  content)	   into	  a	   larger	  one	  (a	  system	  of	  complex	  ideas,	  in	  this	  case	  our	  philosophical	  system),	  our	  understanding	  of	  relation	  is	  crucial.	  Therefore,	  we	  simply	  need	  to	  see	  causality	  as	  the	  form	  of	  relation	  that	  is	  subjectively	  understood	  when	  we	  approach	  facts	  and	  documents	  as	  historians,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  Paris:	  Éd.	  du	  Seuil,	  1955,	  p.	  32.	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understand	  that	  in	  any	  appropriation	  (thus	  including	  inheritance)	  a	  subjective	  view	  of	   relation	   is	   involved.	   After	   all,	   the	   process	   of	   historicisation	   as	   described	   by	  Ricoeur	  is	  similar	  to	  and	  may	  involve	  a	  process	  of	  inheritance,	  despite	  his	  interest	  in	  describing	  it	  matter-­‐of-­‐fact-­‐wise	  and	  not	  trying	  to	  expand	  it	  to	  the	  reception	  of	  any	  content.6	  In	   light	  of	   this	  simplification	  (from	  the	  relation	  of	  causality	   for	  reception	  of	  historical	  documents	  to	  relation	  in	  general	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  our	  reception	  of	  a	  content),	  traits	   1	   and	   2	   of	   Ricoeur’s	   treatment	   of	   subjectivity	   can	   be	   compressed	   into	   the	  notion	  of	   judgment	  of	   importance	   and	   relation;	   after	   all,	   the	   two	   ‘traits’	   deal	  with	  our	   interpretation	  of	   the	   content	  prima	  facie:	   beside	  dealing	  with	   the	  merit	  of	   the	  content,	  we	  must	  decide	  whether	  it	  relates,	  overall	  and	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way,	  to	  the	  array	   of	   (other)	   contents	   that	   constitute	   our	   system.	   This	   bring	   us	   back	   to	  expectation	   (expectation-­‐A-­‐(2))	   that	   we	   already	   discussed7,	   with	   the	   qualifying	  difference	   that,	   if	   before	   it	   was	   a	   matter	   of	   interest,	   now	   we	   are	   dealing	   with	  
relevance.	  The	  definition	  and	  verification	  of	  the	  former	  becomes	  explicit	  in	  the	  latter.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  As	  we	  will	   see,	   this	   is	   not	   true	   of	  Oneself	  as	  Another	   and	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	  which	   are	  more	  concerned	  with	   the	  personal	  perspective	  of	   the	  historian/author	   then	   they	  are	  with	  History	  as	  a	  collective	  opus	  to	  which	  every	  historian	  brings	  its	  own	  subjectivity.	  7	  See	  Chapter	  2,	  pg.	  111.	  Briefly,	  Expectation	  A	  was	  an	  expectation	  about	  the	  text	  itself,	  with	  (1)	   being	   the	   expectation	   of	   the	   text	   having	   a	   meaning	   and	   (2)	   of	   it	   having	   a	   meaning	  
interesting	  to	  me.	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The	  third	  trait	  deals	  with	  «equivocal	  nomenclature»8	  and	  it	  is	  not	  paralleled	  in	   our	   analysis.	   There	   is	   a	   difference,	   indeed,	   in	   the	   way	   the	   inheritor	   and	   the	  historian	  approach	  the	  past,	  since	  their	  aim	  is	  different.	  The	  product	  of	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance,	  per	  se,	  needs	  only	  to	  be	  understood	  by	  the	  inheritor,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	   interpretation,	   but	   of	   fruitful	   transformation.	   Therefore,	   the	   equivocal	  nomenclature	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   problem,	   as	   it	   might	   be	   the	   case	   with	   the	  historian	  misrepresenting	  a	  concept	  in	  the	  historical	  document	  in	  light	  of	  something	  alive	  in	  his	  time	  (in	  Ricoeur’s	  example,	  the	  problematic	  notion	  of	  State,	  which	  tends	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  connected	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  reader).	  But	  it	  is	  on	  the	  4th	  trait	  of	  the	  interpreter’s	  “subjectivity”	  that	  the	  historian’s	  perspective	   and	   the	   inheritor’s	   one	   diverge	   the	   most:	   according	   to	   Ricoeur,	   the	  subjective	  part	  of	  ‘historical	  reconstruction’	  implies	  trying	  to	  see	  the	  men	  behind	  the	  facts,	   to	   «deduct	   Men	   from	   events»9:	   while	   this	   is	   a	   limiting	   trait	   of	   subjectivity	  threatening	  the	  objectivity	  of	  History,	   it	   is	  a	  veritable	  aim	  of	  the	  inheritor.	  To	  fully	  grasp	  the	  inheritance	  as	  someone’s	  legacy,	  we	  will	  need	  to	  deduct	  the	  author	  behind	  the	  text.	  However,	  this	  deals	  more	  with	  the	  relation	  between	  legacy	  and	  inheritance	  than	  it	  does	  with	  inheritance	  considered	  on	  its	  own,	  thus	  we	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  at	  a	  later	  time.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  35	  9	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  36	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The	   time	   in	   which	   the	   interpreter	   exerts	   his	   subjectivity	   (from	   which	   the	  historian	  must	  guard	  himself,	  but	  which	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  inheritor)	  is	  nothing	  else	  than	  the	  extended	  now	  in	  which	  the	  content	  is	  accessed.	  There	  are	  three	  factors	  that	  help	  us	  identify	  this	  now.	  a) It	   is	   a	  now,	   a	  moment	   or	   period	   of	   time	   identified	   by	   the	   status	   of	   the	  reader	  and	  not	  simply	  by	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  reading.	  While	  we	  may	  not	  know	  the	  time	  of	  the	  clock	  at	  which	  we	  have	  accessed	  a	  content,	  we	  have	   a	   clear	   idea	   of	   when	   (in	   terms	   of	   years,	   activities,	   possible	  distractions)	  it	  became	  relevant	  to	  us.	  The	  process	  of	  inheritance	  is	  part	  of	   our	   self-­‐evolution,	   our	   growth.	   Ricoeur	   says	   that	   «l’histoire	   fait	  l’historien	   autant	   que	   l’historien	   fait	   l’histoire»10,	   and	   this	   is	   true	   of	  inheritance	  as	  well.	  Therefore,	  speaking	  of	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  reader	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  inheritance	  is	  the	  same	  as	  speaking	  of	  the	  inheritance	  itself,	   since	   it	   is	   a	   process	   determined	   by	   and	   determining	   such	  subjectivity.	  b) It	   is	   a	   now	   which	   is	   conceived	   and	   not	   recorded.	   Its	   identification	   (no	  matter	  how	  extended	  it	  is	  in	  time)	  can	  only	  rely	  on	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  inheritor.	   Only	   the	   perceived	   beginning	   and	   end	   of	   the	   process	   can	  delimit	   the	   moment	   (or	   the	   time)	   of	   the	   inheriting.	   When	   discussing	  attention,	  we	   saw	   how	   the	   time	   ‘at	  which	   I	   started	   reading	  Melville’	   is	  impossible	  to	  grasp	  when	  it	  is	  present,	  since	  at	  that	  time	  its	  relevance	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  39.	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lost	  on	  me.	  Only	  ex-­‐post,	  looking	  back,	  I	  can	  identify	  that	  moment	  as	  the	  beginning	   of	   something	   persistent,	   which	   I	   later	   deemed	   worthy	   of	  significance,	  thus	  retroactively	  making	  it	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  inheritance.	  Before	  such	  an	  awareness	  kicks	  in,	  the	  moment	  can	  only	  be	  recorded	  as	  ‘the	   time	   when	   I	   grasped	   the	   book’	   or	   ‘the	   time	   when	   I	   turned	   my	  attention	  to	  the	  page.	  c) It	  is	  a	  now	  that	  is	  understandable	  on	  three	  different	  levels:	  three	  facets	  of	  this	   ‘now’	   of	   inheritance	   (or	   this	   ‘then’	   when	   thematised	   from	   the	  standpoint	  of	  my	  Inheritance	  in	  its	  whole)	  are	  collapsed	  into	  the	  moment	  of	  reading	  and	  interpretation.	  	  i) There	  is	  a	  time	  of	  the	  reading	  that	  happens	  on	  the	  horizon	  of	  time	  as	  external	  to	  us.	  As	  we	  said,	  we	  cannot	  record	  the	  moment	  of	  our	  reading,	  but	  we	  can	  position	   it	   relatively	   to	  other	   factual	  events.	  ‘When	   9/11	   happened,	   I	   had	   not	   read	   the	   Koran,	   yet’	   is	   both	   a	  statement	   about	   my	   internal	   state	   (I	   did	   not	   know	   Islam	   if	   not	  through	   the	  media)	   and	   a	   statement	   of	   factual	   time,	   and	   even	   ‘I	  read	   Virgil	   before	   reading	   Dante’,	   while	   not	   anchored	   to	   any	  
factual	   time	   is	   still	   suitable	   to	   be	   aligned	   on	   a	   time	   line	   that	   is	  parallel	  to	  that	  of	  external	  time.	  ii) The	   time	   of	   reading	   is	   also	   connected	   to	   “perceived”	   time,	   or	  interior	  time.	  This	  is	  true	  regarding	  the	  qualification	  of	  the	  time	  as	  connected	  to	  the	  reader’s	  statuses,	  both	  emotional	  (‘I	  discovered	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Proust	  in	  a	  difficult	  time	  of	  my	  life’)	  and	  related	  to	  Inheritance	  in	  its	  whole	  (‘Plato	  was	  the	  first	  philosopher	  I	  read’).	  Memory	  shapes	  this	  perception	  of	  time	  (‘Plato	  is	  the	  first	  philosopher	  I	  remember	  reading’),	  not	  only	  superficially	  (as	  if	  I	  wrongly	  recalled	  the	  time	  of	  the	  reading)	  but	  also	  substantially:	  what	  I	  remember	  as	  the	  time	  of	   the	   appropriation	   is	   the	   time	   of	   inheritance,	   since	   that	   is	   the	  point	   of	   the	   personal,	   internal	   timeline	   in	   which	   the	   event-­‐inheritance	   is	   implanted.	   It	   is	   a	   time	   that	   changes	   its	  determination	  even	  after	  it	  is	  passed,	  since	  the	  qualifying	  qualities	  of	  that	  time	  (the	  remembered	  position	  and	  its	  relevance)	  change	  in	  light	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  memory.	  iii) The	  reader	  and	  the	  act	  of	  reading,	  and	  the	  inheritance	  process	  as	  well,	  are	  situated	  in	  a	  historical	  epoch	  or	  age.	  This	  is	  a	  conceived	  time	  (b),	  both	  on	  an	  individual	  and	  collective	  level:	  the	  individual	  recognizes	   certain	   features	   of	   ‘his	   own	   time’,	   but	   most	  importantly	  identifies	  his	  time	  as	  such.	  The	  process	  of	  inheritance	  takes	   place	   at	   a	   precise	   moment	   of	   his	   individual	   time	   (a),	   but	  nonetheless	   is	   contained	   by	   an	   epoch	   of	   time,	  which	   transcends	  his	   personal	   status.	   The	   very	  notion	  of	   epoch,	   though,	   is	   a	   not	   a	  measurable	  one,	  since	  it	  relies	  on	  arbitrary	  limits	  that	  are	  shared	  (or	   contested)	   by	   participants	   in	   the	   historiographical	   discourse	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and	  on	  a	  general	  consensus	  that	  is	  participated	  unconsciously	  by	  the	  larger	  part	  of	  the	  population.	  As	  we	  mentioned	   in	  chapter	  1,	   the	   idea	  of	  epoch	  or	  ages	  of	  History	  was	  an	  extremely	   popular	   notion	   with	   theorists	   of	   hermeneutics	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   19th	  century;	  they	  were	  concerned	  with	  finding	  a	  working	  model	  to	  account	  for	  what	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  cultural	  evolution	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  discuss	  how	  individuals	  (both	   ordinary	   and	   extraordinary)	   could	   fit	   in	   such	   a	   model.	   We	   have	   discussed	  Dilthey	  and	  his	  idea	  of	  a	  cultural	  milieu	  as	  historically	  collocated,	  which	  served	  as	  a	  starting	   point	   for	   the	   definition	   of	   cultural	   density.	   He	   was	   convinced	   that	   to	  understand	  an	  author	  we	  must	  understand	  his	  time11,	  a	  notion	  he	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	   first	   formulated	   by	   Semler 12 .	   Given	   his	   focus	   on	   interpretation	   and	  understanding,	  Dilthey	  analysed	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  interpreter	  in	  time	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  without	   inquiring	  what	   being	   in	   the	   same	   (or	   in	   a	   different)	   time	   actually	  meant.	  There	  are	  some	  references	  to	  «the	  whole»	  of	  one	  author’s	  time,	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  «grasped	  from	  the	  individual»’s	  words13,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  Sense	  of	  Life	  of	  the	  exegete	  that	  remains	  central	  and	   the	  Other’s	  cultural	  milieu	   remains	   in	   the	  background,	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Wilhelm	   Dilthey.	   On	   Understanding	   and	   Hermeneutics,	   collected	   in	   Dilthey,	   Wilhelm,	  Rudolf	   A.	   Makkreel,	   and	   Frithjof	   Rodi.	   Selected	   Works.	   Vol.	   IV.	   Princeton,	   N.J:	   Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1985.	  12	  Johann	  Salomo	  Semler,	  a	  church	  historian	  and	  biblical	  commentator.	  Dilthey	  refers	  mainly	  to	   his	   autobiography	   Semler's	   Lebensbeschreibung,	   von	   ihm	   selbst	   abgefasst,	   which	   is	  currently	  not	  available	  in	  a	  modern	  edition.	  13	  Dilthey,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Hermeneutics,	  in	  Selected	  Works	  IV,	  p.	  353.	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an	  object	  onto	  which	  one	  should	  project	  his	  own	  individuality.	  The	  Sense	  of	  Life,	  as	  well,	   is	  not	   fully	  explained,	  and	  oscillates	  between	  a	  function	  of	  consciousness	  and	  an	   impetus	   to	  explanation	   influenced	  by	  external	   condition	   (i.e.	   the	  exegete’s	  own	  cultural	  milieu).	  At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	  Herder	  was	   a	   strong	   opponent	   of	   the	  idea	   (that	   he	   attributes	   to	   Enlightenment	   philosophers)	   that	   the	   epistemological	  condition	   of	   mankind	   could	   have	   stayed	   the	   same	   over	   history,	   and	   advocated	   a	  theory	   of	   interpretation	   that	   could	   account	   for	   the	   differences	   between	   the	  interpreter	   and	   the	   interpreted.14	  However,	   far	   from	   claiming	   that	   the	   interpreter	  should	   embrace	   his	   belonging	   to	   an	   epoch	   and	   act	   accordingly,	   he	   warned	   the	  exegete	  of	  a	  text	  from	  succumbing	  to	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  ‘the	  crowd’:	  he	  believed	  that,	  given	  the	  ill-­‐conception	  of	  philosophy	  amongst	  the	  people	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  the	  true	  thinker	   should	  have	  approached	  philosophy	   from	  a	  personal	  perspective,	   straying	  away	  from	  the	  barbarism	  of	  public	  opinion.	  He	  wrote	  that	  «there	  are	  disadvantages	  when	   the	   crowd	   thinks	   for	   us»15	  and	   encouraged	   the	   philosopher	   to	   think	   alone,	  freeing	   itself	   from	  the	  burden	  of	   contemporary	  opinion.	  Herder	  has	  an	   interesting	  view	  of	  “ages”	  as	  interloping	  in	  a	  dynamic	  way.	  He	  writes	  that	  «every	  human	  being,	  in	   every	   age,	   thus	   stands	   in	   a	   middle,	   so	   to	   speak.	   He	   can	   gather	   about	   him	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Michael	  Forster,	  “Introduction”,	  in	  Herder,	  Johann	  G,	  and	  Michael	  N.	  Forster.	  Philosophical	  
Writings.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  15	  Herder,	   “How	  Philosophy	  Can	  Become	  More	  Universal	   and	  Useful	   for	   the	  Benefit	   of	   the	  People	   (1765)”	   in	   Herder,	   Johann	   G,	   and	   Michael	   N.	   Forster.	  Philosophical	   Writings.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007,	  p.	  26.	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extinguished	  images	  of	  his	  ancestors,	  he	  can	  call	  forth	  their	  shades	  and,	  so	  to	  speak,	  make	   a	   feast	   for	   his	   eyes	   […]	   But	   can	   he	   also	   cast	   a	   prophetic	   look	   into	   the	   later	  times	  beyond	  this	  grave?16».	  	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	   notice	   how	   Herder’s	   intuitions	   about	   the	   connection	   to	  predecessors	   and	   successors	   are	   reduced	   to	   theoretical	   tools	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   an	  alternative	  to	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Culture:	  the	  individual	  has	  no	  access	  to	  all	  the	  “images”	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  only	  to	  some	  of	  them.	  While	  we	  could	  rework	  this	  notion	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  cultural	  density,	  Herder	   lacks	  such	  a	   tool,	  and	   it	   is	  precisely	  because	  of	  this	   that	  he	  struggles	   to	  give	  a	  coherent	  and	  consistent	  account	  of	   the	   individual’s	  experience	   of	   ‘gathering	   the	   past’.	   He	   tries	   to	   get	   to	   something	   similar	   when	   he	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  Bildung	  in	  the	  education	  of	  the	  philosopher,	  but	  he	  then	  reverts	  to	  philosophical	  sense	  as	  present	  in	  the	  population	  at	  large.	  In	  his	  late	  works,	  he	  has	  resorted	  to	  a	  view	  in	  which	  every	  man	  can	  be	  a	  placeholder	  for	  humanity	  at	   large.	  The	  idea	  that	  «everyman	  is	  ultimately	  a	  world»17	  implies	  that	  every	  thinker	  is	  part	  of	   a	   narrative	   of	   Mankind	   ultimately	   accessible	   to	   all	   individuals	   at	   all	   times.	   He	  arrives	   to	   such	  a	  view	   in	  order	   to	   support	  his	   ideas	  about	   the	  unity	  of	   the	  human	  race	  and	  his	  teleological	  view	  of	  it18,	  but	  by	  doing	  so	  he	  renounces	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Herder,	  “On	  the	  change	  of	  Taste”,	  in	  Herder	  and	  Forster.	  Philosophical	  Writings.	  Op.	  cit,	  p.	  254.	  17	  Herder,	  Johan	  G.	  Reflection	  on	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Mankind,	  abridged	  by	  Frank	  E.	  Manuel,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1968,	  p.	  4	  18	  By	  seeing	  humanity	  as	  sharing	  an	  uninterrupted	  stream	  of	  culture	  and	  ideas,	  he	  can	  reject	  the	   idea	   that	   ‘races’	   exists	   amongst	  men	   (cf.	   “Same	   Species	   of	  Man	   throughout	   the	  whole	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limitation	   of	   the	   hermeneutical	   approach	   that	   had	   been	   central	   to	   his	   previous	  works.	  Herder	   fails	   to	   distinguish	   functionally	   between	   Bildung	   as	   personal,	  
actualised	  Culture	  of	   a	  philosopher/historian	  and	   the	   sum	  of	  all	  possible	   images	  of	  
history	   as	   shared	   by	   humanity	   at	   large:	   he	   appears	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   former	   is	  functionally	   capable	   of	   providing	   the	   individual	  with	   full	   access	   to	   the	   latter.	   The	  only	  concession	  he	  makes	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  accessibility	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  language,	  but	  he	  presents	  that	  as	  an	  interpretation	  issue	  and	  seems	  factually	  oblivious	  to	  the	  non-­‐coincidence	   between	   one	   individual	   historian’s	   access	   to	   the	   past	   and	   the	  ‘world	  of	  the	  past’	  intended	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  It	  is	  in	  a	  minor	  work	  of	  his	  -­‐	  On	  Thomas	  Abbt’s	  Writings	  (1768)	  -­‐	  that	  Herder	  deals	   specifically	   with	   the	   need	   for	   the	   interpreter	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	  difference	   of	   age	   between	   himself	   and	   the	   author	   of	   the	   interpreted	   text.	  Nonetheless,	  he	  focuses	  always	  on	  the	  age	  of	  the	  inheritee19,	  like	  when	  he	  states	  how	  «the	  explainer	  should	  define	  the	  borders»	  of	  the	  author’s	  past	  world,	  own	  time	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Earth”,	  Book	  VII,	  Ch.	  1	  of	  Reflection	  on	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Mankind).	  By	  claiming	  that	   every	   individual	   has	   access	   to	   all	   of	   it,	   he	   can	   advocate	   for	   the	   role	   of	   Reason	  (unfettered	  by	  limitation	  in	  knowledge)	  as	  the	  source	  for	  State.	  19	  Inheritee	   is	   the	   one	   whose	   work/text/content	   is	   to	   be	   inherited.	   The	   need	   for	   the	  neologism	  was	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  but	  the	  reader	  must	  be	  sure	  to	  comprehend	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  here	  (and	  later):	  the	  inheritee	  is	  here	  the	  ‘original	  author’	  of	  the	  content	  that	  is	  to	  be	  inherited.	  We	  will	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  terminology	  again	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Chapter	  4.	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‘world	  of	  posterity’.20	  Even	  if	  he	  is	  aware	  that	  our	  Bildung	  (education,	  or	  the	  process	  of	  cultural	  formation)	  will	  be	  determinant	  in	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  world	  («Prejudices	  of	  the	  formative	  years	  […]	  are	  the	  pillars	  upon	  which	  we	  build	  our	  world-­‐view»),	  he	  never	  considers	  how	  the	  age	   in	  which	  we	   live	  (the	  cultural	  milieu	  that	  Dilthey	  will	  explore)	  influences	  our	  Bildung:	  he	  appears	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  the	  right	  Bildung	  is	  possible	  no	  matter	  the	  historical	  moment.	  	  Herder	  never	  mentions	  any	   influence	  of	   the	   current	  Age	  on	   the	   interpreter	  once	  such	  a	   formative	  process	   is	   completed.	  Relatively	   to	   the	  work	  of	   ‘the	  author’	  (the	  inheritee)	  Herder	  acknowledges	  a	  co-­‐presence	  of	  his	  (the	  author’s)	  own	  ideas,	  elements	   of	   the	   world	   of	   the	   past,	   elements	   of	   projection	   into	   «the	   world	   of	  posterity»21,	  but	  also	  of	  an	   influence	   from	  «his	  own	   time»22.	  All	  of	   this	  disappears	  when	   he	   discusses	   the	   inheritor’s	   perspective:	   only	   methodological	   and	   critical	  concerns	  are	  voiced,	  as	  if	  the	  interpreter	  was	  living	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  or	  as	  if	  his	  proper	  cultural	   formation	  could	  put	  him	   in	  a	   sort	  of	   resonating	  harmony	  with	   the	  overall	  History	   of	  Mankind	   and	   screen	  him	   from	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   age	   in	  which	  he	   his	  immersed.	  But	  why,	   then,	  are	  we	  warned	  over	  and	  over23	  against	  Common	  Sense?	  Herder	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   this	   tension	   in	   his	   work,	   as	   if	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Herder,	  “On	  Thomas	  Abbt’s	  Writings”,	  in	  Herder	  and	  Foster,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  177	  21	  Herder,	  “On	  Thomas	  Abbt’s	  Writings”,	  p.	  172	  22	  Herder,	  “On	  Thomas	  Abbt’s	  Writings”,	  p.	  178	  23	  See	   in	   particular	  On	   the	  Change	  of	  Taste	   and	   the	   already	   discussed	  How	  Philosophy	  can	  
become	  More	  Universal	  and	  Useful	  for	  the	  Benefit	  of	  the	  People,	  both	  in	  Herder	  and	  Foster,	  op.	  
cit.	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compartmentalization	   of	   his	   approach	   (one	  work	   being	   devoted	   to	  Taste,	   another	  one	  to	  the	  proper	  way	  to	   interpret,	  another	  one	  to	  Bildung,	  etc.)	  meant	  he	  did	  not	  need	  to	  provide	  a	  coherent	  unifying	  theory.	  Once	  again,	  the	  attention	  to	  individual	  interpretation	  is	  exerted	  in	  a	  larger	  frame	  of	  cultural	   inheritance	  that	  is	  connected	  to	   tradition	   and	   gives	   no	   account	   of	   the	   individual’s	   relation	   to	   the	   historically	  transmitted	  content.	  The	  Romantic	  author	  who	  comes	  closer	  to	  address	  this	  distinction	  between	  the	  individual’s	  situation	  in	  his	  age	  in	  time	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  this	  age	  per	  se	  is	  Fichte,	  in	  his	  work	  dedicated	  to	  philosophy	  of	  history	  titled	  The	  Characteristics	  of	  
Present	  Age.	  When	   approaching	   this	  work	   (as	  most	   others	   by	   Fichte)	  we	  must	   be	  aware	   that	   it	   is	  meant	  not	   as	   an	   aggregated	   commentary	   (which	   could	   instead	  be	  argued	  for	  Herder’s	  reflection	  on	  the	  matter,	  spread	  over	  different	  books),	  but	  as	  an	  ‘organic’	   performative	   task	   of	   learning24.	   	   Nonetheless,	   certain	   notions	   are	   clearly	  stated,	  and	  appear	  repeatedly	  throughout	  the	  book,	  giving	  us	  a	  certain	  grasp	  of	  what	  Fichte	  meant	  when	  discussing	  them.	  Moreover,	  even	  what	  can	  be	  taken	  away	  from	  these	  descriptions	  can	  provide	  a	  workable	  tool	  for	  our	  enquiry,	  independently	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  theme	  of	  his	  philosophy	  as	  “live”	  thought,	  for	  which	  understanding	  it	  and	  performing	  it	  are	  the	  same,	  is	  ever-­‐present	  in	  Fichte’s	  work,	  and	  present	  in	  detail	  in	  most	  versions	  of	  his	  
Wissenschaftslehere.	   In	   particular,	   in	   the	   opening	  paragraph	  of	  Characteristics,	   he	   tells	   his	  reader	   that	   [he	   his]	   «compelled	   gradually,	   and	   [on	   his]	   own	   sight,	   to	   build	   up	   this	   single	  thought	   out	   of	   its	   several	   parts,	   disengaging	   it	   at	   the	   same	   time	   from	   various	  modifying	  elements:	   this	   is	   the	   necessary	   condition	   of	   every	   communication	   of	   thought.»	   -­‐	   Fichte,	  Johann	  G,	  and	  William	  Smith.	  The	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Present	  Age.	  London:	  John	  Chapman,	  1847,	  	  Lecture	  1.	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their	   being	   instrumental	   to	   Fichte’s	   project	   at	   large.	   The	   interesting	   points	   in	  Fichte’s	  account	  are	  those	  dealing	  with	  Humanity’s	  time	  as	  divided	  in	  Ages/Epochs	  and	  most	  importantly	  with	  the	  relation	  between	  these	  Ages/Epochs	  of	  cultural	  time	  and	  time	  chronologically	  intended,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  respect	  to	  both	  of	  them	  throughout	  his	  life.	  According	  to	  Fichte,	  at	  any	  given	  time	  Humanity	  inhabits	  an	  Age	  (or	  at	  least	  a	  fraction	   of	   Humanity	   inhabits	   a	   determinate	   Age,	   since	   he	   is	   aware	   of	   different	  conditions	   of	   different	   populations	   on	   earth).	   This	   Age	   he	   defines	   as	   being	   the	  relation	  of	  an	  Epoch	  (an	  Idea	  realized	  in	  time)	  to	  others	  and	  to	  ‘Universal	  time’:	  	  Every	  particular	  Epoch	  of	  Time,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  hinted	  above,	  is	  the	  fundamental	   Idea	   of	   a	   particular	   Age.	   These	   Epochs	   and	   fundamental	  Ideas	  of	  particular	  Ages,	  however,	  can	  only	  be	  thoroughly	  understood	  by	  and	  through	  each	  other.25	  	  	   Fichte	  stresses	  that	  these	  Epochs	  and	  Ages	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  Idea	  of	  time	  that	  Mankind	   shares,	   and	   have	   no	   direct	   relation	   to	  what	   he	   calls	   the	   Life	   of	   the	  Individual	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  Life	  of	  the	  Race).	  His	  description	  in	  detail	  of	  what	  the	  main	   Epochs	   are	   (which	   inform	   what	   an	   Age	   can	   be)	   is	   not	   relevant	   to	   our	  exploration,	  but	  what	   I	  want	   to	  highlight	   is	  what	  Fichte	  says	  about	   the	   role	  of	   the	  individual	  in	  such	  a	  scheme:	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  Fichte,	  The	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Present	  Age.	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  The	   Present	   Age	   considered	   as	   a	  whole,	   I	   mean;	   -­‐	   for	   since,	   as	   I	   have	  remarked	   above,	   different	   Ages	   may,	   in	   perfect	   accordance	   with	   their	  spiritual	  principle,	  coexist	   in	  one	  and	  the	  same	  chronological	  Time,	  and	  even	  cross	  or	  run	  parallel	  to	  each	  other	  in	  different	  individuals	  […]	  One	  may	  be	  behind	  his	  Age,	  because	   in	   the	  course	  of	  his	  culture	  he	  has	  not	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  sufficiently	  extensive	  mass	  of	  his	  fellowmen,	  but	  has	   been	   trained	   in	   some	   narrow	   circle	   which	   is	   only	   a	   remnant	   of	   a	  former	   Time.	   Another	   may	   be	   in	   advance	   of	   his	   Age,	   and	   bear	   in	   his	  breast	   the	  germs	  of	   a	   future	  Time,	  while	   that	  which	  has	  become	  old	   to	  him	  still	  rules	  around	  him	  in	  true,	  actual,	  present	  and	  efficient	  power.26	  	  What	  Smith	  translates	  with	  Culture,	  here,	  is	  nothing	  different	  from	  what	  we	  were	  referring	  to	  when	  discussing	  Herder’s	  Bildung.	  What	  Fichte	  is	  telling	  us	  is	  that	  our	  Education,	  more	  than	  the	  chronological	  accident	  of	  our	  birth,	  is	  the	  main	  factor	  in	  determining	  our	  relative	  position	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Mankind.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  argue,	  once	   again,	   that	   this	   idea	   of	   Culture	   and/or	   Education	   is	   not	   the	  most	   apt	   to	   the	  analysis,	   and	   should	   once	   again	   be	   replaced	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   cultural	   density.	  Fichte	   is	   once	   again	   talking	   about	   a	   process	   (since	   any	   transmission	  of	   thought	   is	  performative,	   as	   we	   said),	   which	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   what	   we	   address	   with	  “Education”,	  which	  is	  not	  a	  status.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  be	  “in	  advance”	  or	  “behind”	  our	  age,	  this	  can	  be	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  something	  that	  is	  a	  concern	  of	  the	  now	  of	  our	  approach	  to	  cultural	  contents.	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This	   is	  on	  the	  one	  side	  cultural	  density	  (as	  the	  potential	  access	  to	  past	  ages	  and	  to	  Herder’s	  “images	  of	  the	  world	  of	  the	  past”)	  and	  on	  the	  other	  our	  Inheritance	  (as	  what	  we	  have	  received	  and	  made	  part	  of	  our	  system	  of	  thought	  so	  far).	  The	  two	  are	   collapsed	   into	   this	   notion	   of	   Culture,	   which	   indeed	   includes	   the	   notion	   of	  reduced	  or	  screened	  accessibility	  (insofar	  as	  someone	  could	  “ha[ve]	  been	  trained	  in	  some	  narrow	   circle”).	   Identifying	   all	   of	   this	  with	   “training”	   is	   reductive	   to	   say	   the	  least,	  and	  it	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  Fichte’s	  further	  description	  of	  the	  role	  of	  individuals	  in	  Ages.	   We	  must	  be	  aware	   that	  Fichte	   is	  not	  writing	  a	  piece	  on	  historiography	  nor	  developing	  a	  theory	  of	  interpretation	  (as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  with	  Dilthey	  and	  Herder):	  what	  we	  are	  considering	  here	  (the	  role	  of	  the	  individual	  thinker	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Age	  he	  lives	  in)	  is	  marginalia	  on	  the	  side	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  Reason	  as	  Life,	  which	  permeates	  the	   entire	   work.	   	   It	   is	   not	   surprising,	   thus,	   that	   the	   connection	   between	  training/education/access	   to	   contents	   (with	   the	   narrowness	   of	   the	   circle	   seen	   as	  limiting)	  is	  not	  explored	  further.	  Fichte	  focuses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Heroes,	  men	  led	  by	  Honour	   and	   Blessedness27	  to	   advance	  Mankind	   to	   the	   next	   age.	   However,	   he	   also	  discusses	  the	  notion	  of	  «true	  meaning	  of	  the	  Author»28	  which	  will	  be	  popular	  in	  the	  hermeneutical	   conversation.	   Underneath	   certain	   idiosyncrasies	   (e.g.	   Fichte	   is	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  Lecture	  3	  and	  4	  of	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convinced	   that	   the	   ‘leading	   principle’,	   to	   which	   Reason	   can	   relate,	   is	   always	  contained	  in	  the	  first	  paragraph29)	  lies	  a	  very	  insightful	  theory	  of	  reception.	  	  He	   believes	   the	   subject-­‐matter	   of	   any	   text	   is	   «in	   itself,	   and	   independently	  from	   the	   Author,	   definable	   in	   this	   way,	   and	   in	   this»30:	   this	   is	   not	   a	   modern	  conception	   of	   the	   death	   of	   the	   author,	   since	   Fichte	   simply	   believes	   that	   both	   an	  authentic	  Author	  (capable	  of	  passing	  down	  something)	  and	  an	  authentic	  reader	  (or	  Reviewer,	   in	   certain	   passages)	   share	   a	   participation	   in	   the	   Life	   of	   Reason,	   which	  belongs	   to	   Mankind	   (and	   not	   to	   the	   individual).	   We	   have	   evidence	   of	   this	   in	   his	  favouring	  speech	  over	  writing:	  «verbal	  communication,	  by	  continuous	  discourse	  or	  scientific	   conversation,	   possesses	   infinite	   advantage	   over	   the	  mere	   dead	   letter.»31	  	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  the	  text	  retains	  a	  content	  independent	  from	  the	  author,	  it	  is	  the	  
subject	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  that	  is	  independent,	  and	  the	  receiver	  can	  participate	  in	  it	  by	  the	  very	  act	  of	  trying	  to	  access	  the	  author’s	  meaning.	  	  This	   is	   true	   even	   of	   ‘Literary	   work’:	   Fichte	   is	   convinced	   that	   «the	   sole	  purpose	  of	  such	  reading	  is,	  that	  the	  Reader	  may	  partake	  of	  the	  inspiration,	  elevation,	  and	   culture	   of	   mind	   which	   the	   work	   may	   be	   designed	   to	   communicate.»32	  Once	  again,	   beside	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   apparent	   contradiction33	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  Characteristics,	  ibidem.	  30	  Characteristics,	  ibidem.	  31	  Characteristics,	  ibidem.	  32	  Characteristics,	  p.	  38.	  33	  Fichte	   states	   that	   «a	   writer	  may	   often	   be	  much	   better	   understood	   by	   another	   than	   by	  himself»	  but	  also	  affirms	  that	  «in	  order	  that	  a	  work	  of	  Art	  may	  even	  come	  into	  contact	  with	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Reason	   in	   Life,	   what	   is	   relevant	   to	   our	   current	   discourse	   is	   the	   insistence	   on	   the	  experiential	   nature	   of	   the	   act	   of	   reading,	   and	   the	   partaking	   of	   the	   Reader	   into	   a	  certain	  moment	  of	  insight.	  This,	  in	  its	  raw	  form,	  is	  what	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  get	  to	  when	  discussing	   inheritance.	   Inheritance	   cannot	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   simple	   act	   of	  reading	  a	   text	  as	  an	  object,	  but	  as	  a	  moment	   (or	  a	  process)	  of	  participation	   in	   the	  overarching	  theme	  of	  which	  the	  text	  is	  only	  an	  instrument.	  Only	  the	  appropriation	  of	  such	  a	  theme	  as	  mine,	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  it	  into	  my	  identity	  as	  the	  Reader	  (which	  is	  the	   inheritor,	   not	   just	   a	   reader	   of	   that	   particular	   instance	   of	   the	   content)	   can	  constitute	   a	   proper	   process	   of	   reception	   and	   inheritance.	   According	   to	   Fichte,	  Genius	  is	  a	  fundamental	  trait	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  literary	  and	  scientific	  works	  from	  an	  age	  to	  another,	  but	  we	  will	  come	  back	  to	  that	  when	  discussing	  legacy.	  We	  must	  depart	  from	  Fichte,	  who	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  book	  deals	  with	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  analysis	  of	  his	  contemporaneity	  and	  his	  vision	  of	  the	  future34.	  What	  we	  are	  left	   with	   is	   this	   description	   of	   an	   Age	   as	   something	   “shared”	   and	   participated	   by	  individuals	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  awareness	  and	  Bildung.	  This	  age	  is	  the	  time	  of	  the	  reader.	  What	  does	  this	  mean?	  Certainly,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  chronological	  coincidence:	  we	   started	   our	   discussion	   of	   period	   and	   age	   precisely	   from	   the	   notion	   of	   an	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  it	  must	  first	  of	  all	  be	  understood.»	  -­‐	  Characteristics,	  ibidem.	  34He	  foresees	  a	  time	  in	  which	  the	  «principle	  of	  the	  Incomprehensible»	  will	  reign	  and	  the	  Age	  of	  Reason	  as	  Knowledge	  will	  «lay	  down	  as	  a	  fundamental	  principle	  that	  everything,	  even	  the	  Unknown	  itself,	  as	  the	  limit	  of	  the	  Known,	  and	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  pledge	  that	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  Known	  is	  exhausted,	  must	  be	  comprehended»	  Characteristics,	  Lecture	  8,	  p.	  46.	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extended	  now	   in	  which	   the	  process	  of	   inheritance	  was	   contained.	  The	   time	  of	  the	  inheritor	  (as	  age)	  must	  overlap	  with	  both	  the	  moment	  of	  access	  to	  the	  content	  (the	  time	  of	  the	  inheritance)	  and	  with	  the	  time	  of	  his	  construction	  of	  a	  system	  of	  thought	  (the	   time	  of	   his	   Inheritance	   collectively	   intended).	  However,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	  age	   is	   not	   strictly	   chronological,	   since	   it	   is	   characterized	  more	   by	   the	   individual’s	  access	   to	  contents	  (both	  potential	  and	  actualized)	   than	   it	   is	  by	  the	  situation	  of	   the	  average	  member	  of	  this	  age.	  	  A	   problematic	   aspect	   is	   the	   relation	   between	   cultural	   density	   and	   the	  
situation	  (intended	  as	  the	  individual’s	  position	  in	  his	  age)	  of	  the	  Reader.	  We	  should	  avoid	   falling	   into	   the	   easy	   trap	   of	   defining	   cultural	   density	   as	   determined	   by	   the	  situation	  and	  the	  situation	  as	  founded	  upon	  cultural	  density.	  Cultural	  density	  must	  be	  understood	  always	  in	  terms	  of	  mere	  potentiality,	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  potential	  access	  to	  content.	   Therefore,	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   inheritor	   must	   have	   its	   foundational	  elements	  in	  the	  post-­‐interpretation	  space,	  which	  is,	  after	  all,	  the	  space	  in	  which	  the	  inheritor	  acts	  and	  speaks	  and	  writes.	  Some	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  this	  situation	  will	  thus	  be	  determined	  by	  his	  own	  doing	   (as	   the	   self-­‐shaped	  status	  of	   the	   inheritor	  before	  this	  one	  specific	  process	  of	  inheritance),	  while	  others	  will	  be	  originated	  outside	  his	  system	  of	  thought,	  in	  a	  social	  space.	  Why	   situation	   and	   not	   Age,	   then?	   We	   have	   discussed	   how	   innovative	  (compared	  to	  other	  cultural-­‐evolution	  theories)	  Fichte’s	  position	  was,	  and	  how	  his	  intuition	   of	   different	   ages	   coexisting	   simultaneously	   in	   different	   men	   was	   an	  acknowledgment	   of	   a	   difference	   inside	   a	   cultural	   block.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   heavily	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charged	  notion	  of	  Age	  as	  manifestation	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  Epoch	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  phenomenology	  of	  Inheritance	  willing	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  preconceived	  notions	  like	  that	  of	  metaphysical	   ideas	   “manifesting”	   themselves	   into	  Being.	  Moreover,	   the	   role	  of	   the	  individual	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed	  even	  more,	  since	  reducing	  differences	  to	  either	  being	  ahead	   or	   behind	   one’s	   time	   not	   only	   implies	   a	   notion	   of	   value	   applied	   to	   human	  culture	   (not	   only	   globally	   but	   also	   individual)	   which	   amounts	   to	   cultural	  supremacism,	  but	  also	  fails	  to	  recognize	  the	  complex	  relation	  between	  an	  individual	  and	   the	   cultural	   milieu	   surrounding	   him	   beside	   the	   formation	   received	   in	   his	  adolescent	  years.	  Tradition,	  we	  said	  in	  the	  introduction,	  is	  a	  source	  of	  authority	  and	  validation,	  or	   lack	   thereof.	   Arendt	   provides	   us	   with	   a	   brilliant	   description	   of	   the	   relation	   of	  truth	  (or	  the	  truth-­‐value	  of	  a	  content)	  to	  tradition:	  	  	  Tradition	   transforms	  truth	   into	  wisdom,	  and	  wisdom	  is	   the	  consistence	  of	   transmissible	   truth.	   […]	   Even	   if	   truth	   should	   appear	   in	   our	  world,	   it	  could	   not	   lead	   to	   wisdom,	   because	   it	   would	   no	   longer	   have	   the	  characteristics	  which	  it	  could	  acquire	  only	  through	  universal	  recognition	  of	  its	  validity.35	  	  	   In	  matters	  of	   inheritance,	   therefore,	  Tradition	  is	  a	  border,	  a	  restraining	   line	  which	  inheritance	  is	  bound	  to	  cross.	  This	  is,	  in	  nucem,	  the	  striking	  point	  of	  contrast	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35 	  Hannah	   Arendt,	   “Introduction”,	   in	   Benjamin,	   Walter,	   Hannah	   Arendt,	   and	   Harry	  Zohn.	  Illuminations.	  New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Brace	  &	  World,	  1968,	  p.	  41.	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between	  Inheritance	  and	  Tradition,	  of	  which	  the	  former	  is	  thought	  being	  a	  subset	  or	  synonym.	   In	   a	   cultural	   space	   governed	   by	   Tradition,	   personal	   inheritance	   has	  neither	   space	   nor	   reason	   to	   be.	   If	   the	   only	   transmissible	   truth	   is	   wisdom,	   as	   a	  content	   backed	   by	   authority,	   only	   breaking	   with	   this	   authority	   can	   the	   reader	  become	  an	  inheritor,	  making	  the	  content	  his	  and	  not	  our.	  	  Objection:	  why	  cannot	  I	  inherit	  my	  Tradition,	  the	  one	  I	  belong	  to?	  There	  are	  multiple	  reasons.	  First	  of	  all,	  if	  one	  can	  certainly	  “belong”	  to	  a	  tradition,	  the	  opposite	  is	  not	  true.	  Having	  a	  Tradition	  that	   is	  mine	  would	  mean	  having	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  control	  or	  at	  least	  influence	  over	  it,	  it	  would	  mean	  having	  a	  say	  in	  the	  validation	  of	  its	   contents.	   This,	   however,	   would	   break	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   tradition,	   which,	   as	  Arendt	  points	  out,	   relies	  on	   the	  universality	  of	   validation.	  This	  universality	   (being	  obviously	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  being	  shared	  by	  all	  men,	  since	  multiple	  traditions	  can	  exist	  side	  by	  side	   in	   the	  same	  age)	  should	  be	  understood	  specifically	  as	   the	  negation	  of	  individuality.	  My	  validation	  of	  the	  content-­‐truth	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  Tradition,	  and	  it	  must	  be	  so,	  for	  it	  to	  be	  indeed	  a	  Tradition36.	  	  Secondly,	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  for	  the	  Tradition	  to	  be	  properly	  mine,	  changing	  approach	  and	  shifting	   from	  a	  Tradition	   to	  another	  would	  be	  a)	   transformative	   for	  the	   entire	   corpus	   of	   tradition	   (not	   just	   for	  me)	   and	   b)	   a	   process	   of	  modification.	  Instead,	  if	  I	  were	  to	  “modify”	  my	  Tradition	  (and	  the	  weirdness	  of	  this	  notion	  is	  due	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  We	  will	   see	   in	   Chapter	   4	   how	   even	   the	   Inheritee	   needs	   to	   be	  made	   irrelevant	   and	   de-­‐individualized	   to	   become	   a	   part	   of	   tradition,	   and	   how	   Legacy	   (like	   Inheritance)	   is	   made	  impossible	  inside	  tradition.	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exactly	  to	  the	  estrangement	  between	  our	  belonging	  to	  Traditions	  but	  Tradition	  not	  belonging	  to	  us)	  a	  certain	  caesura	  would	  be	  present	  in	  my	  development	  as	  a	  thinker	  (in	  my	  Inheritance),	  while	  the	  Traditions	  from	  and	  to	  I	  was	  switching	  my	  intellectual	  allegiance	  would	  remain	  functionally	  unmodified.	  Therefore,	   Tradition	   is	   not	  mine,	   but	   only	   ours.	   I	   am	   (or	   can	   be)	   part	   of	   a	  tradition,	  but	  “my	  Tradition”	  is	  a	  senseless	  expression.	  The	  illusion	  of	  participation	  remains	   on	   a	   praxis	   level,	   since	  we	   cannot	  be	   tradition.	   Once	   again:	  we	  may	  well	  belong	  to	  a	  Tradition,	  but	  no	  Tradition	  can	  belong	  to	  us.	  My	  Inheritance,	  and	  every	  instance	  of	  inheritance	  of	  which	  it	  is	  the	  aggregate,	  happens	  in	  a	  situation	  defined	  by	  multiple	   factors,	  of	  which	  Traditions	  are	  certainly	  an	   important	  part.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  notion	  of	  validation	  of	  an	  inheritance,	  which	  lies	  in	  its	  very	  happening,	  since	  the	  process	  of	  modification	  of	   our	   Inheritance	   is	   in	   itself	   its	   justification,	   clashes	  with	  the	  claim	  by	  Tradition	  to	  have	  a	  say	  in	  what	  is	  of	  worth	  and	  valid.	  Foucault	  believes	  that	  historiography	  has	  been	  able	  to	  overcome	  its	  reliance	  on	  Tradition	  and	  move	  toward	  a	  most	  efficient	  interpretation	  focused	  on	  the	  object	  (at	   least	   since	   1950).	   The	   shift,	   he	   believes,	   occurred	   when	   we	   renounced	   an	  overarching	   theme	   of	   memory	   and	   focused	   on	   the	   content	   as	   the	   force	   behind	  history:	   «the	  document	   is	   not	   the	   fortunate	   tool	   of	   a	   history	   that	   is	   primarily	   and	  fundamentally	   memory;	   history	   is	   one	   way	   in	   which	   a	   society	   recognizes	   and	  develops	  a	  mass	  of	  documentation	  with	  which	  it	  is	  inextricably	  linked.»37	  He	  claims	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Archeology	  of	  Knowledge	  and	  the	  discourse	  on	  language,	  New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1972,	  p.	  7.	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that,	   in	  post-­‐WWII	  European	   cultural	  discourses,	   tradition	   (as	   a	   form	  of	   collective	  memory	  reducing	  the	  document/content	  to	  its	  tool)	  has	  begun	  losing	  its	  ground	  as	  a	  prime	   factor	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   cultural	   history:	   «the	   problem	   is	   no	   longer	   one	   of	  tradition	  […]	  but	  one	  of	  division,	  of	  limits.»38	  	  We	   should	   not	   mistakenly	   ascribe	   to	   Foucault	   a	   theory	   of	   inheritance:	   he	  remains	  strongly	  interested	  in	  History	  intended	  as	  a	  collective	  process	  in	  which	  the	  individual	   interpreter,	   just	   like	   the	   single	   document,	   is	   just	   a	  moment	   of	   a	   larger,	  social	  enterprise.	  However,	  when	  he	  explains	  how	  each	  access	  to	  a	  content	  needs	  to	  happen	  outside	  any	  “synthesis”	  (since	  all	  syntheses	  are	  to	  be	  questioned)	  he	  creates	  a	  space	  of	  absolute	  instantaneity	  which	  is	  the	  same	  as	  what	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  get	  to.	  What	  he	   reduces	   to	  discontinuity	   (claiming	   that	   even	   the	  unity	  of	   a	  book	  or	  of	   an	  author’s	  oeuvre	   need	   to	  be	   fragmented	   into	   contents)	   is	   the	  act	  of	   signification,	   of	  seeing	  the	  interpreted	  content	  for	  what	  it	  is,	  and	  not	  as	  related	  to	  a	  predetermined	  horizon.	  He	  notes	  that	  	  	  “Tradition”	   is	   intended	   to	   give	   a	   special	   temporal	   status	   to	   a	   group	   of	  phenomena	  that	  are	  both	  successive	  and	  identical;	  it	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  rethink	   the	  dispersion	  of	  history	   in	   the	   form	  of	   the	   same;	   […]	   tradition	  enables	  us	  to	  isolate	  the	  new	  against	  a	  background	  of	  permanence,	  and	  to	  transfer	   its	   merit	   to	   originality,	   to	   genius,	   to	   the	   decisions	   proper	   to	  individuals.39	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Foucault,	  The	  Archeology…,	  p.	  5.	  39	  Foucault,	  The	  Archeology…,	  p.	  21.	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In	  getting	  rid	  of	  tradition	  as	  a	  surpassed	  tool	  for	  the	  thematization	  of	  cultural	  history,	   Foucault	   describes	   the	   moment	   of	   interpretation	   as	   an	   occurrence	   of	  
irruption	  that	  replaces	  the	  infinite	  continuity	  of	  tradition.	  	  The	   same	   rupture	   is	   required	   for	   the	   process	   of	   Inheritance	   to	   take	   place.	  Where	  this	  differs	  from	  Foucault,	  then,	  is	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  reconstruction	  after	  this	  methodological	  deconstruction:	  Foucault	   is	  developing	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  History,	  and	  thus	  pushes	  back	   into	  anonymity	   the	  eruption	  of	   individual	  genius	  which	  was	  crucial	   to	   his	   notion	   of	   discourse.	   	   Nonetheless,	   what	   he	   says	   about	   the	   event	   is	  fundamental	   to	   our	   inquiry	   into	   inheritance.	   He	  warns	   us	   against	   the	   «naïveté	   of	  chronology» 40 	  and	   the	   tendency	   to	   consider	   any	   event	   as	   simply	   a	   re-­‐commencement	   of	   a	   previous,	   uninterrupted	   flux	   of	   happenings.	   He	   wants	   us	   to	  renounce	   the	   idea	   that	   everything	   that	   is	   presented	   in	   a	   documental	   form	   to	   our	  historical	   view	   must	   be	   conceived	   as	   expression	   and	   continuation	   of	   previous	  cultural	  forms,	  identified	  as	  its	  causes.	  The	  singularity	  of	  the	  event-­‐document	  is	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  preserved	  if	  we	  want	  to	  be	  freed	  from	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  «already	  said.»41	  	  However,	  this	  notion	  of	  the	  event	  as	  absolutely	  singular	  highlights	  a	  dialectic	  tension	  internal	  to	  Inheritance,	  which	  is	  both	  an	  event	  and	  a	  process:	  	  
- On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  awareness	  of	  events	  that	  happened	  before	  and	  up	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  attention	  is	  what	  makes	  Inheritance	  valuable,	  tying	  the	  reading	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Foucault,	  The	  Archeology…,	  p.	  25	  ff.	  41	  Foucault,	  The	  Archeology…,	  p.	  25.	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the	  knowledge	  that	  its	  content	  was	  transmitted	  to	  us.	  The	  document	  itself,	  as	  an	  object	  and	  as	  a	  bearer	  of	  content,	   is	   testimony	  of	  continuity.	  Chronology	  matters,	  insofar	  as	  the	  inheritor	  understands	  that	  the	  content	  is	  there	  not	  by	  accident,	   but	   by	   a	   series	   of	   events	   that	   begins	  with	   an	   intellectual	  moment	  and	   that	  entails	   the	   formation	  of	  a	  potential	   legacy,	   the	  preservation	  of	   the	  document,	  the	  entrance	  of	  both	  into	  the	  range	  of	  the	  inheritor’s	  own	  cultural	  density	  and	  the	  historical	  situation	  allowing	  the	  content	  to	  be	  meaningful	  to	  him	  and	  to	  his	  system	  of	  thought	  (is	  Inheritance	  as	  large).	  The	  being-­‐there	  of	  the	   content	   (which	   is	   absolute	   and	   pre-­‐interpretational	   at	   the	   stage	   of	  cultural	   density)	   has	   been	   replaced	   with	   a	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐situation	   (a	   being	  “now”	  which	  the	  historical	  now	  and	  not	  the	  now	  of	  absolute	  contemporaneity	  that	  we	   previously	   addressed	  when	   dealing	  with	   the	   turning	   of	   attention).	  Without	  an	  historical	  perspective,	  reading	  cannot	  become	  inheritance.	  	  
- On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Inheritance	   is	   a	   transformative	   process.	   Repetition	   and	  re-­‐presentation	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  genuine	  inheritance,	  if	  we	  intend	  them	  as	  just	   the	  new	  offer	  of	  something	  that	   is	  grounded	   in	  the	  past,	  belongs	  to	   the	  past	  and	   is	  only	  witnessed	  by	  a	   spectator	   in	   the	  now	   of	   its	   re-­‐presentation.	  For	  a	  process	  of	  reception	  to	  be	  an	  inheritance,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  freed	  from	  the	  shackles	  of	   the	   situation	  of	   the	  author,	   the	   inheritee.	  The	  event-­‐inheritance	  makes	  use	  of	  but	  does	  not	  coincide	  with	  the	  event-­‐document	  that	  is	  fixed	  in	  the	  past	  and	  indissolubly	  linked	  to	  its	  moment	  of	  origin.	  While	  the	  content	  of	  the	   document	   may	   be	   the	   same	   at	   the	   moment	   of	   its	   creation	   and	   at	   the	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moment	  in	  which	  it	  is	  accessed	  by	  the	  inheritor	  (at	  the	  turning	  of	  attention),	  the	  historicized	   interpretation	   transforms	   the	   received	   content	   by	   the	   very	  act	  of	  reading	  it	  on	  an	  horizon	  of	  historicity.	  Ironically,	  the	  very	  openness	  of	  historical	  awareness	  to	  chronology	  (although	  arguably	  without	  the	  naïveté	  of	  post	   hoc	   ergo	   propter	   hoc)	   creates	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	   process	   of	  inheritance	  to	  be	  ‘a	  beginning	  and	  not	  a	  re-­‐commencement’.	  Foucault’s	  methodological	  hypothesis	  is	  fascinating,	  but	  strikes	  the	  reader	  as	  quite	  abstract	  when	  he	  does	  not	  go	  into	  details	  as	  to	  how	  this	  detachment	  from	  the	  naïveté	  of	  chronology	  should	  be	  made	  actual.	   Indeed,	   it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  even	  reading	   something	   as	   “unrelated”	   to	   the	   past	   would	   be	   a	   form	   of	   historical	  acknowledgment.	   Therefore,	   true	   detachment	   would	   be	   impossible,	   if	   chronology	  was	   to	  be	   forgotten	  or	  pushed	  out	  of	   the	   field	  of	  our	  historical	   consciousness.	  We	  have	   to	   assume	   that	   Foucault	   is	   referring	   to	   a	   self-­‐created	   value	   of	   the	   historical	  interpretation	  process,	  which	  is	  the	  same	  that	  I	  advocate	  here	  for	   inheritance.	  The	  notion	   of	   discontinuity	   as	   a	   methodologically	   imposed	   limit	   thus	   need	   to	   be	  addressed	  for	  inheritance	  as	  well,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  inheritance	  as	  a	  form	  of	  historically	  informed	  act	  of	  reading,	  as	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  do	  in	  Foucault’s	  model.	  But	  what	  is	  discontinuity	  in	  the	  inheritance	  discourse	  and	  how	  does	  it	  affect	  the	   inheritor’s	   access	   to	   the	   content	   of	   the	   document?	   Going	   back	   to	   the	   role	   of	  tradition	  in	  regards	  to	  inheritance(s),	  we	  explained	  how	  tradition	  constitutes	  a	  limit,	  and	  not	  a	  facilitator.	  There	  lies	  the	  possibility	  of	  discontinuity.	  Even	  when	  receiving	  a	   traditional	   (i.e.	   a	   tradition-­‐approved)	   content	   and	   subjecting	   it	   to	   a	   process	   of	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interpretation,	   the	   inheritor	   steps	   beyond	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   already-­‐said,	   by	  modifying	  the	  content	  or	  by	  generating	  a	  series	  of	  contents	  that	  depend	  upon	  it	  and	  were	   not	   there	   in	   the	   original	   formulation.	   Discontinuity	   does	   not	   necessarily	  involves	   dissociation	   and	   renounciation	   (as	   certain	   passages	   in	   Foucault’s	   The	  
Archeology	   of	   Knowledge	   seem	   to	   imply),	   but	   it	   can	   consist	   in	   a	   new	   system	   of	  relation.	  If,	  as	  we	  said	  with	  Locke,	  relation	  is	  central	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  complex	  ideas,	  then	  constructing	  a	  different	  system	  of	  relations	  involves	  a	  modification	  of	  a	  complex	  idea.	  In	  other	  words,	  even	  assuming	  that	  a	  content	  C	  is	  received	  identical	  as	  C’	   in	   the	   inheritor’s	   Inheritance	   (I),	   the	   system	   in	  which	   it	  was	   collocated	   (S)	  will	  differ	   from	   the	   one	   of	   the	   receiver	   (I).	   This	  will	   be	   relevant	   for	   the	   discussion	   of	  negative	  reception,	  and	  we	  will	  go	  back	  to	  that	  then.	  For	  now,	  it	  suffices	  to	  establish	  that	  only	  this	  discontinuity	  in	  systems	  -­‐	  I(C’)	  being	  different	  than	  S(C)	  –	  can	  disclose	  the	   space	   for	   an	   inheritance,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   satisfying	   Foucalt’s	   call	   for	   a	  disruption	  of	  continuity	  in	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  History.	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  moment,	  of	  the	  event-­‐inheritance	  as	  relevant	  per	  se	  and	  not	   only	   as	   part	   of	   a	   succession	   of	   moments	   strides	   with	   the	   notion	   of	  disappearance,	  which	  is	  strictly	  ingrained	  into	  our	  vision	  of	  history.	  The	  very	  notion	  of	  historical	  horizon	  implies	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  personality	  of	  actors	  to	  their	  role	  in	  the	   history	   that	   we	   are	   analyzing.	   «Time	   is	   the	   element	   of	   invisibility»42	  -­‐	   writes	  Derrida	  –	  and	  this	  goes	  beyond	  reflections	  on	  the	  ephemerality	  of	  human	  memory.	  The	   circle	   of	   time,	   the	   one	   day	   after	   another,	   cannot	   provide	   the	   space	   for	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Jacques	  Derrida.	  Given	  Time:	  I.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1992.	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absolutely	   individual	  moment,	  according	  to	  Derrida.	  The	  problem	  of	  visibility	  (and	  conversely	  of	  invisibility)	  is	  one	  that	  matters	  the	  most	  to	  Legacy,	  not	  to	  Inheritance,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  its	  contemporaneity,	  with	  what	  was	  accessible	  (as	  cultural	  density),	  has	  been	  accessed	  (with	  attention)	  and	  is	  deemed	  valuable	  to	  be	  retained	  (thus	  becoming	  inheritance)	  in	  the	  present.	  	  Nonetheless,	   the	   event	   needs	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   such,	   as	   a	   process	   (of	  interpretation	   and	   of	   inheritance)	   that	   happens	   now	   and	   not	   at	   another	   time.	  Breaking	  with	  the	  naïveté	  of	  chronology	  is	  not	  enough,	  a	  break	  from	  the	  naïveté	  of	  time,	   so	   to	   speak,	   is	   also	   required.	   The	   inheritor	   renounces	   the	   circle,	   the	  inevitability	  of	  transmission	  (which	  is	  proper	  to	  Tradition)	  and	  chooses.	  He	  chooses	  the	  when	  (now,	  and	  not	  before),	  the	  what	  (this	  content	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  him)	  and	  most	  importantly	  the	  why	  of	  his	  process	  of	  inheritance:	  not	  only	  the	  tautological	  but	  self-­‐affirming	   ‘I	   choose	   this	   because	   it	   interests	  me’	   but	   also	   the	   tradition-­‐defying	  ‘because	  this	  is	  valuable,	  more	  so	  than	  other	  contents	  provided	  by	  tradition.’	  Foucault’s	   and	   Derrida’s	   visions	   require	   us	   to	   go	   beyond	   not	   only	   the	  «Cartesian	   method	   of	   verifiability»43	  focusing	   on	   universals,	   but	   even	   beyond	   the	  ancients’	   method	   revived	   by	   Hegel	   («all	   method	   is	   tied	   to	   the	   object-­‐itself»44):	  Gadamer	  rightly	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  historical	  knowledge	  whose	  aim	  «is	  not	  that	  of	  explaining	  a	  concrete	  phenomenon	  as	  a	  particular	  case	  of	  a	  general	  rule,	  [but]	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43 	  Gadamer,	   “Problèmes	   Épistémologiques	   des	   Sciences	   Humaines”,	   in	   Gadamer,	   Le	  
Problème	  de	  la	  Conscience	  Historique,	  Paris:	  Seuil,	  1996.	  p.	  29	  44	  Hegel,	  Wissenschaft	  der	  Logik,	  vol	  II,	  p.	  486.	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understand	   an	   historical	   phenomenon	   in	   its	   singularity.»45	  Inheritance,	   however,	  requires	  an	  ulterior	   step:	  after	   the	  disruption	  of	  history	  and	   tradition	   (formulated	  more	   clearly	   by	   Foucault,	   and	   shown	   as	   necessary	   by	   Gadamer)	   we	   need	   to	   find	  another	  unifying	  principle,	   if	  we	  want	   to	  understand	  why	  not	   all	   interpretation	   is	  retained,	  and	  understood	  as	  relevant,	  by	  the	  interpreter.	  	  This	  principle	  of	  re-­‐unification	  is	  nothing	  else	  than	  the	  unified	  Inheritance	  of	  the	   inheritor.	  What	   Gadamer’s	   early	   theory	   of	   interpretation	   lacks	   -­‐	   if	   it	   needs	   to	  account	   for	   the	   absolute	   autonomy	  of	   the	  process	   of	   inheritance	   -­‐	   is	   precisely	   the	  notion	  of	  rupture	  that	  we	  have	  found	  in	  Foucault:	  the	  German	  scholar	  still	  advocates	  for	  the	  surpassing	  of	  opposition	  between	  tradition	  and	  historical	  research46,	  without	  acknowledging	  the	  need	  for	  a	  space	  of	  discontinuity	  in	  which	  the	  inheritor’s	  agency	  can	  be	  made	  explicit.	  	  We	  said	  that	  Tradition	  demands	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  the	  source	  of	  validation	  for	  any	  content	  entering	  its	  orbit.	  There	  is	  no	  evaluation	  of	  ‘rightfulness’	  before	  the	  process	  of	   Inheritance,	  nor	   is	   it	  characterized	  by	  the	   ‘correct’	   interpretation	  of	   the	  content.	  Even	  assuming	  a	   content	   could	  be	  misinterpreted	   (which	  would	  presume	  either	   a	   “true”	   gnoseological	   meaning	   or	   the	   adherence	   to	   authorial	   intent),	   this	  would	  be	   irrelevant	  to	  Inheritance,	  since	  the	  very	  process	  of	  accessing	  the	  content	  has	  already	  made	  it	  possible,	  and	  the	  eventual	  integration	  of	  the	  perceived	  truth	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Gadamer,	  “Problèmes…”,	  p.	  31	  46	  Cf.	   Gadamer,	   “Martin	  Heidegger	   and	   the	  meaning	   of	   his	   ‘Hermeneutics	   of	   Facts’	   for	   the	  Human	  Sciences”	  in	  Gadamer,	  Le	  Problème	  de	  la	  Conscience	  Historique,	  Paris:	  Seuil,	  1996.	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the	   content	   (or	   of	   the	   derived	   negation-­‐al	   content47)	   in	   the	   inheritor’s	   system	   of	  thought	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  classify	  the	  process	  as	  a	  full	  experience	  of	  inheritance.	  Nonetheless,	   a	   judgment	  of	   value	  and	  a	   judgment	  of	   truth	  are	  undoubtedly	  present	  during	   the	  process	  of	   inheritance,	  and	   they	  constitute	  a	  crucial	  axis	  of	   the	  inheritor’s	  initiative.	  We	  have	  already	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two	  how	  the	  turning	  of	  attention	  implies	  a	  pre-­‐judgment	  of	  importance,	  which	  we	  reduced	  to	  a	  tautological	  “my	   interest	   lies	  with	  what	   I	   am	   interested	   in”.	  When	  we	  move	   to	   the	   inheritance	  process	  (and	  thus	   to	  a	  status	  of	  extended	  attentiveness,	   in	  contrast	   to	  momentous	  attention)	  this	  judgment	  can	  either	  be	  confirmed	  or	  denied.	  	  If	   the	   informed	   judgment	   is	   one	   of	   irrelevance,	   the	   process	   of	   inheritance	  breaks	   down.	  What	   the	   situation	   and	   the	   concurring	   Tradition’s	   authorities	   could	  not	  do,	  disinterest	  can.	   If	   the	  to-­‐be-­‐inheritor	   finds	   the	  accessed	  content	   to	  be	  non-­‐relevant,	  he	  will	  discard	  it.	  Here	  is	  where	  inheritance	  differs	  from	  the	  simple	  act	  of	  reading/listening	   and	   from	   the	   process	   of	   interpretation,	   which	   are	   both	  fundamental	  to	  it	  but	  do	  not	  exhaust	  its	  phenomenality.	  We	  engaged	  tradition	  because	  we	  were	  discussing	  time,	  and	  to	  time	  we	  need	  to	   return;	   any	   inheritance	   deals	   with	   two	   times:	   the	   ‘now’,	   the	   present,	   however	  conceived	   (we	   discussed	   many	   notions	   of	   “now”	   all	   applicable	   to	   the	   process	   of	  inheritance)	   and	   the	   ‘then’,	   the	   ‘before’	   (and	   thus	   not-­‐now)	   that	   characterizes	   the	  origin	   of	   the	   content	  we	   inherit.	   The	   two	   times	   are	   not	   equivalent	   to	   inheritance:	  contemporaneity,	  ‘now’,	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  process,	  it	  is	  the	  only	  space	  in	  which	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  I	  will	  delve	  into	  this	  in	  a	  few	  pages.	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can	  conceive	  the	  act	  of	  inheriting	  as	  alive,	  not	  yet	  consigned	  to	  a	  documental	  state,	  nor	  to	  chronology	  or	  (if	  case	  may	  be)	  mutated	  in	  turn	  into	  a	  legacy.	  	  What	   is,	   then,	   the	   role	  of	   the	  past,	   the	   ‘before’,	   in	   the	   scope	  of	   inheritance?	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  such	  a	  dimension	  of	  time	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed:	  the	  inheritor	  always	  realizes	  that	   the	  content	  he	   is	  accessing	  was	  created	  before	  the	  moment	   in	  which	  he	  accesses	   it.	  How	  can	  this	   ‘other	  time’	  be	  conflated	   into	  the	   ‘now’	  that	  we	  have	  described	  as	  the	  only	  time	  to	  which	  inheritance	  can	  properly	  belong?	  	  Augustine	  was	  well	   aware	  of	   the	  problems	  connected	  with	   the	  necessity	  of	  accounting	  for	  a	  time	  that	  was	  not	  the	  ‘now’	  he	  was	  living	  in;	  although	  his	  problem	  was	  one	  of	  justifying	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  time	  (and	  thus	  of	  movement	  and	  world)	  faced	  to	  the	  doubts	  of	  Skeptics,	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  aporia	  of	  time,	  which	  he	  carries	  out	   in	   his	   Confessions48,	   will	   provide	   us	  with	   some	   useful	   tools	   for	   an	   analogous	  discussion.	  Augustine	  believes	  that	  time	  is	  intimately	  tied	  with	  our	  consciousness	  of	  the	   world,	   but	   that	   our	   notion	   of	   it	   is	   hardly	   transferable	   into	   a	   clear,	  understandable	  and	  communicable	  statement:	  «Quid	  est	  ergo	  tempus?	  Si	  nemo	  ex	  me	  
quærat,	   scio;	   si	   quærenti	   explicare	  uelim,	  nescio»49	  [«What	   is,	   then,	   time?	   If	   no	   one	  asks	  me,	  I	  know	  what	  it	  is;	  but	  if	  I	  wish	  to	  explain	  it	  to	  those	  who	  ask,	  then	  I	  do	  not	  know»].	   	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   though,	  he	   feels	   that	  before	   trying	   to	   come	   to	   such	  an	  understanding,	  we	  should	  at	  first	  solve	  the	  aporia	  of	  time,	  that	  he	  summarizes	  so:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Cf.	  in	  particular	  books	  14	  and	  28.	  49	  Confessions,	  11:14.	  Translation	  mine.	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Yet	  I	  say	  with	  confidence	  that	  I	  know	  that	  if	  nothing	  passed	  away,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  past	  time;	  and	  if	  nothing	  were	  still	  coming,	  there	  would	  be	  no	   future	   time;	   and	   if	   there	   were	   nothing	   at	   all,	   there	   would	   be	   no	  present	  time.	  	  But,	   then,	  how	   is	   it	   that	   there	  are	   the	   two	   times,	  past	  and	   future,	  when	  even	  the	  past	  is	  now	  no	  longer	  and	  the	  future	  is	  now	  not	  yet?	  But	  if	  the	  present	  were	  always	  present,	  and	  did	  not	  pass	  into	  past	  time,	  it	  obviously	  would	  not	  be	  time	  but	  eternity.	  If,	  then,	  time	  present-­‐-­‐if	  it	  be	  time-­‐-­‐comes	  into	  existence	  only	  because	  it	  passes	  into	  time	  past,	  how	  can	  we	  say	  that	  even	  this	  is,	  since	  the	  cause	  of	  its	  being	  is	  that	  it	  will	  cease	  to	  be?	  Thus,	  can	  we	  not	  truly	  say	  that	  time	  is	  only	  as	  it	  tends	  toward	  nonbeing?	  50	  	  	   To	   try	   to	   resolve	   such	   a	   problematic	   point,	  Augustine	  develops	   a	   theory	   of	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  threefold	  present,	  saying	  that	  memory	  and	  expectation	  are	  the	  way	  in	   which	   our	   mind	   collapses	   past	   and	   future	   into	   our	   present 51 .	   Insofar	   as	  inheritance	   is	   concerned,	   we	   have	   to	   worry	   only	   about	   the	   past,	   since	   it	   is	  impossible	   for	   an	   inheritor	   to	   access	   a	   content	   that	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   created.	  Augustin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  «Fidenter	  tamen	  dico	  scire	  me	  quod,	  si	  nihil	  præteriret,	  non	  esset	  præteritum	  tempus,	  et	  si	   nihil	   adueniret,	   non	   esset	   futurum	   tempus,	   et	   si	   nihil	   esset,	   non	   esset	  præsens	   tempus.	  Duo	   ergo	   illa	   tempora,	   præteritum	  et	   futurum,	  quomodo	   sunt,	   quando	   et	   præteritum	   iam	  non	  est	  et	  futurum	  nondum	  est?	  Præsens	  autem	  si	  semper	  esset	  præsens	  nec	  in	  præteritum	  transiret,	  non	  iam	  esset	  tempus,	  sed	  æternitas.	  Si	  ergo	  præsens,	  ut	  tempus	  sit,	  ideo	  fit,	  quia	  in	  præteritum	  transit,	  quomodo	  et	  hoc	  esse	  dicimus,	  cui	  causa,	  ut	  sit,	  illa	  est,	  quia	  non	  erit,	  ut	  scilicet	  non	  uere	  dicamus	  tempus	  esse,	  nisi	  quia	  tendit	  non	  esse?»	  -­‐	  Augustin,	  Confessions,	  11:14,	  translated	  by	  Albert	  C.	  Outler.	  	  51	  «Mens	  [..]	  et	  expectat,	  et	  adtendit,	  et	  meminit»,	  Confessions,	  28:38	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writes	  that	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  (and	  not	  time	  itself)	  is	  what	  we	  experience,	  and	  what	  our	  concept	  of	  time	  must	  depend	  upon.	  	  To	  recall	  the	  past	  into	  our	  present	  (via	  memory52)	  is	  the	  way	  for	  the	  mind	  to	  give	  account	  of	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  in	  regards	  to	  what	  was	  before.	  The	  document	  –	  the	  container	  of	  the	  content	  –	  is	  a	  crystallized	  memory:	  our	  personal	  memory	  (as	  a	  faculty	  of	  the	  mind/soul	  in	  Augustinian	  terms53)	  is	  not	  the	  initiator	  of	  the	  process	  of	  recovery.	  The	  past	  is	  made	  present	  in	  front	  of	  our	  witnessing	  intellect,	  not	  by	  its	  own	  doing.	   Intelligence	   (in	   its	   etymologic	   meaning	   of	   intellig-­‐entia,	   ‘capacity	   to	  understand’,	  intelligo/ere),	  not	  memory,	  is	  the	  function	  of	  our	  mind	  that	  makes	  the	  past	  alive	  and	  present	   in	  the	  present	  of	  our	  ad-­‐tending	  consciousness.	  But	  what	   is	  the	  document,	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  reading	  it?	  Ricoeur	  identifies	  this	  act	  of	  recreation	  of	  the	  past	  as	  narrative:	  	  	  Time	   becomes	   human	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   is	   articulated	   through	   a	  narrative	  mode,	  and	  narrative	  attains	  its	  full	  meaning	  when	  it	  becomes	  a	  condition	  of	  temporal	  existence.54	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Augustine	  writes	   that	   «The	   time	   present	   of	   things	   past	   is	  memory;	   the	   time	   present	   of	  things	   present	   is	   direct	   experience;	   the	   time	   present	   of	   things	   future	   is	   expectation.»	  (Confessions,	   11:26,	  Outler’s	   translation.)	  We	  deal	  here	  with	  memory,	   and	  we	  will	   discuss	  expectation	   even	   more,	   when	   analyzing	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   inheritee	   who	   foresees	   a	  recipient	  for	  his	  words,	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5.	  53	  Bonaventure	  gives	  a	  wonderful	  depiction	  of	  an	  Augustinian	  theory	  of	  intellect/mind/soul	  in	  his	  Itinerarium	  Mentis	  ad	  Deum.	  	  54	  Ricoeur,	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1984,	  vl.	  1,	  p.	  52.	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The	   time	   that	   is	   “yet	   to	   become”	   human	   is	   to	   be	   intended	   as	   time	   as	   an	  abstract	   concept,	   something	   that	   could	   exist	   before	   consciousness	   and	   that	  would	  require	   an	   explanation	   as	   independent	   from	   consciousness,	   the	   explanation	   that	  Augustine	  sees	  as	  philosophically	  impossible,	  si	  quarenti	  explicare.	  Making	  the	  time	  human	  means	  to	  bring	  it	  into	  our	  conscious	  present,	  which	  is	  re-­‐narrated	  not	  just	  as	  a	  dull	  self-­‐standing	  and	  non-­‐conceptualized	  ‘now’,	  but	  as	  a	  mediated	  ‘now’	  that	  has	  a	  ‘before’,	  testified	  to	  by	  the	  document,	  in	  need	  of	  an	  overarching	  narration.	  	  Our	   reception	   of	   the	   document	   constitutes	   the	   narration,	   the	   content	   is	  conveyed	  by	  it.	  The	  document	  is	  emplotted55,	  insofar	  as	  the	  content	  is	  depicted	  onto	  the	  background	  of	  time.	  Narration	  equates	  historicisation,	  it	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  fiction	  but	  not	  even	  to	  the	  telling	  of	  events.	  Ricoeur	  tells	  us	  that	  Narration	  is	  mimesis,	  and	  that	   the	   textual	   configuration	   (Mimesis	   2,	   or	   the	  document	   in	   simpler	   terms)	   is	   a	  medium	   between	   prefiguration	   (Mimesis	   1,	   the	   narrated	   content)	   and	   reception	  (Mimesis	  3,	  i.e.	  inheritance).	  According	   to	   Ricoeur,	   the	   content	   carries	   with	   it	   the	   identifying	   action,	   a	  process	  of	  meaning	  that	  others	  have	  attributed	  to	  the	  author:	  for	  the	  content	  to	  have	  survived,	   there	  must	  be	  a	  meaning	  attached	  to	   it.	  The	  temporalizing	  action	   is	  what	  the	   inheritor	   carries	   out	   through	   what	   Ricoeur	   defines	   as	   symbolization.56	  His	  intuition	  is	  correct:	  to	  move	  from	  the	  event-­‐content	  to	  the	  event-­‐inheritance,	  and	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Ricoeur,	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	  p.	  60.	  56	  For	   a	   detailed	   explanation	   of	   Ricoeur’s	   three-­‐part	   Mimesis,	   see	   Time	   and	   Narrative,	  particularly	  III:	  “Time	  and	  Narrative,	  threefold	  mimesis”,	  p.	  52	  ff.	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realize	  the	  historicization	  of	  the	  content,	  we	  need	  some	  sort	  of	  symbolization	  and	  an	  actualization	   of	   the	   content,	   which	   is	   provided	   by	   narrative.	   It	   is	   not,	   indeed,	   a	  narrative	   internal	   to	  and	  proper	  of	   the	   document,	   but	   our	   personal	   narrative	   that	  needs	  to	  come	  to	  the	  rescue	  of	  the	  content	  from	  the	  clutches	  of	  the	  (otherwise	  dead)	  document.	  	  By	  inheriting,	  we	  present	  ourselves	  as	  inheritors.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  a	  pleonastic	  reiteration;	  it	   is	  the	  core	  of	  the	  narrative	  action	  required	  to	  overcome	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  time	  of	  the	  document	  (the	  ‘before’	  in	  which	  it	  was	  composed)	  and	  the	  a-­‐temporal	   ‘now’	   in	   which	   the	   content	   is	   accessed.	   This	   can	   only	   happen	   via	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  narration	  in	  which	  the	  present	  of	  the	  inheritor	  becomes	  a	  multifold	  present	   in	  Augustine’s	  sense,	  able	   to	  give	  account	  of	  both	   the	  historical	  present	  of	  the	  inheritor	  (situated	  in	  time	  but	  also	  structured	  as	  his	  ‘situation’),	  and	  the	  residual	  presence	  of	   the	  document,	  which	   is	   narrated	   into	   the	  present	   and	   charged	  with	   a	  meaning	  that	   is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  the	  content	  but	  surpasses	  its	  borders	  and	  draws	  sense	  from	  the	  historical	  horizon.	  It	  is	  a	  narration	  by	  the	  inheritor,	  for	  the	  inheritor	  and	  about	  the	  inheritor	  as	  such.	  Once	  we	  understand	  these	  characteristics	  of	  the	  required	  narration,	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  need	  for	  an	  agent	  with	  a	  cultural	  network57,	  required	  –	  according	  to	  Ricoeur	   –	   to	   identify	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   three	   actions	   (identification,	  
symbolization	   and	   temporalization)	   and	   thus	   achieving	   emplotment.	   He	   mentions	  this	   in	   passing,	   without	   any	   extensive	   explanation,	   but	   given	   our	   path	   so	   far,	   we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Ricoeur,	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	  p.	  63.	  
	   154	  
should	  not	  encounter	  any	  impasse	  in	  our	  effort	  to	  understand	  this.	  The	  agent	  is	  the	  historically	  aware	  inheritor,	  who	  draws	  from	  its	  situation	  (i.e.	  the	  cultural	  network)	  -­‐	   which	   contains	   cultural	   density	   and	   social	   networking	   but	   is	   not	   exhausted	   by	  them	  –	  the	  hermeneutic	  tools	  to	  understand	  the	  content	  historically.	  Foucault’s	  and	  Ricoeur’s	   perspectives,	   once	   again,	   travel	   hand	   in	   hand:	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	  narrative	   from	   the	   level	   of	   collective,	   traditional	   history	   to	   the	   standpoint	   of	   the	  
agent	   implies	   the	   disruption	   of	   a	   super-­‐level	   of	   cultural	   network	   intended	   as	  universal.	  	  The	  inheritor	  performs	  his	  self-­‐narrative,	  which	  is	  threefold:	  	  
- a	  narrative	  of	  himself	  as	  inheritor:	  he	  positions	  himself	  not	  just	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  reading,	  but	  as	  the	  understand-­‐er	  and	  the	  chronologist	  of	  the	  content	  through	  time;	  
- a	  narrative	  of	  the	  content	  as	  an	  inheritance,	  i.e.	  a	  content	  that	  is	  subjected	  to	  duration	  through	  time	  not	  only	  in	  its	  physical	  form	  (the	  document)	  but	  also	  in	  its	  intellectual	  form	  (the	  symbolic	  meaning	  provided	  by	  narration	  extends	  internal	   meaning,	   belonging	   to	   the	   Legacy,	   into	   the	   temporal	   space	   of	   the	  reader);	  
- finally,	  a	  narrative	  of	   the	  moment	  of	  reading	  as	  belonging	  both	  the	   ‘now’	  of	  his	   situation	   and	   to	   the	   ‘then-­‐and-­‐now’	   of	   the	   content	   as	   found	   in	   the	  document	  (which	  was	  made	  before	  but	  exists	  now).	  	  By	  doing	  all	  this,	  he	  carries	  out	  the	  «synthesis	  of	  heterogeneous	  times»	  which	  is,	  in	  Ricoeur’s	  intentions,	  the	  aim	  of	  historical	  awareness,	  while	  solving	  the	  aporia	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of	  time	  concerning	  the	  mind,	  which	  was	  raised	  by	  Augustine.	  Narrative,	  thus,	  is	  the	  way	   in	   which	   the	   ‘threefold	   present’	   is	   realized	   in	   the	   cultural	   space	   where	   the	  agent/inheritor	   operates.	   If	   the	   threefold	   present	   is	   conjured	   to	   the	   mind	   by	  memory	   and	   expectation,	   narration	   is	   what	   makes	   the	   past	   present	   by	   the	  explicitation	  of	   its	  permanence	  throughout	  cultural	  contents.	  Narration,	  as	  Ricoeur	  concludes	   in	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	   «marks	   the	   intersection	  of	   the	  world	  of	   the	   text	  and	   the	  world	   of	   the	   hearer/reader»:	   this	   intersection,	  which	   could	   be	   otherwise	  subject	   to	   disappearance	   (making	   the	   past	   a	   forgotten	   past	   and	   breaking	   the	  manifold	  of	  the	  present	  once	  again),	  finds	  its	  permanence	  in	  Inheritance.	  However,	  at	  the	  very	  core	  of	  historical	  Narration	  is	  our	  concept	  of	  Time,	  if	  we	  are	   to	  believe	  Ricoeur	  himself.58	  For	   centuries,	   he	   claims,	   theories	  of	   history	  were	  founded	  upon	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  persistent	  Truth,	  which	  should	  have	   informed	  “true”	  philosophy	  of	  history,	  which	  would	  undergo	  a	  process	  of	  evolution.	  This,	  however,	  created	   a	   historiographical	   perspective	   which	   gave	   no	   space	   for	   individual	   views	  and	  subjectivity:	  only	  objectivity	  and	  collective	  history	  of	  philosophy	  (i.e.	  tradition)	  were	  believed	   to	  give	  account	  of	   the	   self-­‐imposing	  appearance	  of	   the	  events,	  with	  the	   subjectivity	   of	   the	   reader	   [of	   the	  document]	  being	   impressed	  passively	  by	   the	  events.59	  This,	   however,	   failed	   to	   address	   the	  profound	   subjectivity	   implied	   in	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  op.	  cit,	  especially	  Chapter	  “Histoire	  de	  la	  Philosophie	  et	  l’unité	  du	  vrai”.	  59	  Ricoeur	   is	   here	   summarizing	  Thevenaz’s	   position,	   especially	   referring	   to	  L’homme	  et	   sa	  
raison.	  On	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  two	  authors,	  see	  Jervolino,	  “Entre	  Thévenaz	  et	  Ricoeur:	  la	  philosophie	  sans	  absolu”	  in	  Capelle,	  Philippe,	  Marie-­‐Dominique	  Popelard,	  and	  Geneviève	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conception	  of	   time,	  and	   incurred	  the	  aporia	   first	  denounced	  by	  Augustine.	  Ricoeur	  opposes	   to	   this	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   paradoxe	   vivant	   of	   multiple	   philosoph-­‐ies	  (contrasted	   to	  one	  Philosophy),	   the	  only	  way	   to	  overcome	   the	  dilemme	  mortel60	  of	  the	  aporia.	  This	   amounts	   to	   the	   recognition	   of	   “impersonal	   Weltanschauung” 61 	  as	  (improperly)	   dominating	   our	   approach	   to	   time	   and	   cultural	   history.	   Once	   again,	  Ricoeur	  does	  not	  fully	  explain	  what	  he	  means	  with	  this	  expression,	  but	  we	  have	  to	  assume	  that	  this	  ‘typology’	  of	  explanation	  (as	  he	  tentatively	  refers	  to	  the	  impersonal	  Weltanschauung)	  coincides	  with	   tradition,	   the	  great	  enemy	  of	   subjectivity	  and	   the	  advocate	  of	  the	  one	  philosophy	  throughout	  history.	  To	  all	  of	  this,	  Ricoeur	  opposes	  a	  
prise	  de	  conscience,	  a	  philosophical	  reception	  of	  history	  in	  which	  the	  ‘Long	  history	  of	  consciousness’	  can	  justify	  and	  coincide	  with	  the	  ‘Short	  History	  of	  the	  Self’62,	  rescuing	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  interpreter	  without	  losing	  his	  historical	  awareness.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	   gauge	  what	   exactly	   he	  makes	   of	   teleology	   in	  History:	  while	   rejected	   ‘at	   first’,	   it	  seems	   to	   be	   later	   incorporated	   in	   the	   subjective	   initiative	   of	   the	  philosopher/interpreter,	  who	  asks	  for	  (and	  finds)	  «le	  sens	  de	  l’Histoire.»63	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hébert.	   Le	   souci	   de	   passage.	   Mélanges	   offert	   à	   Jean	   Greisch,	   ed.	   Capelle	   et	   al.,	   Paris:	  Beauchesne,	  2004,	  pp.	  180-­‐190.	  60	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  57	  61	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  60.	  62	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  40.	  63	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  40.	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A	  proper	  philosophy	  of	  history	  (which	  corresponds	  to	  a	  philosophy/idea	  of	  historiography,	  and	  to	  a	  philosophical	  Weltanschauung	  in	  general)	  would	  then	  allow	  the	  historically	  aware	   interpreter/reader	  (the	  two	  terms	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  throughout	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité)	   to	   see	   both	  distentio	  (crucial	   for	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	  mind	  to	  experience	  time	  without	  gaps,	  according	  to	  Augustine)	  and	  the	  particularity	  of	  the	  singular	  event.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true,	  continues	  Ricoeur,	  when	  dealing	  with	  another	   thinker	   (whose	   peculiar	   approach	   or	   theme	   the	   historical	   interpreter	   is	  interested	   in):	   between	   the	   receiver	   (=inheritor)	   and	   the	   previous	   philosopher	  (=inheritee)	  a	  sort	  of	  friendship	  tends	  to	  be	  created,	  relying	  on	  the	  moment	  of	  choice	  from	  the	  inheritor.	  	  But	   how	   can	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   inheritor	   create	   and	   inform	   the	   connection	  between	  the	  authors	  (and	  not	  between	  the	  inheritor	  and	  the	  content)?	  Is	  this	  not	  in	  conflict	   with	   our	   notion	   of	   causality?	   Shouldn’t	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   relation	   be	  chronologically	  antecedent	  to	  its	  realization?	  We	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  problem	  in	  chapter	   five.	   For	   now,	   it	   will	   suffice	   to	   say	   that	   we	   can	   conceive	   history	   of	  philosophy	   (and	   philosophy	   of	   history)	   as	   a	   series	   of	   connections	  à	  deux	   (one-­‐to-­‐one,	   in	   pairs),	   interwoven	   into	   a	   more	   general	   awareness	   of	   these	   connection	  unified	  into	  one	  overarching	  historical	  sense.	  Ricoeur	  states	  that	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  a	  certain	   philosophy	   (i.e.	   a	   moment	   in	   the	   succession	   of	   philosoph-­‐ies)	   cannot	   be	  reduced	  to	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  philosopher	  performing	  it:	  he	  brings	  the	  Kantian	  idea	  of	  understanding	  the	  author	  better	   than	  himself	   to	   its	  extreme	  consequences.	  However,	  he	   immediately	  reduces	  the	   impact	  of	  his	  claim,	  rephrasing	   it	   into	  a	  (far	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less	  impactful)	  evaluation	  of	  the	  life	  and	  situation	  of	  the	  author	  as	  anecdotic	  when	  faced	  with	  the	  task	  of	  comprehending	  his	  work64.	  	  Ricoeur	  reduces	  and	   limits	   the	  scope	  of	   this	   friendly	  connection	   in	  order	  to	  avoid	   risking	   to	  go	  back	   to	  Schleiermacher’s65	  notion	  of	   ‘understanding’	   as	   relying	  exclusively	  on	  communication,	  with	  the	  “utterance”	  to	  be	  interpreted	  conceived	  not	  in	   terms	   of	   objective	   content	   but	   solely	   as	   communication.	   Schleiermacher	   claims	  that	  the	  task	  of	  the	  interpreter,	  in	  order	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  in	  time,	  is	  to	  «place	  oneself	  on	   the	   same	   level	   as	   the	   original	   reader»66,	   in	   order	   to	   grasp	   the	   psychological	  dimension	  of	  the	  communication.	  Gadamer	  will	  later	  liquidate	  this	  as	  a	  «divinatory	  process»,	   but	   Schleiermacher	   believes	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   would	   allow	   us	   to	  understand	  a	  text	  «as	  an	  aesthetic	  construct,	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art	  or	  ‘artistic	  thought’»67	  and	   that	   in	   artistic	   thought	   –as	   in	   free	   dialogue	   –	   the	   content	   «plays	   almost	   no	  part.»68	  While	   Schleiermacher’s	   description	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   inheritee	   and	  inheritor	  as	  a	  co-­‐participation	   in	  artistic	   thought	  will	  be	  precious	  when	  discussing	  the	   ensemble	   of	   legacy	   and	   inheritance,	   we	   must	   be	   aware	   that	   20th	   century	  hermeneutic	   scholars	   (including	   Ricoeur)	   do	   not	   intend	   to	   abandon	   the	   content	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  58	  ff.	  65 	  Schleiermacher,	   Friedrich,	   and	   Andrew	   Bowie.	  Schleiermacher:	   "Hermeneutics	   and	  
Criticism".	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998.	  Ch.	  15	  and	  16	  in	  particular.	  66	  Quoted	  in	  Hans	  Georg	  Gadamer.	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  New	  York:	  Crossroad,	  1975,	  p.	  168.	  67	  Schleiermacher,	  Dialektik,	  ed.	  Odebrecht,	  p.	  569,	  quoted	  in	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  165.	  68	  Ibidem,	  p.	  572.	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completely.	   Contrary	   to	   Schleiermacher	   (who	   believes	   that	   «True	   historical	  significance	   rises	  above	  history.	  Phenomena	  exist,	   like	  miracles,	  only	   to	  direct	  our	  attention	  towards	  the	  Spirit	  that	  playfully	  generates	  them»69),	  Ricoeur	  believes	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  document	  has	  a	  content	  value	  to	  be	  preserved,	  which	  makes	  it	   even	   harder	   to	   fully	   understand	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   sort	   of	   chronologically	  dichotomous	  friendship.	  Ricoeur’s	   connections/friendships70	  between	   inheritor	   and	   inheritee	   is	   not	  parallel	   to	   distentio	   and	   continuity,	  which	   fall	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   historical	   tradition:	  establishing	   an	   absolute	   discontinuity	   between	   the	   two	   philosophies	   allows	   us	   to	  construct	   them	   as	   true	   insofar	   as	   they	   answer	   to	   the	   problems	   they	   disclose;	  discontinuity	  breaks	  the	  need	  of	  an	  unified	  teleological	  meaning	  and	  allows	  for	  the	  same	  question	  (=content)	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  two	  different	  subjectivities	   immersed	  in	  different	   situations,	   and	   thus	   producing	   different	   end	   results	   (inheritances).	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Quoted	  in	  Dilthey,	  Das	  Leben	  Schleiermachers,	  1st	  ed,	  Appendix,	  p.	  117.	  70	  The	  notion	  of	  identification	  between	  the	  philosopher	  and	  his	  predecessors	  reminds	  us	  of	  Feuerbach,	  with	  his	  «insofar	  as	  I	  think,	  I	  am	  all	  men»	  (Thoughts	  on	  Death	  and	  Immortality,	  p.	  19).	  However,	  what	  was	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  shared	  faculty	  of	   thought	  as	  main	   identifier	  of	  the	  Human	  Race	  as	  a	  whole	  becomes	  in	  Ricoeur	  a	  strictly	  experiential	  (and	  not	  ontological)	  concern.	  Moreover,	   the	   friendship-­‐like	   status	   of	   the	   relation	   is	   not	   between	   the	   inheritor	  and	   the	  authors	  of	   the	  philosophies	  antérieures	  (see	   footnote	  62)	  considered	  as	  a	  group	  of	  predecessors,	  but	  with	  each	  and	  everyone	  of	  them,	  considered	  in	  the	  absolute	  individuality	  of	   the	   moment	   of	   inheritance	   (of	   which	   the	   inheritor	   is	   protagonist	   and	   to	   which	   the	  inheritee	  participate	  only	  insofar	  as	  he	  is	  part	  of	  this	  ‘friendship’).	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reconstruction	   of	   a	   history	   of	   discontinuity	   cannot	   happen	   elsewhere	   than	   in	   the	  situation	  of	  the	  inheritor:	  	  There	   is	   a	   history	   only	   because	   previous	   philosophies	   are	   part	   of	   the	  memory	  and	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  new	  philosopher.	  But	  all	  of	  us	  contain	  somehow	  in	  ourselves	  [all	  of]	  past	  history,	  in	  an	  historical	  moment	  which	  constitutes	  a	  sort	  of	  absolute.71	  	   Such	   a	   description	   is	   fascinating	   but	   problematic:	   if	   the	   author-­‐inheritee	   is	  
englobé	   (incorporated)	   by	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   author-­‐inheritor,	   how	   can	   we	  preserve	   that	   feeling	   of	   reciprocal	   friendship-­‐like	   connection	   that	   Ricoeur	   was	  proposing	  as	  informing	  the	  inheritance	  moment?	  The	  focus’	  shift	  from	  the	  inheritee	  to	   his	   philosophy	   (one	   among	   others	   philosophies	   antecedent)	   has	   allowed	   the	  transformation	   of	   the	   latter	   from	   an	   objective	   cause	   (as	   perceived	   by	   tradition-­‐based	  philosophy	  of	  history)	  into	  one	  of	  the	  «aspects	  of	  his	  [of	  the	  new	  philosopher]	  
situation	  fondamentale.»72	  	  With	   the	   completion	   of	   the	   process	   of	   inheritance,	   the	   content	   is	   detached	  from	   the	   (problematic)	   relation	   inheritor-­‐inheritee	   and	   becomes	   a	   part	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71«Il	  n’y	  a	  une	  histoire	  que	  parce	  que	  les	  philosophies	  antérieures	  font	  partie	  de	  la	  mémoire	  et	   de	   la	   situation	   du	   noveau	   philosophe;	  mais	   chacun	   englobe	   en	   quelque	   sorte	   l’histoire	  passée	  en	   lui,	  dans	  un	  moment	  historique	  qui	  est	  une	  sorte	  d’absolu.»	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  
Vérité,	   p.	  63,	   translation	  mine.	  We	  will	   come	  back	   to	   this	  passage	   in	   chapter	  4,	  where	   the	  translation	  of	  “englober”	  will	  be	  addressed	  directly.	  72	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  64.	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inheritor’s	   Inheritance,	   to	  which	   the	  Ricoeurian	   «situation	   fondamentale»	   appears	  to	   correspond.	   The	   truth-­‐value	   of	   the	   process-­‐inheritance	   takes	   the	   place	  traditionally	  held	  by	  Truth	  (capitalized)	  intended	  as	  identifiable	  and	  transmissible.	  Such	  a	  ‘monadic,	  monolithic	  definition	  of	  Truth	  is	  renounced	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  communal	  and	   communicational	   truth,	   a	   symphilosophieren73:	   in	   place	   of	   a	   Truth	   with	   one	  source	  (authority,	  or	  tradition),	  the	  sym-­‐	  (co-­‐)	  philosophieren	  (philosophizing)	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  truth,	  non-­‐absolute	  and	  resulting	  from	  an	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  protagonists.	   This	   would	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   objectivity	   of	   time	   as	  chronology	   and	   the	   absolute	  present	  brought	   forward	  by	   subjectivity.	  Once	   again,	  the	  mortal	  dilemma	  has	  become,	  in	  Ricoeur’s	  eyes,	  a	  living	  and	  prolific	  paradox.	  At	   the	   core	   of	   this	   symphilosophieren,	   which	   transcends	   history	  chronologically	   intended	   to	   disclose	   a	   more	   truthful	   history	   of	   shared	  consciousness,	  we	   find	   the	  notion	  of	   truth	   as	  multidimensional.	  Ricoeur	  perceives	  the	  idea	  of	  scientific,	  verifiable	  truth	  as	  the	  biggest	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  monism	  of	   truth	   that	  we	  had	  dismissed	  alongside	   tradition	   (as	   incapable	  of	   accounting	   for	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  situation).	  However,	  he	  correctly	  notices	  how	  even	  experimental	  science	  is	  an	  event	  of	  cultural	  history,	  requiring	  a	  subject-­‐man	  in	  a	  circular	  relation	  with	  the	  object-­‐man.	  This	  cultural	  paradigm	  has	  permeated	  the	  situation	  of	  almost	  any	  of	  us,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  we	  can	  “feel”	  the	  infinity	  of	  the	  sky,	  the	  radiations	  of	  light,	  the	  hormones	  of	  others.	  But	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  the	  belief	  in	  experimental	  validation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  68.	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has	   a	   personal	   connection	   to	   our	   subjectivity	   proves	   that	   even	   scientific	   truth	   is	  susceptible	  to	  a	  communicational	  dimension	  of	  its	  informing	  philosophy.74	  	  We	   must	   ask,	   though,	   how	   can	   such	   a	   integration,	   this	   englobement,	   be	  possible?	   The	   ‘now’	   of	   the	   inheritor	   is	   not	   any	   other	   ‘now’.	   It	   is	   not	   the	  contemporaneity	  of	  the	  inheritee	  (no	  matter	  how	  close	  in	  time	  the	  event-­‐document	  was	   originated)	   but	   it	   is	   also	   not	   the	   ‘now’	   of	   his	   contemporaneity	   at	   large.	   It	   is	  impossible	  to	  experience	  Culture	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  individual	  life,	  and	  only	  some	  of	  its	  elements	   can	   be	   relevant	   in	   the	   inheritor’s	   situation.	   However,	   we	   cannot	   simply	  understand	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   inheritee	   (and	   of	   his	   subjectivity)	   into	   the	  situation	  (of	  the	  inheritor)	  as	  its	  being	  subsumed	  into	  a	  common	  cultural	  memory:	  otherwise,	  we	  would	   fall	  back	   to	  a	   theory	  of	   tradition	  overshadowing	   the	  value	  of	  individual	   subjectivity.	   If	  we	  were	   to	   understand	   this	   subsumption	   as	   the	   content	  being	   “already	   there”	   in	   a	   shared	   space,	   then	   we	   would	   be	   simply	   defining	   the	  
conditions	   for	   the	   inheritance	   (or	   the	   historically	   aware	   reception,	   in	   Ricoeur’s	  words)	  to	  happen,	  and	  saying	  nothing	  about	  it	  per	  se.	  	  This	   identification	  between	  the	  content	  as-­‐of-­‐the-­‐inheritor	  and	  the	  content-­‐as-­‐of-­‐the-­‐inheritee	   must	   thus	   find	   its	   space	   in	   the	   discontinuity	   of	   history	   (and	  truth)	  that	  we	  have	  been	  exploring	  with	  both	  Foucault	  and	  Ricoeur.	  Such	  a	  contact	  may	   happen	   in	   the	   space	   of	   contemporaneity.	  We	   have	   said	   that	   the	   ‘now’	   of	   the	  inheritor	  differs	  from	  the	  ‘now’	  of	  the	  inheritee:	  the	  inheritor	  perceives	  the	  time	  of	  creation	  as	  different	  from	  and	  antecedent	  to	  the	  time	  of	  his	  process	  of	  inheritance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  Ch.	  6,	  “Vérité	  et	  Mensogne”.	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Even	  when	  the	  two	  are	  contemporary	  (e.g.	  when	  listening	  to	  someone	  speaking)	  the	  latter	  begins	  when	  the	  former	  end.	  The	  speaker’s	  uttering	  of	  the	  words	  constitutes	  the	  end	  of	  his	  process	  of	  creation,	  while	  the	  inheritor	  begins	  his	  process	  (of	  hearing,	  understanding	  and	  inheriting)	  after	  they	  are	  uttered.	  Moreover,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  both	   are	   not	   simply	   coincident	   with	   their	   position	   in	   an	   evolutionary	   (and	  processional)	  history	  of	  culture,	  but	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  status	  of	  the	  inheritor	  and	  by	  his	  memory.	  Nonetheless,	  precisely	  this	  absoluteness	  of	  the	  two	  ‘now’s	  can	  constitute	  the	  bridge	   between	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   inheritor	   and	   the	   contemporaneity	   of	   the	  inheritee,	  which	  is	  reconstructed	  as	  a	  projection	  in	  ‘memory’	  (although	  the	  status	  of	  this	  memory	  is	  problematic,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  inheritor’s	  mind,	  and	  it	  is	  hardly	  definable	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  ‘collective	  mind’	  of	  sorts).	  Presence,	  therefore,	  is	  what	   connects	   the	   present	   of	   the	   inheritor	   with	   the	   re-­‐presented	   present	   of	   the	  inheritee:	   the	   latter	   is	   past-­‐made-­‐present	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   the	   inheritor,	  whose	   subjectivity	   is	   the	   only	   active	   one	   in	   his	   situation,	   but	   not	   the	   only	   one	   to	  have	  a	  presence.	  Gadamer	  tackled	  the	  role	  of	  memory	  -­‐	  as	  key	  to	  historical	  reconstruction	  and	  to	  the	  reception	  of	  contents	  -­‐	   in	  the	  very	  first	  chapter	  of	  his	  Truth	  and	  Method.	  He	  intuited	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  cultural	  reception,	  memory	  could	  not	  be	  understood	  merely	  as	  a	  faculty	  (of	  the	  mind):	  «remembering,	  forgetting	  and	  recalling	  belong	  to	  the	   historical	   constitution	   of	   man	   and	   are	   themselves	   part	   of	   his	   history	   and	   his	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Bildung.»75	  He	  gives	  Bildung	  and	  memory	  a	  foundational	  role,	  since	  he	  believes	  they	  constitute	   the	   sense	   for	   an	   educated	   (gebildet)	   consciousness.	   But	   once	  we	   agree	  that	  memory	  is	  not	  just	  a	  natural	  faculty	  of	  the	  mind,	  but	  a	  performative	  approach	  to	  the	  world	  of	  cultural	  contents,	  we	  are	  called	  to	  clarify	  the	  space	  of	  action	  of	  such	  a	  force.	  	   The	  relation	  between	  Bildung	  –	  which	  Gadamer	  defines	  as	  Culture+Formatio	  –	  and	  inheritance	  is	  complicated;	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  Bildung	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  section	  of	  the	   situation	   informed	   by	   personality	   and	   personal	   history,	   and	   thus	   we	   could	  construct	   it	   as	   a	   product	   of	   Inheritance,	   or	   even	   re-­‐define	   it	   as	   identical;	   other	  passages,	  however,	  seem	  to	  hint	  to	  a	  non-­‐inherited	  Bildung,	  one	  that	  is	  not	  entirely	  personal.	  This	  would	  reduce	  Bildung	   to	  an	  expansion	  of	   the	  situation,	  and	  reverse	  the	  hierarchy	  between	  the	  two.	  	  Gadamer’s	   construction	   of	   Bildung	   seems	   to	   include	   Sensus	   Communis,	  which	  Gadamer	   sees	   as	   similar	   to	   phronesis	   in	  Aristotle.	  Nonetheless,	   contrary	   to	  Vico’s	   view	   and	   to	   what	   the	   expression	   suggests,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   something	  deeply	   individual	   in	   the	   way	   common	   sense	   is	   used	   here.	   We	   are	   reminded	   of	  Bergson,	  who	  as	  we	  said	  thought	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  16	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«Common	  sense	  refers	  to	  the	  social	  miliey	  […]	  like	  the	  other	  senses	  put	  us	   into	   relation	   with	   things,	   the	   common	   sense	   presides	   over	   our	  relations	  with	  things.»76	  	  If	   we	   apply	  what	  we	   have	   been	   discussing	   so	   far,	   the	   social	   dimension	   of	   sensus	  communis	   is	   strongly	   reduced,	   and	   replaced	   by	   an	   idea	   of	   ‘circumstantial	  explanation’	  that	  is	  more	  one	  of	  discontinuity	  than	  it	  is	  of	  communality.	  This	  primacy	  of	  historical	  awareness	  over	  the	   factuality	  of	   time	  understood	  as	  a	  series	  of	  facti	  bruti	  gravitates	  around	  the	  notion	  of	  recognition.	  The	  content	  as	  inheritance	  is	  recognized	  a) as	  available	  and	  having	  limits:	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  identified	  (recognized)	  as	   a	   coherent	   object	   for	   our	   historical	   interpretation.	   A	  discontinuity	  from	  the	  historical	  accumulation	  of	  the	  period	  needs	  to	  be	  forced	  upon	  “the	  past”	  intended	  as	  a	  mass	  of	  documents.	  This	  fracturing	  of	  documental	  unity	   and	   the	   choice	  of	   this	   one	   content	  over	  the	  many	  others	  which	  have	  been	  accessed	  are	  based	  upon	  a	  judgment	  of	  value;	  b) the	   content	   is	   recognized	   as	   original	   (being	   proper	   to	   that	  document,	   not	   to	   another)	   and	   real=true.	   According	   to	   Gadamer,	  Reality	  is	  the	  “untransformed	  world	  of	  possibilities”.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  «Le	   bon	   séns	   refer	   à	   le	   milieu	   social	   […]	   tandis	   que	   les	   autres	   sens	   nous	   mettent	   en	  rapport	  avec	  de	  choses,	   le	  bon	  séns	  preside	  à	  nos	  relations	  avec	  des	  personnes.»	  Bergson,	  Henri.	  Ecrits	  Et	  Paroles.	  Paris:	  Presses	  Univ.	  de	  France,	  1959,	  p.	  89.	  Translation	  is	  mine	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Therefore,	   recognition	   is	   not	   only	   knowing	   again	   something	   that	   was	   previously	  known.	  It	  implies	  an	  awareness	  (be	  it	  aesthetic	  or	  historical,	  with	  the	  two	  coinciding	  in	  Gadamer’s	  work)	  that	  orients	  the	  recognition	  itself,	  but	  that	  modifies	  itself	  in	  the	  process.	  Gadamer	  is	  right	   in	  pointing	  out	  that	  receiving	  a	  content	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  faculty	   (memory),	   and	   indicating	   the	   three	   factors	   contributing	   to	   this	   process	   of	  historical	   appropriation.	   Beside	   remembering	   (accessing	   the	   content,	   reading	   the	  document,	   etc.)	  he	   correctly	  points	  out	   that	   forgetting	  has	   a	   crucial	   role	   too:	  once	  again,	  we	  should	  not	  understand	  forgetting	  as	  the	  simple	  disappearance	  of	  an	  image,	  but	   as	   an	   historical	   process	  which	   is	   as	   part	   of	   the	   shaping	   of	   our	   Inheritance	   as	  remembering	  (and	  retaining)	  is.	  Limitation,	  the	  disruption	  of	  continuity,	  is	  required	  to	  provide	  an	  identifiable	  content,	  and	  more	  generally	  a	  unity	  of	  a	  system	  allowing	  the	   inheritor	   to	  have	  a	  cultural	  dimension	  that	   is	  his	  own	  (and	  not	   ‘of	  his	   time’	  or	  even	  ‘of	  Humanity’	  at	  large).	  	  Borges,	  more	  than	  any	  theorist,	  gives	  a	  fascinating	  rendition	  of	  the	  problem	  in	  his	  novella,	   titled	   in	   Spanish	  Funes	  el	  Memorioso.77	  There,	   the	  poor	   country	  boy	  turned	  into	  «an	  untamed	  and	  vernacular	  Zarathustra»	  succumbs	  to	  its	  own	  talent	  of	  absolute	   and	   prodigious	   memory.	   The	   impossibility	   of	   restricting	   mnemonic	  retention	   causes	   him	   to	   be	   incapable	   of	   «platonic	   ideas»	   and	   even	   of	   recognizing	  himself	   in	   the	  mirror,	  since	  persistence	  of	   the	   image	   in	  time	  becomes	  ungraspable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Borges,	  Funes	  the	  Memorius.	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among	   the	   infinite	   retention	   of	   circumstantial	   differences. 78 	  Our	   capability	   of	  distinguishing	  ourselves	  as	   individual	  agents	   in	   the	  cultural	  environment	  relies	  on	  our	  ability	  of	  creating	  limits	  to	  what	  belongs	  to	  our	  cultural	  density	  at	  first	  and	  our	  cultural	  Inheritance	  more	  completely.	  Our	  cultural	  identity	  (our	  Inheritance)	  relies	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  rejecting	  certain	  contents	  and	  ignoring	  others,	  thus	  shaping	  our	  remembrance	  in	  the	  process	  of	  delimiting	  our	  cultural	  reception.	  Recalling,	   the	   third	   pole	   of	   our	   process	   of	   historical	   prise	   de	   conscience,	  relates	  to	  repetition.	  It	  is	  the	  point	  of	  encounter	  of	  remembering	  and	  forgetting,	  and	  goes	  along	  the	   lines	  of	  repetition	  of	  what	  was	  said	  before,	  not	  as	  witnessed	  but	  as	  recalled.	  We	  recalled	  what	  we	  have	  decided	  to	  remember,	  and	  we	  do	  so	  by	  repeating	  it.	  Repetition	  «expresses	  at	  once	  a	  singularity	  opposed	  to	  the	  general,	  a	  universality	  opposed	   to	   the	   particular,	   a	   distinctive	   opposed	   to	   the	   ordinary,	   an	   instantaneity	  opposed	  to	  variation,	  and	  an	  eternity	  opposed	  to	  permanence»79,	  and	  is	  once	  again	  called	  to	  conciliate	  the	  opposite	  needs	  of	  our	  idea	  of	  History	  as	  duration	  and	  of	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  incommensurably	  instantaneous	  process	  of	  interpretation.	  There	  is	   nothing	   mechanical	   nor	   dull	   in	   the	   post-­‐structuralist	   and	   post-­‐modern	   idea	   of	  repetition	   (which,	   I	  would	  argue,	   is	   coherent	  with	   the	   recalling	  process	  advocated	  by	   Gadamer):	   the	   awareness	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   unavoidable	   and	   ontologically	  
historical	   in	   the	  document	   invests	   the	   choice	  of	   the	   inheritor	   (qua	  repeater)	  of	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  All	   quotes	   are	   taken	   from	  Borges,	   “Funes	   the	  Memorius”	   in	   Jorge	   Luis	  Borges,	  Anthony	  Kerrigan,	  et	  al.	  Ficciones.	  New	  York:	  Grove	  Press,	  1962,	  p.	  107-­‐116.	  79	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition,	  p.	  3.	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importance	   that	   was	   absent	   in	   traditional	   and	   tradition-­‐oriented	   theories	   of	  transmission.	  	  Once	  we	  have	  freed	  the	  inheritor	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  adhering	  to	  a	  theoretical	  “progression	  of	   philosophy”	   and	   a	   global	   view	  of	   time,	  we	   can	  bracket	   everything	  exceeding	   the	  moment	   of	   inheritance	   from	  our	   consideration:	  we	   are	   left	  with	   an	  author	  of	  the	  text	  present	  only	  as	  the	  author	  (and	  not,	  as	  Schleiermacher	  saw	  him,	  as	  a	   personality	   in	   communication	   with	   another	   throughout	   time),	   and	   an	   inheritor	  who	   is	   willingly	   approaching	   the	   content,	   and	   who	   is	   choosing	   to	   retain	   such	   a	  content,	   making	   it	   part	   of	   his	   own	   Inheritance.	   The	   Hegelian	   notion	   of	  Historical	  
Individual	  perfectly	   fits	   the	   inheritor,	   insofar	  as	  he	  becomes	   the	  maker	  of	  his	  past,	  and	   of	   all	   relevant	   past.	   By	  making	   certain	   contents	   part	   of	   his	   Inheritance,	   he	   is	  reducing	   history	   to	   his	   History,	   without	   any	   residual	   influence	   from	   outside	  teleological	   consideration.	   The	   situation,	   which	   can	   influence	   his	   cultural	   density	  and	  even	  his	  interest,	  is	  exhausted	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  agency.	  The	  individual	  reader	  is	  rescued	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  humanity,	  and	  makes	  the	  content	  (and	  the	  author	  of	  that	  content)	  part	  of	  his	  inheritance,	  with	  no	  regards	  for	  what	  Gadamer	  (with	  Droysen)	  called	   “ethical	   commonality”,	   the	   overall	   cultural	   dimension	   informing	   the	   acts	   of	  society.	  We	  have	  mentioned	  judgment	  of	  “value”	  as	  a	  central	  dynamic	  to	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance.	  The	  switch	  from	  the	  turning	  of	  attention	  (absolutely	  momentous)	  to	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the	   extended	  process	   of	   inheritance	   (which	   relies	   on	  attentiveness80)	   is	   consistent	  with	  a	  move	  from	  an	  impression	  of	  interest	  to	  a	  judgment	  of	  worthiness.	  I	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  a	  content	  (be	  it	  a	  text,	  a	  discourse,	  a	  painting,	  etc.)	  because	  I	  believe	  this	  
could	  be	  relevant,	  because	  it	  interests	  me.	  This	  equates	  to	  a	  daring	  investment	  of	  my	  time	  and	  intellectual	  energies:	  based	  on	  what	  I	  know	  about	  the	  document,	  I	  access	  it	  looking	   for	   interesting	   content.	  Only	  during	   and	   after	   the	   interpretation	   following	  this	   hopeful	   access,	   I	   can	   determine	   (with	   an	   absolutely	   personal	   judgment)	  whether	  the	  interest	  was	  well	  placed,	  and	  the	  content	  is	  indeed	  relevant	  to	  me.	  	  This	   is	   what	   differentiates	   a	   theory	   of	   inheritance	   from	   a	   theory	   of	  interpretation:	   while	   some	   reception	   theorists	   have	   recognized	   the	   role	   of	  prejudices81	  (and	   thus	   of	   biases,	   of	  which	   ‘interest’	   is	   one)	   in	   our	   interpretational	  process,	  their	  aim	  was	  to	  explain	  how	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  those	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  See	  ch.	  2,	  especially	  p.	  XX	  81 	  E.g.	   Gadamer,	   The	   Universality	   of	   the	   Hermeneutical	   Problem,	   In	   Philosophical	  
Hermeneutics,	  Berkeley	   :	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1976,	  p.	  9	  reads	  «it	   is	  not	  so	  much	  our	  judgments	  as	  it	  is	  our	  prejudices	  that	  constitute	  our	  being».	  We	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  what	  is	  translated	  with	  “prejudice”	  is	  the	  German	  word	  Vorurteil,	  more	  aptly	  translated	  by	  Frenchmen	   as	   préjugé	   (and	   not	   prejudice),	   which	   could	   be	   rendered	   as	   pre-­‐judgment,	  without	  introducing	  the	  problematic	  notion	  of	  prejudice,	  which,	  in	  English,	  is	  connected	  to	  unreflective	   bias.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   notice,	   though,	   that	   most	   of	   what	   he	   considers	  “prejudices”	   going	   into	   the	   hermeneutical	   process	   could	   be	   defined	   as	   judgments	   on	  previous	  matters	  and	  not	  as	  depending	  on	  social	   factors.	  The	  decision	  not	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  construction	  of	  one’s	   system	  of	   thought	   (or	   Inheritance)	  but	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  condition	  of	  the	   single	   instance	   of	   interpretation	   prevents	   insights	   like	   these	   from	   developing	   into	   a	  theory	  of	  interest,	  among	  other	  things.	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‘more	  true’	  interpretation.	  Vice	  versa,	  Inheritance	  self-­‐justifies	  it,	  and	  we	  experience	  this,	   unaware,	   every	   time	   we	   retain	   a	   content	   (remembering	   it	   and	   forgetting	  others):	   there	   is	  not	  a	  “correct”	  way	  to	   inherit,	  as	   long	  as	  we	  are	  aware	  of	   the	  fact	  that	   inheritance	   is	   happening	   and	   our	   Inheritance	   is	   being	  modified.	   If	   ‘historical	  awareness’	   was	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   access	   a	   proper	   hermeneutic,	   historical	   self-­‐awareness	   is	   all	   that	   is	   needed	   insofar	   Inheritance	   is	   concerned.	   The	   judgment	   of	  value	   is	   always	   already	   cast	   and	   it	  would	  be	  meaningless	   to	  question	   it,	   since	   the	  only	   judgment	   expressed	   is	   ‘this	   content	   is	   relevant	   to	  me’.	   Inheritance,	   being	   an	  absolutely	   personal	   phenomenon,	   relies	   on	   tautologies	   both	   before	   (see	   attention	  and	  the	  correlated	  ‘I	  am	  interested	  in	  what	  interests	  me’)	  and	  after	  it	  is	  processed	  (‘I	  recall	  this	  because	  it	  is	  worth	  for	  me	  to	  recall	  it’).	  	  While	   discussing	   the	   ‘Logical	   use	   of	   the	   understanding	   in	   general’,	   Kant	  writes	   that	   «Judgment	   is	   therefore	   the	   mediate	   cognition	   of	   an	   object,	   hence	   the	  representation	  of	  a	   representation	  of	   it.	   In	  every	   Judgment	   there	   is	  a	   concept	   that	  holds	  of	  many	  and	  that	  among	  this	  many	  also	  comprehends	  a	  given	  representation,	  which	  is	  then	  related	  immediately	  to	  the	  object.»82	  Therefore,	  we	  must	  recognize	  in	  a	  judgment	  a	  moment	  of	  intellectual	  synthesis	  (the	  mediate	  cognition),	  which	  is	  both	  reproductive	   (since	   it	   is	   a	   representation)	   and	   reflective	   (a	   representation	   of	   a	  representation)	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  is	  productive,	  since	  the	   judgment	   is	  always	  a	  new	  judgment,	  despite	  being	  immediately	  related	  to	  the	  object.	  The	  category	  of	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Kant,	   Immanuel,	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	   translated	   and	   edited	   by	   Paul	   Guyer,	   Allen	  W.	  Wood,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009,	  p.	  205	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a	  judgment	  (the	  concept	  that	  holds	  of	  many)	  is	  not	  negated	  by	  the	  immediacy	  of	  its	  objective	  content.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  notion	  of	  Inheritance,	  on	  which	  the	  judgment	  of	  value	  is	  to	  be	  exerted,	  is	  represented	  as	  an	  object,	  and	  represented	  as	  an	  object	  that	  is	  ‘worthy’.	  	  «All	   judgments	   are	   functions	   of	   unity	   among	   our	   representations,	   since	  instead	  of	  an	  immediate	  representation	  a	  higher	  one,	  which	  comprehends	  this	  and	  other	  representations	  under	  itself,	  is	  used	  for	  the	  cognition	  of	  the	  object,	  and	  many	  possible	  cognitions	  are	  thereby	  drawn	  together	  into	  one.»83	  This	  definition	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  aim	  we	  have	  stated:	  the	  unifying	  value	  of	  any	  judgment	  and	  its	  capability	  of	  subsuming	  many	  representations	  is	  essential	  in	  the	  self-­‐referential	  judgment	  on	  the	  ‘right’	  inheritance,	  which	  amounts	  to	  a	  judgment	  about	  our	  «faculty	  of	  judging.»84	  Approaching	  ‘The	  logical	  form	  of	  all	  judgments’,	  Kant	  defines	  again	  judgment,	  this	  time	  as	  «nothing	  other	  than	  the	  way	  to	  bring	  given	  cognitions	  to	  the	  objective	  unity	   of	   apperception.	   That	   is	   the	   aim	  of	   the	   copula	   is	   in	   them:	   to	   distinguish	   the	  objective	   unity	   of	   given	   representations	   from	   the	   subjective.»85	  This	   definition	   is	  open	   to	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   interpretation,	   but	   nevertheless	   we	   can	   state	   that	  judgment	  carries	  an	  objectivity,	  which	  is	  not	  in	  the	  intuition	  itself	  but	  derives	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  that	  are	  carried	  on	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  Judgment.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Kant,	  ibidem.	  84	  Kant,	  ibidem.	  85	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  p.	  251.	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This	  was	  not	  in	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  the	  Critique:	  Kant	  evidently	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  better	  explain	  the	  role	  of	  deduction	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  judgment	  qua	  objective.	  He	  also	   explains	   how	   his	   definition	   of	   judgment	   is	   no	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	   old	  maxim	  of	  the	  logicians:	  a	  judgment	  is	  «the	  representation	  of	  a	  relation	  between	  two	  concepts»86.	   One	   of	   the	   explicit	   reasons	   for	   the	   refusal	   of	   this	   definition	   is	   the	  impossibility	   to	   account	   for	   non-­‐categorical	   judgments	   (namely	   hypothetical	   and	  disjunctive	  ones).	  We	  can	  see	  how	  moving	  objectivity	  from	  a	  given	  relation	  between	  objects	  to	  a	  relation	  that	  springs	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  association	  as	  present	  in	  our	  unity	  of	  apperception	  creates	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  personal	  access	  to	  objectivity	  itself	  and	  to	  an	  objectivity	  internal	  to	  our	  transcendental	  Ego.	  In	   ‘The	   Analytic	   of	   Principles’	   Kant	   describes	   general	   logic	   and	   its	  correspondence	   with	   the	   faculties	   of	   cognition,	   then	   he	   moves	   to	   transcendental	  logic,	  which	  cannot	  adhere	  to	  the	  same	  rules	  if	  it	  has	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  priori	  cognitions.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  explains,	  we	  still	  need	  judgments,	  since	  «the	  power	  of	  judgment	  is	  the	  faculty	  of	  subsuming	  under	  rules,	  i.e.	  of	  determining	  whether	  something	  stands	  under	   a	   given	   rule	   (casus	   datae	   legis)	   or	   not.»87	  While	   transcendental	   analytic	   is	  only	  concerned	  with	  the	  rules	  of	  thought	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  logical	  connections,	  this	  definition	   of	   judgment	   clarifies	   that,	   once	   given	   a	   value	   idea	   (whether	   it	   is	   ‘good’,	  ‘honest’	   or	   any	   other	   similar	   definition	   of	   worthiness),	   we	   can	   judge	   whether	  something	  stands	   in	  according	   to	   that	   rule,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   such	  a	   rule	   is	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Kant,	  ibidem.	  87	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  p.	  268.	  
	   173	  
found	   as	   such	   in	   reality,	   but	   stated	   by	   us.	   It	   is	   indeed	   an	   unusual	   form	   of	  hypothetical	   judgment,	   where	   it	   is	   not	   the	   content	   of	   the	   judgment	   to	   be	  hypothetical	  but	  the	  rule	  under	  which	  this	  content	  must	  be	  subsumed.	  Nonetheless,	  we	  can	  once	  again	  state	  that	  our	  faculty	  of	  judging	  presents	  itself	  to	  us	  as	  necessarily	  ‘worthy’,	  since	   it	  defines	   its	  own	  criteria	  of	   judgment	  and	  would	  be	  then	  senseless	  for	   it	   to	   self-­‐judge	   itself	   as	   ‘wrong’.	   Since	   our	   appropriation	   of	   a	   content,	   in	  Inheritance,	   is	   conceivable	   as	   a	   prolonged	   judgment	   of	   the	   content,	   there	   is	   no	  doubt,	  as	  said	  above,	   that	  we	  will	   judge	  our	   Inheritance	  as	  a	   “proper”	  or	   “correct”	  appropriation	  of	  the	  content.	  	  Beside	   the	   self-­‐reflective	   judgment	   on	   one’s	   own	   process	   of	   inheritance	  (which	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  is	  always	  a	  judgment	  of	  worthiness	  and	  correctness),	  value-­‐judgment	   can	   intervene	   at	   a	   content-­‐level	   as	   well.	   In	   particular,	   originality	   is	   a	  crucial	  notion	   in	  our	  experience	  of	   Inheritance.	  Originality	   is	  here	   intended	  as	   the	  correspondence	   between	   the	   document	   and	   its	   content,	   with	   the	   latter	   being	  authored	  by	  the	  same	  thinker	  that	  authored	  the	  former.	  Without	  it,	  we	  tend	  to	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  the	  “source”	  of	  our	  inheritance,	  and	  to	  construct	  the	  narrative	  of	  our	  inheriting	  as	  dependent	  upon	  another	   text	   than	   the	  one	  we	  have	   interpreted.	   It	   is	  the	  case	  with	  textbooks,	  secondary	  sources	  and	  in	  general	  in	  all	  the	  occurrences	  of	  an	  interpreted	  text	  referring	  to	  a	  content	  originating	  elsewhere,	  and	  consequently	  in	  a	  “before”	  that	  is	  problematically	  collocated	  when	  seen	  in	  a	  relation	  with	  the	  now-­‐then	  chronological	  dynamic	  of	  inheritance.	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This	  discloses	   the	  problem	  of	  a	  meta-­‐inheritance,	   i.e.	  of	   a	   content	   inherited	  not	  via	  its	  interpretation,	  but	  through	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  previous	  interpretation	  of	   it.	   This	   has	   typically	   been	   subsumed	   into	   the	   notion	   of	   tradition:	   when	   the	  interpreter	  is	  seen	  as	  simply	  a	  member	  of	  a	  historical	  group,	  and	  thus	  as	  a	  moment	  in	   a	   larger	   history	   of	   interpretations,	   the	   meta-­‐inheritance	   is	   resolved	   and	  reassorbed	  without	  distinguishing	  itself	  from	  any	  other	  instance	  of	  reception.	  	  Nonetheless,	   if	  we	  stay	   true	   to	   the	   inquiry	   into	   the	   individual	  dimension	  of	  reception	   that	  we	  have	  been	  pursuing,	   this	   constitutes	   a	   problematic	   case:	   on	   the	  one	   hand,	   the	   content-­‐interpretation	   seems	   to	   become	   a	  mediated	   process,	   losing	  the	   primacy	   that	   we	   have	   discovered	   and	   the	   fundamental	   individuality	   of	   the	  process:	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  original	  content	  is	  not	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  inheritor,	  but	  by	  some	  else	  in	  his	  stead.	  	  We	  must	   here	   identify	   three	   actors,	   and	   not	   only	   two	   as	   in	   our	   usual	   pair	  inheritor	  (who	  interprets/reads,	  etc.)	  and	  inheritee	  (the	  creator	  of	  the	  content	  to	  be	  inherited.	  The	  figure	  of	  the	  inheritee	  is	  here	  split	  between	  an	  inheritee	  proper	  (of	  whom	  the	  inheritor	  wants	  to	  inherit	  the	  creation)	  and	  a	  ‘mediator’,	  who	  is	  in	  turn	  an	   inheritee	   insofar	   as	   his	   content	   (his	   interpretation	   of	   the	   inheritee	   proper)	   is	  received	  by	  the	  inheritor,	  but	  he	  is	  not	  recognized	  and	  interacted	  with	  as	  such.	  The	  inheritor	   remains	   susceptible	   of	   being	   transformed	   by	   the	   content,	   which	   he	  identifies	   not	   with	   the	   intellectual	   production	   of	   the	  mediator	   (the	   author	   of	   the	  document	  accessed)	  but	  as	  an	  inheritable	  content	  uttered	  by	  the	  original	   inheritee	  (the	   thinker	   to	   whom	   the	   inheritor	   is	   referring);	   the	   content,	   in	   the	   narrative	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constructed	  by	  the	  inheritor,	  happens	  to	  have	  been	  inherited	  by	  the	  mediator	  (the	  interpreter	  of	  the	  content	  of	  inheritee	  proper)	  and	  is	  now	  presented	  to	  him	  as	  well	  as	  a	  potential	  inheritance.	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  inheritor	  believes	  (and	  narrates)	  himself	  to	  be	   inheriting	   the	  content	  as	  the	   inheritee	  (proper)	  created	   it,	  he	  will	   remember	  his	  process	  of	   inheritance	  as	   referring	   to	   the	   inheritee	   (proper),	   and	   the	  mediator	  will	  be	  relegated	  to	  a	  tool	  (and	  not	  rise	  to	  the	  role	  of	  alternative	  inheritee	  in	  place	  of	  the	  inheritee	  proper).	  Inheritance	   presents	   itself	   as	   a	   process	   dealing	   always	   with	   the	   original	  content.	  No	  matter	  the	  historically	  defined	  source	  of	  the	  document,	  it	  is	  the	  content	  that	  we	  make	  the	  object	  of	  our	   inheritance,	  and	  the	  then	  of	  the	  inheritee	  is	  always	  that	  of	   inheritee	  proper	  (or	  at	   least	  of	  who	  we	  perceive	  as	  such:	  the	  one	  whom	  we	  believe	   to	   be	   the	   author	   of	   the	   content).	   If	   we	   perceive	   ourselves	   receiving	  something	  from	  the	  mediator,	  it	  is	  always	  in	  terms	  of	  new	  formulations,	  and	  thus	  of	  a	  mediated-­‐content	   (by	   the	  mediator)	  which	   is	  different	   from	   the	  original-­‐content	  (by	  the	  inheritee)	  discussed.	  	  It	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  subjective	   identification,	  and	  not	  of	  an	  historical	   ‘objective’	  analysis:	  the	  inheritor,	  always	  dominated	  by	  the	  tautologies	  we	  have	  explored	  (‘this	  is	   interesting	   to	   me’	   and	   ‘my	   inheritance	   is	   correct	   since	   I	   believe	   myself	   to	   be	  right”)	  is	  not	  in	  the	  condition	  to	  distinguish	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  mediated-­‐content	  is	  a	  modification	  of	   the	  original-­‐content	   from	  a	   case	   in	  which	   the	  original-­‐content	   is	  simply	   “retold”	   by	   the	   mediator.	   If	   we	   believe	   that	   any	   interpretation	   involves	  modification,	  we	  would	  say	  that	  this	  is	  never	  the	  case,	  but	  even	  if	  we	  believe	  in	  the	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possibility	   of	   “reporting/referring”	   without	   modifying	   the	   content,	   the	   self-­‐perception	  of	   the	   inheritor	  as	   inheritor	  of	  original	   content	   is	  unmodified,	   since	   its	  validation	   lies	   in	   the	   subjective	   process	   of	   inheritance,	   and	   not	   in	   an	   external	  objective	  “verifiability”.	  	  Even	  the	  historical	  awareness	  advocated	  by	  Gadamer	  cannot	  avoid	  deluding	  itself	  with	  a	  notion	  of	  the	  originality	  of	  its	  documents.	  The	  document	  intended	  in	  its	  historically	   determined	   form	   is	   considered	   “true”:	   while	   the	   truth-­‐judgment	   is	  moved	   from	   the	   content	   to	   the	   document,	   the	   fact	   remains	   that	   any	   access	   to	   a	  document	   and/or	   content	   is	   determined	  by	  our	   situation,	   thus	  making	   impossible	  any	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  content	  as	  it	  was	  when	  it	  was	  created.	  	  The	  difference,	  before	  interpretation,	  is	  one	  of	  relevance.	  The	  content	  -­‐	  at	  the	  moment	   of	   its	   creation	   -­‐	   was	   one-­‐of-­‐many,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   new	   contents	   are	  produced	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  and	  the	  ones	  that	  we	  choose	  to	  access	  are,	  again,	  some	  amongst	  many	  possible	  ones,	  even	  if	  we	  limit	  ourselves	  to	  content	  having	  the	  same	  chronological	   origin;	   but	   the	   content	   is	   also	   one-­‐of-­‐many	   contents	   present	   in	   a	  situation	   and	   more	   specifically	   in	   a	   thought-­‐system,	   that	   of	   the	   inheritee	   (which	  constitutes	  his	  potential	  Legacy,	  but	  was,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  content’s	  creation,	  part	  of	  his	  situation).	  Not	  only	  the	  inheritor	  could	  have	  chosen	  a	  different	  content	  (with	  a	  different	   author-­‐inheritee),	   but	   the	   content	  was	   one	   of	  many	   even	   amongst	   those	  received,	  created	  and	  transmitted	  by	  the	  inheritee.	  In	  regards	  to	  both	  aspects,	  our	  selection	  and	  our	  extrapolation	  of	  the	  content	  from	   our	   cultural	   density	   prevent	   the	   content	   from	   appearing	   “purely”	   as	   it	   was	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conceived.	  However,	  once	  again,	  the	  transformative	  value	  of	  inheritance	  is	  in	  the	  act	  of	  accessing	  the	  content	  as	  it	  is,	  and	  to	  adjust	  one’s	  own	  Inheritance	  accordingly.	  The	  nature	   of	   the	   content	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   inheritor	   in	   the	  moment	   of	   choice	   about	  whether	   to	   welcome	   it	   in	   his	   system	   or	   to	   reject	   it	   systematically	   or	   whether	   to	  simply	  deem	  it	  irrelevant.	  Refusal	  and	  irrelevance	  are	  not,	   indeed,	  equivalent	  to	  the	  process:	  while	  we	  have	  discussed	  how	  a	  content	  deemed	  irrelevant	  by	  the	  interpreter	  is	  unsuitable	  for	  retention	   by	   an	   individual	   inheritance,	   we	   have	   not	   yet	   analyzed	   the	   case	   of	   a	  
negative	  inheritance.	  We	  have	  defined	  inheritance	  as	  a	  transformative	  process	  of	  
interpretation,	  which	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  an	  individual	  (immersed	  in	  a	  situation)	  
on	  a	  content	  that	  was	  originated	  before,	  but	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  him	  now,	  and	  
is	  retained	  in	  his	  cultural	  system	  of	  thought	  (or	  his	  Inheritance,	  capitalized).	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  we	  should	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  negative	  inheritances,	  i.e.	  the	  interpretation	  by	  the	  inheritor	  of	  a	  content	  with	  which	  he	  disagrees	  ethically	  or	  philosophically	  (that	  is,	  he	  finds	  it	  bad	  or	  simply	  wrong):	  can	  then	  an	  inheritance	  process	  begin,	  or	  is	  such	  a	  refusal	  a	  reason	  to	  stop?	  Can	  the	  non-­‐correspondence	  of	  a	  content	  to	  our	  prejudice	  (intended	  in	  Gadamer’s	  sense	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  judgments	  previously	   constructed,	   without	   the	   stigma	   conveyed	   by	   the	   expression)	   still	  contribute	   to	   the	   transformative	   process	   of	   inheritance?	   And	   to	  what	   degree	   is	   a	  negative	   inheritance	   relevant,	   compared	   to	   instances	   of	   inheritances	   where	   the	  content	  is	  welcomed	  into	  the	  fold	  of	  one’s	  own	  philosophical	  system?	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First	   of	   all,	   we	   shall	   point	   out	   that	   up	   to	   the	  moment	   of	   attention	   and	   the	  beginning	  of	   interpretation,	   there	   is	  not	  any	  difference	  between	  what	  we	  are	  now	  describing	  as	  a	  negative	  inheritance	  and	  any	  other	  one:	  it	  is	  not	  until	  the	  content	  is	  accessed	   and	   interpreted	   (extracted	   from	   cultural	   density)	   that	  we	   can	   express	   a	  judgment,	   and	   thus	   that	   we	   can	   consider	   the	   content	   negatively	   (as	   ethically	  unacceptable	   or	   philosophically/logically	   unsound).	  We	   are	   thus	   in	   a	   condition	   of	  interest,	  since	  attention	  has	  been	  turned	  and	  maintained	  –	  as	  attentiveness	  –	  for	  the	  time	  necessary	   for	   the	   interpretation	   to	  be	  performed.	  The	   content	   as	   accessed	   is	  not	  deemed	  irrelevant:	  attentiveness	  is	  maintained,	  and	  a	  judgment	  (a	  negative	  one)	  is	  carried	  out.	  	  We	  must	  wonder	  what	  happens	  to	  this	  content.	  There	  are	  two	  situations	  that	  can	  occur.	  Either	  part	  of	   the	  content	   is	  salvageable/accepted	  or	   it	   is	  rejected	   in	   its	  entirety.	   What	   we	   define	   as	   the	   ‘entirety’	   of	   a	   content	   (see	   also	   Ch.	   1)	   is	   not	  necessarily	   the	   sum	   of	   all	   contents	   contained	   in	   a	   document,	   but	   the	   perceived	  completeness	   of	   a	   content	   that	   the	   interpreter	   sees	   as	   independent	   from	   other	  contents	  present	  in	  the	  same	  document	  or	  in	  a	  body	  of	  works	  by	  the	  same	  author.	  It	  is	   a	   matter	   of	   relative	   relevance88:	   if	   the	   inheritor	   deems	   no	   other	   part	   of	   the	  content,	  the	  document	  and	  the	  (known	  by	  him)	  body	  of	  works	  by	  the	  inheritee	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  interpretation	  of	  this	  specific	  content,	  the	  content	  can	  be	  rejected	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  As	   opposed	   to	   an	   absolute	   ‘irrelevance	   to	   me’	   that	   -­‐	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   -­‐	   interrupts	   the	  process	  of	  inheritance,	  be	  it	  negative	  or	  one	  of	  appropriation.	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Nonetheless,	   even	   in	   the	   first	   case	   (with	   the	   ‘entirety	   of	   the	   content’	  rejected),	   this	   is	   far	   from	   leaving	  no	   trace	   in	   the	   inheritor’s	   inheritance.	  Assuming	  that	   the	   original	   content	   was	   deemed	   relevant	   and	   then	   rejected,	   an	   opposite	  content	   (a	   content-­‐N)	   negating	   the	   accessed	   content	   would	   be	   formed,	   either	   in	  writing	  (as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  of	  a	  formal	  refutation)	  or	  -­‐	  most	  often	  -­‐	  just	  as	  a	  intangible	  part	   of	   the	   accessed	   contents,	   interpreted	   contents	   and	   retained	   contents	   that	  constitute	  one’s	   Inheritance.	  The	  content-­‐N	  will	   then	  be	  not	  simply	  the	  memory	  of	  having	  read	  the	  original	  content	  with	  which	  the	  inheritor	  disagreed,	  but	  a	  product	  of	  the	   process	   of	   inheritance	   (=an	   inheritance)	  which	  will	   be	   retained	   as	   part	   of	   the	  Inheritance.	   Recalling	   the	   original	   content	   will	   automatically	   imply	   recalling	   it	   as	  
confuted	  and	  thus	  recalling	  content-­‐N.	  	  We	  must	  not	  be	  mistaken,	   though,	  by	   imagining	   that	   -­‐	  given	   that	  content-­‐N	  was	  not	   part	   of	   the	   original	   document	   by	   the	   inheritee	   -­‐	  what	  was	   retained	   is	   an	  original	  production	  of	  the	  inheritor	  and	  thus	  not	  a	  proper	  inheritance.	  What	  we	  have	  said,	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed	  once	  again,	  is	  that	  in	  the	  very	  process	  of	  interpreting,	  deeming	  relevant,	  and	  retaining,	  new	  relations	  (and	  thus	  new	  complex	  ideas)	  are	  to	  be	  formed,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  inheriting	  from	  repeating.	  The	  completely	  rejected	  original	  content,	  thus,	  has	  undergone	  a	  process	  of	  inheritance,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  by	   that	  process	   that	   it	  has	  been	  accessed-­‐and-­‐rejected	   (and	  not	   simply	   ignored	  or	  forgotten);	  moreover,	  it	  survives	  in	  the	  inheritance	  inside	  the	  complex	  idea	  content-­‐N,	  which	  by	  necessity	  refers	  to	  it.	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When	   only	   part	   of	   the	   content	   is	   rejected,	   the	   transformative	   process	   of	  inheritance	  (which	  transforms	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  single	  inheritance	  –	  intended	  as	  the	   content	   accessed	  –	   and	   the	   inheritor’s	   Inheritance)	   is	  different,	   but	   still	   active	  and	  transformative.	  The	  content	  to	  be	  rejected	  partially	  will	  then	  be	  fragmented	  in	  sub-­‐contents	   of	   which	   only	   one	   or	   some	   of	   them	   will	   be	   deemed	   rebuttable.	  However,	   we	  must	   consider	   a]	   the	   fragmentability	   of	   contents	   into	   contents	   (see	  chapter	  1	   and	   the	  discussion	  of	  what	   a	   content	   is)	   and	  b]	   the	  preeminence	  of	   the	  interpreter’s	   discernment	   in	   determining	   what	   he	   is	   rejecting	   and	   his	   ability	   to	  construct	   the	   rejected	  part	   as	   a	   self-­‐standing	   content	   (different	   from	   the	  original)	  for	  him	  to	  reject.	  	  These	  sub-­‐contents	  are	  parts	  of	  the	  original	  content	  and	  they	  would	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐presented	  as	  autonomous	  contents	  of	  which	  some	  need	  to	  be	  received:	   if	   the	  original	  content	  was	  not	  entirely	  rejected,	  some	  of	  its	  parts	  must	  be	  re-­‐presented	  as	  valid	   content,	  while	   other	  parts	  must	  be	   rejected	   as	   invalid.	  Therefore,	   these	   sub-­‐contents	   are	   dealt	  with	   as	   self	   standing	   contents,	   related	   by	   connections	   that	   are	  deemed	  at	   least	  partially	  wrong:	   otherwise,	   if	   they	  were	   to	  be	   considered	   (by	   the	  interpreter)	  in	  a	  status	  of	  co-­‐dependence	  or	  of	  (correct)	  logical	  derivation,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  for	  the	  interpreter	  not	  to	  reject	  the	  ensemble	  of	  their	  connection	  (the	  original	  content	  we	  just	  see	  split	  into	  sub-­‐contents)	  as	  incorrect	  as	  well.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  invalid	  “part”	  would	  create	  a	  content-­‐N	  as	  we	  explain	   above.	   However,	   even	   the	   other	   connected	   contents	   (the	   “parts”/sub-­‐contents	  not	  considered	   invalid	  per	  se)	  would	  be	  modified	   to	  give	  account	  of	   their	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new	   relation	   (one	   of	   contrast	   or	   at	   least	   of	   non-­‐dependence)	   with	   said	   invalid	  content.	   From	   an	   original	   content	   which	   was	   accessed,	   therefore,	   the	   inheritor’s	  Inheritance	   would	   now	   appropriate	   a	   content-­‐N	   (the	   refutation	   of	   the	   invalid	  part/subcontent)	   as	   well	   as	   new	   contents	   generated	   by	   the	   valid	   sub-­‐contents	  related	   to	   content-­‐N	   by	   a	   new	   relation	   (no	   more	   one	   of	   co-­‐dependence	   and	  agreement,	  	  if	  they	  need	  to	  be	  deemed	  salvageable).	  All	   of	   this	   is	   independent	   from	   any	   discourse	   on	   the	   ‘rightful’	   take	   on	   the	  subject	   matter.	   As	   Gadamer	   explains,	   hermeneutic	   is	   the	   manifestation	   of	   a	  «comprehensive	  life-­‐phenomenon»89	  which	  while	  exerted	  on	  a	  subject	  matter	  is	  not	  about	  it,	  but	  about	  the	  ‘we’	  of	  the	  interpreters	  (which	  in	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance	  has	   become	   an	   “I”	   when	   understood	   as	   individually	   extrapolated	   from	   the	  communality	  of	  tradition).	  Therefore,	  even	  where	  the	  content-­‐N	  (or	  the	  refutation	  of	  the	   invalid	   sub-­‐content	   and	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   correlated	   ones)	   was	   to	   be	  incoherently	   constructed,	   this	   would	   be	   a	   matter	   for	   the	   interpreter	   of	   the	  inheritor’s	   intellectual	   output	   (assuming	   such	   output	   becomes	   verbal),	   and	  would	  not	   prevent	   the	   new	   content	   from	   becoming	   a	   bona	   fide	   constituent	   of	   the	  inheritor’s	  Inheritance.	  	  Schlegel,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  writes	  that	  «To	  understand	  someone	  one	  must	  be	   first	  cleverer	  than	  him,	   then	   just	  as	   clever	   and	   just	   as	   stupid.	   It	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   understand	   the	   actual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Gadamer,	   “The	   Universality	   of	   the	   Hermeneutical	   Problem”	   (1966),	   in	   Philosophical	  
Hermeneutics,	  p.	  8	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meaning	   of	   a	   confused	  work	  better	   than	   the	   author	  understood	   it.	  One	  must	  also	  be	  able	   to	  know,	   characterise	  and	  construct	   the	  principles	  of	  the	  confusion	  itself»90	  	  	  This	   statement,	   while	   quite	   lyrical	   (with	   its	   dealing	   with	   cleverness	   and	  stupidity	   in	   quite	   a	   non-­‐systematic	   way)	   and	   lacking	   the	   theoretical	   underlying	  structure	  of	  a	  Schleiermacher,	  says	  nothing	  else	  than	  what	  we	  were	  saying	  above:	  in	  order	   for	   a	   negative	   inheritance	   to	   be	   constructed,	   the	   content/document/‘work’	  that	   we	   want	   to	   contest	   needs	   to	   be	   understood	   at	   a	   deeper	   level	   than	   even	   its	  creator	  could,	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  to	  light	  the	  ‘principles	  of	  confusion’,	  i.e.	  the	  fallacies	  and	  the	  wrong	  connections	  between	  sub-­‐contents/complex	  ideas.	  Disagreement	   with	   the	   source,	   we	   have	   seen,	   has	   proved	   not	   to	   be	   a	  hindrance	   to	   the	   process	   of	   inheritance.	   Nonetheless,	   there	   are	   possible	   forms	   of	  ‘alienation’	  that	  we	  can	  incur	  in	  our	  hermeneutical	  process;	  both	  are	  susceptible	  of	  preventing	   the	   content	   from	   becoming	   part	   of	   our	   Inheritance:	   Gadamer	  distinguishes	  	  a) an	  alienation	  due	  to	  our	  «aesthetic	  consciousness»91:	  we	  reject	  what	  has	  nothing	  to	  say	  to	  us.	  Gadamer	  is	  mainly	  referring	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  “Art	   for	  art’s	   sake”,	  which	  would	  alienate	   the	  spectator.	  This	  goes	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  art,	  and	  extends	  to	  any	  cultural	  construct:	  no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Schlegel,	  Schriften	  und	  Fragmente,	  ed.	  Beheler,	  p	  158.	  91	  Gadamer,	   “The	   Universality	   of	   the	   Hermeneutical	   Problem”	   (1966),	   in	   Philosophical	  
Hermeneutics,	  p.	  4	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matter	  its	  scope,	  the	  relevance	  to	  us	   is	  determined	  by	  an	  objective	  status	  of	  subjectivity.	  I.e.	  there	  is	  no	  perspective	  for	  interpretation	  of	  this	  alienation	  beside	  the	  objective	  fact	  that	  the	  content	  did	  not	  meet	   our	   subjective	   interest.	   The	   alienation	   occurs	   when	   no	  communication	   with	   the	   content	   is	   possible.	   We	   have	   discussed	  irrelevance,	  but	  impossibility	  to	  comprehend	  the	  content	  would	  fall	  under	  this	  category,	  be	  it	  a	  linguistic	  problem	  (more	  on	  this	  later)	  or	  an	  impossibility	  of	  grasping	  the	  matter	  (for	  lack	  of	  instruments,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  field,	  etc.).	  b) The	   alienation	  of	   «historical	   consciousness»92:	   the	   obsession	  with	  an	  objectivity	  of	  judgment	  and	  the	  (naïve)	  delusion	  of	  being	  able	  to	  completely	   bracket	   one’s	   own	   historical	   situation	   leads	   to	   an	  historical	  science	  (with	  pretence	  to	  «no	  narration»)	  which	  alienates	  our	   Inheritance	   substituting	   it	   with	   tradition.	   Once	   again,	   the	  dispossession	   of	   the	   inheritor’s	   personal	   situation	   is	   intertwined	  with	  the	  preeminence	  of	  tradition	  and	  traditional	  authorities.	  	  Gadamer	   explores	   these	   ‘alienations’	   further;	   he	   is	   interested	   in	   discussing	  the	  experience	  of	  Art	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  historical	  alienation.	  However,	  this	  is	  not,	  here,	   our	   main	   concern:	   we	   have	   set	   upon	   ourselves	   the	   task	   of	   analyzing	  inheritance	  as	  an	  interpretation	  of	  cultural	  contents	  and	  not	  from	  a	  strictly	  aesthetic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Ibidem,	  p.	  5.	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point	  of	  view.	  The	  relation	  between	  our	  situation,	  our	  Inheritance	  and	  our	  aesthetic	  taste	  would	  be	  an	  undoubtedly	   fascinating	  topic,	  but	  not	  one	  that	   is	  central	   to	  our	  description	  of	  the	  inheriting	  process.	  	  Nonetheless,	  Gadamer	  touches	  on	  an	  extremely	  relevant	  point,	  which	   is	   the	  problem	  of	   language	   in	   interpretation.	  He	  explains93	  how	  we	   live	   in	   language,	   and	  thus	  any	  interpretation	  is	  subjected	  to	  the	  use	  of	  language.	  However,	  he	  notices	  how	  we	  are	  not	  “captives”	  of	  language:	  	  While	  we	  live	  wholly	  within	  a	   language,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  so	  does	  not	  constitute	   linguistic	   relativism	   because	   there	   is	   absolutely	   no	   captivity	  within	  a	   language-­‐-­‐not	  even	  within	  our	  native	   language.	   ...Any	   language	  in	  which	  we	  live	  is	  infinite	  in	  this	  sense	  [in	  that	  it	  opens	  us	  to	  the	  infinite	  realm	  of	  possible	  expression],	  and	  it	  is	  completely	  mistaken	  to	  infer	  that	  reason	   is	   fragmented	   because	   there	   are	   various	   languages.	   Just	   the	  opposite	   is	   the	   case.	   Precisely	   through	  our	   finitude,	   the	  particularity	   of	  our	  being,	  which	  is	  evident	  even	  in	  the	  variety	  of	   languages,	  the	  infinite	  dialogue	  is	  opened	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  truth	  that	  we	  are.94	  	  We	   approach	   the	   content	   by	   means	   of	   language:	   Gadamer	   points	   out	   that	  «Language	   is	   the	   foundamental	   mode	   of	   operation	   of	   our	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world»95:	  consequently	   it	   is	   crucial	  not	  only	   to	  our	   interpretation	  of	   the	  content,	  but	  also	   to	  the	  establishment	  of	  our	  way	  to	  relate	  with	  our	  situation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Ibidem,	  p.	  7-­‐8	  94	  Ibidem,	  p.	  15.	  	  	  95	  Ibidem,	  p.	  3.	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We	  will	  not	  discuss,	  here,	  whether	   language	   is	   inherited	  or	   inherent	   to	  our	  human	  nature:	  the	  topic	  is	  well	  debated	  and	  it	  would	  take	  more	  than	  a	  dissertation	  by	   itself.	   However,	   we	   must	   discuss	   how	   language	   can	   interfere	   or	   facilitate	   our	  process	   of	   inheritance,	   and	   focus	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   language	   on	   cultural	  transmission	   (and	  not	  viceversa).	   Insofar	  as	  our	  process	  of	  appropriating	  a	   text	   is	  concerned,	  we	  must	  distinguish	  four	  main	  cases:	  a) a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  inheritee	  authored	  a	  text	  in	  a	  language	  that	  we	  fully	   understand	   or	   that	   we	   perceive	   to	   fully	   understand;	   once	  again,	   considerations	   on	   the	   “right”	   understanding	   or	   the	   “full”	  appropriation	  of	   a	   text	   are	   external	   to	   the	  process	   of	   inheritance,	  and	   –	   while	   of	   historical	   interest	   –	   represent	   no	   issue	   for	   the	  inheritor	   convinced	   of	   being	   able	   to	   understand	   the	   text.	   In	   this	  case,	  everything	  we	  have	  said	  of	  inheritance	  retains	  its	  validity:	  the	  content	   is	   appropriated	  by	   the	   inheritor	   and	  possibly	   reproduced	  into	  another	   language,	  but	   still	   one	   that	   the	   inheritor	  masters	   (or	  believes	   himself	   to	   master).	   The	   transformative	   process	   happens	  on	   a	   level	   that	   is	   independent	   of	   language,	   at	   least	   from	   the	  standpoint	  of	   Inheritance.	  We	  will	   see	  how	   this	   is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  Legacy.	  Gadamer	   writes	   (following	   Schleiermacher)	   that	   «[the	  hermeneutic]	   understanding	   can	   be	   called	   ‘better’	   insofar	   as	   the	  explicit	   –	   and	   hence	   worked	   out	   –	   understanding	   of	   a	   statement	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involves	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  knowledge	  of	  its	  actual	  contents.	  […]	  A	  person	  who	   learns	   to	  understand	  a	   text	   in	  a	   foreign	   language	  will	  bring	   into	   explicit	   consciousness	   its	   grammatical	   rules 96 	  and	  literary	  forms	  which	  the	  author	  followed	  without	  noticing,	  because	  he	  lived	  in	  the	  language	  and	  in	  its	  means	  of	  artistic	  expressions.»97	  However,	   the	  difference	   in	   forms	  and	   language	  which	  can	  become	  apparent	   is	   not	   exclusively	   restricted	   to	   foreign	   languages:	   «The	  same	   thing	   is	   true	   of	   all	   production	   by	   artistic	   genius	   and	   its	  reception	  by	  others.»98	  	  We	   should	   not,	   therefore,	   conclude	   that	   the	   simple	   fact	   of	  the	  content	  being	  in	  a	  language	  that	  was	  learned	  as	  foreign	  implies	  a	   less-­‐direct	   interaction	   with	   the	   text.	   Language	   is	   subjected	   to	  regional,	   chronological,	   social	   and	   class-­‐related	   modifications,	  which	  contribute	  to	  make	  the	  language	  used	  in	  the	  situation	  by	  the	  inheritee	   inherently	   different	   from	   the	   one	   belonging	   to	   the	  inheritor.	  Assuming	  the	  latter	  knows	  the	  language,	  the	  foreign-­‐ness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Gadamer	  has	  here	  either	  a	  very	  restricted	   idea	  of	  how	  the	  non-­‐native	  speaker	   interacts	  with	  a	   language	  he	  knows,	  or	  a	  very	  strict	  definition	  of	  what	  a	   ‘foreign	   language’	   is.	   If	  our	  reader	   has	   any	   experience	   with	   foreign	   languages,	   he	   will	   know	   whether	   -­‐	   once	   the	  language	   is	   learned	   -­‐	   the	   emergence	  of	   grammatical	   forms	  as	   explicit	   become	   sporadic	   to	  say	   the	   least,	   or	   whether,	   as	   Gadamer	   believes,	   any	   text	   presents	   itself	   to	   explicit	  consciousness	  as	  an	  aggregation	  of	  grammatical	  forms.	  97	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  op.	  cit.	  p	  169-­‐170.	  98	  Gadamer,	  ibidem.	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of	  it	  is	  only	  one	  of	  these	  factors,	  and	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	   it	   has	   any	   sort	   of	   preeminence	   (as	   Gadamer	   concedes	   in	   the	  second	  sentence	  above).	  b) A	   case	   in	   which	   the	   content	   is	   completely	   inaccessible,	   since	   the	  language	  is	  different	  from	  those	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  reference	  of	  the	  inheritor.	  The	  content	  as	  it	  is	  (inscribed	  in	  that	  document	  or	  spoken	  by	   that	   voice)	   is	   inaccessible	   by	   the	  would-­‐be	   inheritor.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  this	  factually	  subtracts	  the	  content	  qua	  meaning	  from	  the	  cultural	   density	   of	   the	   potential	   inheritor;	   although	   it	   can	   still	   be	  present	   in	   potentiality	   as	   an	   artefact,	   accessible	   by	   mean	   of	  aesthetic	   consciousness	   and	   even	   in	   terms	   of	   historical	   survey,	   it	  loses	   its	   accessibility	   as	   a	   text	   to	   be	   interpreted	   by	   means	   of	  reading/listening.	  	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   foreign	   (or	   forgotten)	   language	   is	   not	  present	   qua	   language,	   and	   this	   is	   what	   was	   meant	   with	   the	   ‘no	  captivity’	  instance	  in	  Gadamer’s	  words:	  this	  language	  does	  not	  limit	  our	   possibility	   of	   interpretation	   (and	   potential	   inheritance)	   by	  virtue	   of	   its	   being	   a	   language,	   but	   precisely	   by	   its	   being	   a	   non-­‐language,	  an	  object	  without	   the	  openness	  and	  dynamism	  which	   is	  disclosed	  by	  engaging	  a	   language	  as	   language,	  even	  when	   it	   is	  not	  our	  native	  one.	   In	   this	   case,	   however,	  we	  are	  held	   captive	  outside	  the	   language	   by	   our	   impossibility	   of	   entering	   the	   sphere	   of	   that	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document	   in	   linguistic	   terms.	   The	   inheritance	  was	   never	   there	   in	  potentiality;	   its	   language	   and	   its	   content	  were	   not	   ours	   to	   access	  and	   potentially	   appropriate.	   The	   only	   access	   to	   the	   content,	   and	  before	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  bring	  it	  back	  into	  our	  cultural	  density,	  is	  through	  mediation	  [see	  d)].	  c) A	  case	  in	  which	  the	  content	  is	  obscure,	  because	  the	  language	  is	  not	  mastered	   by	   the	   inheritor	   or	   because	   the	   text	   is	   dense	   with	  terminology	  referring	  to	  a	  larger	  scope	  of	  knowledge	  unfamiliar	  to	  and	   not	   mastered	   by	   the	   inheritor.	   However,	   this	   case	   is	   only	  apparently	  distinct	  from	  the	  others:	  if	  we	  consider	  what	  we	  have	  so	  far	   understood	   about	   inheritance	   (which	   is	   a	   process	   of	   self-­‐reflection	   initiated	   by	   the	   inheritor)	  we	   should	   realize	   that	   if	   the	  content	   is	   indeed	  accessed,	   the	   self-­‐judgment	  of	   ‘rightfulness’	  will	  intervene,	  therefore	  bringing	  this	  back	  to	  case	  a);	  the	  inheritor	  will	  judge	   himself	   competent	   enough	   to	   understand	   what	   he	   has	  understood.	  	  Vice	   versa,	   parts	   of	   the	   document	   (and	   thus	   contents	   and	  sub-­‐contents)	   he	   will	   possibly	   reject	   as	   incomprehensible;	   this	  either	   leads	   to	   a	   rejection	   of	   the	   content	   qua	   text	   [	   b)	   ]	   or	   to	   the	  necessity	  of	  a	  mediation	  [	  d)	  ].	  In	  any	  of	  the	  three	  cases,	  this	  state	  of	  things	   is	   only	   apparent,	   or	   at	   least	   temporary,	   since	   the	   self-­‐reflection	  of	  the	  inheritor	  will	  lead	  him	  necessarily	  to	  redefine	  this	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hermeneutic	   situation	   into	   a	   different	   one,	   which	   would	  correspond	  to	  one	  of	  the	  other	  three	  cases,	  therefore	  extinguishing	  these	  hesitations.	  d) The	   fourth	   case	   is	   that	   in	   which	   the	   notion	   of	   inheritance	   risks	  becoming	   blurry	   and	   individual	   appropriation	   becomes	   stratified.	  It	  is	  the	  case	  of	  a	  (linguistic)	  content	  accessed	  in	  translation,	  either	  in	  writing	  or	  through	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  translator.	  	  It	  can	  also	  be	  the	  case	   of	   a	   content	   (even	   a	   non-­‐textual	   one)	   ‘explained’	   to	   the	  inheritor	  by	  someone	  else.	   In	  all	  of	   these	   instances,	   the	  content	   is	  mediated,	  and	  such	  mediation	  (a	  narration	  of	  the	  content,	  trying	  to	  be	   faithful	   but	   by	   necessity	   re-­‐constructing	   it)	   creates	   an	  intermediate	  step	  in	  the	  chain	  inheritee-­‐content-­‐inheritor.	  	  The	  duality	  of	  time	  remains	  unchanged:	  the	  ‘now’	  of	  the	  inheritee	  (and	  thus	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  content	  as	  potential)	   is	  still	  a	   ‘before’	   for	  the	  inheritor,	  and	  the	  ‘now’	   of	   the	   access	   is	   still	   marked	   by	   the	   moment	   of	   attention.	   The	   ‘now’	   of	   the	  translator	  (when	  the	  translator	  has	  accessed	  the	  content)	  is	  either	  coincident	  (with	  oral	  translation)	  or	  pushed	  back	  into	  anonymity,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  addressed	  in	  and	  by	  the	  content,	  but	  only	  –	  possibly	  –	  beside	  the	  content,	  in	  an	  introduction,	  a	  footnote,	  a	  commentary.	   However,	   the	   content	   has	   been	   transformed	   by	   this	   mediation.	   The	  narrative	  -­‐	  which	  was	  needed	  to	  make	  it	  present	  (and	  that	  we	  have	  seen	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  inheritance	  process)	  -­‐	  has	  already	  begun:	  the	  content	  is	  reproduced	  by	  means	  of	  explanation	  and	  re-­‐creation.	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Is	   the	   explainer/translator	   a	   part	   of	   our	   inheritance?	  Are	  we	   inheriting	  his	  content	   or	   the	   original	   content?	   Who	   should	   we	   identify	   as	   the	   inheritee	   (the	  author)	  from	  whom	  we	  inherit	  the	  content?	  Once	  again,	  we	  should	  bracket	  out	  any	  historiographical	   concerns:	   what	   matters	   is	   the	   narrative,	   and	   the	   narrative	   is	  spoken	   by	   the	   inheritor,	   to	   himself	   before	   to	   any	   outsider.	  What	   he	   perceives	   as	  source	  of	  the	  inheritance	  remains	  the	  discriminating	  factor	  in	  the	  way	  he	  constructs	  his	  inheritance	  as	  stemming	  from	  a	  source	  (and	  not	  from	  the	  explainer/translator).	  The	   very	   existence	   of	   translation	   as	   a	   profitable	   tool	   (and	   as	   a	   surviving	   activity)	  resides	   on	   our	   ability	   to	   ignore	   it.	   We	   read	   the	   author’s	   text	   translated	   by	   the	  translator.	  This	  is	  not	  true	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  reproductions:	  when	  we	  watch	  Kubrick’s	  
Lolita	  we	  are	  not	  watching	  (or	  we	  do	  not	  narrate	  ourselves	  as	  watching)	  Nabokov’s	  narration.	   But	   when	   the	   medium	   stays	   the	   same	   (verbal	   to	   verbal,	   written	   to	  written)	  our	  narrative	  reconstructs	  the	  event-­‐translation	  as	  the	  same	  as	  the	  event-­‐creation:	  the	  translation	  is	  simply	  a	  way	  for	  the	  content	  to	  enter	  our	  cultural	  density	  in	  a	  more	  decisive	  way	  (compared	  to	  the	  simple	  notion	  of	  its	  existence).	  	  Robert	  Frost	  famously	  said	  «I	  could	  define	  poetry	  this	  way:	  it	  is	  that	  which	  is	  lost	  out	  of	  both	  prose	  and	  verse	  in	  translation»99,	  and	  this	  is	  an	  underlying	  theme	  of	  post-­‐classical	  Western	  culture100,	  even	  in	  medieval	  times,	  where	  the	  admiration	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Brooks,	  Cleanth,	  Robert	  P.	  Warren,	  and	  Robert	  Frost.	  Conversations	  on	  the	  Craft	  of	  Poetry.	  New	  York:	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1961,	  p.	  7.	  100	  Arguably	  coming	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  Christianity	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Word,	  which	  was	  unknown	  to	  pre-­‐Christian	  Rome,	  in	  which	  texts	  were	  translated	  without	  any	  stigma	  of	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the	   traditio	   (and	   thus	   the	   repetition	  of	   the	  past)	  was	  paired	  with	   the	   fear	   that	   (in	  Dante’s	  famous	  words)	  	  Nothing	  harmonized	  by	   the	   laws	  of	   the	  Muses	   can	  be	   changed	   from	   its	  own	   tongue	   to	   another	   one	   without	   destroying	   all	   its	   sweetness	   and	  harmony.	  101	  	   While	   both	   quotes	   certainly	   refer	   mainly	   to	   poetical	   pieces	   (of	   muses’	  inspiration	  and	  with	  poetry	  always	   involved),	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  everything	  that	   is	  not	  strictly	  technical	  (that	  is:	  instructional	  or	  descriptive)	  falls	  under	  this	  category	  of	  the	  ‘not	   fully	  translatable’.	  Something	  is	  bound	  to	  be	   lost,	   insofar	  as	  the	  text	  had	  some	  value	  beyond	  the	  simple	  factual	  evidence	  contained	  in	  it:	  no	  one	  argues	  that	  data	  are	  not	  translatable.	  However,	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  preservation	  of	  that	  je	  ne	  sais	  quoi	  -­‐	  which	  Frost	  calls	  poetry	  and	  Dante	  sweetness	  and	  harmony	  -­‐	  is	  not	  a	  concern	  for	  our	  analysis,	  since	  it	  lies	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  content	  as	  autonomous	  from	  our	  experience,	  a	  sort	  of	  cultural	  noumenon	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  it	  really	  is.	  	  We	  will	  go	  back	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  contents’	  preservation	  in	  our	  discussion	  of	  Legacy	   (see	   ch.	   4),	   but	   for	   the	  moment	  we	   should	   bracket	   this	   content-­‐per-­‐se	   and	  focus	  on	  the	   inheritor’s	  reception	  of	   it.	  Going	  back	  to	  our	  analysis	  of	   four	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  infidelity.	  Inspirational	  translation,	  the	  solution	  found	  by	  the	  translators	  of	  the	  Septuagint,	  is	  unavailable	  for	  lay	  works,	  and	  there	  begins	  the	  problem.	  101	  «E	  però	  sappia	  ciascuno	  che	  nulla	  cosa	  per	  legame	  musaico	  armonizzata	  si	  può	  della	  sua	  loquela	   in	  altra	   transmutare	  sanza	  rompere	  tutta	  sua	  dolcezza	  ed	  armonia»	  Convivio,	   I.VII,	  14.	  Hillard’s	  translation.	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cases	  in	  which	  the	  foreign	  text	  can	  be	  presented	  to	  us,	  when	  the	  content	  is	  accessed	  fully	   -­‐	   as	   an	   interpretable	   possible	   inheritance	   –	   an	   interest	   has	   already	   been	  affirmed,	  and	  the	  content	  as	  it	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  inheritor	  is	  already	  accepted	  as	  the	  only	  content	  possible,	  the	  one	  the	  inheritor	  is	  actually	  dealing	  with.	  Translation	  does	  not	  constitute	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance,	  but	  simply	  a	  fact	  which	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  trying	  to	  reconstruct	  such	  a	  process	  from	  an	  analytical,	  uninvolved	  point	  of	  view.	  We	   have	   struggled	   to	   keep	   the	   inheritor,	   as	   a	   subject	   in	   the	   process	   of	  inheritance,	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  exploration,	  resisting	  the	  temptation	  of	  derailing	  the	  discussion	   following	   ideas	   like	   ‘the	   true	  meaning	  of	   the	   content’	  or	   ‘the	   content	   in	  
itself’.	  We	  should	  nonetheless	  wonder	  what	  the	  role	  of	   the	   inheritee	   is	  (either	  as	  a	  participatory	   subject	   or	   as	   an	   object)	   in	   the	   process	   of	   inheritance.	   However,	   we	  must	  not	  yet	  embark	  upon	  the	  analysis	  of	  Legacy	  (i.e.	  of	  cultural	  transmission	  as	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  the	  inheritee’s	  system	  of	  thought)	  and	  remain	  solidly	  in	  the	  field	  of	  inheritance:	   the	  remaining	  questions	  we	  should	  ask	  should	  be	  asked	   in	  relation	  to	  the	   ‘now’	   of	   the	   inheritor,	   not	   to	   the	   ‘now’	   of	   the	   inheritee,	  which	   amount	   to	   the	  ‘then/before’	  of	  the	  inheritor.	  Roland	  Barthes,	  more	  than	  any	  other,	  has	  been	  dealing	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  author	   (the	   ‘originator’	   of	   the	   interpreted	   text)	   from	   a	   post-­‐interpretational	  perspective.	  His	  position	   is	   summarized	  at	   the	  very	  beginning	  of	  what	   is	   arguably	  his	   more	   important	   work,	  Death	   of	   the	   Author:	   «Once	   an	   action	   is	   recounted,	   for	  intransitive	   ends,	   […]	   this	  disjunction	  occurs,	   the	  voice	   loses	   its	   origin,	   the	   author	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enters	   his	   own	  death.»102	  Inspired	  by	  Mallarmé,	   he	   opposes	   to	   the	   «empire	   of	   the	  author»	   the	   “voice”	   of	   language,	   and	   claims	   that	   writing	   and	   the	   specular	   act	   of	  reading	  allow	  us	  to	  reach	  –	  via	  impersonality	  –	  the	  point	  where	  language	  acts	  alone.	  So	   far,	   so	   good:	   we	   have	   discussed	   already	   how	   -­‐	   in	   the	   ‘now’	   of	   content	  appropriation	  –	  the	  author	  can	  exist	  only	  as	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  text.	  	  Barthes	  points	  out	  that:	   	  Once	   the	   Author	   is	   gone,	   the	   claim	   to	   “decipher”	   a	   text	   becomes	   quite	  useless.	   To	   give	   an	  Author	   to	   a	   text	   is	   to	   impose	   upon	   that	   text	   a	   stop	  clause,	  to	  furnish	  it	  with	  final	  signification,	  to	  close	  the	  writing	  […]	  Thus,	  literature	  -­‐	  by	  refusing	  to	  assign	  to	  the	  text	  a	  “secret”:	  that	  is,	  an	  ultimate	  meaning	  –	  liberates	  an	  activity	  which	  we	  might	  call	  counter-­‐theological,	  proper	  revolutionary.103	  	  The	   Author,	   therefore,	   is	   a	   placeholder	   for	   authority,	   which	   etymologically	  stems	   from	   the	   latin	   Auctor/Auctoritas	   (and	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   author-­‐ity,	   as	  having	  the	  power	  to	  be	  author);	  to	  this	  Barthes	  opposes	  the	  liberating	  revolution	  of	  a	   literary	   approach.	   And	   what	   can	   this	   authority	   be,	   as	   a	   depository	   of	   the	   right	  ‘deciphering’,	   if	   not	   Tradition?	   The	   death	   of	   the	   Author-­‐qua-­‐author-­‐ity	   is	   the	  liberation	  of	   the	   individual	   reader	   from	   tradition,	   but	   fails	   to	   reconcile	   the	   reader	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Roland	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’	  in	  Aspen,	  no.	  5-­‐6	  (1967),	  p.	  2.	  103	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  p.	  5	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with	  his	   own	  historical	   perspective,	  which	  was	   subtracted	   from	  him	  by	  Tradition,	  but	  needs	  to	  be	  re-­‐appropriated	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Tradition’s	  demise.	  	  	  	  	  Inheritance	  begins	  with	  interpretation	  of	  the	  text	  but	  does	  not	  end	  there.	  We	  cannot	  conceptually	  isolate	  the	  reader	  as	  an	  a-­‐historical	  being	  who	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  content	   and	   with	   the	   content	   alone.	   Barthes’	   claim	   that	   the	   authors’	   absence	  (replaced	  by	  the	  Writer,	  the	  voice)	  displaces	  the	  book	  from	  temporality104	  cannot	  be	  true	   for	   the	   inheritor;	   the	   inheritor	  must	  be	   intended	  as	  a	  persistent	   subject,	  who	  undergoes	  the	  process	  of	  interpretation	  (or	  that	  process	  of	  inheritance)	  but	  survives	  it	   and	   integrates	  what	   he	   just	   read	  with	   (and	  within)	   his	   historical	   awareness,	   in	  order	   to	   appropriate	   the	   content	   and	   make	   it	   a	   part	   of	   his	   Inheritance.	   It	   is	  specifically	  in	  this	  recreation	  that	  the	  autonomous	  narrative	  of	  the	  inheritor	  can	  be	  exerted	   and	   bridge	   the	   gap	  with	   the	   time	   of	   the	   (dead)	   author,	   in	   a	  way	   that	   the	  simple	  disappearance	  of	  the	  latter	  could	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  explain.	  The	   author	   disappears,	   but	   is	   the	   inheritee	   just	   the	   same	   as	   the	   author?	  Barthes	   clearly	   opposes	   the	   permanence	   of	   the	   author	  qua	  “person”105,	   i.e.	  with	   a	  voice	   still	   present,	   autonomous	   from	   the	   document	   as	   written.	   The	   author	   as	   an	  object,	   pinpointing	   the	   originating	   moment	   of	   the	   content,	   and	   brought	   into	  presence	   only	   by	   force	   of	   the	   inheritor’s	   hermeneutical	   action	   and	   historical	  reflection,	  can	  and	  must	  survive,	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  what	  we	  have	  described	  as	  the	  inheritee.	  Inheriting	  a	  text	  involves	  narrating	  its	  history	  or,	  omitting	  to	  do	  so,	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  p.	  4.	  105	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  p.	  2.	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refuse	   the	   content	   a	   historical	   grounding.	   There	   cannot	   be	   a	   neutral	   failed	  recognition,	  the	  inheritor,	  so	  to	  speak,	  cannot	  be	  a	  simple	  spectator	  of	  the	  death	  of	  the	   Author-­‐as-­‐inheritee:	   he	   either	   narrates	   the	   history	   that	   ties	   himself	   to	   the	  inheritee	  (and	  by	  doing	  this	  contains	  Barthes’	  murderous	  instincts	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  interpretation	   of	   a	   single	   text)	   or,	   vice	   	   versa,	   destroys	   the	   historicality	   of	   the	  inheritee	  and	  his	  own	  historical	  awareness	  in	  the	  process.	  The	  author	  is	  present	  to	  the	  inheritor	  as	  unequivocally	  “past”,	  no	  matter	  how	  far	  in	  time	  the	  content	  was	  composed	  and	  even	  if	  the	  author	  is	  still	  alive	  and	  well.	  The	   historicisation	   of	   the	   content	   requires	   a	   “before”	   which	   is	   understood	   as	   a	  different	   period	   from	   the	   now	  of	   elaboration:	   as	  De	   Certau	   explains,	   «breakage	   is	  [therefore]	   the	   postulate	   of	   interpretation	   and	   its	   object.»106	  A	   caesura	   must	   be	  conceived,	   for	   the	   inheritee	   to	   be	   identified	   as	   a	   source,	   on	  which	   the	   inheritance	  depends	   for	   its	   realization.	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   past	   and	   the	   present	   is	  precisely	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   content	   is	   perceived	   by	   the	   inheritor	   as	   self-­‐standing,	  while	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  content	  itself.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  action	  lies	  with	  the	  inheritor,	  the	  passivity	  of	  the	  inheritee	  is	  a	  dominating	  position:	   the	   inheritor	   charges	   himself	   with	   receiving	   what	   the	   inheritance	  expresses,	  to	  appropriate	  its	  meaning.	  De	  Certeau	  asks:	  «what	  is	  the	  historical	  significance	  of	  a	  doctrine	  within	  the	  totality	  of	  a	  period?	  According	  to	  what	  criteria	  can	  it	  be	  understood?	  How	  can	  it	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Michel	   De	   Certeau.	   The	  Writing	   of	   History.	  New	   York,	   N.Y:	   Columbia	   University	   Press,	  1992,	  p.	  4.	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explained	  in	  relation	  to	  terms	  advanced	  by	  the	  period	  under	  study?»107	  How	  can	  this	  interest	   for	  the	  Zeitgeist	   in	  which	  the	  content	   is	  originated	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  death	  of	  the	  author?	  Are	  we	  condemned	  to	  choose	  between	  really	  appropriating	  the	  text	   and	   really	   understanding	   it?	   An	  Heterogonie	   der	   Zwecke	   prevents	   De	   Certau	  from	  reconciling	  the	  two:	  in	  his	  effort	  to	  show	  how	  there	  is	  no	  ‘teleology’	  in	  history	  (and	   no	   Spirit	   of	   Humanity	   marching	   together),	   he	   gets	   involved	   in	   a	   theory	   of	  history	   that	   risks	   identifying	   the	   author	   with	   its	   time,	   and	   make	   a	   document	   a	  necessary	  production	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  it	  was	  composed.	  	  However,	   the	  solution	  can	  and	  must	  come	   from	  the	  same	  concern,	  and	   it	   is	  once	  again	  a	  matter	  of	  narrative	  (or	  ‘narrativization’,	  in	  De	  Certau’s	  words);	  writing	  (or	   speaking)	   of	   the	  work	   of	   a	   past	   thinker	   places	   «a	   ‘population	   of	   the	   dead’	   on	  stage»108:	  the	  concern	  with	  the	  Zeitgeist	  of	  the	  past	  is	  not	  resolved	  via	  accumulation	  of	   data	   (thus	   constructing	   a	   criterion	   against	   which	   the	   historiographical	   work	  should	  be	  tested)	  but	  by	  the	  narrative	  ‘staging’	  operated	  by	  the	  inheritor,	  who	  is	  led	  necessarily	   to	   recount	   the	   inheritee,	   on	   whom	   the	   inheritance	   depends.	   The	  «problem	  facing	  historians:	  what	  can	  we	  apprehend	  from	  the	  discourse	  of	  an	  absent	  being?»109	  is	   solved	  by	  making	   the	  absent	  present.	  This	   is	   an	  act	  of	  destruction	  as	  much	  as	  one	  of	  creation;	  «a	  certain	  distructive	  force	  [is]	  active	  in	  this	  passion	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  De	  Certeau,	  Writing	  History,	  p.	  22.	  108	  De	  Certau,	  Writing	  History,	  p.	  85.	  109	  De	  Certau,	  Writing	  History,	  p.	  244.	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past,	   so	   characteristic	   of	   heirs	   and	   latecomers»110,	   writes	   Arendt:	   in	   creating	   the	  inheritee	  as	  author	  of	  what	  he	  inherits,	  the	  inheritor	  destroys	  the	  hovering	  ghost	  of	  the	   ‘historical’	   personality.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   perfect	   inheritor,	   freed	   from	   the	  alienations	  of	  historical	  objectivity	  that	  we	  have	  discussed	  with	  Gadamer,	  would	  be	  no	  different	   from	  Jean	  Paul’s	  Cheerful	  Little	  Schoolmaster	  Maria	  Wutz,	  who	  created	  his	   own	   library	   by	   writing	   manu	   sua	   all	   the	   books	   he	   had	   read	   about111.	   No	  personality	  but	  also	  no	  authorial	  figure	  are	  left,	  the	  writer-­‐author	  is	  present	  only	  as	  inherited.	   Identity	   is	   only	   narrated	   (and	   not	   ‘objectively’	   identified):	   the	   original	  Zeitgeist	  of	  time	  of	  the	  author	  is	  not	  an	  object	  of	  interest	  per	  se,	  but	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  inheritor’s	  interpretation.	  The	   connection	  between	   inheritance	  and	   identity	   (and	  creation	  of	   identity)	  does	  not	  end	  with	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  author’s	  identity	  (and	  its	  resurgence	  as	  inheritee);	  we	   inherit	  our	   identity	  before	  we	  can	  construct	  one.	   It	  all	   starts	  with	  a	  name,	   unique	   inheritance	   and	   primary	   moment	   of	   identification.	   The	   name	   is	  certainly	  a	  cultural	  content	  (and	  a	  textual	  one,	  since	  it	  is	  written	  and	  spoken),	  which	  belongs,	  at	  first,	  to	  the	  cultural	  density	  of	  the	  parents.	  The	  name	  is	  not	  immediately	  appropriable	   by	   the	   baby,	   to	   whom	   it	   means	   nothing	   at	   first.	   It	   belongs	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Hannah	  Arendt,	   ‘Introduction’	   to	  Walter	  Benjamin	  and	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Illuminations,	  p.	  39.	  111	  Jean	  Paul,	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Cheerful	  Little	  Schoolmaster	  Maria	  Wutz,	   referenced	  by	  Walter	  Benjamin	  in	  ‘Unpacking	  My	  Library’	  in	  Harendt	  and	  Benjamin,	  Illuminations,	  pp.	  61ff.	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accessibility	   of	   the	   parents,112	  although	   they	   are	   at	   the	   same	   time	   turning	   their	  attention	   to	   it	   (as	   a	  name	   to	  be	   chosen)	   and	   creating	   it	   (as	   the	   specific	  name	  of	   a	  specific	  child).	  It	  is	  not	  part	  of	  their	  Inheritance,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  appropriate	  it:	  it	  is	  not	  their	  identity.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  child,	  the	  name	  comes	  before	  Inheritance	  -­‐	  since	  it	   comes	  with	   language	   (that	  we	  have	   seen	  being	   a	  prerequisite	   for	   inheritance)	   -­‐	  and	  defines	  it.	  It	  is	  however,	  not	  properly	  an	  inheritance,	  since	  it	  is	  unreflective	  and	  un-­‐interpreted:	  interest	  is	  not	  affirmed,	  but	  imposed.	  Imposing	  a	  name	  (not	  only	  to	  a	  child113)	  is	  giving	  identity,	  is	  handing	  down	  something	  that	  was	  never	  fully	  owned	  by	  the	  giver.	  The	  name	  is	  an	  inheritance	  without	  an	  inheritee	  and	  without	  a	  proper	  inheritor.	  ‘Living	  up	  to	  the	  name’	  is	  a	  moral	  choice,	  and	  not	  a	  cultural	  one.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   name	   of	   the	   inheritee	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	  inheritance,	   both	   by	   the	   inheritor	   and	   by	   the	   situation	   he	   is	   immersed	   in.	  Acknowledging	   inheritance	  means	   recognizing	   the	   burden	   of	   the	   name	   and	  make	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  Names	   are	   usually	   chosen	   from	   an	   existing	   pool,	   no	  matter	   how	   “out	   there”	   they	  may	  appear	  to	  be.	  The	  increasingly	  common	  choice	  of	  giving	  untraditional	  names	  (or	  names	  that	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  baby’s	  ‘Culture’-­‐	  be	  it	  defined	  by	  family	  or	  by	  country)	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  parents,	  and	  thus	  in	  their	  cultural	  density.	  The	  (extremely	   rare)	   case	   of	   a	   newly	   created	   name	   would	   deserve	   a	   separate	   analysis	   (as	   a	  moment	  of	  aesthetic	  and	  civic	  creation),	  for	  which	  this	  dissertation	  is	  not	  the	  place.	  113	  ‘You	   shall	   be	   called’	   is	   a	   recurring	   sentence	   in	   the	   bible:	   imposing	   names	   to	   adults	  (“Israel”	  in	  Gen	  32:28	  or	  “Cephas/Peter”	  in	  John	  1:42)	  is	  a	  transformative	  process,	  it	  means	  bestowing	  upon	  them	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  inheritance	  and	  a	  legacy	  (since	  it	  implies	  the	  new	  name	  will	  be	  known).	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the	  identity	  represented	  by	  that	  name,	  as	  well,	  part	  of	  one’s	  Inheritance,	  alongside	  with	  the	  content.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  name	  of	  the	  person,	  but	  the	  name	  of	  that	  Author	  that	  we	  had	  killed	   in	   the	  process	  of	   inheritance.	  Acknowledging	   inheritance	   resurrects	  the	  author	  as	  historically	   significant	  and	  historically	   collocated	   (and	  vice	  versa,	   as	  we	  shall	  see,	  denying	  an	  inheritance	  kills	  the	  author	  once	  again);	  this	  collocation	  of	  the	   content	   into	   a	   historical	   environment	   (which	   the	   name	   of	   the	   inheritee	  summarizes)	  is	  not	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  inheritor:	  he	  has	  already	  historicized	  –	  or	  neglected	   to	   do	   so	   –	   the	   content	  when,	   after	   interpretation,	   he	   has	   understood	   it	  against	  the	  background	  of	  his	  own	  historical	  awareness.	  	  The	   acknowledgment	  of	   the	   inheritee	   (and	  of	  his	  name)	   is	  part	   of	   a	   larger,	  more	  public	  narrative:	  the	  inheritor	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  who	  are	  you?	  implicit	  in	  the	  relation	  with	  the	  they	  of	  sensus	  communis	  that	  we	  have	  described	  in	  chapter	  1.	  And	  the	  answer	  of	  the	  philosopher,	  of	  the	  historian,	  of	  the	  conscious	  inheritor	  is	  not	  only	   their	   own	   name,	   but	   also	   the	   name	   of	   the	   inheritees	   for	  whom	   they	   believe	  themselves	  to	  be	  carrying	  the	  torch.	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  return	  into	  the	  welcoming	  fold	  of	   tradition	   as	   comforting	   scheme:	   the	   very	   fact	   of	   declaring	   one’s	   intellectual	  ancestors	  is	  a	  claim	  to	  autonomy,	  since	  they	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  the	  Authors	  of	  the	  Tradition,	  and	  they	  certainly	  are	  not	  simply	  author-­‐itatively	  received.	  The	   claim	   to	   the	   name	   is	   a	   claim	   to	   a	   role,	   the	   role	   of	   heir	   –	   as	   legitimate	  inheritor.	  While	  being	  an	  inheritor	  is	  personal,	  ‘heir’	  implies	  recognition.	  It	  reverses	  the	  relation	  to	  tradition:	  it	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  to	  a	  tradition	  (which	  does	  not	  necessarily	  involve	   appropriation)	   but	   the	   establishment	   of	   oneself	   as	   gate	   to	   a	   Legacy.	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Depending	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  authority	  bestowed	  upon	  the	   inheritee	  by	  society,	   this	  may	   mean	   to	   claim	   the	   role	   of	   gatekeeper	   to	   a	   given	   tradition	   or	   to	   propose	   an	  alternative	  access	  to	  the	  wisdom	  of	  the	  past	  based	  on	  one’s	  own	  interpretation	  and	  not	   on	   the	   hermeneutic	   process	   proposed	   by	   others	   (individuals	   or	   institutions).	  Recognizing	   inheritees	   involves	   substituting	   oneself	   to	   them	   as	   an	   access	   to	   the	  contents,	  implying	  that	  the	  content	  is	  re-­‐proposed	  and	  re-­‐presented	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  filtered	  by	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  or	  at	  least	  by	  the	  status	  of	  the	  inheritor/heir	  as	  present	  in	  the	  situation	  which	  he	  shares	  with	  his	  contemporaries.	  The	  underlying	  narrative	  of	  Western	   civilization	   tells	  us	   that	   appropriation	  involves	  denial	  and	  later	  recognition:	  Oedipus114	  finds	  out	  Laius	  was	  his	  father	  only	  after	  killing	  him;	  by	  killing	  him	  (and	  fulfilling	  the	  prophecy)	  he	  makes	  him	  his	  father,	  since	  the	  father	   is	   the	  one	  who	  he	  shall	  kill.115	  Sophocles	  portrays	  the	  mode	  of	  our	  relation	  with	  the	  past	  author:	  by	  killing	  him	  in	  Barthes’	  sense,	  by	  removing	  him	  as	  an	   author,	   we	   can	   claim	   inheritance	   and	   power	   over	   the	   content,	   and	   establish	  ourselves	  as	  heirs.	  It	  is	  precisely	  by	  this	  appropriation	  and	  by	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  author	   as	   an	   historically	   established	   person	   that	   we	   establish	   the	   writer	   of	   the	  inherited	   content	   as	   an	   inheritee,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   creating	   and	   receiving	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Cf.	  Sophocles,	  and	  Theodore	  H.	  Banks.	  Three	  Theban	  Plays.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011.	  	  115	  On	  the	  matter	  of	  Oedipus’	  making	  of	  fatherhood,	  Judith	  Butler	  commented	  splendidly	  in	  her	   Roger	   Henkle	   Memorial	   Lecture	   “Fallible	   Recognition:	   The	   Politics	   of	   Kinship	   in	   the	  Bacchae”.	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Legacy116:	   the	   father	   is	  killed	   to	  become	  such,	  and	  by	  the	  act	  of	  killing	  he	   is	  at	   the	  same	  time	  discovered	  as	  and	  made	  into	  his	  role	  of	  father.	  	  Naming	  the	  content	  as	  author-­‐ed	  comes	  only	  after	  interpretation,	  as	  we	  have	  seen.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   though,	   inheritance	  names	   the	   inheritor	   only	   after	   having	  appropriated	   the	   content,	   and	   having	   historicized	   it	   as	   coming	   from	   a	   temporal	  ‘elsewhere’.	  What	  then	  should	  we	  make	  of	  those	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  inheritor	  rejects	  the	   name?	   What	   of	   those	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   name	   is	   and	   remains	   unknown,	   or	  simply	  unspoken?	  Denying	  an	   inheritance	   is	  not	   the	  same	  as	  narrating	  a	  negative	   inheritance:	  we	  should	  not	  confuse	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  content	  as	  wrong	  (which	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  does	  not	  prevent	   the	  content	   from	  initiating	  an	   inheritance	  process)	  with	   the	  self-­‐narration	  of	  a	  (potential)	  inheritor	  as	  non-­‐heir,	  i.e.	  his	  refusal	  of	  being	  identified	  as	  participating	   in	   someone	   else’s	   Legacy.	   The	   former	   lies	   in	   the	   realm	   of	  interpretation,	   and	   is	   constituted	   as	   inheritance	   by	   its	   inscription,	   as	   a	   negative	  content,	   in	   the	   system	   of	   thought	   of	   the	   inheritor.	   The	   latter,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  happens	  post-­‐interpretation,	  in	  a	  public	  narrative,	  which	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  content	  
per	  se,	  and	  only	  deals	  with	  the	  inheritance	  as	  a	  process.	  If	  the	  former	  operates	  on	  the	  content,	   the	   latter	   is	   a	  projection	  of	   the	   inheritor	  as	   not-­‐a-­‐heir:	  while	   the	   two	   can	  run	  parallel	  (with	  the	  disagreement	  being	  held	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  the	  heir-­‐status)	  they	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  More	  on	  this	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
	   202	  
The	  rejection	  of	  the	  heir-­‐status	  (or	  denying	  an	  inheritance)	  is	  a	  reaction,	  thus	  the	   inheritor	   cannot	   initiate	   it:	   it	   is	   an	   answer	   to	   the	  voice	  of	   the	   situation,	  which	  accuses	   him	   of	   being	   a	   heir	   in	   a	   way	   that	   does	   not	   resonate	   with	   his	   own	   self-­‐narrative	   (not	   only	   a	   condemning	   one,	   as	   we	   shall	   see).	   The	   reasons	   for	   the	  disowning	   of	   the	   inheritee	   (and	   the	   refusal	   to	   be	   constructed	   as	   his	   heir)	   can	   be	  manifold;	  a) the	  character	  of	  the	  inheritee	  can	  be	  a	  contested	  one	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	   Heidegger	   and	   his	   alleged	   National-­‐socialist	   sympathies117),	  carrying	   the	   stigma	   of	   a	   political	   or	   social	   “guilt”	   which	   is	  consequently	  associated	  with	  his	  theories.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  whoever	  approaches	   the	   content	   this	   inheritee	   authored	   without	   a	  distantiation	   is	   inevitably	  bound	   to	  be	  contaminated	  by	  whatever	  ideological	  germ	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  author.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  true	  of	  situations	   where	   the	   content	   is	   related	   to	   the	   action	   that	   is	  criminalized,118	  but	   infects	   the	   public	   perception	   of	   the	   legacy	   in	  whatever	  field	  this	  may	  be	  represented.119	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117 	  Cf.	   in	   particular	   Joshua	   Rothman,	   ‘Is	   Heidegger	   contaminated	   by	   Nazism?’	   in	   The	  
NewYorker,	  April	  8th,	  2014.	  Contamination	  is	  a	  precious	  word,	  as	  we	  shall	  see.	  118 	  E.g.	   see	   K.	   Moe,	  Should	   the	   Nazi	   Research	   Data	   be	   Cited?	  Hasting	   Center	   Report,	  December,	  1984,	  pp	  5-­‐7.	  119	  It	   is	   the	   case,	   to	   remain	   in	   our	   line	   of	   Nazi-­‐related	   public	   condemnations,	   of	   Albert	  Speer’s	  architectural	   intuitions,	  which	  are	   largely	   ignored	  by	  architectural	  historiography.	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b) the	  content	  per	  se	  can	  be	  discredited	  as	  presented	  by	  that	  specific	  author,	   and	   proclaiming	   oneself	   as	   an	   heir	   could	   bring	   the	   same	  discredit	   upon	   the	   inheritor,	   no	   matter	   what	   re-­‐elaboration	   the	  content	   may	   have	   undergone.	   The	   inheritor	   does	   have	   a	   choice,	  which	  is	  that	  of	  defending	  the	  content	  and	  the	  inheritee,	  and	  trying	  to	  show	  how	  both	  were	  misunderstood.	  A	  most	  striking	  example	  of	  this	   behavior,	  which	   I	   had	   the	   chance	   to	   study	   in	   detail,	   was	   the	  defense	  and	  recovery	  of	  Origen	  (and	  his	  theories	  on	  the	  Spirit)	  by	  the	   group	   of	   theologians	   later	   identified	   by	   the	   label	   of	  Ressourcement	   Theologians	   (or	   “Nouvelle	   Théologiens”).	   At	   the	  beginning	   of	   their	   work	   (in	   the	   ‘40s)	   Origen	   was	   seen	   as	   a	  extremely	  discussed	   theologian,	  borderline	  heretic,	   and	   their	   first	  presentation	   of	   his	   work	   was	   absolutely	   non-­‐committal,	   dealing	  with	  it	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  historical	  fact	  in	  their	  edition	  of	  his	  work	  with	  Les	  Editions	  du	  Cerf.	  It	  is	  only	  with	  Danielou’s	  work	  Origène	  that	  a	  defense	   of	   the	   value	   of	   his	   work	   from	   a	   modern	   Christian	  standpoint	   is	   first	   attempted.120	  While	   the	   details	   of	   such	   a	   case	  study	   (quite	   unfamiliar	   to	   anyone	   unaccustomed	   to	   the	   debate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  My	  (limited)	  knowledge	  of	  the	  matter	  comes	  from	  Sereny,	  Gitta.	  Albert	  Speer:	  His	  Battle	  with	  
Truth.	  New	  York:	  Knopf,	  1995.	  120	  Danielou,	  Jean.	  Origène.,	  Paris,	  La	  table	  ronde,	  1948.	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around	   the	   Humani	   Generis)	   are	   not	   to	   be	   discussed	   in	   this	  circumstance,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  noteworthy	  elements:	  	  i. Re-­‐introducing	  the	  author	  (and	  prospective	  inheritee)	  in	  the	  public	   discourse	   was	   deemed	   necessary	   before	   trying	   to	  advocate	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  his	  figure.	  ii. Previous	  readers	  of	  Origen	  (e.g.	  Brady)	  had	  been	  extremely	  cautious	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	   an	   image	   of	   ‘heir’	   to	  the	  Alexandrine	   thinker,	   limiting	   their	  appropriation	  of	  his	  contents	  to	  specific	  subsets	  of	  their	  analysis.	  iii. The	   label	   ‘Origenist’	   (despite	   the	   vigorous	   defense	   of	  Danielou,	   DeLubac	   and	  Von	  Balthasar)	   remained	   a	   serious	  accusation	   well	   into	   the	   ‘50s,	   thus	   leading	   Nouvelle	  Theologie’s	   defenders	   to	   fight	   it	   quite	   vigorously.	   That	  means	   that,	   even	   after	   the	   recognition	   of	   an	   intellectual	  inheritance	   by	   the	   protagonists	   of	   the	   movement,	   the	  narrative	   remained	   fragmented,	   with	   some	   of	   their	  supporters	  viewing	  the	  claims	  of	  inheritance	  as	  an	  external	  accusation.	  We	  should	  not	  be	   surprised	  by	   this	  dissonance	  between	  Ressourcement	  theologians	  and	  their	  supporters,	  if	  we	  consider	  how	  the	  narrative	  must	  be	  always	  understood	  as	   self-­‐narrative,	   and	   thus	   how	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	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completely	  share	  someone’s	  claim	  (or	  denial	  of)	  inheritance	  moving	  from	  a	  different	  individual	  standpoint.	  c) Finally,	  a	  reason	  to	  deny	  (or	  simply	  not	  to	  mention)	  an	  inheritance,	  and	  thus	  narrate	  oneself	  as	  not-­‐an-­‐heir,	  can	  reside	   in	  the	  claim	  to	  genius,	   or	   at	   least	   to	   originality.	  We	   have	   said	   how,	   in	   reading	   a	  document,	   the	   interpreter	  tends	  to	   look	  (or	  believe	  to	  be	   looking)	  for	  the	  original	  content,	  thus	  distinguishing	  what	  is	  presented	  from	  what	   is	   re-­‐presented.	   It	   is	   therefore	   possible	   that	   the	   inheritor,	  when	  presenting	  a	   content	   to	   the	  They	   -­‐	   and	   thus	  projecting	   it	   in	  his	  situation	  and	  in	  the	  cultural	  density	  of	  those	  who	  share	  parts	  of	  this	   situation	  with	  him	   -­‐,	  wishes	   to	  narrate	  himself	   as	   an	  original	  thinker	   and	   to	   underplay	   the	   role	   of	   the	   inheritee	   in	   the	  construction	  of	  his	  system	  of	  thought.	  While	  all	  this	  cases	  constitute	  a	  concern	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  Legacy	  (how	  we	  present	   our	   content	   to	   be	   received)	   and	  will	   thus	   be	   addressed	   again	   in	   the	   next	  chapter,	   case	   c)	   (denying	   an	   inheritance	   to	   avoid	   being	   considered	   a	   derivative	  thinker)	  introduces	  a	  dilemma	  which	  emerges	  from	  time	  to	  time	  in	  reflections	  about	  philosophy.	   Derrida	   voices	   such	   a	   concern	   when	   he	   explains	   how	   only	   «pure	  absence»	  discloses	  «the	  possibility	  of	  creative	   imagination.»121	  It	   is	  a	  problem	  that	  cannot	   be	   easily	   dismissed:	   if	   inheritance	   always	   builds	   on	   something	   else,	   if	   it	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Jacques	  Derrida.	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1978,	  p.	  24.	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always	  relying	  on	  what	  was	  uttered	  by	  a	  voice	  of	  the	  past,	  how	  can	  it	  be	  creative?	  If	  we	  need	  “pure	  absence”	  to	  create,	  how	  can	  we	  live	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  past?	  	  If	   that	  was	   the	  case,	  we	  should	  advocate	  a	  philosophy	  of	  disinterest,	  one	   in	  which	  care	  was	  not	  the	  center	  of	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  world,	  since	  in	  caring,	  in	  being	  interested,	   something	   is	   already	   made	   present,	   and	   pure	   absence	   (if	   intended	  ontologically)	   already	   impossible.	   But	   such	   a	   disinterest,	   in	   turn,	   could	   not	   be	  creative	   at	   all,	   since	   it	   would	   be	   relegated	   into	   potentiality,	   without	   being	  susceptible	  of	  being	  actualized	  by	  a	  content	  to	  which	  to	  turn	  attention.	  Pure	  thought,	  therefore,	  could	  not	  exit	  an	  idealistic	  state	  of	  self-­‐reflection,	  thus	  being	  intrinsically	  non-­‐creative	   itself.	   Should	  we	   then	   suppose	   that	   no	   creation	   is	   possible	   if	  we	   are	  already	  immersed	  in	  a	  cultural	  density,	  which	  makes	  pure	  absence	  impossible	  and	  presents	  to	  us	  a	  manifold	  past?	  Literature	  can	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  imagination	  as	  strong	  (if	  not	   stronger)	   than	  philosophy’s.	   Ralph	  Waldo	  Emerson,	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   creative	  imagination,	  writes	  that	  	  	   The	  insight	  which	  expresses	  itself	  by	  what	  is	  called	  Imagination	  is	  a	  very	  high	   sort	   of	   seeing,	  which	  does	   not	   come	  by	   study,	   but	   by	   the	   intellect	  being	  where	  and	  what	   it	   sees,	  by	   sharing	   the	  path,	  or	   circuits	  of	   things	  through	   forms,	   and	   so	   making	   them	   translucid	   to	   others.	   The	   path	   of	  things	  is	  silent.122	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Ralph	  Waldo	  Emerson,	  The	  Poet,	   in	  Emerson,	  Ralph	  W,	   and	  Larzer	   Ziff.	  Selected	  Essays.	  Harmondsworth,	  Middlesex:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1982,	  p.	  215.	  
	   207	  
He	  seems	  to	  believe	  (and	  show	  us)	  how	  while	  absence	  is	  impossible,	  silence	  is	  what	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  by	  the	  world,	  which	  –	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  intellect	  sees	  (and	  hears,	  arguably)	  –	  is	  ready	  to	  be	  imagined	  (and	  narrated).	  We	   must	   understand	   once	   again	   that	   what	   is	   created	   in	   the	   process	   of	  inheritance	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   new	   content,	   but	   a	   new	   inheritor	   reading	   the	  content(s):	  pure	  absence	  is	  impossible	  if	  understood	  absolutely,	  since	  we	  are	  Dasein	  and	   we	   are	   never	   not-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	   Derrida	   is	   aware	   of	   our	   status	   of	   beings	  necessarily	  presented	  with	   interpretations.	  What	  he	   is	  advocating,	   therefore,	  must	  be	   understood	   not	   as	   a	   factual	   absence:	   the	   ‘pureness’	   of	   the	   absence	   is	   not	   an	  ontological	   one	   but	   a	   gnoseological	   enterprise!	   «We	   need	   to	   interpret	  interpretations	  more	  than	  to	  interpret	  things»123,	  and	  what	  is	  to	  be	  made	  absent	  is	  the	  imposing	  figure	  of	  the	  author	  as	  a	  source	  of	  traditional	  authority.	  Substitution	  is	  thus	   the	   norm	   of	   absence	   in	   historical	   structure:	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   inheritor	  substitutes	  that	  of	  the	  inheritee,	  which	  is	  made	  absent	  as	  a	  narrator	  and	  represented	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  narration.124	  We	  have	  reached	  the	  end	  of	  our	  inquiry	  into	  inheritance	  considered	  as	  a	  self-­‐standing	   phenomenon,	   although	   we	   will	   have	   to	   come	   back	   to	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   its	  specular	  relation	  with	  Legacy,	  in	  chapter	  5.	  However,	  before	  delving	  into	  Legacy	  per	  se,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  recap	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  points	  of	  our	  exploration.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Montaigne,	  quoted	  by	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  ch.	  10.	  124	  Derrida	   explains	   how	   the	   very	  notion	   of	   structure	   in	   history	   is	   based	  on	   the	  notion	   of	  substitution.	  See	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  p.	  280	  ff.	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Firstly,	   we	   have	   defined	   the	   limits	   and	   extensions	   of	   the	   word	   inheritance	  seeing	  how	  it	  can	  indicate	  a	  content,	  a	  process	  and	  a	  system	  of	  thought,	  depending	  on	   usage.	   We	   have	   clarified	   the	   relation	   between	   these	   three	   instances,	   showing	  how	  they	  all	  relate	  to	  the	  same	  moment	  of	  reception.	  This	  has	  led	  us	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  timing	  of	  such	  reception,	  and	  we	  have	  exposed	  how	  subjective	  historical	  awareness,	  and	  not	  objective	  chronological	  time,	  is	  the	  discriminating	  factor	  in	  our	  perception	  of	  the	  historicality	  of	  the	  content	  (and	  of	  the	  event	  of	  its	  creation).	  We	  have	  then	  explained	  how	  the	  time	  of	  inheritance	  is	  necessarily	  reducible	  to	   a	   ‘now’	   which	   can	   be	   explained	   as	   both	   objective,	   subjective	   and	   related	   to	   an	  
epoch	   (which	   is	   subjective,	   but	   stems	   from	   a	   subjectivity	  which	   is	   not	   that	   of	   the	  individual).	  We	   have	   then	   explained	  what	   philosophers	   have	   intended	   by	   ‘epoch’	  and	   how	   this	   relates	   strictly	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   inheritance,	   which	   tends	   to	   be	   a	  mediation	  between	   the	  historical	   situation	  of	   the	   inheritor	  and	   that	  of	   the	  content	  (originated	  in	  another	  epoch).	  The	  absolute	  individuality	  of	  the	  situation	  (contrasting	  the	  universality	  of	  the	  epochs)	  has	  provided	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  opposition	  between	  absolutely	   individual	   inheritance	   and	   the	   opposing	   concept	   of	   tradition.	   Following	  Foucault,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  inheritance	  (and	  history)	  thrive	  in	  discontinuity,	  while	  tradition	   relies	   on	   homogeneous	   continuity.	   We	   have	   discussed,	   however,	   how	  discontinuity	  cannot	  give	  a	  full	  account	  of	  inheritance,	  which	  is	  dialectically	  involved	  in	  continuity	  and	  discontinuity	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  thus	  distinguishing	  itself	  both	  from	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tradition	   and	   from	   what	   Foucault	   describes	   as	   a	   mature	   approach	   to	   historical	  interpretation.	  Consequently,	  we	  have	  explored	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  truth	  (crucial	  to	  historical	  exploration)	  and	  that	  of	  righteousness/wisdom	  (which	  inspires	  tradition)	  lose	  their	  primacy	   in	   the	   process	   of	   inheritance,	   where	   interest	   and	   self-­‐judgment	   take	   the	  center	  of	  the	  stage,	  guaranteeing	  a	  self-­‐confirmation	  that	  is	  always	  true	  in	  the	  self-­‐evaluation	  of	  the	  inheritor.	  The	   problem	  of	   time,	   as	   theorized	   by	  Augustin,	   has	   proved	   a	   challenge	   for	  modern	  notion	  of	  history,	  but	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  inheritance	  (by	  its	  making	  present	  the	  past)	  works	  perfectly	  within	   the	   frame	  of	   the	   “threefold	  present”	  proposed	  by	  Augustine:	  by	  understanding	  the	  narrative	  dimension	  of	   inheritance,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  immediacy	  of	  attention	  and	  the	  extended	  time	  of	  historical	  awareness	  can	  be	  brought	   together	   in	  a	  narration	   that	   is	   told	  now	  but	   that	   ties	   together	  different	  times	  (the	  then	  and	  the	  now).	  We	  have	  seen	  how	   the	  narrative	  of	  inheritance	   involves	  both	   remembering,	  recalling	  and	  forgetting,	  but	  how	  it	  is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  it,	  and	  how	  interest	  predates	  both	  memory	  and	  narrative,	   and	   constitutes	   the	  moving	   force	  behind	   inheritance;	  this	   has	   required	   us	   to	   deal	   with	   negative	   inheritances,	   seeing	   how	   perceived	  “falsehood”	   or	   “wrongfulness”	   of	   a	   given	   content	   cannot	   prevent	   a	   process	   of	  inheritance	  from	  beginning,	  given	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  inheritor	  for	  the	  subject	  matter.	  The	  interest	  in	  originality	  has	  led	  us	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  language	  and	  to	   discover	   how,	   no	   matter	   the	   epistemological	   concerns	   that	   theories	   of	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interpretation	  may	  rise,	  inheritance	  is	  fully	  able	  to	  be	  performed	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  difficult	  language	  (foreign	  or	  technical)	  and	  even	  when	  faced	  with	  translation,	  which	  does	  not	  constitute	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  self-­‐presentation	  of	  the	  inheritor	  as	  accessing	  the	  ‘true’	  original	  content.	  This	   displacement	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘true’	   content	   from	   the	   core	   of	   the	  phenomenon	  required	  us	  to	  discuss	  theories	  on	  authoriality	  and	  to	  stress	  how	  the	  death	  of	  the	  author	  is	  performed	  and	  surpassed	  in	  the	  process	  of	  inheritance,	  with	  the	   three	   moments	   of	   de-­‐authorising	   the	   document,	   recovering	   the	   historical	  
perceived	  inheritee	  and	  naming	  him	  to	  complete	  the	  appropriation.	  The	  problem	  of	  the	  name	  and	  of	  the	  recognition	  connected	  to	  naming	  one’s	  inheritee	  has	  accompanied	  us	   in	   these	   last	   few	  pages,	   in	  which	  we	  have	  discussed	  the	   role	   of	   the	   heir	   as	   a	   public	   image	   of	   the	   inheritor	   and	   analysed	   some	   of	   the	  possible	  reactions	  of	  the	  inheritor	  to	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  heir-­‐status.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  tackled	   the	  problem	  of	   creativity	   in	   Inheritance,	   given	   the	  presence	   of	   a	   past	   that	  may	  appear	  to	  destroy	  individual	  spaces	  of	  imagination.	  We	  have	  established	  the	  inheritor	  as	  a	  narrator	  of	  his	  own	  cultural	  reception,	  which	  is	  aware	  of	  both	  his	  situation	  and	  of	  the	  historical	  narration	  to	  which	  he	  must	  answer.	  We	  have	  disclosed	  how	  being	  an	   inheritor	  and	  recognizing	  oneself	  as	  one	  (or	  better	  as	  a	  heir	  are	  not	   identical)	  and	  how	  narration	  of	   the	  content	  (and	  of	   its	  reception)	   takes	   precedence	   over	   any	   notion	   of	   objective	   ‘verifiability’	   of	   the	  transmission.	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The	  inheritor	  as	  narrator	  has	  consistently	  played	  the	  role	  of	  protagonist,	  and	  both	   his	   contemporaries	   and	   his	   inheritees	   have	   appeared	   only	   as	   objects	   of	   his	  initiative.	  What	  remains	  to	  be	  discussed,	  then,	  is	  the	  opposite	  perspective,	  i.e.	  that	  of	  the	   person	   who	   utters	   the	   words	   to	   be	   inherited.	   The	   distinction,	   is	   clear,	   is	  performative	  and	  situational,	  not	  ontological.	  Nonetheless,	  a	  reversal	  of	  perspective	  is	  necessary,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  approach	  Legacy	  as	  a	  phenomenon,	  and	  not	  as	  something	  constructed	  theoretically	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  Inheritance.	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Chapter	  4:	  Legacy.	  	  	   Now	   that	   we	   have	   discussed	   how	   inheritance	   comes	   to	   presence	   as	   a	  transformative	  process,	  we	  must	  move	  on	  to	  explore	  the	  dimension	  of	  Legacy,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  role	  of	   the	   ‘inheritee’	  as	  a	  subject	  (and	  not	   just	  as	  an	   interlocutor	  for	  the	  inheritor).	  Inheritee	  is	  a	  term	  that	  we	  will	  continue	  to	  use,	  in	  this	  chapter	  as	  in	  the	  following	  ones.	  While	  our	  perspective	  will	  change,	  moving	  from	  a	  bracketed	  inheritance	  process	  to	  the	  corresponding	  bracketed	   legacy	  and	  then	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  passing	   as	   a	   moment	   of	   synthesis,	   switching	   to	   terms	   like	   legacy-­‐er,	   although	  appropriate,	  would	  only	  be	  a	  cause	  of	  confusion,	  and	  would	  not	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  clarity.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  reader	  should	  understand	  clearly	  that	  Inheritee	  will	  be	  used	  to	  indicate	  the	  author	  of	  the	  legacy	  and	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  simple	  identifier	  and	  not	  as	  a	  descriptor	  of	  his	   role,	   since	   implying	   inheritance	  would	  defy	   the	  very	  goal	  of	  this	  section,	  and	  defuse	  the	  bracketing.	  	  Alternatives	  like	  author	  or	  predecessor	  would	  not	  solve	  the	  problem;	  the	  first	  would	   introduce	   a	   confusion	   between	   authors	   of	   contents	   as	   such	   (thus	   from	   a	  content	   perspective)	   and	   their	   role	   as	   creative	   minds	   immersed	   in	   a	   historical	  situation.	  The	   latter	  would	  once	  again	  refer	  to	  successors,	   thus	   incurring	  the	  same	  problems	  as	  Inheritee	  itself.	  Legacy-­‐er	  would	  then	  be	  the	  most	  reasonable	  solution;	  yet,	  beside	  adding	  another	  technical	  neologism,	  it	  would	  require	  a	  specular	  creation	  to	  substitute	  Inheritor,	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  the	  change	  of	  perspective	  as	  well.	  We	  will	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then	  stick	  to	  Inheritor-­‐Inheritee,	  but	  we	  must	  be	  clear	  that	  we	  are	  approaching	  their	  relation	   ab	   ovo,	   from	   a	   tabula	   rasa	   cleaned	   of	   the	   inheritor’s	   perspective	   we	   just	  explored.	  	  Moving	  into	  our	  analysis	  of	  Legacy,	  then,	  we	  should	  first	  of	  all,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  confusion,	  go	  through	  a	  clarification	  of	  the	  term,	  analogously	  to	  and	  somehow	  mirroring	   what	   we	   did	   for	   Inheritance	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   chapter	   3.	   We	   should	  distinguish	   three	  usages	  of	   the	   term:	  1)	  a	   content	   consigned	   to	  posterity,	  2)	  one’s	  Legacy	   as	   everything	   which	   is	   passed	   on,	   and	   3)	   the	   process	   through	   which	   the	  latter	  is	  created.	  A	  legacy	  is	  something	  left	  behind,	  passed	  on.	  	  We	  approach	  it	  from	  a	  cultural	  perspective,	  since	  culture	  and	  our	  agency	  in	  a	  cultural	  panorama	  remain	  the	  focus	  of	  our	   analysis.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   every	   object	   is	   susceptible	   of	   acquiring	   a	   cultural	  significance	   and,	   conversely,	   that	   a	   medium	   for	   the	   transmission	   of	   a	   cultural	  content	   in	   time	  may	   acquire	   some	   form	  of	   physicality:	   however,	   the	   two	   levels	   of	  legacy	  (the	  material,	  property-­‐laws	  governed	  one	  vs	  the	  immaterial,	  content	  related	  one)	  are	  not	   identical	  and,	  while	  partially	  overlapping,	   they	  cannot	  be	   fungible	   for	  our	  discussion.	  By	  legacy,	  therefore,	  we	  indicate	  a	  cultural	  content1	  that	  is	  passed	  on,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  is	  made	  available	  to	  be	  received.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We	   defined	   the	   concept	   of	   content	   in	   chapter	   1,	   and	  we	   distinguished	   it	   both	   from	   text	  (which	  can	  be	  one,	  but	  can	  also	  contain	  one	  or	  many,	  and	  even	  be	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  content)	  and	   from	   document	   (which	   implies	   a	   physical	   object	   reproducible	   and	   destroyable)	  throughout	  chapter	  2	  and	  3.	  See	  chapter	  1	  in	  particular	  for	  the	  limits	  of	  our	  idea	  of	  content,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  expandability	  and	  fragmentability.	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We	  will	  see	  shortly	  how	  and	  if	  Legacy	  depends	  on	  reception	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  such;	  for	  the	  moment,	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  understand	  that	  with	  a	  legacy	  we	  identify	  a	  content	   that	   is	  no	  more	  one’s	  own,	  but	   consigned	   to	   someone	  else,	  be	   it	   an	  actual	  inheritor,	   a	   potential	   receiver	   or	   simply	   the	   general	   anonymity	   of	   ‘the	   public’.	   By	  saying	   that	   something	   (a	   given	   content)	   is	   someone’s	   legacy,	   we	   mean	   that	   this	  content	  has	  been	  passed	  on	  (and	  arguably	  that	  it	  is	  still	  recognizable	  as	  having	  been	  created	  by	  that	  someone,	  but	  we	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this),	  or	  at	  least	  that	  it	  has	  been	  made	  available	  to	  others	  by	  that	  someone.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  we	  refer	   to	  someone’s	  Legacy	  (capitalized)	  as	   the	  overall	  sum	   of	   contents	   (considered	   as	   coherently	   constructed)	   that	   a	   someone	   (the	  
inheritee	   in	   our	  discussion)	   has	  passed	  on.	   Fragmentation	   (which	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	  content-­‐legacy,	  since	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  2	  it	  is	  an	  element	  of	  our	  individuation	  of	  contents)	   disappears	   in	   this	   notion	   of	   Legacy,	   which	   on	   the	   contrary	   derives	   its	  meaning	   from	   an	   idea	   of	   aggregation	   that	   we	   superimpose	   on	   the	   agglomerated	  series	   of	   contents	   produced	   by	   the	   individual	   inheritee.	   Legacy,	   in	   this	   instance,	  indicates	   the	   body	   of	   work,	   the	   totality	   of	   contents	   and	   any	   structured	   thought	  produced,	  written	  and	  uttered	  by	  the	   inheritee.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   it	  can	  expand	  to	  include	   any	   symbolic	   act,	   or	   any	   act	   that	   is	   susceptible	   of	   being	   received	   as	  meaningful	  (i.e.	  someone’s	  legacy	  can	  comprehend	  even	  non-­‐textual	  contents).	  Finally,	  legacy	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  process,	  which	  starts	  with	  Legacy	  as	  aggregation	  of	  contents	  but	   is	  not	  statically	  exhausted	  by	   it.	  Legacy	   ‘happens’,	  and	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  stretching	  in	  time.	  We	  shall	  see	  how	  the	  process-­‐
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nature	   of	   legacy	   is	   fundamental	   to	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   talking	   of	   a	   ‘legacy’	   in	  retrospective.	  The	  transformative	  nature	  (which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  an	  attribute	  of	  the	   process	   of	   inheritance)	   is	   not	   self-­‐evident	   in	   legacy,	   since	   the	   act	   of	   content	  creation	   is	   in	   a	   diachronic	   relation	   with	   the	   actualization	   of	   legacy	   (while	  inheritance	  and	  act	  of	  interpretation	  were	  in	  a	  synchronic	  relation),	  but	  we	  will	  see	  how	  the	  very	  perspective	  of	  a	  legacy	  shapes	  the	  work	  of	  an	  author.	  Legacy	   cannot	   be	   momentary,	   since	   persistence	   in	   time	   is	   exactly	   what	  identifies	   it	   as	   Legacy:	   something	   that	   appears	   and	   is	   immediately	   forgotten	   is,	  intrinsically,	  incapable	  of	  becoming	  a	  legacy.	  However,	  the	  time-­‐frame	  of	  a	  legacy	  is	  problematic	  to	  determine.	  There	  is	  certainly	  a	  now	  of	  creation,	  in	  which	  the	  content-­‐legacy	  is	  in	  the	  present	  as	  created-­‐right-­‐now:	  the	  inheritee	  wrote	  the	  text,	  spoke	  the	  words,	  painted	   the	  picture	  or	  made	   the	  gesture	   at	   a	  determinate	   time,	  which	  was	  potentially	  witness-­‐able	  as	  a	  moment	  bracketing	  out	  past	  and	  future.	  However,	  this	  simple	  now	  can	  only	  be	  the	  time	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  content	  as	  such,	  and	  not	  of	  the	  content	  as	  legacy.	  Legacy,	   indeed,	  must	   contemplate	   the	  possibility	  of	   a	   future.	  Therefore,	   the	  now	   of	   legacy	   (even	   at	   its	   creation)	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   now	   and	   not	   later,	  disclosing	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  timeline	  that	  is	  not	  only	  chronological	  (‘I	  performed	  the	  act’	  today,	  or	  in	  June,	  or	  in	  2009)	  but	  also,	  and	  specifically,	  comparative	  (‘He	  finished	  his	   first	   article	  when	   his	   first	   book	  was	   not	   yet/still/already	   being	  written’).	   The	  difference	   is	  only	  apparently	  subtle.	  While	  when	   listening	  or	  reading	  a	  content	  we	  begin	  a	  process	  of	  interpretation	  which	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  now	  and,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	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in	   chapter	  3,	  we	  must	   resist	   the	   temptation	  of	   interpreting	   it	   in	   light	   of	   the	   ‘dead	  author’;	  the	  paradigm	  is	  reversed	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  legacy.	  What	  we	  are	  uttering	  is	  never	  understood	  as	  present	  just	  now,	  provided	  that	  there	  is	  a	  listener,	  or	  that	  what	  we	   write	   is,	   by	   its	   very	   nature,	   inscribed	   on	   an	   object	   (the	   document)	   made	   to	  survive	  the	  instant.	  Fichte	  points	  out	  how	  the	  possibility	  of	  reception	  is	  always	  alive,	  no	  matter	  how	  trivial	   the	  situation,	  given	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  being	  heard/read,	  and	  without	  a	  necessary	  intentionality:	  	  Has	  any	  one,	  in	  the	  circle	  of	  a	  few	  friends	  perhaps,	  allowed	  an	  assertion	  to	   escape	   him,	   which	   it	   may	   be	   supposed	   he	   would	   not	   willingly	   see	  published	  to	  the	  world?	  In	  a	  week	  or	  two	  the	  printing	  press	  is	  at	  work	  to	  announce	  the	  remarkable	  fact	  to	  the	  world	  and	  to	  posterity	  […]	  carefully	  investigating	  and	   inquiring	  whether	   the	  assertion	  was	  actually	  made	  or	  not,	   before	  whom	  was	   it	  made,	   what	   were	   the	   exact	   words	   employed,	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  the	  offender	  may	  be	  dismissed.2	  	   Fichte	   is	   partially	   ironic,	   and	   certainly	   not	   everyone	   experiences	   the	   same	  exposure	  he	  did3.	  Nonetheless,	  beneath	  the	  hyperbole	  and	  the	  comical	  exaggeration	  we	  see	  something	  more	  profound,	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  impossibility	  to	  distinguish,	  upon	  utterance,	  what	  can	  be	  legacy	  and	  what	  can	  not.	  We	  should	  come	  back	  to	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Fichte,	   Johann	  G,	   and	  William	  Smith.	  The	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Present	  Age.	   London:	   John	  Chapman,	  1847,	  	  Lecture	  6,	  p.	  33.	  3	  Which	  would	  probably	  be	  welcome	  to	  any	  scholar	   (and	  would	  certainly	  be	  useful	   to	  any	  young	   academic),	   but	   even	   then	   it	   would	   create	   a	   problem	   of	   how	   the	   contents	   are	  represented.	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quote	   and	   this	   problem	   (what	   is	   legacy-­‐able	   and	  who	   determines	   legacy),	   but	   for	  now	   we	   should	   focus	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   permanence,	   which	   as	   Fichte	   shows	   can	  permeate	  any	  cultural	  production,	  no	  matter	  how	  small.	  	  Permanence,	   not	   presence,	   is	   the	   dimension	   of	   time	   that	   belongs	   most	  properly	  to	  legacy,	  especially	  in	  the	  age	  of	  record-­‐ability	  in	  which	  we	  are	  immersed.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  Bergson’s	  duration	  as	  opposed	  to	  Bachelard’s	  instant,	  since	  both	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  (potential)	  legacy,	  and	  both	  risk	  preventing	  it	  from	  becoming	  a	  legacy.	  	  The	   instant	  of	  creation	   is	   identifiable	  both	  as	  the	  conception	  of	   the	  content	  and	   as	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   ‘publicization’	   of	   the	   content,	   i.e.	   the	   first	   sentence	  uttered,	  the	  first	  page	  written,	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  curtains	  at	  the	  premiere,	  the	  first	  brushstroke,	  etc.	  Beginning	  and	  coming	  into	  being	  appear	  as	  ‘instances	  of	  instants’,	  so	   to	   speak,	   since	   we	   cannot	   escape	   the	   need	   for	   the	   moment	   of	   appearance.	  Bachelard	   explains:	   «within	   the	   realm	   of	   knowledge	   itself,	   there	   is	   indeed	   an	  original	  fault	  –	  that	  of	  having	  an	  origin;	  that	  of	  falling	  short	  of	  the	  glory	  of	  atemporal	  being.»4	  The	  origin	  of	  the	  legacy,	  intended	  as	  chronological	  origin,	  and	  not	  as	  causal	  origin,	   is	   therefore	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   intrinsic	   claim	   of	   legacy	   to	   transcend	   the	  narrowness	  of	  the	  moment.	  Saying	  that	  legacy	  strives	  for	  permanence	  means	  saying	  that	   it	   tries	   to	   escape	   the	   momentary	   nature	   of	   its	   apparition,	   to	   prove	   Roupnel	  wrong	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  history	  «time	  is	  a	  solitude	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Gaston	   Bachelard.	   Intuition	   of	   the	   Instant,	  Evanston,	   IL:	   Northwestern	   University	   Press,	  2013,	  p.	  3.	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instant»5:	   the	   instant	   of	   creation	   of	   the	   content	   cannot	   contain	   and	   restrain	   its	  emergence	  as	  a	  potential	  legacy.	  For	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  there,	  the	  content	  itself	  must	  be	  constructible	  as	  super-­‐momentary.	  	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   though,	  duration	  does	  not	  exhaust	   the	   time	  dimension	  of	  legacy,	  relating	  to	  its	  creation:	  the	  content	  appears	  as	  finite	  and	  transmissible,	  thus	  even	   the	  duration	   (of	   the	   time	  spent	  writing,	  of	   the	  conference	  paper’s	  delivering,	  etc.)	  must	  disappear.	  The	  content	  escapes	   the	  moment	  but	  collapses	  duration	   into	  itself:	  when	  we	  conceive	  of	  the	  content,	  we	  think	  of	  a	  static	  object	  fixed	  in	  time	  (the	  time	  of	  creation),	  and	  the	  only	  time	  that	  survives	  in	  it	  is	  the	  length	  of	  reproducibility	  (i.e.	   the	  movie	   lasts	   two	   hours)	  which	   is,	   however,	   a	  measure	   of	   dimension	  more	  akin	  to	  the	  length	  of	  the	  book	  or	  the	  size	  of	  the	  painting	  than	  to	  a	  position	  in	  a	  time-­‐line	  (where	  the	  duration/instant	  tension	  is	  made	  explicit).	  Permanence	   of	   the	   object,	   therefore,	   is	  what	   constitutes	   the	  modal	   time	   of	  legacy;	   the	   content	   –	   lacking	   subject’s	   agency	   -­‐	   does	   not	   perceive	   a	  moment	   or	   a	  duration,	  yet	  it	  is	  imbued	  with	  both.	  Legacy	  is	  therefore,	  in	  Bachelard	  and	  Roupnel’s	  terms,	  both	  an	  act	  and	  an	  action,	  or	  at	  least	  it	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  such	  if	  we	  want	  to	  account	  for	  its	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  creation	  and	  its	  survival	  beyond	   it.	   Roupnel	   claims,	   quite	   lyrically,	   that	   «we	   are	   conscious	   only	   of	   the	  present»	  and	  that:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Gaston	  Roupnel,	  Siloë,	   ,	  Paris:	  Librairie	  Stock,	  1927,	  p.	  108.	  All	  Ropunel’s	  translations	  are	  by	  Eileen	  Rizo-­‐Patron.	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The	   instant	   that	  has	   just	   fled	   from	  us	   is	   the	  same	  vast	  death	   that	  holds	  dominion	  over	  abolished	  worlds	  and	  extinguished	   firmaments.	  And	   the	  same	  fearsome	  unknown	  holds	  the	  approaching	  instant	  within	  the	  dark	  shadows	  of	   the	   future,	   as	  much	  as	   it	   does	   the	  Worlds	   and	   the	  Heavens	  that	  have	  yet	  no	  inkling	  of	  themselves.6	  	   Bachelard,	   deciphering	   such	   obscure	   poetics,	   interprets	   this	   passage	   as	   a	  claim	   for	   the	   impossibility	   for	   us	   to	   conceive	   a	   duration	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	  instant,	   and	   agrees	   with	   Roupnel	   only	   to	   a	   certain	   degree;	   yet	   Bachelard	   as	   well	  remains	   convinced	   -­‐	   with	   regard	   to	   our	   experience	   of	   history	   –	   that	   «in	   the	  experience	  of	  a	  certain	  rupture	  of	  being	  […]	  the	  idea	  of	  discontinuity	  imposes	  itself	  without	  dispute.»7	  The	  possibility	  of	  legacy	  is	  not	  alienated	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  rupture	  per	   se8,	   since	   projecting	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   content	   created	   (at	   least	   potentially)	  beyond	  the	   instant	   is	  exactly	  what	  brings	  us	  to	  utter	  the	  content	   in	  the	   first	  place:	  duration	  may	  arguably	  not	  be	  immediately	  experienceable	  by	  our	  mind,9	  but	  at	  least	  an	  idea	  of	  it	  must	  be	  present	  for	  the	  author	  to	  begin	  the	  creation	  process.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Roupnel,	  Siloë,	  ibidem.	  7	  Bachelard,	  Intuition	  of	  the	  Instant,	  p.	  7.	  	  8	  We	  shall	  see	  later	  how	  it	  is	  exactly	  its	  power	  to	  bridge	  a	  gap	  in	  time	  that	  constitutes	  it	  as	  more	  precious	  than	  simple	  repetition.	  9	  This	  claim	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Bachelard’s	  book,	  which	  presents	  his	  arguments	  over	  100	  pages	  but	  still	  remains,	  in	  my	  humble	  opinion,	  not	  completely	  convincing.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  place	  for	  confirming	  or	  opposing	  this	  claim.	  We	  will	  then	  be	  satisfied	  to	  point	  out	  that	  some	  of	  his	  intuitions	  are	  absolutely	  precious	  and	  argue	  our	  opposing	  point	  (i.e.	  that	  the	  rupture	  does	  not	  prevent	  our	  legacy	  to	  project	  itself	  immediately	  beyond	  the	  instant)	  assuming	  for	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Reducing	  this	  idea	  of	  permanence	  -­‐	  as	  Bachelard	  seems	  to	  suggest10	  -­‐	  to	  the	  product	  of	  the	  work	  of	  historians	  fails	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  survival	  of	  the	   content	   predates	   the	   question	   of	   who	   will	   receive	   the	   content	   (and	   thus	   the	  creation	   of	   a	   projected	   posterity	   of	   potential	   inheritors)	   which	   arises	   from	   our	  historical	  awareness	  insofar	  as	  we	  understand	  ourselves	  as	  historical	  beings	  with	  an	  historical	  future	  –	  and	  not	  just	  a	  biological	  one	  –	  in	  front	  of	  us.	  Before	  any	  concern	  for	  the	  passing	  on	  of	  the	  cultural	  content,	  we	  understand	  its	  survival	   in	  a	  primary,	  instinctive	  way,	  which	  relates	  to	  our	  perception	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  (documents,	  sounds,	  receiving	  subjects).	  The	   presence	   of	   the	   witnessing	   object	   (be	   it	   a	   person,	   a	   recorder,	   a	   blank	  page)	  and	  its	  recognition	  as	  a	  possible	  carrier	  of	  legacy	  are	  crucial	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  cultural	  contents:	  the	  language	  of	  the	  lone	  madman,	  who	  does	  not	  care	  whether	  he	  is	   heard	   or	   not,	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   create	   a	   content	   (although	   that	   can	   happen	  accidentally).	   Permanence	   is	   not	   a	   concern	   for	   the	   madman,	   as	   it	   is	   not	   for	   the	  mystic	  during	  the	  transcendent	  experience.	  	  The	   madman	   who	   ‘talks	   to	   himself’	   is	   not	   interested	   in	   the	   creation	   of	  cultural	   content:	   he	   speaks	   only	   the	   content	   that	   he	  wants	   to	   hear,	   and	   does	   not	  concern	  himself	  with	   the	   possibility	   for	   this	   content	   to	   be	   received.	  His	   discourse	  has	  no	  cultural	  content	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  enter	  anyone’s	  cultural	  density:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  sake	  of	  discussion	  that	  he	  is	  right	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  absolute	  «solitude	  of	  the	  instant»	  (Bachelard,	  Intuition	  of	  the	  Instant,	  p.	  5).	  10	  Bachelard,	  Intuition	  of	  the	  Instant,	  ch.	  2.	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the	   words	   are	   dissolving	   into	   present,	   not	   meant	   to	   be	   carried	   into	   any	   kind	   of	  permanence.	   The	   cultural	   world	   of	   the	   madman	   is	   self-­‐contained,	   the	   discourse	  relates	   only	   to	   the	   speaker	   and	   cannot	   survive	   its	   being	   spoken.	   Even	  when	   it	   is	  repeated	  and	  transmitted,	  it	  is	  arguably	  someone	  else	  who	  transmits	  what	  he	  picked	  up	  from	  the	  un-­‐transmittable	  discourse	  of	  the	  madman.	  Permanence,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  precisely	   the	   concern	   of	   the	   listener	   who	   believes	   it	   is	   her	   duty	   to	   make	   the	  blabbering	   survive	   the	   moment,	   and	   we	   would	   be	   hard	   pressed	   if	   we	   had	   to	  determine	  whether	  the	  content	  of	  the	  listener’s	  report	  constitutes	  her	  legacy,	  or	  the	  madman’s.	  Michel	   De	   Certeau,	   when	   discussing	   the	   ‘historicisation’	   of	   the	   mystical	  experience11,	  rightly	  contrasts	  the	  attention	  for	  the	  exteriority	  of	   language	  (typical	  of	   the	   ‘normalized’	   discourse)	   with	   the	   absolute	   interiority	   of	   the	   mystical	  discourse:	   the	   opposition	   of	   the	  world,	   in	  which	   presence	   and	   absence	   determine	  the	   reception	   of	   the	   word,	   is	   washed	   away	   in	   the	   «absolute	   présent	   volitive.»12	  Presence,13	  not	  permanence,	   is	   the	   concern	  of	   those	  who	   speak	  without	   a	   cultural	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Michel	  De	  Certeau,	  La	  Fable	  Mystique,	  Paris:	  Gallimard,	  1982,	  especially	  chapter	  1	  ‘Un	  Lieu	  pour	  se	  perdre’	  and	  chapter	  2	  (on	  language)	  ‘Une	  topique’.	  12	  De	  Certeau,	  La	  Fable	  Mystique,	  p.	  231.	  13	  De	   Certeau	   writes	   (La	   Fable	   Mystique,	   p.	   11)	   that	   the	   history	   of	   mysticism	   cannot	   be	  anything	  else	   than	  «une	  histoire	  de	  Manquant»	   (a	  history	  of	   the	  missing	   -­‐	  one).	  However,	  once	   again,	   this	   absence	   is	   manifested	   (or	   un-­‐manifested)	   to	   the	   external	   observer,	   the	  historian	   himself.	   And	   it	   is	   exactly	   the	   contrast	   between	   this	   external	   absence	   and	   the	  absolute	  (internal)	  presence	  of	  volition	  that	  makes	   impossible	   for	   the	  mystical	  experience	  to	  maintain	  permanence	  in	  legacy.	  Only	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  mystique	  can	  be	  legacy-­‐ed,	  not	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and	  historical	  concern.	  If,	  as	  Angelus	  Silesius14	  writes,	  «Gott	  spricht	  nur	  immer	  Ja»15	  it	  is	  precisely	  to	  contrast	  a	  world	  where	  disappearance	  and	  opposition	  (the	  ‘no’s	  of	  time)	   are	   prevalent.	   God’s	   voice	   speaking	   to	   (or	   better	   ‘listened	   by’,	   from	   a	  epistemological	  perspective)	   the	  mystic	   contains	   its	  own	  permanence	   (the	  eternal	  ‘yes’	  which	  affirms	  perennial	  presence).	  Utterance	   of	   a	   cultural	   content,	   therefore,	   implies	   anticipation	   of	  meaning,	  and	   of	   retention	   of	   such	   meaning:	   not	   only	   does	   the	   author	   anticipate	   ‘making	  sense’,	  so	  to	  speak	  (be	  it	  a	  gnoseological	  or	  simply	  an	  aesthetical	  sense),	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  also	  assumes	  that	  the	  content	  will	  be	  transmittable	  and	  that	  someone	  (not	  necessarily	   the	  receiving	  object,	  even	  when	   it	   is	  a	   live	  person)	  will	  be	  able	   to	  decipher	  that	  meaning.	  This	  is	  in	  some	  reciprocity	  with	  the	  reception	  theory’s	  take	  on	  interpretation:	  Gadamer	  explains	  how	  Heidegger’s	  ‘circle	  of	  hermeneutics’	  finds	  «positive	  ontological	  significance»	  specifically	  in	  the	  realization	  that	  	  	  A	  person	  who	  is	  trying	  to	  understand	  a	  text	  is	  always	  performing	  an	  act	  of	   projecting.	   He	   projects	   before	   himself	   a	   meaning	   for	   the	   text	   as	   a	  whole	   as	   soon	   as	   some	   initial	  meaning	   emerges	   in	   the	   text.	   Again,	   the	  latter	   emerges	   only	   because	   he	   is	   reading	   the	   text	   with	   particular	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  mysticism	   itself,	   and	   this	   absence	   ‘to	   history’	   does	   not	   contrast	   the	   presence	   that	  we	  have	  defined	  as	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  mystic.	  14	  A	  17th-­‐century	  mystical	  theologian	  and	  poet.	  See	  Angelus,	  Silesius,	  and	  Paul	  Carus.	  Angelus	  
Silesius:	  A	  Selection	   from	   the	  Rhymes	  of	  a	  German	  Mystic.	  Whitefish,	  Mont.:	   Kessinger	   Pub,	  2007.	  15	  «God	  only	  says	  yes»,	  Angelus	  Silesius,	  Cherubinischer	  Wondersmann,	  II,	  4.	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expectations	  in	  regard	  to	  a	  certain	  meaning.	  The	  working	  out	  of	  this	  fore-­‐project,	   which	   is	   constantly	   revised	   in	   terms	   of	   what	   emerges	   as	   he	  penetrates	  into	  the	  meaning,	  is	  understanding	  what	  is	  there.16	  	  Gadamer	   is	   talking	   about	   the	   interpretation-­‐side	   of	   cultural	   transmission,	  and	  we	  have	  explored	  his	  insights	  when	  describing	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  inheritance	  (which	   is	   intertwined	  with	  and	  contains	   interpretation).	  However,	   in	   light	  of	  what	  we	   have	   said	   about	   permanence	   (and	   about	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   cultural	   content	  surviving	  the	  moment	  as	  necessary	  for	  the	  very	  creation	  of	   that	  content)	   it	  should	  appear	  clear	  how	  projection	  of	  meaning	  applies	  not	  only	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  text,	   but	   also	   (and	   first)	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   it	   as	   a	   text	   (or	   more	   in	   general	   as	   a	  content)	  with	  a	  meaning.	  And	   indeed	   it	  was	  Gadamer	  himself	  who	  wrote	   that	  «the	  intention	  and	  fulfillment	  of	  meaning	  belong	  essentially	  to	  the	  unity	  of	  meaning.»17	  The	   inheritee	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   need	   for	   meaning,	   and	   fore-­‐projects	   such	   a	  meaning	  not	  differently	   than	  the	   inheritor	  will	   later	  do.	  While	   the	   latter	  projects	  a	  yet-­‐to-­‐be-­‐discovered	   (and	   thus	   future)	  meaning	   ‘retrospectively’,	   the	  projecting	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  232	  17 	  Gadamer,	   Truth	   and	   Method,	   p.	   216.	   Gadamer	   is	   commenting	   on	   Husserl’s	   Logical	  
Intuitions	   and	   in	   this	   passage	   (contrary	   to	   the	   longer	   quote	   above)	   he	   is	   not	   referring	  specifically	  to	  meaning	  of	  a	  text.	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  meaning	  as	  a	  dialectic	  process	  with	  moments	  of	  creation,	  misunderstanding	  and	  interpretation	  works	  quite	  well	  with	  the	  unity	  of	   meaning	   that	   this	   quote	   suggests.	   Moreover,	   we	   could	   argue	   that	   if	   this	   applies	   to	  meaning	  in	  general	  it	  must	  apply	  to	  meaning	  in	  texts	  as	  well.	  We	  shall	  return	  to	  this	  unity	  of	  intention	   and	   fulfillment	   in	   chapter	   5,	  when	   dealing	  with	   the	  moment	   of	   Passing	   and	   the	  codependence	  of	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy.	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the	  inheritee	  is	  completely	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  meaning	  projected	  by	  the	  interpreter	  is	  the	  meaning	  that	  she	  expects	  to	  found,	  understand	  and	  be	  provided	  with.	  It	  is	  a	  past	  meaning	   that	   she	   expects	   in	  her	  own	   future.	   Conversely,	   the	   inheritee	   expects	   the	  meaning	  her	  text	  is	  imbued	  with	  to	  be	  understandable	  somewhere	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  
present	  of	   such	  meaning	   is	   the	   inheritee’s	   own,	   and	   its	   ‘making	   sense’	   is	   what	   is	  projected	   in	   the	   future.	   The	   expectation	   is	   reversed:	   the	   future	   is	   ‘historical’	   and	  ‘hermeneutical’,	  while	  the	  present	  is	  absolutely	  personal.	  	  Hope	  is	  at	  the	  base	  of	  this	  projection.	  Yet	  the	  inheritee	  does	  not	  project	  this	  meaning	  onto	  something	  else,	  but	  onto	  someone	  else:	  she	  hopes	  that	  the	  meaning	  –	  which	  she	  knows	  (or	  thinks	  she	  knows)	  experientially	  to	  be	  there	  -­‐	  will	  be	  grasped	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  interpretation.	  She	  projects	  the	  possibility	  for	  it	  to	  be	  interpreted.	  Vice	   versa,	   in	   the	   inheritor’s	   perspective,	   the	   possibility	   was	   taken	   as	  incontrovertible	   (belonging	   to	   the	   present	   of	   the	   interpreter),	   and	   it	   was	   the	  meaning	  itself	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  projected.	  	  Therefore,	   the	   inheritee	   identifies	   herself	   as	   a	   harbinger	   of	   meaning,	   and	  understands	   the	   object	   of	   reception	   (be	   it	   the	   camera,	   the	  document,	   the	   listener,	  etc.)	   as	   a	   suitable	   receptor.	   In	   S/Z,	   a	   seminal	   text	   for	   poststructuralist	   theories	   of	  cultural	   reception,	   Barthes	  writes	   that	   «the	   goal	   of	   literary	  work	   (of	   literature	   as	  work)	  is	  to	  make	  the	  reader	  no	  longer	  a	  consumer,	  but	  a	  producer	  of	  the	  text,»18	  and	  this	   applies	   to	   philosophical	   texts	   as	   well.	   The	   reader/inheritor	   (no	   matter	   how	  displaced	   in	   time)	   is	   called	   to	   cooperate	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   a	  meaning	   that	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Barthes,	  Roland,	  and	  Honoré	  de	  Balzac.	  S/Z.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1974,	  p.	  4.	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being	  conceived	  in	  advance,	  far	  before	  (conceptually	  if	  not	  also	  chronologically)	  she	  actually	  enters	  the	  scene.	  The	  text	  is	  produced	  as	  a	  text	  (and	  not	  as	  a	  dead	  object)	  only	   insofar	   as	   its	   intention	   is	   for	   it	   to	   be	   “readable”	   (lisible	   in	   Barthes’	   original	  French)19.	  The	   intentionality	   of	   discourse,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   shapes	   the	   delivery	   of	  content,	  but	  such	  intentionality	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  intention	  to	  produce	  a	  Legacy:	  as	  in	  Fichte’s	  example,	  the	  content	  may	  be	  uttered	  just	  for	  a	  few	  selected	  listeners,	  or	  it	  can	  be	  said	  ‘in	  passing’	  and	  not	  with	  the	  aspiration	  of	  having	  it	  identified	  with	  the	   speaker	   as	   their	   own.	   However,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   account	   for	   this	   intentionality	  staying	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  modern	  and	  post-­‐modern	  theories	  of	  interpretation;	  not	  only	   have	   we	   seen	   how	   a	   large	   section	   of	   Hermeneutics	   has	   championed	   a	  bracketing	  of	  or	  at	   least	  a	  blindness	  to	   the	  personality	  and	   intention	  of	   the	  author	  (with	   the	   projected	   meaning	   taking	   precedence	   over	   the	   intended	   meaning),	   but	  even	   those	   who	   think	   we	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   person-­‐author	   also	   risk	  confusing	   the	   author	   as	   received	   with	   the	   inheritee	   as	   a	   speaking	   subject.	  Recognizing	   our	   historical	   prejudices	   (freeing	   our	   possibility	   of	   historical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Barthes	   uses	   ‘lisible’	   for	   the	   text	   intended	   only	   as	   a	   inscripted	   series	   of	  words	  written	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  language	  and	  consequently	  capable	  of	  being	  read	  by	  an	  audience.	  
Scriptible	   texts	   (usually	   translated	   as	   ‘writerly	   texts’)	   require	   en	   engagement	   from	   the	  reader	  (who	  is	  challenged	  by	  the	  reworking	  of	  established	  codes	  performed	  in	  them).	  	  The	  common	  denominator,	  nevertheless,	  remains	  ‘readability’,	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  we	  use	  here	  the	  term	  ‘lisable.’	  Cf.	  S/Z	  (op.	  cit.)	  as	  well	  as	  Roland	  Barthes	  and	  Richard	  Miller,	  The	  Pleasure	  of	  
the	  Text,	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1975.	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awareness)	  is	  not	  enough,	  if	  we	  keep	  reaching	  the	  inheritee	  through	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  text	  –	  a	  meaning	  that,	  as	  we	  saw,	  we	  are	  projecting.	  	  If	  Hegel	   is	  right	  when	  writing	  that	  «all	  method	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  object	   itself»20,	  then	   we	   cannot	   conceive	   a	   theory	   of	   Legacy	   which	   fails	   to	   recognize	   the	   object-­‐legacy.	  But	  what	   is	   it?	  And	  how	  can	  we	  distinguish	   the	   single	   instance	  of	  a	   legacy	  (which	   is	   addressed	   by	   theory	   of	   interpretation)	   from	   the	   overall	   narrative	   of	  someone’s	   Legacy	   (which	   is	  what	   is	   ultimately	   the	   goal	   of	   this	   second	  part	   of	   our	  exploration)?	   Even	   Gadamer,	   with	   his	   ambition	   to	   historicize	   the	   content	   by	  addressing	  the	  historicality	  of	  the	  author,	  defines	  his	  own	  efforts	  always	  in	  relation	  to	   the	   text	  he	  addresses:	   the	  author	   is	   functional	   to	  our	  understanding	  of	   the	   text,	  not	  vice	  versa.	  	  Philosophical	   biographers,	   conversely,	   are	   usually	   interested	   in	   their	  character	   as	   a	   living	   being,	   with	   the	   underlying	   assumption,	   once	   again,	   that	  understanding	  the	  historical	  biography	  of	  a	  person	  will	  help	  us	  position	  him	  as	  an	  author,	   which	   in	   turn	   constitutes	   a	   tool	   for	   understanding	   a	   text.	   “Transversal”	  analyses	  as	  well	  ultimately	  fail	  at	  grasping	  the	  individuality	  of	  the	  inheritees,	  as	  they	  are	  usually	  carried	  out	  focusing	  on	  a	  specific	  facet	  of	  the	  Legacy	  (‘the	  role	  of	  x	  in	  the	  philosophy	   of	   y’)	   and	   therefore	   accessed	   and	   accessible	   only	   through	   a	   specific	  interest	  that,	  once	  again,	  cuts	  out	  the	  Legacy	  as	  a	  self-­‐justifying	  entity.	  We	   should	   not,	   however,	   confuse	   the	  moment	   of	   interpretation	   (when	   the	  content	  is	  addressed)	  with	  the	  overarching	  narrative	  of	  Legacy,	  which	  goes	  beyond	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Hegel,	  Wissenschaft	  der	  Logik,	  v.	  II.,	  p.	  486.	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the	   text	   and	   deals	   with	   the	   respective	   position	   of	   the	   inheritee	   and	   of	   his	   heirs.	  Gadamer	  is	  on	  point	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  	  D’une	   part,	   tout	   texte	   appartient	   d’abord	   à	   l’ensemble	   des	   ouvres	   de	  l’auteur	   et	   ensuite	   à	   l’ensemble	   de	   la	   littérature	   dont	   il	   provient.	   De	  l’autre	  côté,	  si	  nous	  voulons	  saisir	  le	  texte	  dans	  l’authenticité	  de	  son	  sens	  original,	  il	  faut	  le	  voir	  comme	  la	  manifestation	  d’un	  moment	  créateur.21	  	  We	  have	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  moment	   of	   creation,	   and	  we	  must	  underline	   once	   again	   that	   the	   body	   of	   work	   of	   the	   author	   is	   something	   that	   is	  defined	   ex	   post,	   since	   it	   is	   not	   necessarily	   existing	   and	   certainly	   not	   collectively	  completed	   at	   the	   time	   in	   which	   every	   single	   content	   (every	   potential	   legacy)	   is	  created.	   Legacy	   is	   not	   experienceable	   directly	   by	   the	   inheritee,	   since	   it	   relies	   on	  inheritors	  receiving	   it.22	  Nonetheless,	   the	   inheritee’s	  Legacy	   is	  what	  we	  can	  access,	  since	  by	  recognizing	  an	  author	  as	  such	  and	  trying	  to	  understand	  him	  as	  historically	  collocated,	  we	  are	  actualizing	  his	  Legacy	  by	  creating	  our	  Inheritance,	  as	  we	  will	  see.	  However,	  inheritees	  are	  often	  analysed	  through	  the	  methodological	  lenses	  of	  tradition,	  assuming	  a	  continuity	  between	  their	  Inheritance	  and	  their	  Legacy	  which	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  «On	  the	  one	  hand,	  all	  texts	  belong	  first	  of	  all	  to	  the	  body	  of	  work	  of	  the	  author	  and	  then	  to	  the	  collective	  of	  the	  literature	  it	  comes	  from.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  grasp	  the	  text	  in	  the	  authenticity	  of	  its	  original	  meaning,	  we	  must	  see	  it	  as	  the	  manifestation	  of	  a	  creative	  moment»	   Gadamer,	   “Foundations	   for	   Hermeneutics”	   in	   Problème	   de	   la	   Conscience	  
Historique,	  p.	  75.	  Translation	  mine.	  22	  More	  on	  this	  in	  chapter	  5.	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taken	   for	   granted,	   but	   not	   verified.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   inheritee	   and	   a	   potential	  inheritor	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  ‘tradition’	  at	  large	  (be	  it	  that	  of	  a	  religious	  community,	  of	   a	   philosophical	   school,	   etc.)	   is	   charged	  with	   an	   essential,	   causal	   value	  where	   it	  should	   only	   carry	   a	   descriptive	   one;	   understanding	   someone’s	   legacy	   in	   a	   certain	  way	  in	  light	  of	  the	  tradition	  she	  subscribed	  to	  may	  appear	  natural,	  but	  it	  is	  actually	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  logical	  bias.	  First,	  we	  must	  assume	  that	  the	  inheritee	  was	  indeed	  a	  part	  of	  that	  tradition:	  as	  we	  saw,	  claiming	  a	  received	   inheritance	   is	  not	   the	  same	  as	  actually	  receiving	   it,	  and	   this	   is	   obviously	   true	   when	   asserting	   to	   belong	   to	   traditions	   as	   well;	   even	  assuming	   the	   good	   faith	   of	   the	   aspiring	   tradition-­‐er	   (our	   hypothetical	   inheritee),	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  she	  was	  orthodoxically	  part	  of	  the	  tradition,	  or	  if	   she	   was	   diverging	   heretically	   from	   it.	   But	   even	   deferring	   the	   decision	   to	   the	  tradition’s	   own	   authorities	   (the	   only	   ones	   empowered	  with	   decreeing	   or	   denying	  ‘belonging’)	   is	   not	   a	   solution;	   besides	   constituting	   an	   abandonment	   of	   individual,	  independent	  hermeneutics,	   it	   fails	   to	  provide	  an	  appropriate	   interpretational	   tool,	  since	  the	  transformation	  of	  ‘truth	  into	  wisdom’23	  subtracts	  the	  transformed	  content	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  methodological	  analysis.	  	  What	  we	   are	   told	   is	   just	   this:	   the	   author’s	  work	   has	   content	   susceptible	   of	  being	   interpreted	   as	   part	   of	   a	   tradition.	   The	   interpretation	   is	   that	   the	   content	   is	  traditional.	  Therefore,	  using	  such	  an	  interpretation	  (by	  the	  authorities)	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  our	   hermeneutics	   of	   the	   content	  would	   constitute	   a	   vicious	   circle.	   Understanding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Introduction	  to	  Benjamin’s	  Illuminations.	  Cf.	  Chapter	  3,	  page	  X.	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something	   in	   light	   of	   the	   tradition	   its	   author	   belonged	   to	   is	   a	   self-­‐referential	  approach.	  Even	  the	  author’s	  perception	  of	  himself	  as	  belonging	  to	  one	  tradition	  (or	  cultural	  group)	  has	  only	  an	  intention-­‐value,	  which	  is	  however	  exhausted	  in	  his/her	  evaluation	  of	  such	  a	  tradition	  as	  philosophically	  (or	  ethically)	  solid,	  even	  assuming	  that	  this	  perception	  is	  sincere	  (and	  not	  claimed	  for	  socio-­‐political	  reasons).	  Beside	   the	   first	   assumption	   (that	   the	   inheritee	   belonged	   to	   a	   tradition	   and	  that	   this	   was	   shaping	   his	   intentionality	   while	   composing	   the	   content	   we	   are	  interested	  in),	  for	  tradition	  to	  be	  a	  valuable	  mode	  of	  interpretation	  when	  accessing	  a	  Legacy	  we	  would	  also	  have	   to	  assume	  that	   the	   tradition	   through	  whose	   lenses	  we	  analyze	  the	  inheritee’s	  legacy	  is	  the	  same	  he	  subscribed	  to,	  and	  that	  we	  understand	  it	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  The	  illusion	  of	  ‘a’	  tradition	  being	  constant	  is	  a	  prejudice	  derived	  of	  our	  historical	  situation.	  On	  the	  matter,	  Dilthey	  said	  that	  we	  would	  be	  in	  need	  of	  a	  «Critique	   of	   Historical	   Reason»24	  as	   a	   counterbalance	   to	   Kant’s	   Critique	   of	   Pure	  Reason,	   in	   order	   to	   deal	   specifically	   with	   our	   distorted	   perception	   of	   historical	  reality.	  The	   use	   of	   tradition	   as	   ‘context’,	   therefore,	   actually	   needs	   to	   be	  contextualized	   in	   turn,	  creating	  a	  spiraling	  need	   for	  confirmation	   that	  reduces	  our	  interpretation	  ‘in	  light	  of	  tradition’	  to	  an	  unsubstantiated	  claim	  or	  to	  a	  tautological	  (and	  thus	  useless)	  one.	  Beside	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  individuality	  of	  authoriality	  and	   the	   institutional	   authority	   of	   tradition,	   this	  methodological	   filter	   prevents	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Quoted	  by	  Gadamer	  in	  “Scope	  and	  Limits	  of	  the	  work	  of	  W.	  Dilthey”	  in	  Le	  Problème	  de	  la	  
conscience	  historique,	  op.	  cit.	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notion	   of	   tradition	   to	   be	   fully	   productive	   in	   our	   exploration	   of	   an	   individual’s	  Legacy,	  even	  if	  we	  were	  to	  admit	  the	  value	  of	  tradition	  for	  such	  individual.	  All	  that	  is	  left,	  therefore,	  when	  dealing	  with	  Legacy	  and	  tradition,	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  inheritee	  was	  convinced	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  tradition.	  Even	  after	  resolving	  the	  problem	   of	   good	   faith	   that	   we	   referred	   above	   (when	   discussing	   the	   truth	   of	   the	  claim	  to	   tradition),	  all	  we	  retain	   is	   intention.	  We	  can	  ascertain	  the	  ambition	  of	   the	  inheritee	  to	  ‘belong’.	  But	  that	  could	  never	  shed	  any	  light	  on	  the	  content	  of	  his	  Legacy	  per	  se,	  since	   it	   is	   in	  the	  content	   itself.	  What	  such	   intention	  can	  disclose,	   instead,	   is	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  inheritee’s	  own	  Inheritance,	  from	  which	  Legacy	  necessarily	  stems.	  We	   have	   reached	   a	   point	   of	   contact	   between	   Inheritance	   and	   Legacy,	  although	   inversely	   related	   and	   far	   less	   problematic	   that	  when	   considered	   in	   their	  more	   fundamental	   succession.	   If	   we	   have	   defined	   Inheritance	   as	   deriving	   from	  cultural	   density	   (in	   actualizing	   potential	   contents	   and	   retaining	   them),	   it	   is	   no	  surprise	   that	   we	   shall	   find	   Inheritance	   at	   the	   core	   of	   one’s	   Legacy	   (which	   is	   the	  aggregation	   of	   all	   contents	   the	   inheritee	   is	   subsceptible	   of	   handing	   down).	   We	  should	   not,	   however,	   underestimate	   three	   factors	   that	   influence	   the	   relation	  between	  one’s	  Inheritance	  and	  one’s	  Legacy:	  	  1) We	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  interpretation	  and	  reception	  of	  a	  content	  as	  part	  of	  one’s	   Inheritance	  are	  not	   simply	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  a	   factus	  brutus,	  but	   a	   process	   of	   transformation.	   However,	   despite	   the	   condition	   of	   the	  inheritee	  being	  that	  of	  a	  human	  in	  society,	  who	  is	  necessarily	  immersed	  in	  a	   cultural	   density	   of	   potential,	   continually	   mutating	   and	   constantly	  
	   231	  
inherited	   potential	   contents,	   the	   role	   of	   individual	   speculation	   remains	  crucial	  to	  the	  progress	  of	  thought.	  While	   it	   could	  be	  argued	   that,	   since	  no	   thought	   (philosophical	  or	  not)	   is	   born	   in	   a	   vacuum	   (the	   thinker	   being	   always	   already	   exposed	   to	  potential	  inheritances),	  the	  transformative	  process	  of	  Inheritance	  is	  what	  propels	  the	  thinking	  forward,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  absolute	  core	  of	  independent	   thinking	   that	   shapes	   the	   inheritance	   itself,	   in	   a	   process	   of	  self-­‐narration.	   This,	   however,	   would	   be	   a	   topic	   for	   a	   different	  philosophical	  and	  psychological	  analysis;	  we	  will	  be	  content	  with	  saying	  that,	  whatever	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is,	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  different	  individuals,	  despite	  experiencing	  an	  overlap	  of	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  their	  cultural	  density,	  derive	  different	  consequences	  from	  the	  inheritances	  on	  a	  given	   matter,	   proves	   the	   relevance	   of	   one’s	   subjectivity	   in	   connecting	  different	   instances	   of	   inheritance	   into	   a	   discourse.	   Therefore,	   simply	  equating	  one’s	  Inheritance	  with	  their	  projected	  Legacy	  (which	  is	  potential	  for	   them	  and	  actualized	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	   the	   inquirer)	  would	   fail	  to	   account	   for	   the	   intervening	   personal	   speculation	   with	   its	  transformational	  power.	  We	   have	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   3	   how	   language	   differences	  influence	   the	   inheritance	   process.	   However,	   for	   obvious	   reasons,	   the	  impact	  of	  language	  is	  far	  less	  relevant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Legacy.	  The	  inheritee	  was	  an	  inheritor	  to	  others,	  and	  possibly	  accessed	  their	  contents	  through	  a	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linguistic	   mediation	   (be	   it	   translation,	   her	   own	   understanding	   of	   the	  Other’s	  language	  or	  a	  retelling	  of	  the	  content	  via	  accessible	  sources);	  her	  output,	  however,	   follows	  directly	   from	  her	  choices,	   to	  the	  point	   that	  her	  intention	  is	  transferred	  into	  her	  writing.	  The	  inheritee	  is	  by	  necessity	  able	  to	  understand	  what	  she	  produces,	  at	  least	  at	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  she	  is	  producing	  it.	  A	   similar	   point	   can	   be	   argued	   for	   cultural	   and	   contingent	  limitations	   to	   understanding:	   we	   have	   discussed	   how	   historical	  awareness	   involves	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   differences	   between	   the	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  content	  was	  created	  and	  our	  situation.	  Consequently,	  when	  we	  approach	  a	  content	  as	  interpreters	  (and	  possibly	  inheritors)	  we	  are	   called	   to	   avoid	   superimposing	   our	   situation	   on	   the	   content	   itself.	  However,	  when	  the	  content	  is	  received	  by	  the	  inheritee	  (qua	  interpreter	  and	   inheritor)	   and	   she	   proceeds	   to	   elaborate	   her	   philosophical	   system,	  the	  situation	  is	  by	  necessity	  and	  legitimately	  a	  factor.	  There	  is	  a	  caesura,	  therefore,	  between	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  inheritee	  as	  interpreter	  and	  her	  subjectivity	  as	  creator	  of	  new	  Legacy,	  which	  prevents	  us	  once	  again	  from	  simply	   identifying	   the	   moment	   of	   Inheritance	   (in	   which	   a	   content	  originated	  by	  a	  different	  intent/subjectivity	  is	  received	  by	  ours)	  with	  the	  Legacy	   we	   are	   susceptible	   of	   handing	   down	   (in	   which	   a	   content	   is	  structured	  according	  to	  our	  own	  intent	  and	  thus	  created	  anew).	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2) The	  inheritee	  qua	  inheritor	  is	  the	  recipient	  of	  a	  history	  that	  collapses	  into	  his	  situation,	  and	  cannot	  escape	  it.	  We	  are	  reminded	  by	  Ricoeur	  that:	  	   Il	   n’y	   a	   une	   histoire	   que	   parce	   que	   les	   philosophies	   antérieures	  font	  partie	  de	  la	  mémoire	  et	  de	  la	  situation	  du	  noveau	  philosophe;	  mais	  chacun	  englobe	  en	  quelque	  sorte	  l’histoire	  passée	  en	  lui,	  dans	  un	  moment	  historique	  qui	  est	  une	  sorte	  d’absolu.25	  	   The	   aspiration	   to	   escape	   present	   through	   permanence,	   which	   is	  the	  temporal	  mode	  lying	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Legacy	  process,	  is	  completely	  absent	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  Inheritance,	  in	  which	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  situation	  is	   precisely	   that	   of	   including26,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   all	   of	   philosophical	  history.	   The	   transmission	   of	   the	   inheritee’s	   inheritance	   into	   her	   Legacy	  cannot	  happen	  without	  a	  radical	  shift	   in	  perspective,	  and	  this	  shift	  must	  be	   reflected	   in	   our	   historiographical	   and	   philosophical	   approach	   to	   the	  transmission	   itself:	   the	   incommensurability	   of	   the	   collapsed	   now	   of	  Inheritance	   with	   the	   projecting	   now	   of	   Legacy	   prevent	   us	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  «There	   is	   a	   history	   only	   because	   previous	   philosophies	   are	   part	   of	   the	   memory	   and	  situation	  of	  the	  new	  philosopher;	  but	  every	  one	  includes	  somehow	  in	  themselves	  all	  of	  past	  history,	   in	  an	  historical	  moment	  that	   is	  somehow	  absolute.»	   	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  63,	  the	  translation	  is	  mine.	  26	  “Englober”	  in	  French	  is	  somewhere	  between	  ‘including’	  and	  ‘absorbing’,	  ‘making	  a	  part	  of	  the	  whole’	  and	  it	  is	  quite	  difficult	  to	  render	  in	  English,	  where	  ‘englobe’	  refers	  more	  directly	  to	  a	  sphere.	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understanding	   them	   as	   the	   same	   process,	   even	   when	   their	   performing	  subject	  is	  the	  same	  (i.e.	  the	  inheritee	  as	  inheritor	  of	  someone	  else’s	  work).	  3) If	   the	   experience	   of	   Inheritance	   is	   set	   in	   the	   diachrony	   between	   the	  moment	  of	  reception	  and	  the	  moment	  of	  creation	  (always	  in	  absentia	  for	  the	  inheritor),	  the	  appropriation	  of	  time	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  self-­‐narration	  of	  the	   speaker	   of	   a	   potential	   Legacy.	   Giving	   a	   speech	   and	   writing	   a	   page	  amounts	  to	  appropriating	  one’s	  time	  and	  giving	  it	  away	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  It	   is	   appropriation	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   speaker	  makes	   the	   time	   that	  of	  
her	  speaking,	   the	   time	   in	  which	  her	  Legacy	   is	  uttered.	  The	  chronological	  time	  of	  the	  situation,	  on	  which	  she	  has	  no	  power,	  is	  shaped	  into	  the	  time	  of	  her	  Legacy	  (or	  of	  part	  of	  it).	  	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   though,	   this	   time	   is	  spent	  giving	  the	  content	   to	  someone	   else,	   the	   time	   of	   the	   inheritee	   is	   given	   completely	   to	   Legacy	  itself,	  and	  this	  Legacy	  is	  given	  to	  the	  world.	  The	  appropriation	  took	  all	  the	  time,	  yet	  the	  time	  is	  given	  to	  the	  (potential)	  inheritor.	  Derrida	  reminds	  us	  of	   the	  clever	  sentence	  Madame	  de	  Maintenon	  wrote	   to	  Madame	  Brinon:	  «The	  King	  takes	  all	  my	  time.	  I	  give	  the	  rest	  to	  Saint	  Cyr	  (to	  whom	  I	  would	  like	   to	   give	   it	   all).»27	  Once	   again,	   the	   ‘belonging’	   of	   time	   is	   a	   matter	   of	  narration.	   Narrating	   the	   content	   implies	   narrating	   one’s	   time	   as	   one’s	  own,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  narrating	  the	  content	  to	  someone	  else	  means	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “Time	  of	  the	  King”,	  in	  Given	  Time	  1:	  Counterfeit	  Money,	  ed.	  Peggy	  Kamuf,	  Chicago	  &	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1992,	  p.	  3.	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making	  that	  someone	  else	  the	  center	  of	  this	  time,	  even	  if	  the	  spectator	  is	  displaced	  in	  a	  time	  that	  is	  yet	  to	  come.	  The	  inheritor	  will	  read	  the	  book	  in	  a	  ‘then’	  that	  is	  not	  yet	  present	  and	  yet	  makes	  the	  time	  of	  Creation	  a	  retrospective	  then:	   the	  Legacy	  will	  
have	   been	  written	   ‘then’,	   and	   that	   ‘then’	   is	   what	   the	   inheritee	   calls	   her	  ‘now’.	  The	  appropriation	  implies	  a	  dispossession	  if	   it	   is	  to	  be	  a	  potential	  legacy,	   and	   such	   dispossession	   is	   not	   identifiable	   with	   the	   absolute	  appropriation	  of	  time	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  Inheritance.	  The	   narration	   of	   Time,	   therefore,	   determines	   the	   temporal	   collocation	   of	  legacy	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  chronological	  time	  cannot	  fully	  sustain.	  De	  Certeau	  writes	  in	  
La	   Fable	  Mystique	   that	   the	   «eternity	   of	   the	   moment»	   contradicts	   the	   «structured	  time»	  produced	  by	  history.28	  We	  must	  tarry	  and	  struggle	  with	  this	  intuition,	  which	  has	  a	  twofold	  meaning	  to	  say	  the	  least.	  	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	  «structured	   time»	  of	  history	   is	  a	  narration	   itself,	   if	  by	  ‘history’	  we	  mean	  ‘historiography’,	  as	  we	  know	  De	  Certeau	  does	  in	  this	  work	  of	  his.	  In	  this	  sense,	  history	  tries	  to	  fit	  a	  series	  of	  absolutely	  incommensurable	  moments	  of	  creation	  in	  a	  structure	  common	  to	  all.	  It	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  history	  as	  tradition	  against	  which	   Foucault	   argued	   (in	   favor	   of	   discontinuity),	   which	   fails	   to	   account	   for	   the	  absolute	   individuality	  of	  moments	  of	   creation	   (and,	  we	  should	   say,	  of	  moments	  of	  attention	   as	   well).	   The	   narration	   of	   history	   as	   a	   history	   of	   continuity,	   therefore,	  proves	   incapable	  of	  narrating	   the	  eternity	  of	   the	  moment	  of	   creation,	  which	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  De	  Certeau,	  La	  Fable	  Mystique,	  Paris:	  Gallimard	  1982,	  p.	  21	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only	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   absolutely	   momentary	   (and	   momentous)	   instance	   of	  legacy	  (with	  our	  narration	  of	  it	  being	  an	  absolutely	  individual	  inheritance).	  De	  Certeau’s	  insight,	  however,	  might	  as	  well	  be	  reversed:	  a	  ‘structured	  time’	  is	   also	   that	   of	   the	   clock,	   which	   only	   knows	   rigid	   subdivisions	   (of	   time)	   that	  encapsulate	   any	   instance	  of	   creation,	  which	   is	  by	  necessity	   located	   in	  one	   specific	  point	   of	   the	   line	   of	   time.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   it	   is	   not	   narrated	   history	   to	   be	  structured,	   but	   the	   very	   nature	   of	   biological,	   geological,	   ‘natural’	   time,	   with	   its	  seconds,	   years,	   life	   cycles,	   etc.	   In	   this	   paradigm,	   then,	   it	   is	   narration	   itself	   that	   is	  capable	  of	  providing	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  dry	  structure	  of	  time	  and	  into	  the	  absolute	  eternity	  of	  the	  moment.	  	  The	   narration	   of	   cultural	   transmission,	   i.e.	   the	   narration	   of	   legacy	   and	  inheritance,	   opposes	   to	   the	   inevitability	   of	   chronological	   time	   a	   sympathetic	  moment,	   in	  which	   the	   creator	   and	   the	   receiver	   are	   narrated	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	  inheritee	   and	   inheritor. 29 	  This	   sympathy	   is	   the	   ‘friendship’-­‐like	   quality	   that	  according	   to	   Ricoeur30	  	   allows	   the	   history-­‐oriented	   philosopher	   to	   focus	   on	   a	  
particularity	   (the	   eternal	   moment,	   in	   De	   Certeau’s	   perspective)	   and	   to	   extract	   it	  from	  the	  sequence	  of	  the	  ‘general	  process.’	  	  However,	   while	   this	   ‘symphilosophieren’31,	   this	   élan	   vital	   of	   sympathetic	  friendship,	   will	   be	   actualized	   only	   in	   the	   moment	   of	   Passing	   (the	   encounter	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  This	  is,	  in	  nucem,	  the	  essence	  of	  Passing,	  to	  which	  we	  shall	  go	  back	  in	  chapter	  5.	  30	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  pp.	  48	  ff.	  31	  Ricoeur,	  ibidem.	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Legacy	  and	  Inheritance	  that	  actualizes	  both	  and	  requires	  both),	  it	  is	  in	  the	  moment	  of	   creation	   that	   the	   first	   narration-­‐against-­‐time	   is	   constructed;	   the	   mode	   of	  narration	   is	   the	   aspiration	   to	   permanence	   that	   we	   have	   discussed	   above,	   which	  takes	   contents	   from	   the	   situational	   dimension	   of	   the	   inheritee’s	   own	   Inheritance	  and	   projects	   them	   into	   the	   eternalized	   (or	   at	   least	   eternalize-­‐able)	   moment	   of	  creation	  of	  (potential)	  Legacy.	  Creation	   of	   a	   content	   destined	   to	   posterity	   (no	   matter	   how	   delayed	   the	  perspective	  reception	   is	   supposed	   to	  be)	  necessarily	   involves	  a	   reflection	  on	   time,	  and	  a	  self-­‐narration	  as	  creator	   in	   time.	  Art	  can	  sometimes	  be	  more	  explicit	  at	   that	  than	  philosophy.	  I	  recently	  found	  this	  snippet	  in	  a	  magazine,	  regarding	  an	  exposition	  by	  a	  fascinating	  (and	  recently	  passed)	  Japanese	  concept	  artist:	  	  Time	  was	  the	  lifelong	  subject	  of	  On	  Kawara,	  the	  deep	  thinking	  Japanese	  artist,	  who	   lived	   in	  New	  York	   from	  1965	  until	  his	  death,	   in	   June,	  at	   the	  age	   of	   eighty-­‐one.	   He	   is	   best	   known	   for	   his	   date	   paintings,	   collectively	  titled	   “Today”,	   of	  which	  he	  produced	   thousands	   throughout	  his	   life.	  On	  each	  monochrome	   canvas,	   he	   hand-­‐painted	   the	   date	   of	   the	   day	   it	   was	  made;	  if	  Kawara	  didn’t	  finish	  a	  piece	  by	  midnight,	  it	  was	  abandoned.	  For	  years,	  he	  sent	  daily	  telegrams	  to	  friends	  and	  associates	  around	  the	  world	  that	  read,	  “I	  am	  still	  alive,”	  and	  mailed	  postcards	  stamped	  with	  the	  time	  he	  woke	  up.32	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Andrea	  K.	  Scott,	  New	  Yorker,	  Nov	  17	  2014.	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The	  article	  does	  not	  dwell	  upon	  the	  aesthetic	  criticisms	  usually	  connected	  to	  Kawara,	  and	  simply	  reports	  the	  ‘bare	  facts’.	  Yet	  we	  are	  immediately	  made	  aware	  of	  how	  ‘Time’	  (not	  ‘date’	  or	  ‘days’,	  but	  time	  itself)	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  Kawara’s	  bizarre	  date-­‐painting.	  He	  produced	  a	  content	  in	  a	  specific	  time	  and	  identified	  such	  content	  with	   the	   moment	   in	   time	   itself	   in	   which	   the	   creation	   happened	   (to	   the	   point	   of	  trashing	  the	  document	  and	  the	  content	  if	  the	  span	  of	  creation	  came	  to	  be	  different	  from	   the	   narrated	   –	   painted	   –time);	   by	   doing	   so,	   Kawara	   caused	   the	   time	   of	  narration	   of	   the	   content	   to	   replace	   (or	   absorb,	   englober)	   narration	   and	   content,	  leaving	  only	  time	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  object-­‐for-­‐attention	  to	  be	  grasped.	  What	  the	  New	  Yorker	  article	  leaves	  out	  is	  how	  this	  legacy	  of	  Kawara’s,	  time	  
as	  a	  content,	  is	  somehow	  the	  end	  result	  of	  a	  process	  that	  began	  with	  Title	  (1965),	  a	  tripartite	  painting	  on	  pink	  canvas	  bearing	  only	  a	  date	  (1965),	  a	  place	  (VIET-­‐NAM)	  and	  an	  indication	  of	  materiality	  (ONE	  THING).	  Art	  Critic	  Anne	  Rorimer,	  arguing	  the	  self-­‐referential	  nature	  of	  Title,	  writes	  that	  «	  “ONE	  THING”	  designates	  the	  painting's	  own	  reality	  as	  an	  object,	  while	   “1965”	  and	   “VIET-­‐NAM”	  provide	  minimal	  political-­‐historical	   context.»33	  We	   shall	   not	   debate	   the	   value	   of	   the	   paintings	   here,	   but	  understand	  how	  the	   intuition	  of	   time	  as	  Art	   (or	  of	  Art	  as	   time)	  symbolized	  by	   the	  Date	   Paintings	   passes	   precisely	   (and	   quite	   explicitly)	   through	   the	   renunciation	   of	  materiality	  and	  localization.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Anne	   Rorimer.	   New	   Art	   in	   the	   60s	   and	   70s:	   Redefining	   Reality.	   London:	   Thames	   and	  Hudson,	  2001,	  p.	  58.	  Also	  see	  her	  "The	  Date	  Paintings	  of	  On	  Kawara,"	  Art	  Institute	  of	  Chicago	  
Museum	  Studies	  17,	  no.	  I	  (1991):	  120-­‐37	  and	  179-­‐80.	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The	   disappearance	   (or	   the	   absence,	   since	   it	   is	   not	   on	   Title	   either)	   of	   the	  artist’s	  signature	  seems	  at	  odds	  with	  our	   idea	  of	   legacy	  as	  a	  personal	  projection	  of	  permanence,	  but	  we	  are	  forcefully	  reminded	  that	  the	  time	  of	  creation	  was	  chosen	  by	  the	   creator:	   in	  writing	   the	   date,	   Kawara	   is	   narrating	   his	   ‘today’	   as	   the	   (repeated)	  moment	  of	  his	  legacy,	  of	  which	  he	  appears	  to	  be	  very	  aware	  when	  we	  consider	  his	  ‘I’m	   still	   alive’	   postcards,	   which	   re-­‐constitute	   him	   as	   the	   creator	   of	   the	   narrated	  content	   and	   establish	   an	   indisputable	   legacy	   composed	   exactly	   of	   this	   time	  made	  content.	  Jung-­‐Ah	   Woo	   brilliantly	   notices	   that	   Kawara	   oscillates	   between	   a	   «cosmic	  dimension	  of	  time»34	  and	  a	  very	  menial	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  approach	  to	  his	  work.	  However,	  he	  also	  states	  that	  	  despite	   the	   tightly	   regulated	   labor	  or,	   rather,	   because	  of	   such	   stringent	  organization,	   Kawara's	   daily	   activity	   is	   essentially	   meaningless,	   unlike	  production	  in	  a	  real	  workplace.	  His	  labor	  is	  meticulous	  but	  unproductive,	  as	   his	   actions	   actually	   produce	   nothing	   other	   than	   a	   series	   of	   almost	  identical	  canvases.	  The	  “rationalized	  time”	  on	  his	  canvas	  eliminates	  and	  ultimately	   abstracts	   the	   sense	   of	   epistemological	   duration.	   It	   is	   not	   a	  lived	  or	  experienced	  continuity	  of	  a	  subject,	  but	  rather	  a	  pure	  articulation	  of	   punctuality:	   “homogeneous,	   empty	   time.”	   Kawara	   has	   marked	   the	  passage	   of	   each	   and	   every	   day	   on	   canvas,	   but	   such	   repetition	   only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Jung-­‐Ah	  Woo.	  “On	  Kawara's	  ‘Date	  Paintings’:	  Series	  of	  Horror	  and	  Boredom”,	  Art	  Journal,	  Vol.	  69,	  No.	  3	  (Fall	  2010),	  p.	  63.	  
	   240	  
diminishes	  the	  differences	  and	  abstracts	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  idiosyncratic	  days.35	  	  	  What	  Woo	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   is	   that	   ‘epistemological	   duration’	   is	   not	   a	  requirement	   for	  a	   lived	  continuity	  of	  subject,	   since	   the	  subject	   is	  alive	  and	  kicking	  even	   in	   the	   absoluteness	   of	   the	   instant.	   The	   eternity	   of	   the	   moment	   appears	  ‘homogenous	   and	   empty’	   only	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   the	   interpreter,	   and	   the	  impression	  of	  repetition	  is	  a	  byproduct	  of	  that	  ‘structured	  time’	  of	  the	  (art)	  historian	  against	   which	   De	   Certeau	   had	   warned	   us.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   legacy,	   each	  moment	   (and	   each	   painting)	   is	   a	   self-­‐contained	   meaningful	   instance	   of	   creation,	  which	   finds	   in	   its	   projection	   of	   a	   future	   receiver	   its	   justification,	   and	   posits	   the	  permanence	  of	  the	  artistic	  persona	  in	  a	  future	  independent	  from	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  artist	  as	  a	  person.	  	  The	   artistic	   persona	   responsible	   for	   the	   collective	  work	   (Date	  Paintings)	   is	  the	  carrier	  of	  legacy.	  The	  On	  Kawara	  who	  is	  constantly	  ‘still	  alive’	  in	  his	  postcards	  is	  what	   allows	   us	   to	   interpret	   his	   production	   as	   anything	   but	   ‘meaningless’:	   the	  projection	   of	   a	   unified	   Legacy	   is	   clearly	   at	   work	   in	   Kawara’s	   work,	   and	   only	  bracketing	   our	   interpretational	   singular	   impression	   (of	  a	  painting	   or	   even	  only	   of	  the	  Date	  Paintings	  without	  the	  postcards	  and	  the	  evolution	  from	  Title)	  can	  we	  reveal	  
ex	  post	  the	  value	  of	  Legacy	  which	  was	  crucial	  ex	  ante	  in	  Kawara’s	  artistic	  aesthetic.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Jung-­‐Ah	  Woo.	  “On	  Kawara's	  ‘Date	  Paintings’”,	  p.	  65.	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  Both	   Tradition	   and	   the	   Inheritee’s	   inheritance	   have	   proved	   unsatisfying	  tools	   for	   the	  discussion	  of	   the	   inheritee’s	  Legacy,	   and	  we	  have	   seen	  how	  even	   the	  single	  piece	  of	  inheritance	  can	  sometimes	  fail	  to	  portray	  its	  larger	  meaning	  as	  part	  of	  a	  Legacy.	  We	  are	   left,	  once	  again,	  with	   intention	  as	  the	  only	  discernible	  relation	  between	   the	  reality	  of	   the	  creating	  moment	   (the	   inheritee	  speaking	  or	  writing	   the	  content),	   the	   inheritee’s	   predecessors	   (insofar	   as	   she	   possibly	   incorporates	   her	  Inheritance	  into	  her	  Legacy)	  and	  the	  projected	  unity	  of	  her	  legacy	  (to	  be	  received	  by	  her	  inheritors).	  We	   saw	   how,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Inheritance,	   any	   cultural	   content	   potentially	  accessible	  to	  the	  inheritor	  was	  susceptible	  of	  becoming	  part	  of	  her	  inheritance.	  This	  is	   not	   true	   of	   Legacy,	   since	   as	   we	   have	   shown	   reception	   of	   contents	   (and	   thus	  actualization	  of	  cultural	  density	  into	  interpretation	  and	  inheritance)	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  define	  and	  determine	  Legacy.	  Intentionality,	  and	  not	  cultural	  density,	  is	  the	  prime	  factor	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  horizon	  of	  Legacy.	  However,	  the	  intentionality	  of	  Legacy	  is	   not	   reducible	   to	   the	   intentionality	   of	   the	   inheritee,	   despite	   our	   immediate	  impression	  that	  would	  suggest	  as	  much.	  Barthes	   appears	   very	   aware	   of	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   absolute	   present-­‐ness	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  creation	  and	  the	  subsequent	  collocation	  of	  the	  content	  into	  a	  larger	  narrative,	   although	  he	   fails	   to	   remain	   focused	  on	   the	  creation	  and	   falls	   into	  the	  trap	  of	  shifting	  to	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  inheritor	  (and	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  content	  according	  to	  categories	  that	  belong	  to	  a	  culture	  at	  large):	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The	   writerly	   text	   is	   a	   perpetual	   present,	   upon	   which	  no	  consequent	  language	   (which	   would	   inevitably	   make	   it	   past)	   can	   be	  superimposed;	   the	  writerly	   text	   is	  ourselves	  writing,	   before	   the	   infinite	  play	   of	   the	   world	   (the	   world	   as	   function)	   is	   traversed,	   intersected,	  stopped,	  plasticized	  by	  some	  singular	  system	  (Ideology,	  Genus,	  Criticism)	  which	   reduces	   the	   plurality	   of	   entrances,	   the	   opening	   of	   networks,	   the	  infinity	  of	  languages.	  36	  	  Once	  again,	  self-­‐narrative	  	  (the	  text	  is	  ‘ourselves	  writing’)	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  moment,	  but	  ‘superimposition	  of	  language’	  comes	  right	  after.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  content	  is	  consigned	  to	  the	  world,	  it	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  ‘play’	  that	  is	  out	  of	  the	  control	  of	  the	  creator.	   Once	   the	   creator	   becomes	   a	   potential	   inheritee	   (i.e.	   once	   her	   content	  becomes	  ‘public’)	  we	  see	  a	  reduction	  of	  her	  intentionality	  as	  self-­‐narrated	  creator	  of	  
that	   content,	  with	   its	  absolute	   freedom	  (‘plurality	  of	  entrances’	  with	  an	   ‘infinity	  of	  languages’).	  	  The	   very	   relevance	   of	   the	   content	   is	   absolute	   in	   the	   moment	   of	   creation,	  which	  as	  we	  saw	  discloses	  a	  complete	  appropriation	  of	  time	  –	  the	  time	  of	  ‘ourselves	  writing’	  in	  Barthes’	  words.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  utterance	  is	  completed,	  however,	  even	  the	  very	   value	   of	   the	   projected	   meaning	   immediately	   escapes	   the	   control	   of	   the	  inheritee.	  «Has	  any	  one,	  in	  the	  circle	  of	  a	  few	  friends	  perhaps,	  allowed	  an	  assertion	  to	  escape	  him,	  which	  it	  may	  be	  supposed	  he	  would	  not	  willingly	  see	  published	  to	  the	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  Barthes,	  Roland.,	  and	  Honoré	  de	  Balzac.	  S/Z,	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1974,	  p.	  5.	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world?»,	   we	   just	   read	   Fichte37	  asking,	   and	   this	   is	   a	   perfect	   example	   of	   how	   the	  simple	   intentionality	   of	   the	   inheritee	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   fully	   determine	   Legacy:	  although	  the	  intention	  to	  create	  the	  uttered	  content	  must	  be	  there,	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  inheritee’s	   power	   to	   decide	   whether	   the	   content	   will	   enter	   her	   Legacy	   or	   be	  dispersed	  in	  the	  chatter	  of	  Heideggerian	  Idle	  Talk.38	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  discount	  any	  value	  of	  the	  intention	  to	  Legacy	  in	   the	   formation	   of	   one’s	   Legacy.	   As	   Kawara’s	   example	   demonstrates,	   the	  overarching	  narrative	  of	  one’s	  work	  is	  indeed	  a	  commentary	  on	  single	  instances	  of	  legacy	   whose	   aggregate	   is	   the	   body	   of	   work	   itself.	   What	   Fichte	   is	   saying	   is	   the	  opposite,	  i.e.	  that	  agreement	  with	  such	  narrative	  is	  not	  indispensable	  for	  the	  content	  to	   become	   a	   legitimate	   part	   of	   inheritance.	   The	   intention	   ‘to	   be	   heard/read’	   is	  enough	   for	   the	   process	   of	   legacy	   to	   begin	   (although	   it	   remains	   in	   a	   state	   of	  potentiality	  until	  actualized	  by	  an	  inheritance).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  See	  footnote	  2.	  38	  Idle	   Talk	   that,	   by	   the	   way,	   resembles	   closely	   the	   ‘Public	   Discourse’	   or	   ‘Public	   Opinion’	  Fichte	  described	  in	  similar	  dismissive	  terms	  120	  years	  before	  Heidegger,	  although	  he	  does	  as	   much	   mainly	   in	   Characteristics	   of	   the	   Present	   Age,	   and	   not	   in	   the	   much	   more	   studied	  
Science	  of	  Knowledge.	  While	  the	  word	  ‘inauthentic’	  –	  so	  crucial	  to	  Being	  and	  Time’s	  account	  of	  Idle	  Talk	  as	  the	  mode	  of	  being	  of	  the	  “They”	  –	  is	  admittedly	  absent,	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  Public	  Opinion	  is	  somehow	  opposed	  to	  the	  True	  Being	  of	  the	  Dasein,	  and	  to	  Truth	  in	  general.	  This	  interesting	  example	  of	  under-­‐stressed	  legacy/inheritance	  would	  probably	  deserve	  a	  paper	  on	  its	  own,	  given	  that	  the	  only	  work	  that	  dedicates	  any	  structured	  discourse	  to	  this	  point	  is	  Gadamer’s	  Fichte….	  Heidegger,	   Hamburg:	   Fischer-­‐Bücherei,	  1970, 	   currently	   not	   translated	  in	  English.	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Nonetheless,	  the	  initiated	  legacy	  is	  susceptible	  of	  reaction	  from	  the	  public	  at	  large	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  individuals:	  while	  it	  is	  always	  a	  determinate	  number	  of	  subjects	   who	   will	   become	   receivers	   (be	   it	   simple	   interpreters	   or	   inheritors,	  depending	  on	   their	   retention	  of	   the	   contents)	  of	   a	  potential	   legacy,	   they	  are,	   from	  the	   perspective	   of	   the	   inheritee,	   embodiments	   of	   the	   public.	   The	   ambition,	   for	  Legacy,	   is	   to	   enter	   the	   public	   discourse	   and	   become	   disseminated	   through	   a	  multitude	  of	  cultural	  densities.	  	  The	  first	  step	  in	  this	  direction	  is	  recognition,	  both	  of	  the	  inheritee	  as	  a	  creative	  subject	  and	  of	  his	  work	  as	  a	  coherent	  body	  of	  contents	  (an	  aggregate).	  Foucault	  addresses	  the	  problem	  of	  recognition	  when	  dealing	  with	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘thesis	  concerning	  a	  work’:	  	  If	  an	  individual	  is	  not	  an	  author,	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  those	  things	  he	  has	  written	  or	  said,	  left	  among	  his	  papers	  or	  communicated	  to	  others?	  Is	  this	  not	  properly	  a	  work?	  What,	  for	  instance,	  were	  Sade’s	  papers	  before	  he	   was	   consecrated	   as	   an	   author?	   Little	   more,	   perhaps,	   than	   rolls	   of	  paper	   on	   which	   he	   endlessly	   unravelled	   [sic]	   his	   fantasies	   while	   in	  prison.	  39	  	  Recognition	  of	  an	  authorial	  subject	  must	  come	  before	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  content	  as	  connected,	  since	  the	  latter	  implies	  the	  former	  and	  depends	  on	  it:	  we	  are	  not	  only	  saying	  that	  those	  are	  connected,	  but	  also	  that	  they	  are	  connected	  by	  virtue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Michel	   Foucault,	   “What	   is	   an	   author?”	   in	   Language,	   Counter-­‐memory,	   practice.	   Selected	  
Essays	   and	   Interviews.	   Ed.	   And	   Trans.	   	   By	   D.	   F.	   Bouchard,	   Ithaca,	   NY:	   Cornell	   University	  Press,	  1980,	  p.	  118.	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of	   their	   belonging,	   having	   belonged	   or	   just	   coming	   from	   a	   someone	   who	   is	   the	  originator	   of	   legacy,	   the	   inheritee.	   Foucault	   is	   coming	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	  critique	   of	   literary	   criticism;	   therefore	   his	   focus	   is	   strictly	   on	   the	   literary	   and	  philosophical	  author.	  Moreover,	  in	  1969	  he	  appears	  to	  cling	  to	  an	  idea	  of	  ‘the	  author’	  as	  a	  peculiar	  status	  of	  privileged	  creator,	  which	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  later	  developments	  in	  his	  L’ordre	  du	  discours	  (1971)40	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  lectures	  on	  L’Hermenetique	  
du	   subject	   (1981-­‐82)41.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   notion	   of	   recognition	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	  process	  of	  legacy,	  and	  influences	  the	  very	  reception	  of	  any	  content.	  A	   content	   whose	   author	   is	   ‘unknown’	   or	   even	   ‘unknowable’ 42 	  is	   still	  accessible,	  but	  its	  status	  as	  part	  of	  a	  Legacy	  is	  quite	  problematic	  (while	  its	  potential	  value	   as	   inheritance	   remains	   still	   very	  much	   the	   same).	   The	   recognition	   of	   legacy	  incorporates	   the	  recognition	  of	  a	  body	  of	  work	   from	  an	  author,	  and	  also	   identifies	  that	   author	   as	   a	   historical	   subject	   (and	   not,	   as	   it	   was	   the	   case	   in	   hermeneutics,	  simply	  as	  the	  author	  of	  the	  specific	  text	  we	  are	  reading).	  The	  problem	  of	  recognition	  and	  identification	  is	  once	  again	  one	  of	  narration,	  but	  we	  should	  try	  to	  distinguish	  the	  instance	  of	  an	  inheritee	  being	  recognized	  and	  named	  from	  the	  issue	  of	  an	  inheritor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Cf.	   Foucault,	   Michel.	   The	   Archeology	   of	   Knowledge	   and	   the	   discourse	   on	   language,	   New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1972.	  41 	  Cf.	   Foucault,	   Michel,	   Frédéric	   Gros,	   François	   Ewald,	   and	   Alessandro	   Fontana.	   The	  
Hermeneutics	   of	   the	   Subject:	   Lectures	   at	   the	   Collège	   De	   France,	   1981-­‐1982.	   New	   York:	  Palgrave-­‐Macmillan,	  2005.	  42	  The	   difference	   being	  whether	   he	   is	   unknown	   to	   the	   reader	   or	  whether	   his	   identity	   has	  been	  lost	  in	  the	  public	  discourse	  and	  only	  the	  text	  survives.	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naming	  herself	  as	  a	  heir	   to	  the	   inheritee.	  While	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  two	  faces	  of	   the	  same	  coin,	  their	  epistemological	  origin	  is	  quite	  different.	  When	  the	  inheritor	  narrates	  him/herself	  as	  such,	  the	  goal	  is	  twofold:	  on	  the	  one	   hand,	   narrating	   the	   content	   as	   of	   someone	   else	   historicizes	   it,	   bringing	   the	  inheritor’s	   historical	   awareness	   to	   full	   development,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	  inheritance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  status	  of	  heir	  to	  the	  inheritee	  (as	  a	  ‘recognized’	  inheritor)	  can	  prove	  useful	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  of	  the	  legitimization	  the	  inheritee	  can	  indirectly	  bestow.	  This	  can	  happen	  even	  when	  the	  inheritee	  is	  still	  alive	  (and	  it	  is	  actually	  a	  widespread	  practice	  in	  academia).	  We	  said	  that	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  inheritance,	  the	  process	  is	  fulfilled	  even	  if	  the	  recognition	  as	  heir	  is	  never	  achieved.	  However,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  legacy,	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  inheritee	  and	  the	  inheritor	  of	  being	  disowned	  (or	  simply	  not	  recognized	  by	  the	  public)	  is	  more	  problematic.	  	  Since	   we	   have	   understood	   the	   potential	   for	   legacy	   as	   something	   that	  immediately	  leaves	  the	  instantaneous	  control	  of	  the	  creator,	  we	  must	  inquire	  what	  her	   denial	   of	   inheritance	   (as	   in	   ‘denying	   that	   someone	   is	   her	   heir)	   can	   signify.	  Somehow,	  she	  appears	  to	  retain	  only	  a	  negative	  power,	  if	  any,	  but	  even	  this	  power	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  inheritor,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  content.	  Fichte	  explains	  how	   nothing	   is	   truly	   retractable,	   yet	   the	   history	   of	  Western	   civilization	   seems	   to	  attribute	  a	  destructive	  power	   to	   the	  predecessor;	   in	  Euripides’	  Bacchae	  Agave	  kills	  Pentheus	   because	   she	   does	   not	   recognize	   him:	   is	   unrecognizing	   the	   inheritor	   the	  same	  as	  destroying	  his/her	  status	  as	  heir?	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  Pentheus	  tore	  off	  his	  headband,	  untying	  it	  from	  his	  head,	  so	  wretched	  Agave	  would	  recognize	  him,	  so	  she	  wouldn’t	  kill	  him.	  Touching	  her	  cheek,	  he	  cried	  out,	  “It’s	  me,	  mother,	  Pentheus,	  your	  child.	  You	  gave	  birth	  to	  me	  at	  home,	  in	  Echion’s	  house.	  Pity	  me,	  mother—	  don’t	  kill	  your	  child	  because	  I’ve	  made	  mistakes.”	  	  But	  Agave	  was	  foaming	  at	  the	  mouth,	  eyes	  rolling	  in	  their	  sockets,	  her	  mind	  not	  set	  on	  what	  she	  ought	  to	  think—she	  didn’t	  listen—43	  	   Agave	  does	  not	  recognize	  Pentheus	  because	  he	  has	  changed	  his	  appearance	  and	   true	   nature	   (leaving	   aside	   legitimate	   concerns	   about	   socially	   imposed	  ‘naturalization’	  of	   gender	   that	   are	  not	   explicit	   in	  Euripides’	   tragedy).	  To	  her,	  he	   is	  not	  her	  heir	  (although	  he	  factually	  is),	  and	  her	  failure	  to	  recognize	  him	  is	  enough	  to	  destroy	  his	  right	  to	  be,	  and	  to	  be	  her	  heir.	  While	  of	  course	  the	  destruction	  (physical	  or	  intellectual)	  of	  the	  person-­‐inheritor	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  inheritee’s	  power	  in	  the	  cultural	  discourse,	  disavowing	  one’s	  inheritance	  as	  not	  the	  inheritee’s	  legacy	  is	  certainly	  in	  the	  latter’s	  reach.	  Since	   the	  short	  monologue	   (or	  not-­‐listened	  dialogue)	  by	  Pentheus	  does	  not	  question	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   killing	   per	   se,	   but	   focuses	   on	   the	   ancestor-­‐descendant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Euripides,	  Bacchae,	  lines	  1115-­‐1125.	  Translation	  by	  Ian	  Johnston.	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relationship,44	  it	  discloses	  the	  space	  for	  a	  metaphorical	  commentary	  on	  the	  status	  of	  heirship	  and	  the	  need	  for	  recognition.	  Pentheus’	  claim	  not-­‐to-­‐be-­‐killed	   is	  based	  on	  his	  knowledge	  that	  he	  is,	  indeed,	  originated	  by	  her	  in	  her	  house	  (metaphorically,	  the	  looming	  tradition	  to	  which	  they	  both	  subscribe).	  He	  appeals	  the	  ‘capital	  sentence	  by	  disowning’.	  From	  his	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  ‘mistakes’	  of	  his	  actions	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  condemn	  him	  not	  to	  death	  per	  se,	  but	  to	  the	  status	  of	  non-­‐heir	  that	  would	  allow	  his	  death.	  These	  mistakes	  are	  failures	  in	  his	  duty	  (as	  a	  son)	  to	  respect	  the	  (apparently	  bizarre)	  passions	  of	  his	  mother.	  They	  are,	  these	  mistakes,	  inaccuracies	  in	  reception	  and	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  role	  of	  inheritor,	  who	  –	  Euripides	  makes	  Pentheus	  argue	  –	  can	  be	   such	   even	   without	   complete	   adherence	   to	   the	   inherited	   duty.	   I.e.,	   a	   non-­‐completely	  truthful	  inheritor	  can	  still	  be	  a	  heir.	  However,	   the	   appeal	   to	   rationality	   fails:	   Agave	   does	   not	   need	   to	   offer	   a	  counterpoint,	   she	   simply	   «didn’t	   listen».	   The	   ultimate	   power	   of	   disowning45	  is	   all	  that	  is	  left	  to	  the	  inheritee	  who	  cannot	  control	  her	  heir	  (and,	  being	  a	  tragedy,	  she	  can	  kill	  him	  for	  good	  measure,	  but	  that	  is	  beyond	  our	  point).	  Rejecting	  an	  heir	  does	  not	  cancel	  the	  mistakes	  and	  the	  misappropriated	  contents,	  but	  cancels	  the	  status	  of	  their	  inheritor.	   So	   to	   speak,	   legacy	   and	   inheritance	   are	   not	   properly	   modified	   by	   this	  refusal,	  only	  their	  identification	  for	  the	  public	  is	  changed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  In	   this	   case	   a	   mother-­‐to-­‐son	   relation	   exemplifies	   it,	   but	   we	   could	   resort	   to	   Sophocles’	  Oedipus	  for	  a	  son-­‐to-­‐father	  murderous	  example.	  45 	  Curiously,	   ‘disown’	   translates	   in	   most	   Romanic	   languages	   (disconoscere,	   desconocer,	  
désavouer),	   as	   non-­‐recognize,	   non-­‐authorize,	   stressing	   moment	   of	   non-­‐recognition	   (and	  refusal)	  over	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  right	  to	  belong.	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The	  opposite	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  inheritee.	  The	  inheritee	  cannot	  claim	  as	  an	  heir	  someone	  that	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  call,	  no	  matter	  how	  close	  her	  legacy	  and	   the	   inheritor’s	   inheritance	  may	  be.	  Unwilled	  heir-­‐status	   (as	  we	  saw)	   is	  bestowed	  by	  the	  public,	  and	  somehow	  the	  inheritee	  can	  only	  declare	  an	  ‘intellectual	  theft’	  of	  sort:	  ‘She	  stole	  my	  idea’	  replaces	  ‘He	  is	  my	  heir’,	  since	  recognizing	  the	  status	  of	  heir	  bears	  positive	  connotations	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   the	   inheritee,	  who	   is	  thus	  unwilling	  to	  bestow	  heir-­‐status	  on	  the	  ungrateful	  inheritor,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  public	  discourse	  would	  receive	  such	  a	  claim	  as	  non-­‐sensical.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   inheritee	   cannot	   avoid	   any	   elaboration	   of	   her	   legacy	  that	  happens	  after	  she	  ‘leaves	  the	  scene’.	  There	  is	  no	  foreseeing	  what	  will	  happen	  to	  one’s	   historicized	   persona,	   and	   the	   inheritee	   (were	   she	   able	   to	   witness	   her	   own	  aftermath)	   could	   find	   herself	   associated	   with	   the	   most	   bizarre	   travelling	  companions.	   Samuel	   Butler’s	   poetry	   gives	   a	   wonderful	   rendition	   of	   such	   possible	  future	  non-­‐experience,	  although	  he	  depicts	  it	  under	  the	  most	  positive	  of	  lights:	  	   «We	  shall	  not	  even	  know	  that	  we	  have	  met.	  Yet	  we	  shall,	  and	  then	  part	  and	  meet	  again,	  Where	  dead	  men	  meet,	  on	  lips	  of	  living	  men»	   	  ‘Life	  after	  death’46	  	   The	   fleeting	  nature	  of	   future	  association	   (‘part	   and	  meet	  again’)	  underlines	  the	  absence	  of	  control	  over	  one’s	  post-­‐biological	  future.	  The	  ‘lips	  of	  living	  men’	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Samuel	  Butler,	  Sonnet	  XIV,	  ‘Life	  after	  death’,	  1918	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Fichte’s	  Public	  Opinion,	  Vico’s	  Common	  Sense,	  Heidegger’s	  They,	  yet	  they	  lose	  here	  their	  gloomy	  colors	  and	  reverberate	  with	  possibilities.	  Connections	  we	  cannot	  make,	  intuitions	  our	  work	  cannot	  reach,	  can	  be	  available	  to	  our	  legacy	  by	  the	  actions	  and	  reflections	  of	   others,	   although	   these	  others	   are	  by	  necessity	  unknown	   to	  us,	   since	  they	  will	  be	  the	  living	  while	  we,	  as	  authors,	  will	  be	  part	  of	  the	  ‘dead	  men	  meeting.’	  	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  inheritee	  have	  limited	  control	  over	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  heirs	  (and	  such	  limited,	  negative	  control	  only	  extends	  to	  the	  range	  of	  her	  biological	   life)	  and	  no	  say	   in	  her	  post-­‐mortem	  associations,	  but	  she	  even	  exercises	   limited	  power	  over	  the	  content	  of	  her	  own	  legacy.	  Foucault,	  once	  again:	  	  Assuming	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  an	  author,	  is	  everything	  he	  wrote	  and	  said,	  everything	  he	  left	  behind,	  to	  be	  included	  in	  his	  work?	  This	  problem	  is	   both	   theoretical	   and	   practical.	   If	   we	   wish	   to	   publish	   the	   complete	  works	  of	  Nietzsche,	   for	  example,	  where	  do	  we	  draw	  the	   line?	  Certainly,	  everything	  must	   be	   published,	   but	   can	  we	   agree	   on	  what	   “everything”	  means?	   […]	   Plainly,	   we	   lack	   a	   theory	   to	   encompass	   the	   questions	  generated	   by	   a	   work	   and	   the	   empirical	   activity	   of	   those	   who	   naively	  undertake	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   complete	   works	   of	   an	   author	   often	  suffer	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  framework.47	  	   This	   resonates	   with	   Fichte’s	   concern,	   although	   coming	   from	   the	   opposite	  direction:	  what	  is	  too	  insignificant	  to	  be	  considered	  and	  what	  content	  of	  importance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Michel	  Foucault,	   “What	   is	   an	  author?”	   in	  Language,	  Counter-­‐memory,	  practice.,	   op.	   cit,	  p.	  118-­‐19.	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risks	  to	  be	  lost	  in	  the	  shuffle,	  especially	  for	  a	  prolific	  author?	  Foucalt	  is	  advocating	  a	  reflection	  on	   the	  value	  of	   legacy,	  although	   the	  rest	  of	  his	  article	  keeps	   falling	  back	  into	   a	   perspective	   strictly	   grounded	   in	   inheritance.	   He	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   limits	   of	  historiographical	   reception,	   and	   challenges	   the	   value	   of	   the	   simple,	   aggregative	  publication	  of	   ‘complete	  works’	   (still	   so	  popular	   in	  his	  days	  and	   in	  ours)	   lacking	  a	  «theory	  to	  encompass	  the	  questions	  generated	  by	  a	  work».	  	  The	  absence	  of	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  authors,	  the	  eclipse	  of	  the	  inheritees,	  is	  made	  evident	  precisely	  by	  those	  who	  try	  (in	  good	  faith)	  to	  make	  them	  present	  simply	  by	  re-­‐presenting	  a	  mass	  of	  documents.	  Accepting	   the	  absence	  of	   the	   living	  voice	  (and	  understanding	   that	   only	   legacy	   remains)	   is	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   a	   legitimate	  historiography	  of	  culture.	  De	  Certeau	  notes	  that	  «L’historiographie	  est	  une	  maniére	  contemporaine	   de	   pratiquer	   le	   deuil.	   Elle	   s’écrit	   à	   partir	   d’une	   absence	   et	   elle	   ne	  produit	  que	  des	  simulacres.»48	  It	  follows	  that	  we	  must	  let	  go	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  ‘revive’	  an	  author	  (i.e.	  access	  his	  voice	  and	  historical	  situation)	  and	  move	  towards	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	   simulacrum	   not	   as	   something	   false,	   but	   as	   a	   Legacy	   that	   is	  necessarily	  always	  already	  actualized	  in	  our	  Inheritance	  when	  we	  are	  approaching	  it.	  	   While	   historiography	   certainly	   does	   not	   exhaust	   the	   range	   of	   possible	  approaches	   to	   our	   cultural	   past	   -­‐	   and	   specifically	   the	   range	   of	   our	   forms	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  «Historiography	   is	   the	   contemporary	   way	   to	   practice	   mourning.	   It	   is	   written	   on	   the	  ground	   of	   an	   absence	   and	   does	   not	   produce	   but	   simulacra»	  Michel	   De	   Certeau,	   La	  Fable	  
Mystique.	  Paris:	  Gallimard	  1982,	  p.	  21.	  The	  translation	  is	  mine.	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relationship	   with	   a	   past	   author	   –	   De	   Certeau’s	   point	   can	   be	   extended	   to	   our	  comprehension	  of	  our	  role	  in	  the	  history	  of	  cultural	  transmission	  and,	  in	  general,	  to	  our	  projection	   and	   foreseeing	  of	   the	   reception	  of	   our	  Legacy.	  Hoping	   for	   a	   lasting	  legacy	  is	  hoping	  to	  be	  (culturally)	  mourned	  for,	  and	  projecting	  permanence	  (of	  the	  uttered	   content)	   is	   projecting	   a	   presence	   specifically	   into	   the	   space	   of	   our	   own	  (inevitable)	   absence.	   The	   content	   must	   survive	   precisely	   our	   demise,	   and	   its	  remembrance	   is	   the	   cultural	   equivalent	   to	   the	   contemplation	   of	   the	   tomb:	   not	   all	  contents	  will	  become	  a	  world-­‐known	  legacy,	  just	  like	  not	  every	  corpse	  is	  buried	  in	  a	  mausoleum,	  yet	   the	  comparison	   is	  strikingly	  suggestive	  even	   in	  cases	  of	   failed	  (i.e.	  never	  actualized)	   legacies.	  The	  forgotten	  content	   is	  equated	  to	  the	   forgotten	  tomb,	  and	  the	  ungenerous	  inheritors	  to	  the	  ungrateful	  child	  who	  deserts	  the	  dead.	  	  The	   relevant	   difference	   is	   that	   the	   call	   to	   mourn,	   or	   the	   responsibility	   for	  failing	  to	  do	  so,	  is	  extended	  from	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  kinship	  to	  the	  universal	  call	  of	  culture.	  Expanding	  one’s	  cultural	  density	  creates	  a	  responsibility	  to	  mourn	  what	  is	  left	  out	  of	  our	   Inheritance.	  Having	  received	  some	  contents,	  we	  are	  mourning	  those	  inheritees	  and	  consigning	  the	  rest	  of	  them	  to	  (possible)	  eternal	  forgetfulness.	  Once	  again,	   this	  discloses	   the	   incommensurability	  of	   the	  historiographical	   concern	   from	  the	  legacy	  perspective	  and	  from	  the	  more	  immediate,	  and	  instinctive,	  perspective	  of	  inheritance.	  What	  we	  perceive	  as	  inclusive	  (our	  constant	  addition	  of	  contents	  to	  our	  cultural	  density	  and	  later	  to	  our	  Inheritance)	   is	  actually	  an	   instance	  of	  rejection	  of	  all	  other	  non-­‐actualized	  legacies.	  	  
	   253	  
Our	   very	   identity	   as	   actors	   in	   a	   cultural	   panorama	   is	   predicated	   on	  recognition,	   and	   thus	   identification/identity.	   Therefore,	   writes	   Ricoeur,	   «personal	  identity	   can	  be	  articulated	  only	   in	   the	   temporal	  dimension	  of	  human	  existence.»49	  Simply	  put,	  instantaneous	  recognition	  from	  others	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  provide	  identity.	  Persistence	   of	   recognition	   is	   the	   origin	   of	   any	   claim	   to	   an	   identity	   that	   is	   socially	  constructed.	   The	   ‘temporal	   dimension’	   is	   intertwined	   with	   our	   experience	   of	  identity,	  and	  just	  as	  primary.	  Legacy	  operates	  in	  parallel,	  since	  it	  relies	  on	  repeated	  instances	  of	  recognition	  and	  reception.	  Sameness	  (idem,	  Gleichheit,	  mêmeté)	  is	  what	  allows	   us	   to	   recognize	   selfhood	   (ipse,	   Selbstheit,	   ipseité),	   and	   it	   is	   realized	   on	   the	  base	   of	   continuity,	   of	   being	   the	   same	   one	   (idem	   ipse,	   so	   to	   speak)	   through	   time.	  Following	   Ricoeur	   we	   could	   argue	   that	   ‘Character’50 	  (and	   author-­‐character	   in	  particular)	   is	   the	  point	  where	   the	   ipse	   and	   the	   idem	   become	   indiscernible.	   For	  us,	  concerned	   with	   Legacy,	   the	   inheritee	   must	   be	   constructed	   precisely	   as	   the	  conceptual	   tool	   that	   allows	   us	   to	   achieve	   recognition,	   identity	   and,	   consequently,	  permanence	  of	  legacy.	  Considering	  that	  we	  have	  been	  heavily	  drawing	  from	  reception	  theory	  for	  the	  construction	   of	   our	   analysis	   of	   Inheritance	   and	   Legacy,	   we	   cannot	   ignore	   the	  apparently	  problematic	  position	  expressed	  by	  Gadamer	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  he	  terms	  ‘the	   temporality	   of	   the	   aesthetic	   being’.	  He	  writes	   that	   «this	   contemporaneity	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Paul	  Ricoeur,	  Oneself	  as	  another,	  Chicago	  :	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1992,	  p.	  114.	  50	  Cf.	  Ricoeur,	  Oneself	  as	  Another,	  op.	  cit.,	  5th	  study:	  Personal/Narrative	  identity.	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present-­‐ness	  of	   aesthetic	  being	   is	   called,	   in	  general,	   its	   timelessness.»51	  What	   then	  should	  we	  make	  of	  cultural	  contents	  that	  are	  artistic	  in	  nature	  (and	  thus	  embody	  the	  aesthetic	  being	  that	  Gadamer	  has	  been	  describing)?	  We	  should	  not	  be	  tricked	   into	  thinking	  that	  such	  timelessness	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  notions	  of	  permanence	  as	  we	  expressed	  so	   far.	  We	  discovered	  how	   this	  permanence	  was	  expressed	  precisely	   in	  the	   projecting	   nature	   of	   the	   absolute	   moment	   of	   creation,	   and	   how	   the	   tension	  between	  momentariness	  and	  persistence	  was	  exactly	  the	  force	  behind	  the	  powerful	  effects	   of	   legacy.	   Once	   we	   read	   further	   into	   Gadamer,	   we	   find	   that	   he	   rejects	   a	  ‘supra-­‐historical’	  temporality52,	  and	  describes	  his	  theorized	  absence	  of	  temporality	  in	  dialectical	  terms.	  The	  lack	  of	  continuity	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  art	  is	  grounded	  exactly	  in	  the	  unrepeatability	  of	  the	  creative	  event,	  which	  can	  be	  only	  re-­‐enacted,	  but	  never	  truly	  repeated.	  The	   ‘play’	   nature	   of	   the	   work	   of	   Art	   (which	   Gadamer	   believes	   perfectly	  symbolized	  by	   the	   festival)	   is	   precisely	   the	  uniqueness	   of	   the	  moment	  of	   creation	  that	  we	  have	  explored	  so	   far,	  when	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  creative	  moment	   is	  not	  repeated	  in	  Legacy,	  but	  only	  remembered	  and	  re-­‐created	  anew	  (in	  the	  Inheritance-­‐s	  of	  the	  heirs).	  In	  his	  closing	  argument	  on	  the	  matter,53	  Gadamer	  characterizes	  ‘trivial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Hans	  Georg	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  92.	  52	  He	  attributes	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  supra-­‐historical	  temporality	  to	  Hans	  Sedlmayr,	  father	   of	   the	  Strukturanalyse	   and	   preeminent	  Art	  Historian.	   On	   the	  matter,	   see	   Sedlmayr,	  Hans.	  Art	  in	  Crisis:	  The	  Lost	  Center.	  New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  Transaction,	  2007.	  53	  In	  Play	  as	  the	  clue	  to	  ontological	  explanation	  [of	  Art]	  (chapter	  1,	  division	  II,	  part	  I	  of	  Truth	  and	   Method)	   Gadamer	   explores	   participation	   (‘play’)	   as	   the	   crucial	   element	   to	   our	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objects	  of	  curiosity’54	  as	  incapable	  of	  engaging	  the	  ‘spectator’	  (=potential	  inheritor),	  who	  is	  unable	  to	  turn	  his	  attention	  to	  these	  trivial	  contents	  (Gadamer	  writes	  that	  the	  spectator’s	   attention	   remains	   focused	   on	   herself).	   The	   representation	   of	   these	  objects,	  contrary	  to	  the	  persistent	  contents	  of	  a	  legacy,	   lacks	  the	  «permanence	  of	  a	  claim,»55	  which	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   a	   condition	   and	   a	   reinforced	   effect	   of	   our	  recognition	  (of	  the	  content	  as	  valuable	  and	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  creation	  as	  generative).	  Nonetheless,	   the	   aspiration	   to	   permanence,	   the	   hope	   to	  make	   “sense”,	   and	  the	   claim	   to	   legacy	   are	   projected	   only	   potentially.	   We	   cannot	   guarantee,	   to	   use	  Gadamer’s	  language,	  that	  our	  work	  will	  not	  prove	  to	  be	  ‘trivial’	  and	  fail	  to	  engage	  the	  witnessing	   ‘spectator’	   that	   it	   need	   to	   fulfill	   its	   intended	   destiny,	   i.e.	   become	   our	  legacy.	  The	  witness,	   the	   foreseen	   inheritor,	   is	  not	  simply	  a	  resonance	  chamber	   for	  our	  uttered,	  dead	  words.	  The	  inheritor	  is	  not	  just	  a	  receiver,	  we	  hope	  him	  or	  her	  to	  be	   first	  of	  all	   an	  understanding	  witness,	   able	   to	  offer	   testimony	  of	  our	   legacy,	   and	  not	   only	   repetition	   of	  words.	  We	   expect	   this	   from	   the	   inheritor	   –	   or	   an	   inheritor,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  perception	   of	   art	   and	   culture	   in	   general,	   following	   (somehow	   naively)	   Schlegel,	   who,	   in	  
Gespräch	   uber	   die	   Poesie,	   had	   written	   «All	   the	   sacred	   games	   of	   Art	   are	   only	   remote	  imitations	   of	   the	   infinite	   play	   of	   the	   world,	   the	   eternally	   self-­‐creating	   work	   of	   Art.»	  [Gadamer,	  p.	  94]	  He	  derives	  from	  this	  that	  «play	  has	  its	  own	  essence,	  independent	  from	  the	  consciousness	   of	   those	   who	   play»	   [G.,	   p.	   92],	   which	   is	   an	   interesting	   intuition	   on	   the	  impersonality	   of	   the	   receivers	   of	   a	   content	   in	   the	   actualization	   of	   the	   content	   itself	   (as	   a	  Legacy).	   The	   notion	   that	   play	   obtains	   its	   representation	   through	   the	   players	   without	  depending	   on	   them	   is	   undeveloped,	   but	   we	   will	   come	   back	   to	   it	   when	   discussing	   the	  moment	  of	  passing.	  54	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  111.	  55	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  112.	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some	  inheritor,	  since	  we	  do	  not	  know	  him	  or	  her	  or	  them,	  and	  it	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  quality	  of	  unknown-­‐ness,	  of	  absolute	  potentiality	   that	   the	   inheritor	  can	  satisfy	  our	  hope	  to	  make	  sense	  to	  the	  point	  that	  our	  speaking	  can	  make	  sense.	  	  If	  we	  knew	  the	  inheritor(s)	  already,	  not	  a	  word	  would	  be	  uttered	  (or	  written,	  or	   something	   performed,	   etc.)	   that	   the	   totality	   of	   our	   inheritors	   could	   not	   make	  sense	  and	  use	  of.	  That	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  we	  speak	  hoping	  to	  be	  witnessed,	  and	  hoping	  that	   all	   of	   our	  words	  will	   prove	   to	   have	   a	  meaning	   disclosed	   by	   this	   yet-­‐to-­‐come	  inheritor	  (or	  the	  next).	  We	  speak	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  «someone	  who	  is	  able	  to	  think	  his	  way	  better	  through	  what	  an	  author	  is	  talking	  about	  will	  be	  able	  to	  see	  what	  the	  author	  says	  in	  the	  light	  of	  a	  truth	  that	  is	  still	  hidden	  from	  the	  author.»56	  We	   saw	   how	   the	   inheritor	   relied	   on	   the	   inheritee’s	   creation	   to	   be	   already	  there	  in	  order	  for	  the	  process	  of	  Inheritance	  to	  be	  realized,	  yet	  now	  we	  are	  back	  to	  the	   inheritor	   as	   a	   necessity	   for	   the	   actualization	   of	   Legacy.	   The	   exploration	   we	  performed	  has	  disclosed	  a	  codependence	  of	  the	  two,	  which	  appears	  to	  clash	  with	  the	  chronological	  distance	  of	   their	  realization.	  We	  must	  then	  step	  beyond	  the	   limits	  of	  the	  bracketing	  we	  imposed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  (i.e.	  to	  restrain	  ourselves	  to	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  inheritee	  as	  subject)	  and	  try	  to	  address	  this	  codependence,	  and	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  both	  inheritance	  and	  legacy	  are	  generated.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  172.	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Chapter	  5:	  The	  Moment	  of	  Passing	  and	  the	  impossible	  codependence	  of	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy.	  	   My	   goal	   for	   this	   last	   chapter	   is	   to	   summarize	   the	   connection	   between	  Inheritance	  and	  Legacy	  that	  I	  uncovered	  and	  discussed	  throughout	  my	  dissertation,	  and	   perform	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   ‘moment	   of	   passing’	   in	  which	   both	   are	   actualized.	  Given	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   co-­‐dependence	   of	   Inheritance	   and	   Legacy	   (with	   each	  relying	  on	  the	  actual	  presence	  of	  the	  other	  to	  achieve	  actuality),	  I	  will	  show	  how	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  amounts	  to	  an	  impossible	  phenomenon,	  i.e.	  an	  unthinkable	  one.	  I	  plan	   to	   refer	   to	   modern	   phenomenological	   analyses	   of	   the	   ‘unconceivable’	   to	  elaborate	   a	   model	   suitable	   for	   our	   description	   of	   this	   problematic,	   impossible	  moment.	  	  Levinas’	  Gaze	  as	  the	  (inconceivable)	  moment	  in	  which	  we	  meet	  the	  other	  will	  constitute	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   our	   description,	   although	   I	  will	   point	   out	   how	   the	  lingering	  ethical	  implications	  of	  this	  Levinassian	  actualization	  of	  the	  impossible	  are	  washed	  away	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Moment	  of	  Passing,	   in	  which	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Other	  is	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  the	  call	  of	  the	  Other	  itself,	  given	  the	  diachronic	  nature	  of	  the	  meeting	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  call	  to	  a	  desire	  not	  to	  be	  ignored.	  Following	   Derrida,	   we	   will	   expand	   the	   interior	   impossibility	   of	   the	  Levinassian	   encounter	   into	   an	   undecidability	   tout	   court,	   in	   front	   of	  which	  we	   are	  required	   to	   ‘think’	   the	   unthinkable	   as	   such.	   However,	   it	   will	   be	   only	   through	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Marion’s	   notion	   of	   saturated	   phenomenon	   (as	   a	   phenomenon	   whose	   intuition	  exceeds	   our	   conceptual	   possibilities)	   that	  we	  will	   be	   able	   to	   perform	   the	   thought	  process	  that	  Derrida	  proposes.	  	  After	   having	   established	   the	   philosophical	   mode	   of	   conceiving	   the	  inconceivable,	   I	   will	   give	   an	   account	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   resolve	   this	  paradigmatic	   tension	   into	   a	   non-­‐problematic	   life	   as	   part	   of	   a	   society	   and	   as	  immersed	   into	   our	   cultural	   density.	   Going	   back	   to	   Ricoeur,	   we	   will	   revert	   to	  narration,	  which	  we	  have	  seen	  as	  crucial	  to	  both	  the	  inheritee’s	  and	  the	  inheritor’s	  self-­‐projection	  and	  to	  their	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  content	  as	  part	  of	  their	  Legacy	  and	   Inheritance	   respectively.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   possible	   congruence	   of	   narration	  with	  Gadamer’s	  notion	  of	  play,	  which	  constitutes	  –	  in	  his	  work	  –	  the	  main	  access	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  art	  and	  to	  cultural	  contents	  in	  general.	  	  We	   have	   described	   Inheritance	   in	   detail	   in	   chapter	   3,	   making	   explicit	   its	  connection	   to	   our	   cultural	   density	   and	   its	   realization	   in	   the	  moment	   of	   attention,	  and	  explaining	  how	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  contents	  elaborated	  by	  minds	  that	  came	  before,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  belong	  to	  someone	  else’s	  Inheritance,	  but	  certainly	  belong	  to	  someone’s	  Legacy.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  Inheritance	   is	  a	   transformative	  process	   that	  springs	   from	   cultural	   density	   and	   historical	   awareness	   while	   modifying	   them	  constantly.	  The	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  Inheritance	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  appears	  in	  the	  ‘now’	  of	  the	  subject-­‐inheritor	  but	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  ‘past’	  of	  the	  inheritee	  has	  led	  us	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   Legacy,	   to	   which	   we	   have	   dedicated	   chapter	   4.	   We	   have	  
	   259	  
analyzed	   hope	   and	   projection	   of	  meaning	   as	   principal	  motors	   of	   one’s	   process	   of	  Legacy,	   and	  discovered	   that	   the	   supposed	  autonomy	  and	  primacy	  of	   the	   inheritee	  over	   their	   legacy	   is	   nothing	   else	   than	   an	   illusion,	   since	   the	   realization	   of	   Legacy	  resides	  squarely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  future	  subjects	  –	  potential	  inheritors.	  Potential	   inheritors,	   we	   say,	   because	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   the	   individual	  actualized	   inheritor	  has	  no	  power	  over	   the	   initiation	  of	   the	  process	  of	   Inheritance	  that	   actualizes	   Legacy,	   since	   his	   attention	   is	   directed	   to	   something	   that	   he	   has	  already	  encountered,	  that	  has	  already	  forced	  its	  way	  into	  his	  cultural	  density.	  While	  the	  two	  paradigms	  are	  efficient	  and	  satisfactory	  enough	  when	  looked	  at	  singularly	  (in	  a	  small	  phenomenological	  bracket,	  so	  to	  speak),	  when	  we	  revert	  to	  their	  analysis	  in	   the	   reality	   of	   history,	   re-­‐inserting	   them	   in	   the	   line	   of	   time,	   and	   try	   to	   find	   the	  connection	  between	  these	  two	  phenomena	  so	  strictly	  related,	   things	  become	  more	  difficult.	  We	   should	   now	   discuss	   certain	   considerations	   that	   apply	   to	   the	   relation	  between	  the	   inheritor	  as	  propeller	  of	   Inheritance	  and	  the	   inheritee	  as	  proposer	  of	  Legacy	  and	  not,	  as	  we	  have	  done	  in	  the	  two	  last	  chapters,	  only	  to	  the	  situations	  in	  which	  only	  one	  of	  them	  was	  re-­‐presented	  as	  subject	  of	  their	  own	  process.	  If	   we	   consider	   that	   the	   series	   of	   ‘now-­‐s’,	   ‘then-­‐s’	   and	   ‘before-­‐s’	   that	   have	  emerged	  during	  our	  analysis	  of	   the	  modes	  of	   time	  of	  both	   Inheritance	  and	  Legacy	  are	   not	   objectively	   posed	   but	   intrinsically	   connected	   to	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   the	  performer	  of	  the	  process	  (be	  it	  Legacy	  or	  Inheritance),	  it	  will	  be	  clear	  that	  we	  must	  strive	   to	   analyze	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   two	   moving	   away	   from	   such	   one-­‐directional	  considerations,	  while	  trying	  to	  preserve	  the	  absolutely	  individual	  nature	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of	   the	   two.	   It	   will	   then	   be	   our	   duty	   to	   describe	   the	   interconnection	   of	   these	   two	  irreducible	  subjectivities,	  the	  one	  who	  creates	  trusting	  the	  foreseen	  witness	  and	  the	  one	  who	  enquires	  hoping	  for	  the	  conceived	  source	  of	  content.	  Without	  repeating	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  two	  processes	  -­‐	  which	  we	  have	  performed	  so	  far	  -­‐	  we	  shall	  try,	  so	  to	  speak,	   to	   bring	   them	   together,	   in	   the	   effort	   to	   discover	   the	   nature,	   and	   the	  characteristics,	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   inheriting-­‐a-­‐legacy1	  that	   was	   the	   starting	  point	  of	  our	  inquiry	  in	  the	  very	  beginning.	  We	  must	  first	  of	  all	  enquire	  whether	  we	  have	  a	  starting	  point,	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  modern	  philosophy,	  to	  account	  for	  this	  relation.	  Philosophical	  Hermeneutics	  would	  provide	   some	  help.	  The	  usual	  way	   to	   look	  at	   the	   relation	  between	   the	   interpreter	  and	  the	  author,	  i.e.	  the	  past	  creator	  of	  the	  content	  and	  its	  future	  receiver,	  has	  been	  modeled	   after	   Schleiermacher’s	   definition	   of	   it	   as	   a	   dialogue.	   While	   certain	  objections	  could	  (and	  shall)	  be	  raised	  to	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  a	  good	  place	  to	  start,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  ‘Inheriting-­‐a-­‐legacy’	  seems	  once	  again	  to	  revert	  to	  a	  priority	  of	  the	  subject-­‐inheritor,	  which	  would	  amount	  to	  the	  premature	  abandonment	  of	  our	  inquiry,	  although	  that	  also	  depends	  on	  our	   interchangeable	   usage	   of	   inheritance/legacy	   in	   common	   discourse	   (see	   beginning	   of	  chapter	  3).	  	  The	  opposite,	  ‘transmitting	  an	  inheritance’	  would	  suffer	  from	  a	  similar	  problem	  and	  risk	  eliminating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  inheritor	  if	  not	  that	  of	  both	  subjectivities.	  We	  shall	  then	  renounce,	   for	   the	  moment,	   an	   encompassing	   expression	   for	   the	   phenomenon	   that	   brings	  together	   the	   two	  phenomena,	   and	  be	   content	  with	   the	   reader	   being	   aware	   that	   the	   verb-­‐value	  of	  ‘inheriting’	  in	  the	  expression	  ‘inheriting-­‐a-­‐legacy’	  is	  only	  an	  unfortunate	  incident	  of	  language,	  which	  prevents	  us	  to	  say	  ‘inheritance-­‐a-­‐legacy’	  or	  ‘legacy-­‐an-­‐inheritance’.	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considering	   how	   it	   has	   explicitly	   informed	   the	  work	   of	   Reception	  Theorists2,	   and,	  arguably,	   of	  modern	   phenomenologists.	   Schleiermacher’s	   innovation,	   according	   to	  Gadamer,	  is	  that	  for	  him	  «what	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  is	  now	  not	  only	  the	  exact	  words	  and	   their	   objective	  meaning,	   but	   also	   the	   individuality	   of	   the	   speaker,	   that	   is,	   the	  author.»3	  So	   far	   nothing	   new,	   and	   in	   agreement	   with	   what	   we	   have	   said	   about	  interpretation	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   Inheritance.	   However,	   it	   is	   Schleiermacher’s	  notion	  of	  dialogue4	  as	  the	  hermeneutical	  mode	  par	  excellence	  that	  becomes	  precious	  when	  we	  want	   to	  account	   for	   the	   relation	  between	   inheritor	  and	   inheritee,	   legacy	  and	  inheritance.	  	  Dialogue	  (German	  Dialog),	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘monologue’	  (Monolog)	  and	  even	  to	  dialectic	  (despite	  stemming	  from	  the	  same	  root),	  calls	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  voices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Gadamer	   shows	   the	   debt	   he	   feels	   toward	   Schleiermacher	   as	   the	   father	   of	   Philosophical	  Hermeneutics	  all	   through	  his	  works,	   since	  at	   least	  Le	  problème	  de	  la	  conscience	  historique.	  He	  addresses	  it	  even	  more	  explicitly	  in	  the	  historical	  section	  of	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  beginning	  with	  “Schleiermacher’s	  project	  of	  universal	  hermeneutics”	  (p.	  162	  ff.).	  Ricoeur	  is	  even	  more	  explicit	   in	   a	   paper	   aptly	   titled	   “Schleiermacher’s	   Hermeneutics”	   in	   which	   he	   states	   that	  «[while]	   it	  would	   be	   ridiculous	   to	   say	   that	   hermeneutics	   begins	  with	   Schleiermacher,	   […]	  with	   him	   a	   specific	   problem	   does	   arise,	   that	   of	   understanding	   as	   such»	   and	   credits	  Schleiermacher	   with	   the	   discovery	   of	   «the	   specific	   character	   of	   hermeneutics»	   (Ricoeur,	  “Schleiermacher’s	  Hermeneutics”,	  in	  The	  Monist,	  vol.	  60,	  n.	  2	  (1967),	  p.	  181	  and	  182),	  i.e.	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  philosophy	  of	  hermeneutics/hermeneutical	  philosophy.	  3	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  164.	  4 	  Cf.	   in	   particular	   Schleiermacher,	   Friedrich	   D.	   E,	   and	   Rudolf	   Odebrecht.	   Friedrich	  
Schleiermachers	  Dialektik.	  Leipzig:	  J.	  C.	  Hinrich,	  1942,	  p.	  569ff.	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in	  a	   relationship	  of	   «mutual	   stimulation	  of	   thought.»5	  If	   “it	   takes	   two	   to	   tango”,	   so	  much	  more	  it	  “takes	  two”	  in	  order	  to	  dia-­‐logue,	  to	  “speak	  in	  two”	  [voices].	  Gadamer	  notices	  that	  «insofar	  as	  utterance	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  inner	  product	  of	  thought,	  but	  is	  also	   communication	   and	   has,	   as	   such,	   an	   external	   form,	   it	   is	   not	   simply	   the	  immediate	   manifestation	   of	   the	   thought,	   but	   presupposes	   reflection.» 6	  Communication	  happens	  from	  one	  to	  another,	  but	  reflected	  communication	  can	  only	  happen	  from	  one	  to	  another	  and	  back.	  Dialogue,	  speaking,	  involves	  a	  codependence.	  «Sorry,	  but	  more	   than	  one,	   it	   is	  always	  necessary	   to	  be	  more	   than	  one	   in	  order	   to	  speak,	   several	   voices	   are	   necessary	   for	   that» 7 ,	   highlights	   Derrida,	   quite	  pleonastically8.	   If	   a	   dialogue	   goes	   both	   ways,	   then,	   and	   implies	   reflection	   on	   the	  (possible,	  potential)	  reaction,	  we	  cannot	  avoid	  applying	  this	  model	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  contact	   (both	   conceptual	   and	   chronological)	   between	   our	   inheritee-­‐emanated	  legacy	  and	  our	  inheritor-­‐performed	  inheritance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Gadamer,	   Truth	   and	   Method,	   p.	   165.	   	   Gadamer	   extensively	   explores	   Schleiermacher’s	  notion	  of	  Hermeneutics	  (and	  its	  novelty	  compared	  to	  traditional,	  exegetical	  approaches)	  in	  detail,	  but	  never	  departs	  from	  this	  core	  notion	  of	  dialogue.	  6	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  166.	  7	  Derrida,	  “Sauf	   le	  nom”,	   in	  Derrida,	  Dutoit,	  On	  the	  Name,	  Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1995,	  p.	  35.	  8	  To	  be	  clear,	  by	  pointing	  out	  the	  pleonastic	  nature	  of	  Derrida’s	  comment	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  diminish	   its	  value.	  On	   the	  contrary,	  when	  dealing	  with	  phenomena	  so	  deeply	   ingrained	   in	  our	  cultural	  construct,	  the	  self-­‐evidence	  of	  certain	  statements	  becomes	  a	  resource,	  granting	  the	  philosopher	  (and	  us)	  a	  solid	  foundation	  upon	  which	  to	  build	  its	  discourse.	  We	  wish	  we	  were	  always	  so	  blessed,	  that	  we	  could	  find	  and	  trace	  our	  path	  from	  pleonasm	  to	  pleonasm,	  and	  only	  require	  an	  intellectual	  effort	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  our	  reflection.	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As	  we	  mentioned	   throughout	  our	  analysis	   (and	  since	   the	  very	  beginning),	   I	  refer	   to	   this	  moment	  as	   the	  moment	  of	  Passing,	  and	   	   -­‐	  before	  continuing	  with	  our	  dialogue-­‐informed	   analysis	   –	   we	   should	   try	   to	   define	   how	   and	   why	   this	  terminological	  choice	  came	  to	  be,	  to	  avoid	  reducing	  it	  to	  another	  obscure	  neologism	  –	  something	  that	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  steer	  clear	  from,	  with	  the	  noticeable	  exception	  of	  ‘inheritee’.	  Moment	  of	  Passing,	  then,	  is	  clearly	  a	  twofold	  expression,	  and	  we	  should	  analyze	  both	  its	  components.	  “Moment”	  refers	  more	  to	  a	  conceptual	  succession	  than	  to	  a	  chronological	  instant	  in	  time:	  while	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  content	  and	  the	  turning	  of	   attention	   are	   clearly	   situated	   in	   a	   chronology	   of	   factual	   events	   (although	   not	  necessarily	  easily	  determinable	  by	  either	  protagonists),	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  is	  –	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  –	  impossible	  to	  pinpoint	  in	  time,	  being	  by	  its	  nature	  a	  liminal	  case.	  Nonetheless,	   “moment”	   retains	   it	   value	   in	   two	  different	   senses:	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	  by	  equating	  the	  moment	  to	  a	  point	  on	  the	  line	  of	  time,	  we	  approximate	  to	  the	  impossibility	  of	  the	  time	  of	  such	  passing,	  with	  the	  metaphorical	  value	  of	  the	  ‘point’	  (space-­‐less,	  in	  geometry)	  prefiguring	  the	  impossibility	  of	  the	  moment.	  The	  moment	  qua	   point	   on	   the	   line	   is	   ungraspable,	   since	   it	   occupies	   no	   space.	   It	   is	   a	   less-­‐than-­‐instantaneous	  moment,	  one	   that	  never	  sparks	   to	  existence,	  as	  we	  will	  discuss	   in	  a	  few	  pages.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   on	  a	  philosophical	   level,	   the	   sense	  of	   “moment”	   as	   a	  momentous	  event,	  as	  something	  that	  changes	   the	  status	  of	   things,	   in	  our	  case	   that	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enables	   the	   actualization	   of	   both	   Legacy	   and	   Inheritance,9	  is	   perfectly	   signified	   by	  this	  expression.	  More	   vast	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   more	   precisely	   fitting	   is	   the	   meaning	   of	  “passing”,	  as	  a	  qualifier	  of	  this	  moment.	  The	  grammatical	  role	  of	  “of	  Passing”	  (which	  is	   just	   a	   qualifier	   indeed)	   should	   not	   divert	   our	   attention	   from	   the	   relevance	   of	  Passing	  itself,	  a	  term	  which	  could	  almost	  be	  presented	  alone	  if	  it	  had	  not	  already	  a	  philosophical	   relevance	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   post-­‐colonialism.	   Passing	   is	   a	   notion	  that	   is	   crucial	   to	   cultural	   transmission	   as	   it	   encapsulates	   the	   idea	   of	   handing	  
something	   to	   someone	   else.	   Not	   only	   the	   content	   passes	   from	   the	   legacy	   into	   the	  inheritance	   (without,	  however,	  ever	   leaving	   the	   legacy),	  but	  agency	  as	  well	  passes	  conceptually	  from	  the	  inheritee	  creator	  to	  the	  inheritor	  interpreter.	  	  Passing	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  verb	  in	  the	  gerund	  form,	  a	  noun	  (‘the	  passing	  of	  the	  seasons’)	  and	  an	  expression	  of	  ethereality	  (‘mentioned	  in	  passing’),	  and	  this	  well	  reflects	   the	  multiplicity	   of	  meaning	   (and	   statuses	   as	   object,	   process,	   etc.)	   that	  we	  have	  explored	   for	  Legacy	  and	  Inheritance.	  Passing	   indicates	  a	  passing	  of	   time,	  and	  the	  Moment	   of	   Passing	   is	   a	   passing	   of	   times:	   from	   the	   timeframe	   of	   the	   inheritee	  (who	  saw	  a	  now	  of	  creation	  –	  that	  is	  already	  past	  –	  and	  foresaw	  a	  future	  of	  witness	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	   etymology	   of	  moment,	   while	   not	   mysterious	   nor	   surprising,	   is	   fascinating.	   It	   stems	  from	   the	   Latin	   “momentum”,	   whose	   primary	   meaning	   is	   indeed	   “momentum”	   and	   not	  “moment”.	   This	   ambiguity	   carries	   into	   most	   European	   languages,	   and	   while	   it	   is	  unproblematically	   averted	   in	   physics	   it	   remains	   as	   a	   stumbling	   block	   for	   this	   kind	   of	  discussions	   in	   Italian	   (where	  momento	   translates	   both	   meanings,	   –	   inertia	   and	   instant	   -­‐	  although	  with	  a	  reversed	  primacy	  of	  the	  time-­‐factor,	  compared	  to	  Latin).	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which	   is	   the	   moment	   of	   passing	   itself)	   to	   that	   of	   the	   inheritor	   (whose	   now	   of	  interpretation	  is	  not	  earlier	  than	  the	  moment	  of	  passing,	  where	  he	  met	  the	  before	  of	  the	  content	  and	  of	   the	   inheritee).	  Time	  passes	   from	  the	  moment	  of	  creation	  to	  the	  moment(s)	   of	   interpretation,	   but	   the	   moment	   of	   passing	   is	   a	   non-­‐chronological	  moment,	   since	   it	   is	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   two	   timeframes	   that	   are	   constructed	   by	  opposite	   reasoning:	   it	   is	   the	   end	   of	   the	   “before	   (I	   met)”	   of	   the	   inheritor	   and	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  “then	  (I	  will	  be	  met)”	  of	  the	  inheritee.	  	  	  Levinas	   in	   Totality	   and	   Infinity	   gets	   to	   the	   core	   of	   the	   temporality	   of	   a	  moment	   of	   meeting,	   although,	   being	   focused	   as	   he	   is	   on	   ‘the	   Gaze’	   as	   a	   mode	   of	  encounter,	   he	   does	   not	   extend	   his	   analysis	   to	   the	  meeting	   in	   absentia	   that	   is	   the	  moment	   of	   passing	   as	   moment	   of	   the	   process	   of	   cultural	   transmission.	   Bergo	  beautifully	  summarizes	  this	  in	  her	  article	  on	  Levinas	  for	  the	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy:	  	  Levinas	  will	  not	  focus	  on	  time	  as	  the	  measure	  of	  movement,	  or	  even	  on	  time	   as	   Henri	   Bergson's	   “duration.”	   Duration	   denoted	   a	   temporality	  lacking	  all	  subjectivity	  […]	  For	  Levinas,	  time	  will	  consist	  in	  two	  axes:	  (1)	  the	   flowing	   synthesis	   of	   now	   moments;	   (2)	   and	   a	   peculiar	   kind	   of	  interruption	  that	  Levinas	  will	  call	  the	  event	  of	  transcendence.	  Transcendence	  is,	  above	  all,	  relational:	   it	   is	  a	  human	  affair.	   It	   is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  transcendence	  is	  an	  “event”	  per	  se	  or	  not.	  An	  event	  should	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	   force	  that	   introduces	  a	  decisive	  break	   into	  the	  historical	  status	  quo	  and	  redirects	  it	  in	  function	  of	  its	  own	  magnitude.	  The	   encounter	   with	   the	   other	   person,	   so	   far	   as	   it	   is	   an	   event,	   merely	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inflects	   history	   or	   leaves	   a	   trace	   in	   it.	   […]	   Transcendence	   in	   Levinas	   is	  lived	  and	  factical.	  How	  could	  transcendence	  be	  factical?	  While	  it	  has	  the	  temporality	   of	   an	   interruption	   that	   ‘I’	   cannot	   represent	   to	   myself,	  transcendence	   nevertheless	   has	   a	   circular	   relationship	   with	   everyday	  life.10	  	   We	  are	  brought	  back	   to	   the	  a-­‐historical	  nature	  of	   the	  event-­‐meeting,	  of	   the	  moment	  of	  passing.	  The	  “encounter	  with	  the	  other	  person”	  (although	  contumacious)	  is	  not	  a	  historical	  event:	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  story	  of	  the	  inheritee	  and	  of	  the	  inheritor,	  and	   transcends	   our	   ability	   to	   quantify	   the	   fact.	   The	   factus	   brutus	   (to	   go	   back	   to	  Bloch)	   is	   not	   only	   irrelevant,	   but	   completely	   absent.	   The	   dialogue	   is	   an	  unconceivable	  dialogue,	  because	  it	  happens	  between	  two	  voices	  that	  never	  met,	  yet	  that	  rely	  on	  each	  other	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  their	  process	  of	  thought.	  	  The	   impossibility	   of	   the	   dialogue	   starts	   with	   the	   impossibility	   to	  acknowledge	   the	   other	   by	   their	   name.	   The	   inheritee	   does	   not	   know	   her	   cultural	  inheritor,	   contrary	   to	   the	   dying	   person,	   who	   gets	   to	   nominate	   the	   heir	   to	   their	  physical	   property.	   The	   inheritee	   trusts	   that	   someone	   will	   ‘get’	   something,	   as	   in	  ‘receiving’	  just	  as	  much	  as	  in	  ‘understanding’.	  What	  she	  passes	  on,	  what	  she	  commits	  to	   a	   possible	   witness,	   is	   passed	   on	   blindly,	   to	   a	   witness	   that	  may	   or	  may	   not	   be	  willing	  to	  step	  up.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Bergo,	  Bettina,	  "Emmanuel	  Levinas",	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Fall	  2014	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/levinas/>.	  
	   267	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  inheritor	  cannot	  name	  the	  inheritee	  before	  the	  dialogue	  has	  come	  to	  pass	  (!),	  since	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  naming	  is	  narrating,	  and	  implies	  having	  met,	  reflected	  and	  recognized.	  The	  process	  of	  inheritance	  is	  what	  names	  (or	  names	  not)	   the	   inheritee,	   what	   proposes	   to	   the	   word	   a	   substance	   to	   which	   the	   name	   is	  applied.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  inheritance,	  the	  name	  cannot	  appear	  in	  the	  meeting	  that	   enables	   the	   inheritance,	   or	   if	   it	  were	   to	   appear,	   it	  would	   be	   an	   empty	   name,	  mentioned	  but	  not	  narrated.	  Therefore,	  this	  dialogue	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  both	  sides	  to	   enable	   the	  meeting	  of	   the	  Other	   is	   a	   dialogue	   in	  which	  one	   cannot	   address	   the	  interlocutor,	  because	  the	  interlocutor	  is	  an	  absolute	  unknown	  (and	  unknowable).	  The	  impossibility	  of	  such	  a	  dialogue	  (or	  of	  the	  beginning	  of	  such	  a	  dialogue)	  extends	  to	  the	  content.	  How	  can	  it	  be	  a	  dialogue	  (from	  the	  inheritee’s	  standpoint)	  if	  no	  one	  is	  (yet)	  there	  to	  answer?	  Yet	  the	  projection	  of	  meaning	  that	  we	  have	  explored	  in	  chapter	  4	  shows	  how	  the	  creator	  of	  content	  creates	  them	  specifically	  relying	  on	  this	  witness	  –	  this	  respond-­‐er	  –	  that	  is	  yet	  to	  come.	  There	  is	  something	  messianic	  in	  the	  appearance	  of	   the	   inheritor,	  who	  comes	   to	   justify	  all	  of	   the	   legacy	   from	  which	  she	  draws	  her	   inheritances.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  however,	   the	   inheritor	   looks	   at	   the	  past	   (both	   specifically	   and	   generally)	   as	   the	   source	   of	   knowledge,	   of	   thought,	   of	  contents	  that	  can	  provide	  validation	  to	  her	  own	  thought.	  	  Derrida	  says	  about	  attributions	  that	  they	  consist	  of	  ‘giving	  what	  one	  does	  not	  have	  to	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  want	  it’11	  and	  this	  fits	  perfectly	  the	  dialogue	  we	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Derrida,	   “Response	   to	   Jean-­‐Luc	   Marion”,	   in	   Jean-­‐Luc	   Marion,	   “In	   the	   name”,	   in	   John	   D.	  Caputo,	  Michael	  J.	  Scanlon,	  God,	  the	  Gift	  and	  Post-­‐Modernism,	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	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exploring.	  One	  cannot	  give	  one’s	  legacy,	  not	  only	  because	  -­‐	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  –	  one	  is	  never	   in	  control	  of	   it	  once	   it	  has	  come	  to	  exist,	  but	  most	  properly	  because	  what	   is	  received	   is	  always	  an	   inheritance,	  not	  a	   legacy.	  The	  content	  can	  be	  passed	  on,	  but	  the	  content	  as	  meant	  is	  not	  the	  content	  as	  received,	  so	  the	  inheritee	  cannot	  be	  the	  one	  giving	  it,	  it	  can	  only	  participate	  in	  the	  dialogue	  with	  the	  receiver	  (the	  inheritor)	  who	  does	  not	  know	  what	  she	  wants,	  since	  she	  does	  not	  know	  the	  result	   (her	  own	  inheritance)	  until	  the	  time	  when	  it	  has	  already	  emerged	  as	  a	  process.	  	  This	  historical	  impossibility	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  mode	  of	  dialogue.	  Even	  if	  we	  consider	   simply	   the	   logical	   possibility	   of	   Inheritance	   and	   Legacy	   as	   we	   have	  explored	  them,	  without	  enquiring	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  passing,	  we	  are	  met	   with	   a	   paradox:	   for	   a	   Legacy	   to	   be	   actualized,	   we	   need	   one	   (or	   more)	  
inheritors	  to	  inherit	  it,	  yet	  for	  the	  Inheritance	  to	  happen	  (to	  be	  actualized),	  an	  
inheritee	  and	  his	  Legacy	  (or	  more	  than	  one)	  must	  already	  be	  actually	  present.	  	  This	   paradoxical	   tension	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   our	   experience	   of	   historical	  transmission,	  but	   it	   is	   lost	   in	   the	  shuffle	  of	   tradition	  and	  multiplicity:	  since	  we	  are	  always	   presented	   with	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   possible	   inheritances	   and	   infinite	  possibilities	   for	   our	   legacy,	   we	   can	   avoid	   focusing	   on	   the	   impossibility	   of	   the	  moment	  of	  passing.	  Tradition,	  with	  the	  anonymity	  of	  belonging,	  shields	  us	  from	  the	  problem,	  since	  it	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  continuity	  that	  is	  already	  there	  and	  tells	  us	  that	  succession	  of	  thought	  is	  easy,	  necessary,	  and	  natural.	  Yet	  this	  shields	  us	  only	  insofar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indiana	   University	   Press,	   1999,	   p.	   43.	   Derrida	   is	   quoting	   Lacan	   (on	   the	   transfert)	   and	  referring	  this	  sentence	  to	  Marion’s	  attribution	  of	  certain	  “objections”	  to	  Derrida	  himself.	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as	   we	   refuse	   to	   interrogate	   the	   reasons	   and	   the	   modalities	   in	   which	   we	   adhere	  
personally	  to	  a	   tradition,	   and	   to	   inquire	  why	  and	  how	  we	   receive	   certain	   contents	  (and	  not	   others)	   from	  a	   tradition	   that	   is	   by	  necessity	   accessed	  by	  us	   through	  our	  cultural	  density.	  	  We	  shall	  not	  repeat	  here	  how	  Tradition	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  Inheritance	  and	  cancels	  the	  individuality	  of	  Legacy,	  but	  only	  reflect	  upon	  the	  reason	  for	  it,	  which	  we	  did	   not	   discover	   in	   our	   analyses	   of	   either	   phenomena	   singularly	   considered.	  Authority	  and	  authorial-­‐ity	  are	  expressed	  in	  tradition	  always	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  whole	  of	  contents,	  avoiding	   facing	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	   in	  which	  one’s	   Inheritance	  and	  someone	  else’s	  Legacy	  are	  generated.	  Since	  we	  grow	  up	  in	  the	  fold	  of	  a	  tradition	  and	  of	  a	   culture12	  –	  always	  presented	  as	  an	  organic	  whole	   -­‐	   the	  personal	  dimension	  of	  our	   cultural	   reception	   is	   hidden	   from	  our	  perspective,	   as	   it	   is	   our	   production:	  we	  speak	   and	   write	   into	   the	   public	   space,	   diverting	   our	   attention	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  someone	  in	  particular	  will	  be	  reading	  or	  hearing	  it.	  The	  moment	   of	   passing,	   then,	   is	   absolutely	   personal	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	  absolute	   absence.	   Hermeneutics	   and	   phenomenology	   alike	   have	   talked	   about	   the	  meeting	   between	   the	   past	   and	   the	  modern	   author	   in	   terms	   of	   friendship.	   Talking	  about	  translation,	  for	  example,	  Derrida	  writes:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Even	   liminal	   cases	   are	   always	   represented	   in	   function	   of	   the	   overlapping	   space	   of	   two	  “cultures”	  with	  expressions	  like	  “Italian-­‐American	  culture.”	  This,	  far	  from	  being	  an	  opening	  to	   the	   idea	   of	   personal	   cultural	   density,	   is	   a	   reaffirmation	   of	   the	   paradigm	   of	   de-­‐individualized	  cultural	  transmission.	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Friendship	   and	   translation,	   then,	   and	   the	   experience	   of	   translation	   as	  friendship,	   that	   is	  what	  you	  seem	  to	  wish	  we	  were	  speaking	  about.	   It	   is	  true	  that	  one	  imagines	  with	  difficulty	  a	  translation,	   in	  the	  current	  sense	  of	   the	   term,	   whether	   it	   is	   competent	   or	   not,	   without	   some	   philein,	  without	   some	   love	   or	   friendship,	  without	   some	   “lovence”	   [aimance],	   as	  you	  would	   say,	   borne	   [portée]	   toward	   the	   thing,	   the	   text,	   or	   the	   other.	  Even	   if	   hatred	   can	   sharpen	   the	   vigilance	   […]	   and	   motivate	   a	  demystifiying	   interpretation,	   this	  hatred	  still	   reveals	  an	   intense	   form	  of	  desire,	  interest,	  indeed	  fascination.13	  	  This	  core	  of	  philein	  and/or	  hatred	  is	  applicable	  without	  effort	  to	  any	  form	  of	  reception,	  of	  which	  translation	  is	  just	  one	  example	  –	  with	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  claiming	  to	  be	  as	  close	  to	  the	  original	  as	  possible.	  This	  meeting	  –	  any	  meeting	  with	  the	  Other	  -­‐is	   already	   transcendental,	   if	  we	   stay	   true	   to	   phenomenology	   and	   to	  what	  we	   said	  with	   Levinas	   a	   couple	   of	   pages	   ago,	   and	   yet	   it	   is	   also	   personal	   acquaintance,	   a	  
friendship-­‐quality	  to	  go	  back	  to	  Ricoeur.14	  	  This	  meeting	  happens	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  absence;	  the	  inheritee	  knows	  that	  «as	  soon	  as	   [she]	   speak[s],	   the	  words	   [she	  has]	   found	   (as	   soon	  as	   they	  are	  words)	  no	  longer	  belong	   to	   [her],	   are	  originally	   repeated.»15	  This	   “as	   soon”	   is	  not	  a	   temporal	  one	  (since	  the	  words	  could	  be	  written	  or	  spoken	  in	  the	  void	  and	  only	  repeated,	  re-­‐listened,	  re-­‐read	  in	  a	  chronological	  future),	  but	  is	  the	  “in	  the	  beginning”,	  it	  means	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Derrida,	  “Sauf	  le	  Nom”,	  p.	  47.	  14	  Ricoeur,	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  p.	  40.	  See	  also	  chapter	  3.	  15	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  p.	  177.	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their	  core.	  Ἐν	  ἀρχῇ,	  ἦν	  ὁ	   λόγος,	   and	   the	   “as	   soon”	   is	   the	  arché,	   the	  principle	  upon	  which	  lies	  the	  very	  possibility	  for	  the	  words	  of	  the	  inheritee	  to	  be	  spoken.	  	  The	   inheritee	   looks	   at	   the	   meeting	   with	   someone	   who	   is	   absent	   at	   the	  moment	   of	   creation,	   yet	   she	   knows	   that	   it	   will	   be	   in	   her	   own	   (the	   inheritee’s)	  absence	  that	  the	  meeting	  will	  take	  place.	  The	  inheritee	  as	  a	  person	  must	  disappear	  for	   the	   legacy	   to	   emerge	   in	   the	  meeting.	   She	   «must	   die	   away	   from	   [her]	   death	   in	  order	  to	  be	  reborn	  “immortal”	  at	  the	  eve	  of	  [her]	  birth»16,	  to	  return	  to	  Derrida.	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  inheritee	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  creation	  and	  in	  the	  immortality	  of	  Legacy	  is	   predicated	   upon	   her	   absence	   in	   the	  moment	   of	   passing.	   Therefore,	   even	   in	   the	  rare	  case	  of	  “direct”	  reception	  (i.e.	  the	  legacy/inheritance	  begins	  and	  ends	  with	  the	  disciple	  hearing	  the	  master),	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  content	  to	  stay	  on	  its	  own,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  death	  of	  the	  utterer,	  is	  what	  is	  projected	  onto	  the	  moment	  of	  passing.	  The	   inheritor	   as	   well	   predicates	   his	   own	   absence.	   If	   the	   meeting	   itself	  generates	   personal	   interpretation	   in	   light	   of	   one’s	   own	   historical	   awareness,	   the	  meeting	  must	  happen	  before	  personal	  interpretation	  is	  afoot.	  To	  inherit	  a	  legacy,	  the	  legacy	  must	  already	  be	   there	  before.	   So	   far	  we	  have	  explored	  and	  understood	  any	  instance	   of	   before	   from	   the	   exclusive	   perspective	   of	   the	   inheritor,	   and	   thus	  conceived	   this	   before	   as	   a	   strictly	   temporal	   one.	   However,	   this	   before	   is	   now	  disclosed	  first	  and	  foremost	  as	  a	  logical	  condition,	  which	  clashes	  with	  the	  necessity	  of	   the	   inheriting	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   the	   legacy	   to	  be.	   This	   fundamental	   yet	   simple	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  p.	  180.	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obstacle	   escapes	   our	   everyday	   thought,	   since	  we	   are	   immersed	   in	   a	   cacophony	  of	  voices	   that	  we	  have	  already	  heard	  (or	  heard	  of)	  and	  we	  speak	   into	  a	  world	   full	  of	  potential	  listeners.	  But	  to	  think	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  is	  to	  think	  the	  unthinkable.	  This	   does	   not	   simply	   relate	   to	   the	   paradoxical	   nature	   of	   the	   moment	   of	  passing,	  but	  to	  the	  inconceivability	  of	  any	  of	  the	  two	  phenomena	  as	  detached	  from	  it.	   To	   think	   of	   a	   pure	   inheritance	   would	   be	   impossible,	   since	   the	   contents	   were	  approached	  in	  a	  certain	  way;	  the	  inheritor	  (being	  the	  inheritor	  ourselves,	  a	  thinker	  we	  use	  as	  an	  example	  or	  a	  detached	  hypothetical	  someone-­‐else)	  must	  have	  read	  the	  content	  in	  a	  certain	  language	  (not	  necessarily	  the	  original	  one).	  He	  will	  have	  done	  as	  much	  at	  a	  certain	  time,	  in	  a	  certain	  situation,	  where	  the	  impact	  of	  certain	  words	  and	  topics	  will	  have	  been	  characterized	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Possibly	  even	  more	  important	  will	   have	   been	   the	   accessibility	   of	   the	   other	   contents	   that	   were	   part	   of	   the	   same	  legacies	  the	  read	  contents	  came	  from	  –	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  been	  read	  by	  the	  inheritor.	  As	  soon	  as	  we	  apply	  the	  paradigm	  of	   Inheritance,	  and	  apply	  the	   insights	  we	   have	   obtained	   in	   chapter	   3	   to	   the	   particular	   contents	   that	   contribute	   to	   its	  formation,	  we	  are	  thrown	  into	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  as	  already	  happened	  through	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  Legacy	  –	  and	   then	  of	  a	  series	  of	  Legacies	  when	  we	  move	   from	  content	   to	   content	  while	   trying	  never	   to	   leave	   the	   Inheritance	  of	   our	  hypothetical	  subject	  (being	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  inheritance	  the	  subject	  of	  our	  analysis).	  The	  same,	  however,	  holds	  true	  of	  Legacy,	  in	  an	  even	  more	  immediate	  sense.	  To	  discuss	  the	  particularity	  of	  a	  Legacy	  we	  must	  first	  have	  identified	  the	  inheritee,	  and	  thus	  performed	  a	  narration	  about	  the	  inheritee	  and	  about	  the	  contents	  that	  are	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aggregated	  by	  recognition	  of	  the	  name	  of	  the	  inheritee	  himself	  or	  herself.	  Narrating	  the	  name	  means	  having	  established	  an	  identity,	  thus	  having	  collocated	  the	  inheritee	  in	   a	   historical	   situation	   that	   we	   define	   as	   theirs	   and	   not	   ours	   (no	   matter	   the	  chronological	  distance	  between	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  content-­‐creation	  and	  the	  time	  of	  our	  thinking).	  As	  Marion	  acutely	  glosses,	  «not	  even	  saying	  the	  name	  would	  not	  suffice»	  to	  avoid	  attribution	  of	  qualities	  to	  the	  named,	  «since	  a	  simple	  denegation	  would	  still	  belong	   to	   predication,	   would	   again	   inscribe	   the	   name	   within	   the	   horizon.»17	  We	  would	  be	  required	  not	  only	  not	  to	  name	  the	  inheritee,	  then,	  but	  to	  avoid	  narrating	  any	  identity	  we	  ascribe	  to	  them.	  But	  their	  identity	  is	  engrained	  in	  our	  having	  heard	  of	   them,	  since	  as	  we	  discussed	   in	  chapter	  2	  we	  cannot	  discuss	  the	  un-­‐heard-­‐of.	  To	  discuss	   the	   particularity	   of	   any	   one	   Legacy,	   we	   must	   have	   received	   it	   in	   our	  Inheritance,	   and	   thus	  have	  already	   “contaminated”	   this	   inconceivable	  Pure	  Legacy	  with	  the	  perspective	  of	  our	  situation	  and	  our	  inheritance	  of	  it.	  We	  cannot	  conceive	  any	  example	  of	  a	  legacy	  before	  we	  depict	  it	  as	  inherited	  by	  us.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Marion,	   “In	   the	   Name”,	   in	   John	   D.	   Caputo,	   Michael	   J.	   Scanlon,	   God,	   the	   Gift	   and	   Post-­‐
Modernism,	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.	  41-­‐42.	  As	  it	  is	  often	   the	   case,	   Marion	   is	   dancing	   on	   the	   line	   separating	   theory	   of	   interpretation	   and	  continental	  philosophy	  (be	  it	  phenomenology	  or	  post-­‐structuralism)	  from	  flat	  out	  theology.	  The	  ambiguity	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  lecture	  he	  is	  dialoguing	  with	   Derrida.	   However,	   what	   they	   say	   about	   attributing	   qualities	   through	   naming	   to	   a	  purely	   transcendent	   being	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   Other	   encountered	   in	   the	   moment	   of	  Passing,	   who	   is,	   in	   her	   Otherness,	   transcendent	   herself,	   at	   the	   very	   least	   until	   an	  interpretation	  is	  performed.	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This	   inconceivability	   of	   pure	   examples	   of	   Legacy	   and	   Inheritance	   (taken	  singularly	   and	   theoretically	   abstracted	   from	   the	   commingling	   of	   the	   moment	   of	  passing)	   shares	   the	   inherent	   philosophical	   difficulties	   implicit	   in	   any	  exemplification,	  which	  are	  summarized	  by	  Derrida	  in	  Passions:	  	  And	   certainly,	   when	   I	   say	   this	   very	   example,	   I	   already	   say	   something	  more	  and	  something	  else;	  I	  say	  something	  which	  goes	  beyond	  the	  tode	  ti,	  the	   this	   of	   the	   example.	   The	   example	   itself,	   as	   such,	   overflows	   its	  singularity	   as	  much	   as	   its	   identity.	   This	   is	  why	   there	   are	   no	   examples,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   there	   are	   only	   examples;	   I	   have	   said	   this,	   too,	  often	  about	  many	  examples,	  no	  doubt.	  The	  exemplarity	  of	  the	  example	  is	  clearly	  never	  the	  exemplarity	  of	  the	  example.18	  	  Choosing	  an	  example	  of	  legacy,	  therefore,	  already	  implies	  a	  surpassing	  of	  the	  immediateness	  of	   “this”19	  instance,	  which	   is	  chosen	  amongst	  others	  and	  presented	  as	  similar	  to	  the	  others	  it	  exemplifies;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  nonetheless,	  the	  exemplified	  (which	  should	  by	  its	  nature	  be	  same-­‐as	  what	  it	  exemplifies)	  must	  be	  different	  from	  something	   else.	   And,	   when	   dealing	   with	   cultural	   examples,	   the	   paradigm	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Jacques	   Derrida,	   “Passions”,	   in	   Derrida,	   Dutoit,	   On	   the	   Name,	   Stanford,	   CA:	   Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1995,	  p.	  19.	  19	  Aristotle’s	   tode	   ti	   constitutes	   a	   problematic	   translation	   issue	   and	   we	   shall	   not	   try	   to	  discuss	   it	   here.	   However,	   referring	   exclusively	   to	   the	   context	   of	   Derrida’s	   usage	   –and	  following	   many	   of	   his	   translators	   –	   we	   feel	   safe	   to	   equate	   it	   to	   the	   “this”	   of	   the	   English	  language.	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difference	  –	  the	  object	  to	  which	  we	  compare	  our	  example	  –	  must	  by	  necessity	  come	  from	   our	   inheritance	   as	   well.	   It	   becomes,	   in	   itself,	   an	   example	   of	   what	   the	   first	  example	  differs	   from.	  This	   is	  what	  Derrida	  means	  when	  he	   says	   that	   there	  are	  no	  examples	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  there	  are	  only	  examples.	  However,	   the	   impossibility	   of	   our	   supposed	   Inheritance	   and	   Legacy	  conceived	  on	  their	  own	  goes	  beyond	  the	  problematic	  of	  exemplification,	  as	  we	  have	  seen.	  They	  belong	  to	  each	  other	  in	  a	  way	  that	  clashes	  with	  the	  absolute	  Otherness	  of	  the	   Other	   and,	  most	   importantly,	   with	   their	   diachrony	   and	   relative	   displacement.	  We	   cannot,	   that	   is,	   conceive	   the	   inheritee	   as	   Other,	   but	   only	   as	   the	   Other	  encountered	  by	  us.	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  Other	  that	  we	  encounter	  in	  Levinas,	  according	  to	  whom	  «the	  Other	  is	  inconceivable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  “the	  Other	  remains	  infinitely	  transcendent,	  infinitely	  foreign”	  to	  the	  I.	  Levinas	  says	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  the	   Other	   is	   infinite	   because	   it	   overflows	   rather	   than	   being	   “contained	   in”	   the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  non-­‐moral	  domain	  of	  the	  I.»20	  	  Truth	   be	   told,	   the	   moment	   of	   passing	   retains	   certain	   characteristics	   that	  make	   it	   remarkably	   different	   from	   the	   Gaze	   (the	   moment	   of	   meeting-­‐the-­‐face	   in	  Levinas).	   The	   inheritee	   as	   such	   is	   encountered	   only	   after	   we	   have	   already	  encountered	  her	  Legacy,	   since	  we	   find	  her	  only	  as	   inheritee,	   and	  not	   as	   a	  morally	  challenging	  Other	   asking	  not	   to	  be	  killed.	  The	  only	   request	   is	   a	  demand	  not	   to	  be	  forgotten,	  which	  we	  are	  already	  obliging	  when	  we	  meet	  her.	  Compared	  to	  Levinas’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Gutting,	   Gary.	  Thinking	   the	   Impossible.	   French	  Philosophy	   since	   1960,	  Oxford:	   University	  Press,	  2011,	  p.	  122.	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Other,	   the	   inheritee	   presents	   herself	   as	   a	   responsibility	   that	   has	   already	   been	  
fulfilled.	   Here	   lies	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   Inheritance	   (even	   a	  negative	  one)	  from	  the	  moral	  judgment	  on	  the	  inheritee	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  inheritor	  that	  we	  explored	  in	  chapter	  3.	  Even	  when	  the	  moral	  or	  ethical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  historical	  person	  who	  acted,	  lived,	  wrote,	  and	  spoke	  were	   to	  be	  negative,	   this	  would	  not	  necessarily	  carry	  over	  into	   the	   judgment	   that	   the	   inheritor	   as	   such	   expresses	   on	   the	   Legacy,	   and	   on	   the	  singular	  contents	  that	  he	  comes	  to	  inherit.	  This	  is	  often	  the	  case	  in	  discussions	  about	  artists,	  since	  the	  call	  to	  inheritance	  is	  fulfilled	  by	  our	  reflection	  on	  the	  work	  of	  art,	  and	  any	  morality	  discussion	  comes	  after	  the	  fact.	  Think	  for	  example	  of	  the	  arrest	  of	  Roman	   Polansky,	   possibly	   the	   most	   internationally	   dividing	   case	   of	   this	   kind	   in	  recent	   times:	   even	   then,	   the	   value	   of	   his	   Legacy	   proper	   was	   never	   in	   discussion,	  while	  the	  moral	   judgment	  on	  his	  person	  (as	  a	  consequence	  of	  his	  act)	  was	  diverse	  (with	   remarkable	   differences	   on	   the	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic).	   Art	   Critic	  Michael	  Kimmelman,	   writing	   for	   The	   New	   York	   Times,21	  noticed	   this	   intrinsic	   difference	  between	  the	  artist	  (as	  inheritee,	  in	  our	  terminology)	  and	  the	  person,	  and	  addressed	  a	  perceived	  confusion	  of	  the	  two.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  It	   is	   noticeable	   that	   only	   in	   time	   of	   peculiar	   crisis	   capable	   to	   ‘make	   the	   news’	   similar	  issues	   reach	   the	   American	   mainstream	   media	   –	   and	   even	   then	   only	   in	   a	   middle	   pages	  column.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   it	  emerges	  from	  Kimmelman’s	  words	  how	  ‘intellectual’	  America	  (and	   not	   only	   specialists	   of	   ethics	   and	   philosophy)	   interrogates	   itself	   on	   these	  matters,	   if	  only	  in	  passing.	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This	   goes	   beyond	   simply	   differentiating	   their	   work	   from	   their	   private	  lives.	  [….]	  Art	  and	  philosophy	  test	  boundaries.	  Artists	  demand	  their	  own	  social	   compass.	  Taken	   to	   its	  extreme,	   the	  argument	   implies	   that	   simply	  being	   an	   exceptional	   artist	   or	   intellectual	   can	   mitigate	   even	   criminal	  behavior.22	  	  The	  critic	  condemns	  the	  leeway	  granted	  to	  artists,	  but	  notices	  how	  this	  stems	  from	   the	   differentiation	   of	   their	   person	   from	   their	   intellectual	   production	   (and	  underlines	   in	  passing	  how	  this	   is	   true	  also	   in	   the	  case	  of	  philosophy).	   In	  receiving	  them	   as	   creators	   of	   (and	   through)	   artistic	   content,	  we	   risk	   confusing	   their	   legacy	  with	   their	  person,	   and	   imagine	   the	  police	   arresting	   the	   first	   instead	  of	   the	   second	  (which	  would	  be	  quite	   the	  surrealist	  short	  story).	  This,	  however,	  only	  strengthens	  our	  point;	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  we	  have	  when	  meeting	  the	  other	  face	  to	  face	  is	  not	  transported	  into	  the	  moment	  of	  passing:	  one	  could	  insult	  his	  readers	  (or	  at	  least	  be	  very	  caustic,	  à	  la	  Nietzsche),	  and	  still	  be	  read.	  Nevertheless,	   even	   assuming	   that	   the	   contents	   themselves	   were	   to	   come	  under	  the	   fire	  of	  our	  moral	   judgment	  (in	  reading	  texts	   like	  Mein	  Kampf	  or,	   from	  a	  more	  conservative	  point	  of	  view,	  La	  philosophie	  dans	  le	  boudoir),	  this	  reaction	  (and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Michael	  Kimmelman,	  “The	  Polansky	  case:	  a	  Gallic	  shrug”,	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  3rd,	   2009.	   Kimmelman	   then	   goes	   on	   focusing	   on	   the	   differences	   between	   America	   and	  France:	   «The	   notion	   certainly	   didn’t	   arise	   with	   Mr.	   Polanski.	   Americans	   democratize	  celebrity,	   then	  love	  to	  knock	  famous	  people	  off	   their	  pedestals.	  Any	  infraction	  will	  do.	  Not	  for	  the	  French.	  They	  lionize	  the	  physician	  writer	  Céline	  even	  though	  he	  disgraced	  himself	  as	  an	  anti-­‐Semite.	  They	  idolize	  the	  vagabond	  writer	  Jean	  Genet	  not	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  was	  a	  criminal	  but,	  in	  part,	  because	  of	  it.»	  and	  more.	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the	  memory	  of	   this	   reaction,	   and	   the	   intellectual	   consequences	   of	   both)	  would	  be	  inscribed	   in	   our	   Inheritance	   and	   disclose	   new	   areas	   of	   our	   cultural	   density.	   The	  other	  that	  speaks	  from	  the	  past	   is	  un-­‐killable	  and	  incapable	  of	  killing	  us	  or	  others,	  and	  thus,	   if	  we	  apply	  a	  strict	  Levinassian	  perspective,	   incapable	  of	  challenging	  our	  morality.	  	  We	  strayed	  into	  the	  discussion	  of	  morality	  and	  reception,	  and	  we	  must	  now	  go	   back	   to	   the	   reason	   for	  which	  we	   turned	   to	   Levinas,	   i.e.	   his	   statement	   that	  any	  encounter	   with	   the	   other	   is	   transcendent.	   We	   were	   and	   are	   still	   trying	   to	   find	   a	  philosophical	   approach	   that	   would	   allow	   us	   to	   conceive	   the	   moment	   of	   passing,	  which	  appears	  impossible	  and	  escapes	  our	  epistemological	  power,	  at	  least	  directly.	  The	  model	  of	   inconceivability	  (and	  invisibility)	  proposed	  by	  Levinas	  limits	  itself	  to	  the	  interiority	  of	  the	  person	  (the	  face	  defies	  ‘the	  power	  of	  my	  power’23),	  i.e.	  it	  is	  an	  impossibility	  to	  account	   for	  the	  Other	  based	  only	  on	  my	  internal	   faculties;	   instead,	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  conceive	  something	  that	  is	  externally	  impossible:	  firstly	  because	  it	  involves	   two	   subjectivities	   and	   it	   appears	   impossible	   from	   both	   reciprocal	  perspectives;	   secondly,	   because	   this	   impossibility	   strides	   with	   our	   intuition	   of	  legacies	  constantly	  flowing	  into	  inheritances.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Emmanuel	   Levinas,	   Totality	   and	   infinity:	   an	   essay	   on	   exteriority,	   Pittsburgh:	   Duquesne	  University	   Press,	   1969,	   p.	   198.	   The	   original	   sentence,	   admittedly	   hard	   to	   translate,	   reads	  “mon	  pouvoir	  de	  pouvoir”,	  which	  could	  also	  be	  made	  into	  “my	  power	  of	  being	  able	  to.”	  
	   279	  
In	   dealing	  with	   impossibility	   (and	   specifically	  with	   the	   impossibility	   of	   the	  encounter)	   Derrida	   moves	   on	   a	   slightly	   different	   level	   than	   Levinas,	   since	   –	   as	  Gutting	  points	  out	  -­‐	  	  Derrida’s	   undecideability	   is	   a	   more	   radical	   version	   of	   Levinas’s	  unconceivability	   [sic]	   of	   the	   Other.	   Levinas’s	   Other	   is	   inconceivable	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  interiority,	  but	  can,	  nonetheless,	  be	  understood	  through	   a	   phenomenological	   description	   of	   our	   encounter	   with	   him.	  Derrida’s	   Other	   is	   inconceivable	   tout	   court	   and,	   in	   particular,	   is	   not	  accessible	  through	  a	  phenomenological	  description.24	  	  However,	   Derrida	   is	   still	   getting	   only	   to	   our	   impossibility	   to	   constitute	   the	   un-­‐decidable	   object	   as	   an	   object	   for	   our	   understanding.	   In	   discussing	  Différance	   (the	  «playing	  movement	   that	   ‘produces’	  –	  by	  means	  of	  something	   that	   is	  not	  simply	  an	  activity»	   -­‐	   our	   experiences),	   he	   argues	   that	   thinking	   of	   it	   is	   «uneasy	   and	  uncomfortable.»25	  	  His	  «talk	  of	  différance	  is	  a	  way	  of	  driving	  home	  the	  point	  that	  all	  positive	   concepts	   fail	   to	   be	   fulfilled	   when	   applied	   to	   the	   experience	   of	   the	  incomprehensible.»26	  The	   incomprehensible	   and	   the	   impossible,	   therefore,	   appear	  as	  such	  specifically	  insofar	  as	  they	  cannot	  be	  grasped	  positively	  and	  directly	  by	  our	  efforts	  at	  conceptualization.	  We	  are	  called	  to	  think	  the	  unthinkable,	  to	  contemplate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Gary	  Gutting,	  Thinking	  the	  Impossible.	  French	  Philosophy	  since	  1960,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  135.	  25	  Derrida,	  “Différance”,	  in	  Margin	  of	  Philosophy,	  tr.	  Alan	  Bass,	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1982,	  p.	  11-­‐12.	  26	  Gutting,	  Thinking	  the	  Impossible,	  p.	  154.	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that	   which	   we	   cannot	   see	   nor	   conceive	   directly,	   but	   which	   we	   intuit	   to	   be	   true	  because	  of	  our	  being	  immersed	  in	  its	  necessity.	  	  A	   possible	   ulterior	   solution	   to	   our	   search	   for	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  moment	  of	  passing	  can	  be	  offered	  by	  Marion’s	  discussion	  of	  saturated	  phenomena.	  When	  discussing	  Husserl’s	  phenomenology,	  Marion	  notices	  how	  it	  begins	  from	  «the	  inescapable	  duality	  of	  appearing	  and	  what	  appears»	  and	  how	  Husserl	  identifies	  two	  possible	  relations	  between	  the	   two.	  1)	  «the	   intention	   finds	   itself	  confirmed	  […]	  by	  the	  intuition»	  or	  2)	  «the	  intention	  can	  exceed	  intuitive	  fulfillment	  [in	  which	  case]	  the	  phenomenon	  does	  not	  deliver	  objective	  knowledge».	  However,	  Marion	  distinguishes	  a	   third	   possibility	   in	   which	   «the	   intention	   (the	   concept	   or	   the	   signification)	   can	  never	   reach	   adequation	   with	   the	   intuition,	   not	   because	   the	   latter	   is	   lacking	   but	  because	   it	   exceeds	  what	   the	   concept	   can	   receive,	   expose	  and	   comprehend.	  This	   is	  what	  we	  have	  called	  the	  saturated	  phenomenon.»27	  	  	  Derrida	   agrees	   that	   while	   the	   inconceivable	   cannot	   be	   fully	   grasped,	  impossibility	  can	  be	  contemplated	  as	  «something	  in	  excess	  of	  knowledge»	  for	  which	  «thinking	   is	  not	   the	   right	  word.»	   (p.	  60)28	  While	  Levinas,	  Derrida	  and	  Marion	   find	  this	  inconceivability	  in	  different	  places	  (in	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  Other,	  in	  the	  Gift	  and	  in	  God	  respectively),	  their	  models	  constitute	  a	  precious	  instrument	  in	  thinking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Marion,	  “In	  the	  Name”,	  p.	  39.	  28	  Derrida	   and	  Marion,	   “On	   the	   Gift:	   A	   Discussion	   between	   Jacques	   Derrida	   and	   Jean-­‐Luc	  Marion.	  Moderated	  by	  Richard	  Kearney”,	  in	  John	  D.	  Caputo,	  Michael	  J.	  Scanlon,	  God,	  the	  Gift	  
and	   Post-­‐Modernism,	   Bloomington	   and	   Indianapolis:	   Indiana	   University	   Press,	   1999,	   pp.	  54ff.	  Page	  numbers	  are	  given	  in	  parenthesis.	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the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  phenomenon.	  Derrida	  summarizes	  it	  well	  by	  saying	  that	  what	  he	  is	  «interested	  in	  […]	  is	  precisely	  this	  experience	  of	  the	   impossible,	  which	  would	  simply	  be	  a	  non-­‐experience.»	  (p.	  72)	  He	  is	  «looking	  for	  another	  possible	  experience	  of	  truth	  […]	  with	  all	  these	  conditions	  of	  impossibility.»	  (p.	  73)	  	  He	  is,	  once	  again,	  dialoguing	  with	  Marion,	  and	  the	  latter	  proposes	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  «counter-­‐experience	  […]	  of	  bedazzlement,	  of	  astonishment	  or	  Bewunderung»	  and	  of	  «an	  event	   that	  we	  cannot	  comprehend	  but	  nevertheless	  we	  have	  to	  see»	  (p.75).	  And	  here	  we	  find,	  finally,	  the	  justification	  for	  our	  expanding	  the	  notion	  of	  saturated	  phenomena	   (and	   of	   contemplating	   the	   inconceivable	   wherever	   it	   should	   arise):	  Marion	  writes	   that	   this	   counter-­‐experience	   is	   «the	   correct	   and	   consistent	   kind	   of	  experience	  appropriate	  to	  every	  decisive	  experience	  in	  our	  life	  –	  death,	  birth,	   love,	  poverty,	  illness,	  joy,	  pleasure	  and	  so	  on:	  […]	  we	  see	  them	  but	  we	  know	  our	  inability	  to	  see	  them	  in	  a	  clear	  manner;	  and	  nevertheless,	  these	  impossible	  and	  unintelligible	  evidences	  play	  the	  most	  important	  role	  for	  us»	  (p.	  75).	  Gutting	  notes	  that	  	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  this	  […]	  discussion	  concerns	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  philosophical	   enterprise	   as	   a	   discourse	   about	   the	   conceptually	  impossible.	   In	   these	   terms,	   the	   question	   concerns	   the	   nature	   of	   our	  experience	   of	   the	   conceptually	   impossible	   and	   of	   the	   kind	   of	  philosophical	  discourse	  that	  expresses	  it.	  Both	  Derrida	  and	  Marion	  agree	  that	  the	  impossible	  is	  not	  […]	  something	  we	  can	  directly	  grasp	  and	  locate	  exactly	  in	  our	  conceptual	  network.29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Gutting,	  Thinking	  the	  Impossible,	  p.	  162.	  
	   282	  
	  What	   our	   exploration	   has	   uncovered	   is	   not	   the	   necessity	   of	   being	   able	   to	  think	   the	   impossible,	   to	   experience	   what	   overflows	   our	   concepts,	   since	   this	   had	  already	  been	  established	  by	  the	  phenomenologists	  to	  which	  we	  referred;	  rather,	  our	  discovery	   is	   that	   beside	   religious	   (in	   Marion),	   biological	   (Marion’s	   off-­‐note	   about	  birth	   and	   death)	   and	   ethical	   (Derrida	   following	   Levinas)	   counter-­‐experiences	   of	  impossibility,	   we	   are	   presented	   with	   another	   phenomenon	   that	   transcends	   our	  possibility	   of	   description	   in	   our	   everyday	   cultural	   dimension:	   the	   moment	   of	  passing.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  as	  impossible	  as	  the	  Gift	  or	  the	  meeting	  with	  the	  Other	  (and	   shares	   certain	   characteristics	   with	   both),	   yet	   it	   exhausts	   its	   ethical	  consequences	  in	  its	  very	  appearance	  onto	  the	  scene.	  The	   lack	  of	  a	  possibility	  of	   conceptualization,	  however,	  does	  not	   imply	   that	  we	  should	  renounce	  speaking	  of	  Legacy	  AND	  Inheritance	  tout	  court,	  but	  just	  that	  we	  cannot	  conceive	  them	  separately,	  nor	  can	  we	  fully	  grasp	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  as	  their	  simultaneous	  actualization.	  What	  is	   left,	  therefore,	   is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we,	  as	  individuals	  in	  a	  cultural	  context,	  deal	  with	  the	  legacy-­‐inheritance	  axis,	  i.e.	  narrative	  and	  narration.	  We	  have	  found	  that	  both	  inheritance	  and	  legacy	  rely	  on	  a	  narration	  that	   is	   carried	   out	   at	   different	  moments	   in	   time,	   but	   that	   is	   tasked	  with	   bringing	  together	   all	   the	   modes	   of	   understanding	   time	   that	   are	   collapsed	   into	   the	   two	  phenomena.	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One	   of	   the	   approaches	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   narration	   is	   Gadamer’s	   notion	   of	  ‘play’,	   which	   in	   his	   work	   assumes	   a	   status	   of	   ‘presentation’	   of	   the	   work	   of	   art	  (largely	  conceived).	  He	  writes:	  	  If	   we	   speak	   of	   play,	   this	   refers	   neither	   to	   the	   attitude	   nor	   even	   to	   the	  state	  of	  mind	  of	   the	  creator	  or	  of	   those	  enjoying	  the	  work	  of	  art,	  nor	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  a	  subjectivity	  expressed	  in	  play,	  but	  to	  the	  mode	  of	  being	  of	   the	   work	   itself.	   […]	   All	   those	   purposive	   relations	   which	   determine	  active	  and	  caring	  existence	  have	  not	  simply	  disappeared,	  but	  in	  a	  curious	  way	   acquire	   a	   different	   quality.	   The	   player	   himself	   knows	   that	   play	   is	  only	  play	  and	  exists	  in	  a	  world	  which	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  seriousness	  of	  purposes.	   […]	  Play	   fulfills	   its	  purpose	  only	   if	   the	  player	   loses	  himself	   in	  his	  play.30	  	  Gadamer	   is	   here	   speaking	   about	   the	   ‘work’,	   which	   would	   equate	   to	   either	  Legacy	  or	  content	  in	  our	  analysis,	  depending	  on	  which	  of	  his	  sentences	  we	  choose	  to	  focus	   on.	   He	  writes	   that	   all	  purposive	   relations	   (i.e.	   the	  projected	  meaning	   that	   he	  discerns	  in	  interpretation	  and	  that	  we	  have	  found	  to	  be	  crucial	  to	  legacy	  as	  well)	  do	  not	   simply	   disappear	   and	   that	   they	   acquire	   a	   different	   quality.	   This	   ‘play’/Spiel	   is	  purposefully	   vague	   and	   only	   described	   as	   «the	   to-­‐and-­‐fro	  movement	  which	   is	   not	  tied	  to	  any	  goal	  which	  would	  bring	  it	  to	  an	  end»31,	  although	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  it	  as	  at	   the	   juxtaposition	  of	  game-­‐play,	  playing	  an	   instrument,	   theatrical	  playing	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  91-­‐92.	  31	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  93.	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even	  «its	  so-­‐called	  transferred	  meanings	  [as…]	  the	  play	  of	   light,	   the	  play	  of	  waves,	  the	  play	  of	  […]	  forces,	  even	  a	  play	  on	  words.»32	  The	  purpose	  of	   the	  play	  appears	   to	  be	  exhausted	  by	   its	  appearance	   ‘on	   the	  stage,’	  just	  as	  we	  observed	  that	  the	  call	  of	  legacy	  is	  satisfied	  by	  inheritance	  and	  that	  inheritance	  self-­‐justifies	  itself	  by	  being	  necessarily	  interesting	  to	  the	  inheritor.	  Can	  we	   then	   understand	   narration	   (the	   unifying	   mode	   of	   being	   of	   Legacy	   and	  Inheritance)	  as	  play	  in	  these	  terms?	  And	  can	  we	  defuse	  the	  problem	  we	  face	  when	  trying	  to	  grasp	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  by	  contemplating	   legacy	  and	   inheritance	  as	  re-­‐united	  as	  part	  of	  narration?	  Ricoeur,	   who	   was	   earlier	   our	   main	   reference	   when	   discussing	   the	   role	   of	  narrative,	  explains	   in	  Time	  and	  Narrative	  that	   time	  «becomes	  human»	  only	   insofar	  as	  it	  is	  articulated	  through	  a	  «narrative	  mode»	  and,	  vice	  versa,	  that	  narrative	  attains	  its	  full	  meaning	  when	  it	  becomes	  a	  «condition	  of	  temporal	  existence.»33I	  believe	  that	  in	  these	  terms	  we	  can	  construct	  narrative	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  bring	  back	  to	  ‘humanity’	  (in	  this	  case	  intended	  as	  our	  epistemological	  horizon)	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  whose	  temporal	  collocation	  has	  so	  far	  eluded	  us.	  The	  narration	  (of	  oneself	  as	   inheritee	  or	  inheritor	   respectively)	  happens	   in	  a	   space	  saturated	  with	  previous	  narrations	  and	  with	   potential	   interlocutors	   for	   our	   narrative.	   Therefore,	   the	   paradoxical	   tension	  created	  by	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  is	  dispersed	  in	  our	  constant	  self-­‐narration,	  which	  defuses	   the	   inconceivability	   of	   the	   moment	   by	   diluting	   it	   with	   the	   matter-­‐of-­‐fact	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  93.	  33	  Ricoeur,	  Time	  and	  Narrative,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  52.	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contemplation	   of	   ourselves	   on	   the	   background	   of	   a	   trickle	   of	   inheritances	   and	  legacies.	  Gadamer:	  «We	  say	  of	  someone	  that	  he	  plays	  with	  possibilities	  or	  with	  plans	  […]	   He	   still	   has	   the	   freedom	   to	   decide	   one	   way	   or	   another,	   for	   one	   of	   the	   other	  possibility	  […	  Yet]	  The	  attraction	  of	  the	  game,	  which	  it	  exercises	  on	  the	  players,	  lies	  in	  this	  risk.	  One	  enjoys	  a	  freedom	  of	  decision,	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  is	  endangered	  and	   irrevocably	   limited.»34	  The	   limitation	   of	   play,	   of	   the	   interplay	   between	   our	  subjectivity	   and	   the	   contents	  we	   face,	   can	   then	   become	   the	   scope	   of	   our	   cultural	  density,	  which	  presents	  us	  with	  possibilities	   that	  appear	   to	  us	   to	  be	  endless,	  since	  what	   lies	   outside	   the	   limits	   of	   accessibility	   is	   unknown.	   We	   have	   an	   illusion	   of	  absolute	  freedom	  (call	  it	  a	  freedom	  of	  attention	  or	  a	  freedom	  of	  inheritance)	  in	  our	  receiving	  attitude	  as	  well	  as	   in	  our	  ambition	  to	  Legacy	  (there	  are,	  after	  all,	   infinite	  potential	  inheritors),	  while	  our	  freedom	  is	  actually	  delimited	  by	  the	  accessibility	  of	  contents.	  We	   enjoy	   this	   limited	   freedom	   and	  we	   participate	   in	   a	   Narration,	  which	   is	  shared	   and	   individual	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   we	   integrate	   in	   our	  narrative	  effort	  notions	  like	  Tradition,	  which	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  only	  has	  a	  tautological	  epistemic	  value.	  The	  force	  of	  the	  limit-­‐notion	  of	  Tradition	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  value	  of	  Gadamer’s	  play:	  Tradition	   is	   conceivable	  as	  a	   form	  of	  play	  where	  «the	  players	  are	  not	   the	   subjects	   of	   play;	   instead	   play	   merely	   reaches	   presentation	   through	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  95.	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players.»35	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  subjects	  of	  tradition	  are	  not	  the	  ones	  performing	  the	  narration,	  but	  the	  “wisdom”	  of	  tradition	  is	  made	  visible	  through	  the	  narrative	  about	  such	  subjects.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  present	  ourselves	  as	  heirs	  to	  some	  currents	  of	  thought	  and	  authors	  of	  the	  past	  and	  originators	  of	  ideas	  to	  be	  received	  in	  the	  future.	  The	   narrative	   thus	   produced	   participates	   in	   the	   play	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   a	  movement	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  our	  present,	  the	  past	  we	  inherit	  and	  the	  future	  onto	  which	  we	  project	  our	  legacy.	  Narration	   is	   a	   form	   of	   individual	   repetition	   -­‐	   since	   it	   is	   a	   way	   for	   us	   to	  acknowledge	   contents	   that	   have	   already	   existed	   in	   the	   past	   and	   since	  we	   rely	   on	  someone	  else	   to	   repeat	   our	   contents	   in	   the	   future.	   It	   is	   not,	   however,	   a	   repetition	  
qua	   duplication,	   or	   a	   repetition	   of	   the	   same.	   In	   Deleuze’s	   terms,	   repetition	   (of	   a	  ‘movement’	   in	   thought)	  «expresses	  at	  once	  a	   singularity	  opposed	   to	   the	  general,	   a	  universality	   opposed	   to	   the	   particular,	   a	   distinctive	   opposed	   to	   the	   ordinary,	   an	  instantaneity	   opposed	   to	   variation.»36	  This	   is	   the	   kind	   of	   narration	   we	   develop	  naturally	   by	   participating	   in	   the	   cultural	   discourse	   we	   are	   immersed	   in.	   The	  narrative	   that	   results,	   which	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   a	   self-­‐narrative,	   absorbs	   the	  absolute	   singularity	   and	   instantaneity	   of	   the	  moment	   of	   passing,	   but	   at	   the	   same	  time	  refers	  to	  the	  universality	  of	  its	  process.	  It	  is	  a	  productive	  repetition	  of	  content	  (and	  a	  production	  of	  contents	  to	  be	  repeated),	  and	  not	  a	  barren	  one.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  p.	  92	  36	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition,	  1994,	  p.	  3.	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This	   close	   relationship	   between	   Narrative,	   Cultural	   Transmission	   and	   Play	  has	  recently	  been	  addressed	  within	  Performance	  Studies	  by	  scholars	  who,	  veritable	  inheritors	   of	   the	   hermeneutical	   tradition,	   are	   interested	   in	   the	   relation	   between	  author	   and	   reader.	   Their	   perspective	   is	   slightly	   different	   from	   that	   of	   the	  philosophers	   we	   have	   insofar	   discussed,	   but	   it	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   their	  intuitions;	  moreover	  it	  has	  the	  merit	  of	  trying	  to	  expand	  this	  reflection	  to	  fields	  not	  traditionally	  addressed	  by	  philosophical	  discussions	  (theater,	  rituals,	  etc.).	  	  Drawing	   from	   Judith	   Butler	   and	   Roland	   Barthes,	   Schneider	   writes:	   «any	  citation	  indicates	  that,	  as	  utterances,	  the	  uttered	  might	  emanate	  from	  the	  reader	  as	  well	   as	   the	   citing	   writer.»	   She	   states	   that	   «one	   of	   the	   dilemmas	   posed	   by	  contemporary	  constructivism	  concerns	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  utterances,	  re-­‐uttered,	  like	   rituals	   (re)enacted,	   become	   or	   undo	   one.	   That	   is,	   utterances	   bring	   one	   into	  subjecthood,	  even	  as,	  by	  virtue	  of	  citation	  and	  the	  necessary	  repetitions	  of	  language,	  utterances	   bring	   one	   out	   of	   an	   identity	   that	   could	   be	   called	   discretely	   or	   entirely	  ‘one’	   or	   ‘mine’.»	  37	  	   Once	   again,	   repetition	   is	   a	  way	   to	   disclose	   a	   subjecthood	   that	  does	  not	  originate	  in	  the	  self-­‐consciousness	  of	  a	  person,	  but	  in	  the	  interplay	  of	  the	  utterances,	   which	   are	   afloat	   in	   our	   cultural	   experience,	   and	   which	   can	   alienate	  ourselves	   from	   ‘our’	   identity	   if	   we	   succumb	   to	   the	   temptation	   of	   ignoring	   the	  absolute	  individuality	  of	  the	  transmission.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37Rebecca	   Schneider,	   “	   ‘Judith	  Butler’	   in	  My	  Hands.”	   In	  Armour,	   Ellen	  T.,	   and	   Susan	  M.	   St.	  Ville.	  Bodily	   Citations:	   Religion	   and	   Judith	   Butler.	   New	   York:	   Columbia	   University	   Press,	  2006.	  225-­‐251.	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Just	   like	   Ricoeur	   explained	   how	   narrative	   can	   solve	   the	   aporia	   of	   time	  disclosed	   by	   Augustine,38	  we	   must	   resort	   to	   narrative	   to	   solve	   the	   paradoxical	  contemplation	   of	   the	   impossible	  moment	   of	   passing,	   which	  we	   narrate	   always	   as	  already	   happened	   (since	   as	   we	   said	   before	   we	   always	   speak	   of	   the	   Legacy	   of	  someone	  as	  already	  received	  by	  us	  or	  someone	  else).	  Not	  only	  historiography,	  then,	  but	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  a	  discourse	  about	  the	  past	  (even	  merely	  about	  a	  content	  that	  we	   did	   not	   think	   ab	   nihilo)	  must	   be	   understood	   as	   grounded	   upon	   our	   self-­‐narrative	   as	   receivers	  of	   cultural	   transmission	  and	   transmitters	  of	   a	   cultural	  quid.	  Tradition	  is	  the	  pre-­‐eminent	  model	  of	  this	  narrative,	  but	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  it	  is	  twice	  removed	  from	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  saturated	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  the	  moment	  of	  passing,	   since	   not	   only	   does	   it	   remove	   the	   inconceivability	   and	   singularity	   of	   the	  moment,	  but	   it	  also	  removes	   the	  subjectivity	  of	   the	  protagonists	   reducing	   them	  to	  objects	  of	  the	  play-­‐narrative.	  We	   must	   therefore	   remember	   Goethe,	   who	   –when	   discussing	   the	   relation	  between	   ourselves	   and	   our	   past	   –	  wrote	   that	   «[History	   is]	   the	  most	   absurd	   of	   all	  things,	   a	   web	   of	   nonsense	   for	   the	   higher	   thinker.» 39 	  Nonetheless,	   we	   are	  unavoidably	   caught	   into	   narrating	   and	   discussing	   history	   and	   our	   role	   in	   it,	   or	   at	  least	   its	   meaning	   for	   us.	   The	   web	   of	   nonsense	   is	   “absurd”	   (i.e.	   unthinkable)	   and	  facing	   it	   directly	   is	   impossible.	   Nonetheless,	   we	   shall	   not	   abdicate	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  Ricoeur,	  Time	  And	  Narrative,	  Chapter	  1,	  and	  above,	  p.	  XX.	  39	  Johann	  Wolfgang	  Goethe,	  F.	  von	  Biederman,	  Goethes	  Gespräche,	  Gesantausgabe,	  ed.	  F.	  von	  Biedermann,	   Leipzig,	   1909,	   1,	   434	   ff.,	   quoted	   in	  Karl	   Löwith,	  Meaning	   in	  History,	   Chicago:	  Univ.	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1949,	  p.	  53.	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depersonalization,	   renouncing	  any	  understanding	  of	   our	   connection	   to	   the	  past	   in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  social	  notions	  like	  tradition,	  culture,	  and	  ‘theories’	  at	  the	  cost	  of	   losing	   our	   perspective	   as	   individual	   actors	   in	   the	   interplay	   of	   Legacy(es)	   and	  Inheritance(s).	  We	  must	  contemplate	  the	  unthinkable	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  passing,	  and	  embrace	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  our	  self-­‐narration	  that	  makes	  tradition	  and	  culture	  graspable,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  	   	  	  And	  when	  you	  are	  gone	  there	  will	  be	  no	  memory	  Of	  you	  and	  no	  regret.	  For	  you	  do	  not	  share	  The	  Pierian	  roses,	  but	  unseen	  in	  the	  house	  of	  Hades	  You	  will	  stray,	  breathed	  out,	  among	  the	  ghostly	  dead.	  	  The	  Muses	  have	  filled	  my	  life	  With	  delight.	  And	  when	  I	  die	  I	  shall	  not	  be	  forgotten.	  And	  I	  say	  to	  you	  someone	  will	  remember	  us	  In	  time	  to	  come….	  -­‐	  Sappho,	  Fragments,	  on	  the	  Muses
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“Literature	  and	  Philosophy”	  	   2012-­‐
Current	  
• I	  collaborated	  in	  the	  development	  of	  classes’	  
structures	  and	  syllabi;	  	  
• I	  was	  charged	  with	  grading	  final	  papers	  for	  both	  
graduate	  and	  undergraduate	  students;	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• I	  personally	  taught	  classes	  on	  Cusa,	  Eckhart,	  
Bonaventure,	  Augustine,	  Kierkegaard,	  
Dostoevsky	  and	  Faulkner	  in	  graduate	  seminars	  
and	  intermediate	  classes.	  
Scuola	  Famiglia	   2008-­‐2010	  
For	  7	  years	  I	  tutored	  struggling	  high	  school	  and	  colleges	  
students	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  topics.	  Scuola	  Famiglia	  (“School-­‐
Family”)	  employed	  me	  in	  particular	  to	  teach	  
Philosophy,	  History,	  Latin	  and	  Algebra/Calculus.	  	  
	  
PUBLICATIONS	  AND	  PAPERS	  
From	  De	  Sade	  to	  Levinas:	  the	  Other	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  
pleasure	  and	  the	  call	  to	  responsibility.	  
Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  conference	  ‘Equinoxes:	  Pleasure	  
and	  Pain’,	  Brown	  University,	  RI.	   2015	   	  	  
	  
Gramsci,	  Cultural	  Hegemony	  and	  the	  Persistence	  of	  
Non-­‐Organic	  Intellectual.	  
Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  conference	  ‘New	  Encounters	  in	  
French	  and	  Italian	  Thought’,	  Villanova	  University,	  PA.	   2015	   	  	  
	  
From	  Galileo	  to	  Ratzinger:	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  relation	  
between	  Science,	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  the	  US	  
and	  in	  Italy.	  
Under	  Publication	  with	  USMC	  Publications	  Series	  
through	  Elegas	  Editions	  in	  Ottawa,	  Ontario	   2015	  
	  
Lettere,	  400	  years	  later:	  Religious	  Science	  between	  
Italy,	  America	  and	  Public	  Opinion.	  
Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  conference	  ‘Galileo,	  Science	  and	  
the	  Arts’,	  St.	  Michel	  College,	  University	  of	  Toronto,	  
Canada.	   2013	   	  	  
	  
God	  and	  the	  gift,	  a	  mystical	  violence.	  
Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Long	  Island	  Philosophical	  
Society	  conference,	  New	  York	  City,	  NY.	   2011	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Review	  of:	  Unità	  della	  ragione	  e	  modi	  dell’esperienza.	  
Herman	  Cohen	  e	  il	  Neokantismo.	  Atti	  del	  Convegno	  
internazionale	  di	  studi	  [Salerno	  21-­‐22-­‐23	  maggio	  2007]	  	  
Book	  Review,	  published	  online	  by	  the	  North	  American	  
Hermann	  Cohen	  Society.	   2011	   	  
Review	  of:	  Ezio	  Gamba,	  La	  Legalità	  del	  Sentimento	  
Puro.	  L’Estetica	  di	  Hermann	  Cohen	  come	  modello	  di	  
una	  filosofia	  della	  cultura.	  
Book	  Review,	  published	  online	  by	  the	  North	  American	  
Hermann	  Cohen	  Society.	   2010	   	  
	  
WORKSHOPS	  
“Teaching	  at	  Teaching	  Intensive	  Institutions”	   2013	  
Bridgewater	  University	  and	  New	  England	  Cross-­‐Sector	  Partnership	  
	  
“Professional	  Development”	   2013	  
Boston	  University,	  DRTS	  
	  
“Late	  Modern	  Philosophy:	  The	  Unconscious”	   2012	  
Boston	  University,	  Philosophy	  Department	  
	  
RELATED	  EXPERIENCE	  
God	  Being	  Nothing	  –	  Book	  Project	  (due	  for	  Publication	  2015)	  
Assistant	  Editor	   2013-­‐2014	  
	  
North	  American	  Hermann	  Cohen	  Society	  
Website	  editor	  and	  acting	  Secretary	  	   Jan	  –	  June	  
2012	  
After	  a	  couple	  of	  book	  reviews	  as	  contributor	  (see	  
publications),	  I	  was	  asked	  to	  re-­‐organize	  the	  website	  
and	  oversee	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  volume.	  	  
Movieconnectionmagazine	  –	  mcmagazine.it	  
Writer,	  editorial	  collaboration	   2008-­‐2009	  
